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i. Punctuation and Style. Punctuation and style follow suggestions in
the Oxford Style Manual, the Chicago Manual of Style, Butcher’s Copy-
editing, and Strunk-White.1
ii. Quotations. Quotations follow British practice in using single quota-
tion marks for verbatim quotations, double quotation marks for nes-
ted quotations, and no quotation marks for block quotations.2 Square
brackets indicate interpolations. Dots enclosed in parentheses indic-
ate an omission or placeholder in the original: three dots indicate an
omission, five dots a placeholder for insertions, and two dots a place-
holder for digits (year).
iii. Citations. Citations are rendered in note format, based on the Chicago
Manual of Style. Tax treaties are cited as Country-Country (year) or,
when the other country is obvious from the context, Country (year).
Unless specified otherwise, all references to ‘Article 31’, ‘Article 32’,
and ‘Article 33’ (including paragraph numbers and letters in paren-
thesis) refer to Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the VCLT.3 The specification
‘VCLT’ is omitted to avoid cluttering the text, and added only when
other VCLT articles are cited for purposes of disambiguation.
iv. Spelling and Grammar. Spelling follows Fowler’sDictionary of Modern
English Usage and the Oxford Dictionary.4 The word ‘data’ is a plural,
but use as a singular is gaining acceptance. Depending on the context,
both forms are used by me.
v. Translations. Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.
1E.M. Ritter, ed.,TheOxford Style Manual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Russell
David Harper, ed., The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed. (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 2010); Butcher, Judith, Butcher’s Copy-editing: The Cambridge Handbook
for Editors, Copy-editors and Proofreaders, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); Strunk, William Jr., The Elements of Style, ed. White, E.B., 4th ed. (Harlow,
Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2014).
2See Ritter, The Oxford Style Manual, 148, s. 5.13, 194, s. 8.1.2.
3UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Treaty Series I–18232
(United Nations, 1980), Articles 31–33. Appendix A.1 contains their full text.
4Burchfield, R. W., ed., The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
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authors Arruda Ferreira and Trindade Marinho, a difference in meaning
between the French and Portuguese texts may have contributed to a wrong
interpretation by the court and a misapplication of the tax treaty between
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Writing a doctoral dissertation in a foreign language is a challenge. Never-
theless, the choice for English has been a conscious one. English is undeni-
ably the lingua franca of international tax law, and anybody who wants re-
ception of his arguments beyond national borders has to employ it. Given
the subject of this thesis, writing it not in English would have defeated its
purpose.
But, writing in a foreign language remains a handicap the reader must
endure, not the author. In order to reduce the gap between being able to
write in English and being able to write well in English, I have looked for
guidance to improve the readability of this book. The most relevant advice
comes from Karl Popper: ‘Anyone who cannot speak simply and clearly
should say nothing and continue to work until he can do so.’7 Regarding spe-
cific guidelines to improve on clarity, I have found Orwell’s six elementary
rules helpful but in need of adjustment because not written with academic
writing in mind:
1. Never use a metaphor, simile, or other figure of speech which you are
used to seeing in print.
2. Never use a long word where a short one will do.
3. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.
4. Never use the passive where you can use the active.
5. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you
can think of an everyday English equivalent.
6. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbar-
ous.8
Thefirst three I have tried to implement rigorously, also in terms of avoid-
ing pleonastic terminology commonly employed by other authors on the
subject.9 Not being a native English speaker, I have found myself occasion-
ally confronted with a trade-off between elegance and precision. In such
case I have opted without exception for the latter as a matter of general
principle even when risking clumsy formulation. Such choice is imperative
7Karl R. Popper, In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays fromThirty Years (London:
Routledge, 2012), 83.
8The Economist, Style Guide, 11th ed. (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2015), 1.
9See Chapter 1, s. 1.5.2.
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in view of the methods I employ.10 Some authors emphasise the necessity
to use symbolic expressions when applying logic to avoid this problem;11
however, use of symbols and logical operators is only helpful if everyone
who participates in the discourse is familiar with them – otherwise it consti-
tutes an obstacle. For this reason I dispense with any use of logic operators
and only use symbols in their most obvious application not entirely uncom-
mon in legal or economic scholarship, such as denoting propositions with
a letter.
Traditionally, use of active voice is discouraged in academicwriting; how-
ever, this iron principle seems to slowly soften. Personally, I much prefer
articles written in active voice for being less strenuous to follow and not
portraying a false sense of objectivity. On the other hand, using first per-
son mode for an entire thesis would surely stand out, and not necessarily in
a good way. Rather than opting for either extreme, I have chosen a balance
in favour of passive voice with injections of active voice, all with rule 6 in
mind. First person singular is used sparsely or replaced by something like
‘this study’. First person plural is sometimes used to imply the reader and
myself. For purely stylistic reasons, third person singular not referring to
any particular person is used exclusively in male form – of course without
implying any gender primacy.
Rule 5 would defeat its own purpose if applied to academic writing. Sci-
entific jargon is important because it communicates complex ideas with
concise pre-defined notions, which allows condensation of text. Hence, us-
ing jargon gives preference to rules 2 and 3 over 5. For the same reason I
occasionally use Latin phrases (with translations provided in parenthesis).
They are not only synonymous for what they literally express, but also for
an entire theory or principle they condense in one short expression.
These style considerations affect the structure of this thesis. Most import-
antly, the individual chapters will not contain separate conclusion sections,
but the conclusions are part of the flow of argument. This may seem un-
usual to the academic reader but is only conclusive: if I have done a good job
in making my point, repeating it is redundant. In the same vein, although
10See Chapter 2, s. 2.2.1.
11See, e.g., Ilmar Tammelo, Modern Logic in the Service of Law, 1st ed. (Wien; New York:
Springer, 1978), x.
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providing a brief synopsis of the previously drawn conclusions, Chapter 10
does not summarise all points in detail again; its job is rather to distil fur-
ther conclusions at the macro level. With regard to synoptic observations,
I refrain from pleonastic referencing throughout Chapter 10 (and the An-






This study makes the following contribution to the field of tax treaty inter-
pretation:
1. It refutes the current orthodoxy that courts may rely on a single text
for cases of routine interpretation, by showing that such approach ne-
cessarily produces cases of treaty misapplication in violation of the
VCLT when the text relied on is not designated as prevailing. In ad-
dition, it refutes the commonly held view that courts may rely on
the original text by virtue of it being the text of initial negotiation
and drafting. Conversely, it shows that a valid combination of the
VCLT principles obliges courts to compare all authentic language
texts when none of them is designated as prevailing.
2. It shows that the VCLT permits courts to rely solely on a text desig-
nated as prevailing whether or not a divergence between the texts has
been raised and established; all counterarguments brought forward
by the critics of such approach are refuted, while any limitations to
its applicability are outlined.
3. Based on all tax treaties concluded between 1960 and 2016 as recorded
in the IBFD Tax Treaties Database, it provides an empirical survey of
the global tax treaty network with respect to its lingual properties, to-
gether with an analysis concerning the interpretation and application
of all types of final clause wordings employed.
4. Finally, it assumes the perspective of a technical strategy paper and,
on the basis of all findings, issues policy recommendations on how
to best eliminate additional interpretational complexity induced by
plurilingual form, together with its economic cost.
1
1. Introduction
In summary, the insights generated by this study may help to reduce
misapplication of plurilingual tax treaties, by way of increased awareness
about the pitfalls of the current orthodoxy and, in consequence, its aban-
donment. The alternative submitted (sole reliance on prevailing texts), if
adopted, will reduce the global resource costs of tax treaty interpretation
and, at the same time, increase its overall consistency via elimination of
unintended deviations caused by language idiosyncrasies. To support this
goal, this study seeks to provide useful arguments and data to policymakers,
treaty negotiators, judges, and other scholars.
1.2. Motivation
Although there is plenty of academic literature concerned with treaty inter-
pretation, the volume of material concerned with the specific issues posed
by plurilingual form is fairly manageable. As far as comprehensive studies
exclusively focussed on the topic are concerned, only four come to mind
with respect to the discourse on tax treaties, namely, the works of Arginelli,
Maisto, Tabory, and Hilf.1
Arginelli’s thesis is fairly recent, whereas the studies of Maisto, Tabory,
and Hilf date back to 2005, 1980, and 1973, respectively. Only Arginelli and
Maisto incorporate a special tax treaty perspective, whereas Tabory and
Hilf are concernedwith plurilingual treaties in general. In addition,Maisto’s
volume is divided in focus: it deals in part with European law and is not a
systematic study but a collection of chapters by several authors on various
issues and specific country perspectives, albeit methodically arranged.
Neither of the four contains a comprehensive empirical study investig-
ating plurilingual form of tax treaties. Maisto’s volume discusses a limited
data set as part of the selective country chapters, but the sample only com-
prises 512 treaties from the treaty networks of a few OECD members ex-
1Paolo Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties (Leiden: Leiden University
Press, 2013); GuglielmoMaisto,Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and
EC Tax Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005); Mala Tabory, Multilingualism in International
Law and Institutions (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980); Meinhard Hilf,
Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge: eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum
Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Berlin, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1973).
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1.2. Motivation
clusively from the EU/EFTA region. Therefore, it is not representative of
the global tax treaty network and insufficient to draw unbiased conclusions
from. Moreover, it provides no comprehensive information about the treaty
final clause wordings concerning implementation of lingual form.
The number of articles devoted to the subject is again fairly manageable
compared to the number of articles dealing with other topics of tax treaty
interpretation. Of the prominent academics in international tax law, only
Michael Lang has taken up the topic recently in two articles.2 All in all, it
seems as if the community of legal scholars engaged in the discourse on tax
treaty interpretation considers plurilingual form a side issue not of central
importance that may be ignored safely until it imposes itself.3 This attitude
has manifested itself as orthodoxy in doctrine.4 In reality, however, plurilin-
gual form is hardly a minor feature of tax treaties that would justify such
disproportion in discussion: almost three-quarters of the well over 3,000
concluded tax treaties currently in force or yet to come into force are pluri-
lingual.
Arginelli’s recent thesis is of almost encyclopaedic breadth, making it a
valuable resource; however, my reservations concerning his views are fun-
damental. They are based on the fact that he does not question established
theories and therefore only helps to solidify a harmful practice, just because
he does not want to argue against the mainstream:
Against this background, drawing a normative legal theory of treaty inter-
pretation affirming principles that conflicted with the generally accepted
constructions of Articles 31–33 VCLT, or that lie to a significant extent out-
side the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable interpretation
of such articles, would be equal to sustaining a legal theory of interpret-
ation that, in the best case, could establish itself only in the very long run
2See Michael Lang, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages’, in
Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward, ed. Guglielmo Maisto, Angelo
Nikolakakis, and John M. Ulmer (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013), 15–30; Michael Lang, ‘Aus-
legung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und authentische Vertragssprachen’, Inter-
nationales Steuerrecht 20, no. 11 (2011): 403–10.
3The BEPS multilateral instrument, which has equally authoritative English and French
texts, is currently reviving general sensitivity for the issue because it modifies a large
number of treaties having texts in various languages. Since it was released only after
conclusion of this study, it will be dealt with separately in the Annex.
4See Chapter 3, s. 3.3.2.
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andwould cause a protracted period characterized bymore legal uncertainty
than in the current state of affairs and, in the worse case, would be generally
regarded as utopian, since too detached fromArticles 31–33 VCLT to be con-
sidered a reasonable interpretation thereof, thus lacking the legal status to
be applied in practice as long as those articles remained in force. However,
since the purpose of the present research is to suggest how the interpreter
should now tackle and disentangle the most common types of issues emer-
ging from the interpretation of multilingual tax treaties under public inter-
national law, the author is not willing to accept the above-described draw-
backs of a normative legal theory infringing the generally accepted rules and
principles of treaty interpretation derived from Articles 31–33 VCLT. In the
author’s intention, his normative legal theory should be shaped so as to fit
within the generally accepted borders of a perceived reasonable interpret-
ation of such articles; where the inferences drawn from the semantic ana-
lysis appeared to lie outside those outer borders, such inferences should be
disregarded for the purpose of setting up the author’s normative (semantics-
based) theory of treaty interpretation. Hence, from a theoretical perspective,
the author’s normative legal theory of interpretation must be regarded as a
non-ideal normative theory, as opposed to ideal normative theories.5
This seems tantamount to saying his entire research project is intended
merely to confirm conventional wisdom, and whenever the results accord-
ing to his adopted methodology contradict general opinion, they should be
ignored. I do not share Arginelli’s standpoint but rather agree with Popper
that ‘orthodoxy is the death of knowledge, since the growth of knowledge
depends entirely upon disagreement.’6 Moreover, Arginelli fails to provide
a comprehensive empirical study of the global tax treaty network concern-
ing plurilingual form but draws conclusions based on the Maisto sample,7
which is problematic for said reasons.
Given all this, I submit my study in the good old tradition of academic
dispute as a response to all scholars who have so far merely reproduced and
bolstered the mainstream position I consider misguided; however, my aim
is not just to refute a theory I regard erroneous and in support of a harmful
practice that promotes divergence rather than uniformity of interpretation,
but also to submit a sound approach in its place that is consistent with the
5Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 17–18.
6Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality (New
York: Routledge, 1994), 34.
7See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 131–34.
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VCLT principles and can be implemented easily to resolve the problems
caused by plurilingual form in practice.
With respect to the dangers of such approach pointed at by Arginelli, I do
not share his concerns. To the extent my approach is adopted, the period of
adoption would be characterised by more legal certainty than the current
state of affairs, increasing in proportion with the rate of adoption. Given
its feasibility, I do not consider it utopian. Certainly not to the extent it is
readily available without requiring modification of operative provisions in
actual treaties, which is the case for almost two-thirds of all plurilingual
treaties in the global tax treaty network. Whether it will be adopted is an-
other matter, of course. That is a question for policy makers, treaty nego-
tiators, and judges. I have no influence on them, but that shall not prevent
me from presenting my views. My hope is simply that my readers, whoever
they may be, will find something of value for their own tasks in this book.
1.3. ResearchQuestion
Theoverarching research question of this study iswhether courts are legally
required to compare all authenticated language texts when interpreting a
plurilingual tax treaty. The question is considered both in the context of
all texts being equally authoritative and of one text being designated as
prevailing. Over the course of the study, the issue is divided into five general
questions, which are then subdivided by the individual chapters into several
individual issues to develop my answer and extend the contribution of my
study in terms of practical applicability and policy recommendations:8 (1)
Are judges legally obliged to compare all authentic language texts in the
absence of a prevailing one? (2) If so, how is the comparison performed
correctly? (3) Towhat extent canwe eliminate the need for such comparison
with the help of prevailing texts without risking treaty misapplication? (4)
To what extent can we rely solely on prevailing texts in actual practice? (5)
What can/should be done to further extend practical applicability of sole
reliance on prevailing texts?
8Since chapters three and five present my fundamental answers to the overarching re-
search question for treaties with and without prevailing text, they are formulated to




Conceptually, this study is divided into several parts. The introductory part
consists of chapters one and two, which introduce and scope the project,
explain the meaning of key terminology, and outline the methodology ap-
plied.
The theoretical part is made up of chapters three to seven and subdivided
into several subparts: chapters three and four deal with interpretation in
case of all equally authoritative texts, whereas chapters five and six are
concerned with the case of one text being designated as prevailing. Chapter
seven is its own subpart, reversing the perspective from international to
domestic law.
The empirical part consists of chapters eight and nine. They share a com-
mon methodological framework but have different functions: chapter eight
is concerned with practical applicability of the theoretical approach de-
veloped to actual tax treaties, whereas chapter nine investigates implement-
ation of English as lingua franca throughout the global tax treaty network.
The concluding part is made up of chapters ten and eleven: the first
provides overall conclusions, while the latter deals exclusively with the
BEPS multilateral instrument. The following list provides a more detailed
overview:
• Chapter 2 outlines my methodology.
• Chapter 3 contains my argument refuting the currently prevailing
view that judges may rely on a single text in isolation for cases of
routine interpretation. In addition, it refutes the view that judges may
rely on the original text by virtue of it being the text of initial negoti-
ation and drafting.
• Chapter 4 deals with practical implementation and additional issues
concerning tax treaties in particular, an in-depth consideration of
which has been postponed by Chapter 3 for structural reasons in or-
der to avoid detours from the main line of argument.
• Chapter 5 makes the case for sole reliance on prevailing texts. In ad-
dition, it sketches any limitations to this approach.
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• Chapter 6 reviews and refutes all counterarguments submitted by the
most adamant opponents to sole reliance on prevailing texts.
• Chapter 7 frames the issue from the viewpoint of domestic procedural
law. This is necessary because tax proceedings are conducted under
the jurisdiction of national courts. In consequence, domestic proced-
ural law and legal culture influence results in practice and must be
taken into account.
• Chapter 8 quantifies the extent to which sole reliance on actual pre-
vailing texts may be applied in practice with respect to all treaties
in the global tax treaty network. In addition to an empirical survey
of treaty lingual properties, it examines policies of individual coun-
tries and certain groupings concerning implementation of prevailing
texts. Moreover, it contains its own theoretical subpart concerning
interpretation of all final clause wordings found in actual tax treaties.
• Chapter 9 investigates use of English as lingua franca for unilingual
tax treaties and prevailing texts. Because such use enforces the ap-
proach proposed in the theoretical part and affects the decisions by
countries concerning lingual form of their treaties, it is an essential
factor to consider when formulating policy recommendations.
• Chapter 10 aggregates the conclusions of the individual chapters and
discusses them from a macro perspective. In addition, it formulates
policy recommendations on the basis of all findings.
• Chapter 11, the Annex, evaluates the policy implemented by the
OECD BEPS multilateral instrument in terms of authentic languages,
and sketches possibly approaches to remedy its deficiencies.
• Finally, the appendices provide auxiliary information that may prove




This section explains the meaning of some key terms used by me in a tech-
nical sense.
1.5.1. Plurilingual versus Multilingual
Curiously, although the ILC Commentaries on the VCLT Draft Articles ex-
clusively use ‘plurilingual’,9 most academic literature on plurilingual treat-
ies uses ‘multilingual’ instead.10 The implied concepts prove difficult to dis-
tinguish,11 and use of terminology remains diverse even among linguists,
although ‘multilingual’ seems to have established itself as standard in Eng-
lish academic literature across disciplines.12
The Oxford Dictionary defines multilingual as ‘In or using several lan-
guages’ and plurilingual as ‘Relating to, involving, or fluent in a number of
languages; multilingual.’ The Common European Framework of Reference
for Languages (CEFR) draws a more pronounced distinction:
Plurilingualism differs from multilingualism, which is the knowledge of a
number of languages, or the co-existence of different languages in a given
society. . . .Beyond this, the plurilingual approach emphasises the fact that
. . .he or she does not keep these languages and cultures in strictly separated
mental compartments, but rather builds up a communicative competence to
9ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries 1966. Documents of the
Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session Including the Re-
ports of the Commission to the General Assembly, vol. II, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission 1966, A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1 (United Nations, 1967), 219, para.
7; 224, paras. 1, 3; 225–226, paras. 6–9. Henceforth, the Commentaries on the Draft
Articles will be referred to as VCLT Commentary.
10See, e.g., Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions; Maisto, Multilin-
gual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law; Arginelli,The Interpretation
of Multilingual Tax Treaties.
11See Daniel Coste, Danièle Moore, and Geneviève Zarate, ‘Plurilingual and Pluricul-
tural Competence: Studies Towards a Common European Framework of Reference for
Language Learning and Teaching’ (Strasbourg: Language Policy Division, Council of
Europe, 2009), 10 et seq.
12See Charlotte Kemp, ‘Defining Multilingualism’, in The Exploration of Multilingualism:
Development of Research on L3, Multilingualism andMultiple Language Acquisition (Am-
sterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2009), passim.
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which all knowledge and experience of language contributes and in which
languages interrelate and interact.13
The same distinction is made by the European Observatory for Plurilingual-
ism in its charter, in which plurilingualism is defined as ‘the use of several
languages by the same individual’ and distinguished from multilingualism
as follows:
This concept [plurilingualism] differs from that of multilingualism, which
means the coexistence of several languages within a social group. A plurilin-
gual society is composed mainly of individuals capable of expressing them-
selves at various levels of proficiency in several languages, . . .whereas a mul-
tilingual society may be predominantly made up of monolingual individuals
ignoring the language of the other.14
In summary, plurilingual implies equal competence in several languages,
whereas multilingual implies their coexistence.
Whatever terminology is chosen in the treaty context does not matter be-
cause themeaning is strictly defined: there is only one treatymade up of one
set of terms, that is, only one text although available in several languages.15
Notwithstanding, ‘plurilingual’ seems somewhat closer to the idea of a text
in several languages, whereas ‘multilingual’ inspires an image of several
coexistent language texts. For this reason – nomen est omen (the name is a
sign), and in order to comply with the original terminology employed by
the ILC, I shall use ‘plurilingual’.
1.5.2. Text(s)
The plural ‘texts’ is misleading in view of the treaty as one set of terms,
because it may inspire the idea that there could be more than one text. Dur-
ing the drafting period of the VCLT the ILC discussed use of the plural
extensively, and several voices argued in favour of ‘versions’ in order to
refer to the different language versions of the one treaty text; however, use
13Language Policy Division, ‘Common European Framework of Reference for Languages:
Learning, Teaching, Assessment’ (Strasbourg: Council of Europe), 4.
14Observatoire européen du plurilinguisme, ‘Charte européenne du plurilinguisme’, June
2015, Préambule.
15See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6.
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of ‘texts’ prevailed while ‘version’ and ‘versions’ were reserved for texts of
non-authentic status.16
This convention has been implemented in Article 33(2) and will be ad-
hered to here: throughout, ‘text’ refers to an authenticated language ver-
sion of the text while ‘texts’ refers to more or all authenticated language
versions. Occasionally, however, the singular will refer to the treaty text in
the abstract as one set of terms, not to any language text in particular and
irrespective of the total number of language texts. Such double meaning is
unavoidable because of the ILC terminology; I trust the intended meaning
will be obvious from the context.
Despite its own convention, the ILC frequently adds the adjective ‘au-
thentic’ in the VCLT Commentary.17 Even the VCLT does so in paragraphs
(3) and (4) of Article 33. Most academic literature on the subject adopts this
terminology. Although this does not hurt, it is superfluous. Therefore, I do
not follow the example but refrain from adding ‘authentic’ every single time.
Occasional exceptions are made to benefit a sentence with precision or the
reader with ease of understanding.
1.5.3. Clear
Most of the academic literature on the subject applies the adjective ‘clear’
to treaties and texts as a matter of course without explicit definition. This
is problematic because it may ingrain a wrong understanding of clarity in
a colloquial sense – the reader might read on without much contemplation.
The Oxford Dictionary defines clear as ‘Leaving no doubt; obvious or un-
ambiguous.’ A treaty text may indeed be clear in this sense, but only after
interpretation, not before.18 This is the essence of the VCLT general rule
16See Frank A. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law: A Study of
Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Their Applic-
ation to Tax Treaties (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2004), 351, 356, 358–59; Richard K. Gardiner,
Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 356–58.
17See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 195, para. 1; 224, paras.
1, 3–4; 225, paras. 6–8; 272, para. 5; 273, para. 9.
18See J. Wouters and M. Vidal, ‘Non-Tax Treaties: Domestic Courts and Treaty Interpret-
ation’, in Courts and Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), s. 1.3.2; L. Oppenheim,
Oppenheim’s International Law, ed. R. Jennings andA.Watts, 9th ed. (Harlow: Longman,
1992), 1267; Brian J. Arnold, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality’, Bul-
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aimed to arrive at a textual not literal meaning.
Furthermore, it is not necessary for a treaty to be unequivocal to be clear.
As Larenz and Canaris observe, no legal text will be unequivocal unless
‘drawn up exclusively in a symbolised sign language’,19 but it is the pur-
pose of interpretation to establish the manifest meaning versus other inter-
pretations that are less manifest.20 To the extent it is possible to establish
such manifest meaning, the text is clear. Otherwise, it remains ambiguous
or obscure. All this will be argued in depth later on; for the moment it is
sufficient to record that, throughout this study, ‘clear’ is used in a technical
sense when referring to texts and treaties.
1.5.4. Analytic and A Priori
The terms ‘analytic’ and ‘a priori’ will be used occasionally because of their
relevance with respect to the methods employed.21 Analytic propositions
are true a priori because of the meaning of the terms used and their rela-
tionship via the sentence structure, with a negation necessarily implying
letin for International Taxation, no. 1 (2010): 3–4; Conseil d’État, Société Schneider Elec-
tric, 2002, per M. Austry, commissaire du gouvernement: ‘the text of an international
treaty, even when clear, must always be interpreted taking into account its object’, as
translated by Eirik Bjorge, ‘”Contractual” And “Statutory” Treaty Interpretation in Do-
mestic Courts? Convergence Around the Vienna Rules’, inThe Interpretation of Interna-
tional Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence, ed. Helmut Philipp
Aust and Georg Nolte (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 49–71, 57;
Emilio Betti, Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Mohr
Siebeck, 1967), 251, in terms of texts in general; cf. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1797), s. 263.
19Karl Larenz and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3rd ed.
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1995), 26.
20Bymanifest I mean the result of an interpretation under Article 31 that is not ambiguous,
obscure, absurd, or unreasonable and, in view of the wording, context, and object and
purpose, more reasonable than any other suggested meaning, i.e., one or more mean-
ings can be discerned, and a decisive choice can be made on the basis of the means
provided by Article 31 in case several interpretations are possible. Although, colloqui-
ally speaking, an absurd or unreasonable reading may be manifest in the sense of being
unequivocal – the text really says so – such is factored out from the meaning of the
term as used here unless the contrary is indicated explicitly.
21See Chapter 2, s. 2.2.1.
11
1. Introduction
a contradiction in terms. Therefore, they are of special interest in logic as
fundamental building blocks.
The classic sources with respect to their meaning are Leibniz and Kant.
Leibniz distinguishes truths of reason from truths of experience, the former
combining the ideas of analytic and a priori. He classifies truths of reason as
necessarily true, their opposite being impossible, and truths of experience
as contingently true, their opposite being possible. Necessary truths may
be split via analysis into simpler ideas until one arrives at some primitive
truth at their basis. At the end of this process remain only simple notions of
which no further definition is possible, as well as first principles of which
further proof is neither necessary nor feasible because they are essentially
statements of identity, negations of which would entail explicit contradic-
tions.22
In contrast to Leibniz, Kant distinguishes explicitly between the analytic
and the a priori.23 Accordingly, an analytic proposition is one in which the
subject entails the predicate, and an analysis of the subject establishes that
the predicate is included in it.24 Kant uses the specific example of exten-
ded versus heavy bodies. The former constitutes an analytic proposition be-
cause all bodies are by definition extended in space, so the predicate ‘exten-
ded’ does not go beyond the boundaries of what is included in the subject
‘body’. Conversely, the latter constitutes a synthetic proposition because
22See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadologie, trans. Robert Zimmermann (Wien:
Braumüller und Seidel, 1847), ss. 33 and 35.
23See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Köln: Anaconda, 2009), Einleitung.
24The German Urteil used by Kant is to be translated with ‘judgement’ rather than ‘pro-
position’. I use the latter because ‘judgement’ may be misinterpreted to imply a mental
process leading from the premisses to the conclusion, which is contrary to the con-
ception of inference in modern logic, see Chapter 2, s. 2.2.1. Kant’s terminology may
indicate that he was influenced by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art
of Thinking, trans. Jill Buroker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pub-
lished anonymously in 1662 as La Logique ou l’art de penser and commonly regarded
as ‘the most influential logic text from Aristotle to the end of the nineteenth century’,
see Jill Buroker, ‘Port Royal Logic’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta, Spring ed. (Stanford University, 2017). It founded the middle phase in
the development of logic as a discipline (between classical Aristotelian and modern
logic), which was characterised ‘by a prevalence of epistemological and psychological
issues’, see Ernst Tugendhat and Ursula Wolf, Logisch-semantische Propädeutik (Stut-
tgart: Reclam, Philipp, jun. GmbH, Verlag, 1993), 7.
12
1.5. Terminology
the predicate is not included in the subject by definition but constitutes an
addition to it.
The notions of a priori and a posteriori are classified as epistemological
concepts denotingways of cognition via reason or experience.25 All analytic
propositions are necessary and as such a priori, that is, discoverable purely
by reason, whereas all empirical, a posteriori propositions are synthetic.
Kant draws these explicit distinctions because he wanted to introduce a
third category of synthetic truths discoverable purely by reason, that is,
while all empirical propositions are synthetic, not all synthetic propositions
are, in his view, empirical.26
1.5.5. All Treaties and Global Tax Treaty Network
‘All treaties’ is used as a proxy for the entire sample defined in Chapter 2
and listed in Appendix E. ‘Global tax treaty network’ is used as a proxy
for the entire sample without terminated treaties. Occasionally, ‘all treaties’
will be used colloquially to imply all treaties of a certain group or country,
including or excluding terminated treaties; I trust the intendedmeaningwill
be obvious from the context. It has to be borne in mind that all generalising
references imply the status quo at the cut-off date for the sample (15 August
2016).
1.5.6. Lingua Franca and (True) Diplomatic Language
I use the term lingua franca because it is commonly understood.27 The Ox-
ford Dictionary defines it as ‘A language that is adopted as a common lan-
guage between speakers whose native languages are different.’ Here it is
used in a slightly wider sense, not only to imply cases in which two coun-
tries adopted a third language for a prevailing text or unilingual treaty, but
25See Steup, Matthias, ‘Epistemology’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta, Fall ed. (Stanford University, 2016).
26Kant’s argument in this respect is not relevant here, so I will not elaborate it any further;
the interested reader is referred to AnthonyQuinton, ‘The “A Priori” and the Analytic’,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (1963): 31–54.
27See John King Gamble and Charlotte Ku, ‘Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties: Fifty




also to imply cases in which two countries concluded a treaty with a prevail-
ing text in the official language of one of them, because some aggregated
data comprises all three scenarios. ‘Diplomatic language’ will be used to de-
note only the latter, while ‘true diplomatic language’ will be used to refer






Every scholar submitting a thesis has to answer the question in which way
his contribution is original and scientific, that is, how and to what extent he
is creating new knowledge instead of saying something purely descriptive
or, worse, offering mere opinion. In contrast to other scholars who have
dealt with the topic of plurilingual treaty interpretation, and in particular
Hardy,1 whose treatment of the subject has substantially influenced the cur-
rently prevailing view, I employ axiomatic-deductive reasoning. The funda-
mental axiom on which I build my theory is the principle of unity of the
treaty:
[I]n law there is only one treaty – one set of terms accepted by the parties
and one common intention with respect to those terms – even when two
authentic texts appear to diverge.2
In addition, I use the methodology of interpretation provided by the VCLT
to help derive the premisses and deduct the conclusions put forward. In
the same vein, the arguments put forward by the most adamant supporters
of the opposite view are evaluated in respect of their validity and sound-
ness against the background of the VCLT principles. Finally, I conduct an
empirical analysis of the global tax treaty network to quantify the applic-
ability of my theoretical findings and formulate policy recommendations.
In summary, the quest of this study is to derive conclusions of logic and
1Jean Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, The British Year Book of International Law, 1961, 73–155. His approach will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
2ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6. Henceforth
referred to as principle of unity.
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good sense from the VCLT ‘principles of logic and good sense’.3 On their
basis I shall submit a pragmatic approach to solve the problem of additional
interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual form.
My choice of methods is utilitarian – I do not maintain that the methods
I employ for purposes of this study are generally sufficient as methods of
jurisprudence,4 but my objective is to use the methods needed to solve the
problems addressed. I stress this in particular for readers coming from a
common law background, to whom my approach focussed on axiomatic-
deductive reasoning may appear outlandish. Doctrine plays a different role
in common law for historical and systematic reasons, wherefore the overall
methodical approach is different as well, focussed on tracking the evolution
of case law concerned with specific fact patterns, rather than the logical
and systematic structure of legislation and consistent application of general
principles, as is the focus of civil law.5
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous dictum of law being characterised by
experience rather than logic has become an iconic and often misused refer-
3Ibid., II:218–19, para. 4.
4Jurisprudence is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as ‘The theory or philosophy of law.’
The English ‘science’ predominantly implies natural sciences, wherefore it is etymo-
logically more narrow than the German Wissenschaft. The Oxford Dictionary defines
science primarily as ‘The intellectual and practical activity encompassing the system-
atic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through
observation and experiment.’ As Kaufmann writes, ‘The German Wissenschaft does
not bring to mind only – perhaps not even primarily – the natural sciences but any
serious, disciplined, rigorous quest for knowledge’, Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Sci-
ence: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1974), Translator’s Introduction, 5. The German Kulturwis-
senschaften (cultural sciences) and Sozialwissenschaften (social sciences) would be clas-
sified as humanities or arts in English. The German Rechtswissenschaft (traditionally
Jurisprudenz) finds its English counterpart in ‘jurisprudence’ or simply ‘law’ as listed
among the humanities. ‘Law’ is too general including the law proper, wherefore I re-
sort to ‘jurisprudence’. Concerning the ambiguity of the former, see Raoul Charles van
Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History, re-
vised ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2–4. The literal translation
of Rechtswissenschaft as ‘legal science’ feels constructed impromptu and conceptually
transgressive, suggesting jurisprudence to be a science in a sense I want to avoid and
consider misguided because it distracts from the real issue and only engages in a futile
argument that is ultimately harmful to the discipline.
5This will be discussed at length in Chapter 7, s. 7.2.
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ence to voice distrust in theory and logic in particular6 – a sentiment com-
mon among English jurists: ‘By and large, English lawyers and writers have
tended to think of it as almost a virtue to be illogical, and have ascribed that
virtue freely to their law; “being logical” is an eccentric continental practice,
in which commonsensical Englishmen indulge at their peril.’7
Although an examination of English case law over a decade has ‘revealed
that on every occasion on which the judges referred to “strict logic” it was
to reject its conclusions’,8 English judges have been shown to regularly use
deductive logic in their reasoning.9 An overly indiscriminate understanding
of the dismissal of logic by common law judges may therefore be based
on a misunderstanding and carry strange fruits in form of a ‘general anti-
rationalism’.10 What is rejected by the common law judge is the syllogistic
approach of his civil law colleagues,11 not deductive logic in general:
So it is not simply a matter of recognising that the word ‘logic’ is often used
in different senses by judges and lawyers; it is also necessary to appreciate
6See Herbert L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford; New York: Ox-
ford University Press, USA, 1984), 129; P. S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English
Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1987), 8; Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, in
Law and Other Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 80. Read out
of context, Holmes’s remark is misleading. To fully appreciate what he is saying, it is
necessary to read the passage surrounding the remark in full. He is not denouncing
the usefulness of logic but merely points to logic alone being insufficient to grasp a
cultural product like law: ‘It is something to show that the consistency of a system
requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed’, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law, ed. Paulo J. S. Pereira and Diego M. Beltran, 1881 edition (Toronto:
University of Toronto Law School Typographical Society, 2011), 5.
7Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and LegalTheory (Clarendon Press, 1978), 40, quoting
the then Regius Professor of Public Law at Edinburgh.
8Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 12.
9See MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 19–32.
10Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 90: ‘English lawyers . . .sometimes make
a positive virtue of their skill in “muddling through” to some hopelessly irrational com-
promise or pragmatic solution to a problem.’
11See ibid., 13, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, s. 7.2.
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that even the strictest of strict logic can be ‘used’ in two different senses.
It can be and is very regularly ‘used’ in the sense of being applied, as in
the many examples which Professor MacCormick gives in his discussion
of this question. But in these cases the real arguments are never about the
logical deductions themselves: they are always about the premisses. Once
the premisses have been finally determined or agreed, the conclusions do
follow inexorably, of course, and are usually seen to follow inexorably. So
judges often apply logic, but they rarely ‘use’ logic in the sense of reasoning
their way to a conclusion which is not otherwise obvious by a process of
logic.12
Nothing else is suggested here by using logic as method (see below). The
criticism of axiomatic-deductive reasoning as a method of jurisprudence
from the perspective of common law pragmatism is that it may be of limited
help in legal practice:
It is sometimes possible to justify legal decisions by deductive arguments
whose premisses are valid rules of law and propositions of ‘proven’ fact.
Given certain presuppositions about the nature of legal systems and the
obligations of legal officials such justifications are conclusive. But we can
run out of ruleswithout running out of the need for legal decisions – because
rules are unclear, or because the proper classification of relevant facts is
disputable, or even because there is dispute whether there is or is not any
legal ground at all for some claim or decision at law. The really interesting
question about legal argumentation is: how can it proceedwhen in this sense
we do ‘run out of rules’?13
My point, however, is that in the above quoted principle of unity we have
a valid rule of law that provides clear guidance as fundamental and indis-
putable premiss concerning the issue at hand, and my methodical approach
in this respect does not intend to give up pragmatism in favour of theory
– quite to the contrary. The ultimate test of pragmatism is whether it leads
to a result that, colloquially speaking, ‘works’.14 As will be argued in detail
in the following chapters, the approach to interpretation of plurilingual tax
treaties currently supported by most scholars does not work as intended
12Ibid., 14–15.
13MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 100.
14The Oxford Dictionary defines pragmatism as ‘An approach that evaluates theories or
beliefs in terms of the success of their practical application.’
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when examined up close. Therefore, it is necessary to rethink the matter.
In the words of Kurt Lewin: ‘There is nothing so practical as a good the-
ory.’15 Hence, concerning the following, I kindly request my readers from
the common law sphere to bear with me through the sections that seem
overly continental to them, as they may see the virtue of my approach once
they have appreciated all my substantive arguments in full – or so I hope.
2.1.2. Jurisprudence as a Science
The aim of science is knowledge. The classic conception of knowledge as
reasoned true opinion has been provided by Plato.16 Although this concep-
tion has evolved over time,17 it already comprises both the objective (truth)
and the fundamental methodology to attain it (reasoning). To qualify as
knowledge, something must be at the same time true and the outcome of
a rational process – mere belief the content of which happens to be true
incidentally without being the product of well-founded reasoning cannot
be considered knowledge.18
Jurisprudence is not concerned with truth in this sense because it is a
normative discipline: juridical judgements are generally not conceptualised
as being true but rather as correct, proper, appropriate, or justified.19 Thus,
jurisprudence is not a science alike natural sciences. The objects of natural
sciences are the laws of nature, whereas the object of jurisprudence is law,
a cultural construct created to serve a specific purpose;20 hence, jurispru-
15Kurt Lewin, ‘Problems of Research in Social Psychology’, in FieldTheory in Social Science;
Selected Theoretical Papers, ed. D. Cartwright (New York: Harper & Row, 1951), 169.
16See Plato, Theaetetus (Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, 380 B.C.), 201a et seq.;
Sophie Grace Chappell, ‘Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus’, in The Stanford Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter ed. (Stanford University, 2013).
17See Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, inThe
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring ed. (Stanford Univer-
sity, 2014); Hanne Andersen and Brian Hepburn, ‘ScientificMethod’, inThe Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer ed. (Stanford University, 2016).
18See Plato, Theaetetus, 201a et seq.
19See Ulli F. H. Rühl, ‘Ist die Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt eine Wissenschaft?’ (Bremen:
Universität Bremen, 2005), 1–2.
20See Popper’s distinction between ‘natural laws’ and ‘normative laws’, Karl R. Popper,The
Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 2011), 55–57. Accordingly, a natural
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dence may be classified as a cultural science.21 Anybody eager to present it
as a science alike natural sciences will fall into Kirchmann’s trap: ‘As juris-
prudence makes the arbitrary its object, it becomes arbitrary itself – three
corrective words from the legislator and whole libraries turn into waste-
paper.’22
Erroneous theories in natural sciences violating the laws of nature will
be falsified by those laws. Scientists can channel this process by devising ex-
periments deliberately set up to disprove their theories, thereby progressing
in knowledge through demarcation from false beliefs.23 In contrast, theor-
ies in cultural sciences may exist – and even co-exist with their antitheses
as antinomies24 – without being falsified by the external world. They may
even shape the external world as self-fulfilling prophecies in the sense that
a theory adopted by agents operating in a socio-cultural system may shape
the system through their behaviour in accordance with that theory.25
If anything, this amplifies the need for scientific method. It seems obvi-
ous that in such context sound rational thought is of prime importance to
law may be described as a ‘strict, unvarying regularity which either in fact holds in
nature (in this case the law is a true statement) or does not hold (in this case it is
false)’ and therefore is ‘unalterable’, whereas normative laws, ‘i.e. such rules as forbid
or demand certain modes of conduct’, are social conventions and therefore ‘alterable’.
Since the latter do not describe facts but only lay down directions for behaviour, they
may be called ‘true’ or ‘false’ only in a ‘metaphorical sense’, implying judgements such
as ‘good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable’.
21See Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, 1st ed. (Berlin: Celtis
Verlag, 2013), passim; Rühl, ‘Ist die Rechtswissenschaft überhaupt eine Wissenschaft?’,
11 et seq.
22Julius von Kirchmann, ‘Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft’ (Berlin:
Julius Springer, 1848), 23. The German original reads Wissenschaft but refers to juris-
prudence, as is obvious from its context.
23See Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, reprint 2004 (Routledge, 2002),
passim.
24Meaning a ‘contradiction, real or apparent, between two principles or conclusions, both
of which seem equally justified’, Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Antinomy’.
25See Oskar Morgenstern, ‘Descriptive, Predictive and Normative Theory’, Kyklos 25, no.
4 (1972): 707. Soros has theorised this as ‘reflexivity’, see George Soros,The Alchemy of
Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market by George Soros (Hoboken, New Jersey: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987), 27–45. He elaborates the concept more comprehensively in




disprove erroneous theories.Therefore, the real issue at stake is not whether
jurisprudence could be regarded a science alike natural sciences, but ‘how
to determine which beliefs are epistemically warranted’26 within the man-
made system of law in the context of the purpose of jurisprudence to not
only describe the law but also to interpret and help develop it into a sound
and consistent system.27 Since it is a fundamental requirement of any sci-
entific endeavour to be as objective and rational as possible, science may be
conceived of as consisting in the collection of knowledge and its ordering
into a coherent system of thought that is free of contradictions, based on
Kant’s understanding of science as ‘a coherent whole of knowledge ordered
according to principles’.28 The element of coherence in this regard consists
in the connection of the parts by conclusive reasoning: ‘Thus science signi-
fies a system of notions, in other words, a totality of connected, as opposed
to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions. . . .The very thing distinguish-
ing every science from the mere aggregate is the fact that its notions follow
from one another as from their ground or reason.’29 In summary, jurispru-
dence may be conceptualised as a science in terms of method, and this is
the understanding underlying this study.
2.2. Methods Employed
To satisfy this conception, I use three methods. First and foremost: logic.
Adherence to the principles of logic fosters scientific endeavours as defined,
26Steve Fuller, ‘The Demarcation of Science: A Problem Whose Demise Has Been Greatly
Exaggerated’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, nos. 3 – 4: 331.
27See Karl Larenz, Über die Unentbehrlichkeit der Jurispridenz als Wissenschaft, vol. 26,
Schriftenreihe Der Juristischen Gesellschaft e.V. (Berlin:Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1966),
12 et seq. Common lawyers may disagree with such contention, see Chapter 7, s. 7.2.
28Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Riga: Johann
Friedrich Hartknoch, 1786), Vorrede; see Klaus Tipke, ‘Steuerrecht als Wissenschaft’,
in Festschrift für Joachim Lang: Gestaltung der Steuerrechtsordnung, ed. Roman Seer et
al. (Köln: Schmidt, Otto, 2010), 26–27; Emil Kraus, Der Systemgedanke bei Kant und
Fichte (Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1916), Einführung. Accordingly, the Ox-
ford Dictionary expands its definition of science by ‘A systematically organized body
of knowledge on a particular subject.’
29Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, trans. E.
F. J. Payne (New York: Open Court Classics, 2001), 5, s. 4.
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because it ensures a consistent and ordered system of thought free of con-
tradictions. As pointed out by Tarski, ‘Logic is justly considered the basis of
all other sciences, even if only for the reason that in every argument we em-
ploy concepts taken from the field of logic, and that ever correct inference
proceeds in accordance with its laws.’30
Some have argued that because of their normative content, laws (like
questions and orders) are not accessible to logic but require a specially de-
signed deontic logic.31 I do not share this opinion but agree with Philipps
that such deontic logic is by nomeans indispensable, albeit occasionally use-
ful.32 Much alike questions and orders, laws can be divided into a normative
and a propositional part, which can then be subjected to logical considera-
tions.33 Even if laws themselves pose some difficulties in this respect that
can be overcome by appropriate construction, theories of and about law are
subject to standard logic.
Although logic may be helpful as a tool to disprove erroneous theories
and construct valid ones, it may be insufficient on its own.34 As Bunikowski
points out, ‘Logic only tells you hypothetically that if you give a certain
term a certain interpretation then a certain conclusion follows. Logic is si-
lent on how to classify particulars – and this is the heart of a judicial de-
cision.’35 Jurisprudence as a science of rationally analysing legal texts36 – in
our particular case the VCLT – requires an additional methodology of inter-
30Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic: And to theMethodology of Deductive Sciences (Courier
Corporation, 2013), 108.
31See Paul McNamara, ‘Deontic Logic’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta, Winter ed. (Stanford University, 2014).
32See Lothar Philipps, ‘Braucht die Rechtswissenschaft eine Deontische Logik?’, in Recht-
stheorie: Beiträge zur Grundlagendiskussion, ed. Günther Jahr and Werner Maihofer
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971), 367.
33See Richard M. Hare, The Language of Morals, reprint (London; New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, USA, 1991), passim; Nicholas Rescher, The Logic of Commands (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul PLC, 1966), passim.
34See Robert Alexy,Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Frankfurt amMain: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 1983), passim.
35Dawid Bunikowski, ‘The Origins of Open Texture in Language and Legal Philosophies
in Oxford and Cambridge’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, August 2015, 5, 7n.
36See Larenz and Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 26.
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pretation, that is, hermeneutics,37 because of what Hart famously theorised
as the ‘open texture’ of law and ‘a penumbra of debatable cases in which
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.’38
Finally, since the purpose of this study is not only to disprove erroneous
theories currently accepted as orthodoxy, but also to solve the problem of
additional interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual form in prac-
tice, the extent to which the solution developed on the basis of my theor-
etical analysis can be applied to existing tax treaties needs to be examined
in order to support formulation of appropriate policies. For this reason, a
quantitative analysis is required to measure applicability and develop a ‘nu-
merical expression of confidence’39 in policy formulation. In the following
sections I shall outline more precisely what is implied by these three meth-
ods and why I consider them most useful to achieve the goals I set for my-
self.
2.2.1. Logic
The explicit focus of this study on logic deserves elaboration – surely all
scientific work in the field of law and, indeed, any legal reasoning in gen-
eral first and foremost claims to be a rational endeavour based on logical
thinking, without any need for special mentioning.40 This default assump-
37Used here exclusively in the sense of the Oxford Dictionary, the American Heritage Dic-
tionary of the English Language, and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as ‘The branch
of knowledge that deals with interpretation’, ‘The theory andmethodology of interpret-
ation’, and ‘the study of the methodological principles of interpretation’, respectively,
not in the sense of an ontological theory of understanding, cf. Martin Heidegger, Onto-
logy – The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. John van Buren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1999), 6–16. As pointed out by the Merriam-Webster and Oxford Dic-
tionaries, ‘hermeneutics’ is ‘plural in form but singular or plural in construction’ and
‘usually treated as singular’.
38Herbert L. A. Hart,TheConcept of Law (Oxford:The Clarendon Press, 1961), 123; Herbert
L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review 71,
no. 4 (1958): 593–629, III; see Bunikowski, ‘The Origins of Open Texture in Language
and Legal Philosophies in Oxford and Cambridge’, passim.
39Andersen and Hepburn, ‘Scientific Method’, s. 4.
40This is not only a question of scientific rigour but also crucial to the legitimacy of judi-
cial decisions, see Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, 15. The German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has stated in this respect that ‘the judge must rid himself of
23
2. Methodology
tion applies the term logic in a wider colloquial sense than implied here,
including all sorts of rational procedures. Legal reasoning is not exhausted
entirely by logic but necessarily includes material aspects in which the role
of purely logical thinking is only subsidiary.41
Here ‘logic’ implies the more narrow meaning of modern logic,42 which
started in the late nineteenth century with Gottlob Frege43 and is sometimes
also referred to as formal or symbolic logic because of its focus on formal
validity and the propensity of its protagonists to use symbols in their ana-
lysis of expressions. Modern logic builds on classical Aristotelian logic,44
and its defining characteristic is the strict separation of logical considera-
tions from psychological questions. Both classical Aristotelian and modern
logic concern themselves rather with the laws of being and the operations
of language, with the latter being the primary focus of modern logic.45
Understood in this sense, logic concerns itself only ‘with the principles
of valid inference’ as applied to the linguistic form of propositions and their
relations,46 allowing formally valid conclusions in turn. The notion of infer-
ence is not intended to imply a mental process leading from the premisses
to the conclusion, but only that the premisses necessarily imply the con-
clusion, that is, it is impossible for the conclusion not to be true when the
premisses are. In the words of Aristotle: ‘A syllogism is discourse in which,
certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of
necessity from their being so. I mean by the last phrase that they produce
the consequence, and by this, that no further term is required from without
in order to make the consequence necessary.’47 This does not necessarily
have to mean that the premisses and conclusion are indeed true, but only
arbitrariness; his decision must be based on rational reasoning’, BVerfG, ‘1 BvR 112/65’
(BVerfGE 34, 269, February 1973), C, IV, 1.
41See Tammelo, Modern Logic in the Service of Law, ix, 2.
42See Tugendhat and Wolf, Logisch-semantische Propädeutik, 8 et seq.
43Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift: Eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des
reinen Denkens (Halle: Louis Nebert Verlag, 1879).
44Comprised in Aristotele’s six works on logic written 350 B.C., see Aristotle,TheOrganon,
ed. Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick (Andesite Press, 2015).
45See Tugendhat and Wolf, Logisch-semantische Propädeutik, 9–10.
46See William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, revised ed. (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1985), 1.
47Aristotle, Prior Analytics (The Internet Classics Archive, 350 B.C.), Book I, Part 1.
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that if the premisses are true, the conclusion must be true as well and can-
not be false.48 All logic is essentially formal in this sense, implying that an
argument is valid because of its logical form regardless of the particular
content of its premisses and conclusions. The commonly used label ‘formal
logic’ is therefore pleonastic.49
The principal logical tool used to evaluate the validity of an inference is
the principle (or law) of non-contradiction,50 that is, the proposition that
it is impossible for an expression that contradicts itself to be true or, more
precisely, that two contradictory propositions a and not-a cannot both be
true in the same sense at the same time.51 Thus, in its proclaimed logical ne-
cessity, the validity of an inference rests on the validity of the principle of
non-contradiction.52 Although it is common to simply presuppose the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction as a fundamental axiom,53 such is not entirely
unproblematic because the principle itself is not self-evident in the sense
that we cannot use it as an argument against someone who denies its uni-
versal validity in form of a dialectic rationality that includes the possibility
of contradictions as a fundamental part of reality.54 Hence, it is important
to clarify wherein precisely the proclaimed necessity of the validity of the
principle of non-contradiction lies.
48See MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Ch. 2.
49See Tammelo, Modern Logic in the Service of Law, 2.
50See Bertrand Russell,The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001),
Ch. 7 – sometimes (particularly in German literature) also referred to as the principle
(or law) of contradiction (Satz vom Widerspruch), see Tugendhat and Wolf, Logisch-
semantische Propädeutik, 50.
51See ibid., 51 et seq.The principle can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle.Whereas Plato
derives it empirically (see Plato, Republic (Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, 380
B.C.), 4.436b), Aristotle is the first to formulate it as a fundamental logical axiom a priori
(see Aristotle, Metaphysics (The Internet Classics Archive, 350 B.C.), Book IV, Parts 3–
5).
52See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Das System der Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes.
Erster Abschnitt. Von dem obersten Grundsatze aller analytischen Urteile.
53John Paul II declared it a ‘fundamental premiss of human reasoning’ at the core of ‘a
body of knowledge’ belonging to the ‘spiritual heritage of humanity’, even if sometimes
possessed only in a ‘general and unreflective way’, John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides
et Ratio, 1998, Introduction.




In principle, the answer to this question has been provided already by
Aristotle,55 and its most significant further development has been brought
forward by Strawson.56 According to Aristotle, stating something means
saying something definite, otherwise we really state nothing and do not
deserve argument. According to Strawson then, the purpose of applying
a predicate to a subject is differentiation. That certain predicates mutually
exclude each other is not necessarily attributable to their ontological reality
but a man-made function of speech so intended:
But must a language have incompatible predicates in it? And what makes
predicates incompatible? I want to answer the first question by saying, not
that a language has incompatible predicates in it; only that it is very natural
that it should. And I want to answer the second question by saying that it is
we, the makers of language, who make predicates incompatible. One of the
main purposes for which we use language is to report events and describe
things and persons. Such reports and descriptions are like answers to ques-
tions of the form: what was it like? What is it (he, she) like? We describe
something, say what it is like, by applying to it words that we are also pre-
pared to apply to other things. But not to all other things. Aword that we are
prepared to apply to everything without exception (such as certain words
in current use in popular, and especially military, speech) would be useless
for the purposes of description. For when we say what a thing is like, we not
only compare it with other things, we also distinguish it from other things.
(These are not two activities, but two aspects of the same activity.) Some-
where, then, a boundary must be drawn, limiting the applicability of a word
used in describing things; and it is we who decide where the boundaries are
to be drawn.57
In short, any predicate depends on how we delineate and intend to apply it.
By applying a certain predicate in a certain sense to a subject x we create
an ‘incompatibility-range’ that defines when y is to count as an instance of
x and when not.58 The extent of any such incompatibility-range is itself a
function of the precision with which we define the scope of the predicate:
any two predicates A and B belong to the same incompatibility-range as
55See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 4.






long as the statement ‘x is A’ at the same time implies ‘x is not B’, as a result
of which A and B are equally as incompatible as A and not-A. Consequently,
by stating both ‘x is A’ and ‘x is B’ we are not saying anything of informative
value, because we state something and take it back at the same time by
stating the opposite – the statements ‘x is A’ and ‘x is B’ cancel each other
out by virtue of our definitions of A and B. In summary, the proclaimed
validity of the principle of non-contradiction merely implies that by not
adhering to it we utter nothing of informative value, not that we violate
some eternal law of nature.59
At this point we can return to the choice ofmethodology and reason for it:
the greater danger of accepting contradictions is not that we ultimately fail
to say anything of informative value, but that we may say and argue any-
thing, unchecked, also known as the fallacy ex contradictione sequitur quod-
libet (from contradiction, anything follows).60 Hence, the importance of spe-
cifying wherein precisely the validity of the principle of non-contradiction
lies and strict reliance on it is given by the necessity to guard against ill-
conceived arguments brought forward under the label of ‘common sense’.61
The Oxford Dictionary defines common sense as ‘Good sense and sound
judgement in practical matters’, and there is nothing wrong with that. Com-
mon sense so defined has its place in legal reasoning and, arguably, may
even have its place as a methodology of epistemology;62 however, it goes
59See Tugendhat and Wolf, Logisch-semantische Propädeutik, 60–64.
60See Karl R. Popper, ‘What is Dialectic?’, Mind 49, no. 196 (1940): 408–10. Popper cri-
ticises Hegel sharply for accepting contradictions and, therefore, having contributed
to pave the way for twentieth century anti-rationalism and ideological dogmatism by
providing an intellectual strategy of immunisation against criticism. He reiterated and
extended his criticism in Karl R. Popper, ‘Facts, Standards, and Truth: A Further Cri-
ticism of Relativism’, in Moral Relativism: A Reader, ed. Paul K. Moser and Thomas L.
Carson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000), 32–52; Popper, The Open
Society and Its Enemies, Ch. 12.
61Colloquially, the label is often used to declare something as simply obvious; however, for
a reasoning to be considered scientific, it has to provide sufficient grounds for its con-
clusions, which cannot merely consist in the latter corresponding to ‘common sense’
by way of declaration. For proper scientific reasoning, it is at the same time superfluous
and insufficient to refer to common sense; any explicit invocation is therefore suspect
of merely attempting to turn one’s own opinion into an argumentum ad verecundiam
(appeal to authority) while lacking sufficient reasons apart from personal conviction.
62See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
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without saying that a necessary precondition for any argument to claim
the property of being commonsensical under this definition is for it to ad-
here at minimum to the principles of logic, which demarcate the boundar-
ies of what can be qualified as good sense and sound judgement. Any self-
proclaimed common sense argument transgressing the principles of logic
must be considered ill-conceived. In the words of Tammelo:
It is to be emphasized thatmodern legal logic can have no substitute in a non-
logic. This is not to deny that there are good habits or patterns of lawyers’
reasonings whose logical structure is not obvious, but which nevertheless
conform to logically sound reasoning. This implicit, ‘common-sense’ logic
may be sufficient for most practical purposes. However, when there is any
doubt as to the formal validity or solidity of instances of legal reasoning,
there is no escape from recourse to appropriate methods of modern logic
in order to attain a certainty about this validity or solidity. . . .Formal impec-
cability is a precondition of self-consistent reasoning. It is indisputable that
in the field of law, as elsewhere, self-consistency is a most important aim –
a standard for all aspects of lawyers’ work performed in the spirit of their
professional ethics.63
Unfortunately, the complex subject matter examined by this study brings
with it all sorts of in the above sense ill-conceived arguments in doctrine,
the quest of this study is to debunk. Unravelling the conceptual knot re-
quires a sharp tool. This tool is provided by logic as the sum of ‘principles
and methods for tracing and displaying self-consistent thought.’64
The choice of method is also by no means arbitrary in view of the scope
of our topic as posed by the VCLT: the principles supplied by it for the in-
terpretation of treaties are qualified by its drafters as ‘principles of logic
and good sense’.65 Although this terminology is not extensively explained
in the VCLT Commentary, it is noteworthy that not only the term ‘good
sense’ alone has been used, but that it is coupled with the term ‘logic’. Use
of ‘good sense’ alone would bear the danger of opening the doors to all sorts
versity Press, 2011); George Edward Moore, ‘A Defense of Common Sense’, in Contem-
porary British Philosophy (second series), ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1925), 192–233.
63Tammelo, Modern Logic in the Service of Law, 2.
64Ibid., vii.
65ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:218, para. 4.
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of arguments, whereas its explicit combination with ‘logic’ makes clear that
the principles of interpretation enshrined in the VLCT are not only amen-
able to logical considerations, but that logical considerations are essential
to the establishment of their rationale.
In the course of my analysis I shall use the logical tool of a thought ex-
periment,66 devised on the basis of the Natexis case.67 Thought experiments
are devices most commonly used in physics and philosophy and, to some
extent, also in other natural and social sciences such as Biology and Eco-
nomics.They are less common in jurisprudence but not unknown.68 Several
types of thought experiments may be distinguished,69 but their common
idea consists in the consideration of a hypothesis in a logically structured
way to deliberate its consequences and arrive at universally valid conclu-
sions without having to actually perform the experiment in reality. I use
this device in order to abstract from specific facts of case law and focus on
design features of tax treaties that allow generalisations.
2.2.2. Hermeneutics
In order to ascertain appropriate application of the VCLT principles when
interpreting plurilingual treaties, we have to interpret Article 33 and estab-
lish its meaning. In particular, we will have to establish the meaning of the
terms ‘divergence’, ‘reconcile’, and ‘prevailing’. Being a multilateral treaty,
the VCLT falls under its own scope.70 Therefore, its text must be interpreted
drawing on the principles and means codified in it.71 The VCLT is a pluri-
lingual treaty with texts in Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish,
none of which is designated as prevailing. As argued by this thesis, all texts
have to be compared in such case to ensure correct interpretation.
66See James Robert Brown and Yiftach Fehige, ‘Thought Experiments’, in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring ed. (Stanford University, 2016).
67Conseil d’État, Société Natexis Banques Populaires v France.
68As quoted by Fredrick Kennard, Thought Experiments: Popular Thought Experiments in
Philosophy, Physics, Ethics, Computer Science & Mathematics (Lulu.com, 2015), 9, the
Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Pandects states that ‘every logical rule of law is capable
of illumination from the law of the Pandects.’
69See Brown and Fehige, ‘Thought Experiments’.




Interpretation of terms has to start somewhere, which raises the question
to what extent dictionaries may be used in order to establish their meaning.
Dictionaries provide the meaning of words as used by people in their most
common contexts; they have the aim to explain the ordinary, non-technical
meaning applicable in everyday use.72 Therefore, resorting to dictionaries
in order to elucidate the meaning of tax treaty terms is problematic. Legal
language is crammed with jargon used in a technical sense different from
dictionary meanings.73 The language of tax treaties is no exception in this
regard, and such special meanings become the ordinary meanings in the
tax treaty context.74
In addition, tax treaties usually feature renvoi clauses modelled on Art-
icle 3(2) of the OECD and UN Model Conventions.75 Accordingly, terms
that have no explicit treaty definition are to be given the meaning they
have under the domestic laws of the contracting states ‘unless the context
otherwise requires’. Such domestic law meanings may also form part of an
otherwise incomplete treaty definition.76 In summary, since the treaty or-
dinary meaning of terms always depends on their context and object and
purpose, we must be cautious about both resorting to dictionary definitions
divorced from the treaty context and applying domestic law definitions if
they defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.77
Notwithstanding, recourse to dictionaries still has its place in the inter-
pretation of treaty terms. Legal language is not a symbolised formal lan-
guage but uses ordinary language as its medium. Even its technical termin-
ology consists mostly of terms borrowed from ordinary language, the mean-
72See Jonas Pfister, Werkzeuge des Philosophierens (Stuttgart: Reclam, Philipp, jun. GmbH,
Verlag, 2013), 52–53. Usually, they also provide etymological information about the
origin of words and how their meaning has changed over time.
73See Deborah Cao, Translating Law (Channel View Publications Ltd., 2007), 53–54.
74See John F. Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, in Global Tax Treaty Commentaries
(IBFD, 2016), s. 3.4.11, and s. 9, for a discussion of liable and subject to tax as examples.
75OECD,Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2017); UN, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between De-
veloped and Developing Countries (United Nations, 2011).
76See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 7.2.2.
77See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 137 et seq., 149 et seq;
Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.4.4; Gladden v Her Majesty the Queen, [1985]
85 DTC 5188, para. 14.
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ing ofwhich is then contextually charged and formed into the intended tech-
nical meaning. The choice of words for this operation is not arbitrary but
correlates to their ordinary language meaning, which shares basic connota-
tions with the legal meaning and lends itself to the intended modification.
The same is true for tax treaty terms as a special category of legal language.
For example, the permanent establishment (PE) concept has a defined treaty
meaning,78 which overrides any defined domestic law and dictionary mean-
ing. Yet, this treatymeaning builds on andmodifies the dictionarymeanings
of the employed terms ‘permanent’ and ‘establishment’.
In extreme situations, such modification may lend itself to departures far
away from the basic connotation of the dictionary meaning, particularly
when the added technical connotation modifying the dictionary meaning
provides some leeway for courts in their interpretation. According to the
decision of the ITAT in the Fugro case, for example, the permanence test for
the existence of a PE in India is satisfied when there exists a place of busi-
ness for the time in which the business operation can be completed.79 This
constitutes a far stretch not only in terms of the dictionary meaning of per-
manence but also considering its tax implications against the background
of the intentions behind the PE concept.80 As a result of this interpretation,
any short-term project or operation could constitute a PE as long as the
non-resident company has a place of business in India long enough for the
project or operation to be concluded, even if it lasts only for a couple of
days.81
Therefore, despite being faced with a similar set of facts like the ITAT in
the Fugro case and Norway being a country with a treaty policy geared to-
wards a low PE threshold, the Norwegian supreme court decided in the PGS
case against the existence of a PE, on the basis that ‘permanent establish-
ment’ as defined by the treaty being modelled on the OECD Model implies
a certain duration with respect to the natural understanding of the terms
employed and the practice of OECD countries suggesting six months as a
78OECD,Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2014), Article 5.
79Fugro Engineering BV v ACIT, TTJ, vol. 122, Delhi Income Tax Appelate Tribunal, 2008.
80See OECD, Model Tax Convention, 2017, Commentary on Article 5.




consensus minimum for that duration test to be satisfied.82
Although both interpretations may be based on arguments derived from
the same paragraph of the OECD Commentary at the time,83 the PGS de-
cision takes into account that the initial choice for the words ‘permanent’
and ‘establishment’ as building blocks of the PE concept is not arbitrary, but
that their dictionary meanings provide the basis for arriving at the finally
intended tax treaty meaning and, therefore, may help to shed some light
on the boundaries of the concept implied in controversial cases. Indeed, the
intuitive reservations we might have concerning examples like the decision
of the ITAT in the Fugro case are a direct result of this relationship.
In summary, dictionary meanings remain useful for the textual interpret-
ation of treaty terms because they illuminate the boundaries of the concepts
employed. They provide the ordinary language context and connotation of
any word, which should be examined always to grasp the general concep-
tual limits of what is and what is not included in the notion, unless they
are explicitly transgressed by a different defined or contextual meaning. Of
course, this applies in particular when the terms to be interpreted do not
have a technical treaty or applicable domestic law definition; however, even
when terms with a technical legal meaning are at issue, dictionary mean-
ings may prove helpful and are used by courts to hedge the textual treaty
meaning.84 As Lord Wilberforce has put it, ‘There is no reason why he [the
judge] should not consult a dictionary, if the word is such that a dictionary
can reveal its significance.’85
82Høyesterett, PGS Geophysical AS v Government of Norway, 2004–01003–A, (Sak Nr.
2003/1311) (Amsterdam: IBFD, Tax Treaties Case Law Database 2016, 2004).
83Commentary on Article 5, para. 6, up to OECD,Model Tax Convention, 2014 (updated to
paras. 28–30 in 2017). For a discussion of the PE permanency test and the PGS and Fugro
cases, see Andreas Perdelwitz, ‘A Certain Degree of Permanence Between Temporary
and Everlasting Business Activities’, in Taxation of Business Profits in the 21st Century,
ed. Andreas Perdelwitz and Carlos Gutiérrez (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013).
84See, e.g., Wolf v Canada, [2002] 4 F.C. 396, as discussed by Jacques Sasseville, ‘The Ca-
nadian Experience’, in Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax
Law, ed. Guglielmo Maisto (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 35–62, 50–61; Jacques Sasseville,
‘The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries’, in Multilingual Texts and Interpret-
ation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law, ed. Guglielmo Maisto (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005),
133.




Concerning the applicability of sole reliance on the prevailing text to ac-
tual tax treaties, I conduct an empirical analysis of the global tax treaty
network with respect to lingual form and final clause wordings. The global
perspective is differentiated via time-series analysis, per country analysis,
and categorisation of the data intomeaningful groups in order to investigate
policy. The wordings of actual final clauses are catalogued, categorised, and
analysed against the background of the interpretative framework provided
by the VCLT and the theory developed in the theoretical chapters.
The sample analysed consists of all tax treaties concluded between 1 Janu-
ary 1960 and 15 August 2016 in so far as they have been recorded by the
IBFD,86 independent of their status, that is, not only treaties in force are
taken into account but also terminated treaties and treaties not yet in force
or still to be ratified. Treaties reported as merely initialled, under negoti-
ation, or abandoned have been excluded.The same goes for mere exchanges
of notes, memoranda of understanding, dominion double taxation relief
rules, and agreements concerning the provisional abolition of double tax-
ation prior to a treaty.
All types of tax treaties have been included (mainly income and capital
and inheritance and gift tax treaties), whether separate, combined, or only
covering specific types of income. One hundred and forty-six treaties that
satisfied the above criteria for inclusion had to be excluded from the final
sample because either their texts could not be retrieved at the cut-off date or
the wordings of their final clauses could not be established beyond doubt.87
Transport tax treaties have not been included by convention, as many of
them are only concluded via an exchange of notes, which precludes a con-
sistent investigation of their linguistic outlook in the current context.
Not included in the survey from the outset have been exchange of inform-
Tullybelton (286), Scarman (293), and Roskill (300).
86Tax Treaties Database (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2016). Treaties concluded before 1960 have
been excluded in order not to bias the data, as several old terminated treaties are dif-
ficult to obtain. According to the data observed, treaties concluded before 1960 make





ation treaties, social security treaties, economic relations treaties, FATCA
agreements, friendship and fiscal co-operation agreements, friendship and
commerce treaties, and mutual assistance agreements.88 Although these
treaties may be considered closely related to the international tax universe,
this has been done on purpose because of the focus of this study on tax treat-
ies and their specific properties. Given the different subject matters of the
listed other treaties, their linguistic properties may differ, and their objects
and purposes may not suffer from the same interpretation issues identified
by this study, wherefore their addition could have biased the data and ana-
lysis because many of them (exchange of information and FATCA) are in
their magnitude fairly recent phenomena. A separate evaluation of them
has been left to future research.
In total, the sample analysed in this study comprises 3,844 tax treaties
concluded between January 1960 and August 2016.89 All percentage num-
bers concerning the sample presented in tables are rounded to two decimal
points, whereas percentage numbers in the running text are mostly roun-
ded to integers.




3. Routine Interpretation: A Refutation
3.1. ResearchQuestion
This chapter concerns itself with the question whether courts are legally
required to compare all authenticated language texts when none of them is
designated as prevailing.1 In this context, it will also discuss the commonly
held view that judges should give preference to the text of initial negotiation
and drafting when they are faced with a divergence between the texts. The
hypothesis put forward in this chapter may be split into the following four
elements: (1) Articles 31–33 in combination with Articles 26–27 VCLT put
courts under an obligation to compare all texts of a plurilingual tax treaty
in the absence of a prevailing one; (2) this obligation is independent of do-
mestic procedural law; (3) the currently prevailing view maintaining the
opposite rests on an erroneous interpretation of Articles 31–33; and (4) Art-
icles 31–33 do not sanction giving preference to the original text merely in
virtue of it being the text of negotiation and drafting. Before we can discuss
these propositions, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the fundamental
notions of treaty and text as well as their relationship.
3.2. Preliminary Considerations
3.2.1. The Treaty and Its Text
What constitutes the treaty? Must the treaty be considered an underlying
agreement of concurring wills that exists independently from the text as
legal instrument being merely the expression of such agreement, or does
the text as legal instrument constitute the treaty as its formal embodiment?
1Parts of this chapter have been presented in embryonic form in the following peer re-
viewed publication: Richard Xenophon Resch, ‘Not in Good Faith – A Critique of the
Vienna Convention Rule of Interpretation Concerning Its Application to Plurilingual
(Tax) Treaties’, British Tax Review, no. 3 (2014): 307–28.
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Or, is this amisleading dichotomy and a treaty is essentially and inseparably
both, an agreement in the form of a written text? The consequences of an
answer to this question are non-trivial. If wewere to arrive at the conclusion
that, in short, the text is the treaty, then any interpreter has only the text
itself as a reference to establish its meaning, that is, the treaty’s content. As
a corollary, if there are more language texts, the meaning of each can only
be established by reference to itself and/or the others, not by any reference
to an agreement behind all texts that is not accessible except for what is
expressed by them. Hence, we need to answer two questions: (1) What is
the relationship between the treaty and its text? (2) In view of the answer
to (1), does the and/or default to and or or?
What constitutes a treaty was discussed by the ILC over a period of six-
teen years on the basis of the Brierly, Lauterpacht, Fitzmaurice, and Wal-
dock reports.2 One of the main sources used by Special Rapporteur Brierly
for his initial report and draft was the Harvard Draft Convention, which
had defined a treaty as ‘a formal instrument of agreement’.3 In contrast,
the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties presented by Brierly defined
a treaty as ‘an agreement recorded in writing’.4 In Brierly’s view, the writ-
ten record did not require a particularly formal instrument,5 such being no
more than evidence for the existence of a treaty he considered to be an
agreement existing before the act of its conclusion.6 Therefore, his Com-
mentary emphasised the underlying agreement as constituting the essence
2SeeMark Eugen Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treat-
ies (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 75–76.
3ILC, Documents of the Second Session Including the Report of the Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly, vol. II, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1950, A/CN.
4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (United Nations, 1957), 243, Appendix A, Article 1(a). For a his-
torical appraisal of the Harvard Draft Convention see Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation,
56–57.
4ILC, Documents of the Second Session Including the Report of the Commission to the Gen-
eral Assembly, II:226, Article 1(a). Brierly’s intention was not to provide an independent
definition of ‘treaty’ but only to define treaties for the limited scope of the draft con-
vention, see ibid., 226, para. 14.
5See ibid., II:227, para. 23.
6See ILC, Summary Records of the Second Session, 5 June – 29 July 1950, vol. I, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission 1950, A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (United Nations, 1958),
82, paras. 88, 92.
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of treaties, with the written record being merely a matter of practical neces-
sity.7
Brierly’s view was criticised by the majority of the ILC members, who
preferred a definition of treaties that reverted to the wording of the Har-
vard draft.8 In essence, the difficulty underlying the discussion consisted
in the inseparability of both constituents.9 In the words of Rapporteur Al-
faro, ‘The agreement could no more be separated from the instrument than
the body from the soul. The soul of a treaty was the unanimity of intent.
The body was the formal written instrument. The agreement without the
instrument was nothing, and vice versa. . . .What constituted a treaty was
an agreement converted into an instrument.’10 In contrast to Brierly, the
discussion in the meetings placed more importance on the formal instru-
ment constituent, not considering any ‘agreement recorded in writing’ but
only a ‘formal instrument of agreement’ to be a treaty.11 In the end the ILC
voted in favour of the Harvard Draft wording by six votes to four, with one
abstention.12
When we fast-forward to the VCLT, we see that the wording of Article
2(1)(a), which defines treaties for purposes of the convention, appears closer
to Brierly’s conception:
For the purposes of the present Convention: . . .‘treaty’ means an interna-
tional agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.
According to the VCLT Commentary, the scope of what constitutes a
treaty is relatively broad, ‘covering all forms of international agreements in
writing concluded between States’, subject to relatively low formal require-
7See ILC, Documents of the Second Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, II:227, para. 19.
8See ILC, Summary Records of the Second Session, 5 June – 29 July 1950, 65, para. 73a; 68,
paras. 8–8b; 69, para. 14; 71, paras. 33–34; 72, paras. 39a–c; 75, para. 14; 76, para. 26; 77,
para. 33; 82, paras. 90–91, 94; 82–83, paras. 3–3a, 6, 7–7b; 84, para. 9.
9See ibid., I:82, para. 94.
10Ibid., I:83, para. 6.
11See ibid., I:84, para. 9.
12See ibid., I:84, para. 17.
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ments regarding the respective instruments.13 The wording ‘concluded’
seems to suggest stronger formal requirements than merely ‘recorded in
writing’; however, there is no fixed meaning of ‘concluded’ in international
law, but the term simply implies a set of distinctive procedures that make a
treaty binding.14 As long as the objective intentions of the parties to create
rights and obligations governed by international law are evident from the
wording, the form is of secondary relevance.15 Nevertheless, the scope of
what constitutes a treaty under the VCLT is confined to agreements ‘in
written form’, even if only for practical reasons and not to deny the legal
force of oral agreements and the applicability of the same principles to
them.16 In summary, treaties are to some degree necessarily textual for
purposes of the VCLT, with both constituents ‘agreement’ and ‘instrument’
being essential to constitute a treaty. This leaves the question of the exact
13See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:188, paras. 2–3;
Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 19–31.
14See Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 78–79.
15See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 21–24. The ICJ has
made clear that all kinds of documents may constitute a treaty. Given clear language in
the document at issue regarding obligations entered into, the court rejected otherwise
declared intentions to the contrary as irrelevant: ‘The 1990 Minutes refer to the con-
sultations between the two Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and Qatar, in the presence
of the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, and state what had been “agreed” between
the Parties. . . .Thus the 1990 Minutes include a reaffirmation of obligations previously
entered into. . . .Accordingly, and contrary to the contentions of Bahrain, the Minutes
are not a simple record of a meeting, . . .they do not merely give an account of dis-
cussions and summarize points of agreement and disagreement. They enumerate the
commitments to which the Parties have consented. They thus create rights and obliga-
tions in international law for the Parties. They constitute an international agreement.
. . .The Court does not find it necessary to consider what might have been the intentions
of the Foreign Minister of Bahrain or, for that matter, those of the Foreign Minister
of Qatar. The two Ministers signed a text recording commitments accepted by their
Governments, some of which were to be given immediate application. Having signed
such a text, the Foreign Minister of Bahrain is not in a position subsequently to say
that he intended to subscribe only to a “statement recording a political understanding”,
and not to an international agreement’,Maritime Delimitation and TerritorialQuestions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ (An-
nual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1994), 121–122, paras. 24–25, 27.
16See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:189, para. 7.
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relationship between a treaty and its text open.17
An indirect answer may be obtained from examining the way how we
are supposed to treat the text. Concerning this we know that we have to
give priority to objective considerations based on the text:
The article as already indicated is based on the view that the text must be
presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and
that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation
of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions
of the parties.18
Thus, when interpreting a treaty, we ought to follow a textual but not literal
approach based on the ordinarymeaning, context, and object and purpose,19
whereas teleological interpretations of the text in violation of its wording
must not be given effect.20 This intrinsic, text-based approach is not abso-
lute but complemented by a limited extrinsic approach if the former leaves
17Presumably, the purpose of the VCLT definition is to limit it to written treaties while
recognising the existence of subsidiary agreements, instruments, and practice in Art-
icle 31, paras. 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b, which need not (or, in the case of practice, will not)
be in writing, leaving the force of oral agreements and the applicability of the VCLT
principles to them unaffected, as is explicitly specified by Article 3(b) VCLT, see Jan
Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 1996), 49–50.
18ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:220, para. 11, repeated in
substance at 223, para. 18.
19UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1); see Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia vThailand), Preliminary Objections, ICJ (Annual Reports of the International
Court of Justice, 1961), 32; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v Iran), ICJ (Annual
Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1952), 104: ‘But the Court cannot base it-
self on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text. It must seek the interpretation
which is in harmony with a natural and reasonable way of reading the text, having
due regard to the intention of the Government of Iran at the time when it accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.’ For a comprehensive discussion of the textual
approach prescribed by the VCLT, see Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 114 et seq.; Engelen, Inter-
pretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, Ch. 5. For a demarcation of the textual
versus a literal approach in case law, refer to the summary elaborations of Mummery J.
in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Commerzbank, [1990] STC 285, 297–298; Fothergill
v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 272, 279, 285, 290, 294; Gladden v Her Majesty the Queen, 519.
20See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 429.
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the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable, in which case recourse may be had to supplement-
ary means in order to determine the meaning.21 Apart from that, the latter
may be used only to confirm but not contest a manifest meaning established
under Article 31.22 Consequently, the will of the parties manifested in the
agreement and its expression in the text converge for purposes of interpret-
ing and applying the treaty, because ‘law cannot take into consideration
anything that remains buried away in the minds of the parties. . . .[T]he ex-
pressed will is the only will upon which the parties have been able to reach
an agreement.’23 In summary, since it has only itself as a reference, the text
must be treated as if it were the treaty – the main task of interpretation
being ‘to give effect to the expressed intention of the parties.’24
3.2.2. The Meaning of Text and Its Implications
What constitutes the text? The answer to this question is more straightfor-
ward: the text comprises all authenticated language versions of the text, and
the procedures establishing authentic status are defined by Article 10 VCLT
and its Commentary:
Authentication is the process bywhich this definitive text is established, and
it consists in some act or procedure which certifies the text as the correct
and authentic text.25
The text of a treaty is established as authentic and definitive: (a) by such
procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the States
participating in its drawing up; or (b) failing such procedure, by the signa-
ture, signature ad referendum or initialling by the representatives of those
States of the text of the treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorpor-
ating the text.26
21The terminology of intrinsic versus extrinsic, which is appropriated for its suitability
here and also by Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 118, was ori-
ginally introduced by Charles de Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation judiciaire en droit
international public (Paris: Pedone, 1963).
22UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32(a) and (b).
23Paul Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (Kegan Paul Intl, 1995), 30, para. 65.
24Lord McNair, as quoted by John F. Avery Jones, ed., ‘Interpretation of Tax Treaties’,
Bulletin for International Taxation, no. 2 (1986): 76.
25ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:195, para. 1.
26UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 10.
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The immediate implication for the interpretation of treaties with their
text in more than one language is that all language texts form part of the
context definition under Article 31(2).27 If we neglect the existence of Article
33 for themoment, this implies that all texts have to be considered authentic
means of interpretation to which more relative weight must be attributed
than to supplementary means.28 Therefore, a legal obligation to compare all
language texts as part of the context could be construed from Article 31 in
the absence of Article 33.29
During the drafting period of the VCLT the Israeli government proposed
that Article 31 should explicitly codify a comparison of all texts because the
utility of such comparison extended beyond the decider function in case of
textual differences.30 This suggestion was not implemented in the VCLT,
which raises the question how multiple language texts relate to each other
for purposes of interpretation: Do all considered together constitute the text
or each considered by itself? Once more the consequences of the answer are
non-trivial: the former implies that considering one text in isolation can
never make the treaty accessible in its entirety, whereas the latter implies
that such is possible in principle.
To answer the question, a look under the hood of Article 33 is neces-
sary. Its construction rests on two basic propositions. The first, henceforth
denoted as p, is the fundamental principle of unity:
27See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 544.
28See ibid., 390.
29In addition to all texts forming part of the context, the requirement to interpret a treaty
‘in light of its object and purpose’ enshrined in Article 31(1) also implies a legal oblig-
ation to compare the texts if such must be presumed to be necessary to appreciate the
full object and purpose, see Christopher B. Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual
Treaties: Comparison of Texts Versus the Presumption of Similar Meaning’, Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1991): 963, 73n, with reference to Hans
van Loon, ‘The Hague Conventions on Private International Law’, in Further Studies
in International Law, ed. Francis Geoffrey Jacobs and Shelley Roberts, vol. 7, United
Kingdom Comparative Law Series (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987), 221, 238; Freder-
ick A. Mann, ‘Uniform Statutes in English Law’, in Further Studies in International Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 284–85.
30See ILC, Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth
Session Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, vol. II, Year-
book of the International Law Commission 1966, A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add.1 (United
Nations, 1967), 92, 301, para. 16(h).
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[I]n law there is only one treaty – one set of terms accepted by the parties
and one common intention with respect to those terms – even when two
authentic texts appear to diverge.31
This principle is a presumption of law that cannot be rebutted.32 It consti-
tutes the fundamental axiom from which all further analysis must depart.
In essence, it is a statement of numerical identity: A = A, A being the treaty.
As we have seen above, we ought to treat the text as if it were the treaty.
Given that there may exist several language texts each of which has been
established as definitive through the process of authentication, we can now
better classify this as if it were relation between the treaty and its text,
namely, as a relation of qualitative identity, because numerical identity is
an analytic one-one relation a priori, whereas the relation between a treaty
and the language of its text is potentially one-many.33
To say that a text is qualitatively identical to the treaty implies that both
equally feature certain relevant properties as a result of which they may be
qualified as the same. With respect to the treaty and its text, the relevant
property for sameness consists in the text expressing the full content of the
treaty, which must be presumed to be the case once a text in a particular
language has been authenticated.34
31ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6.
32See Jörg Manfred Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, Archiv des
Völkerrechts, Bd. 15, no. 3. H. (1972): 282; Ulf Linderfalk,On the Interpretation of Treaties:
The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Springer, 2007), 356.
33Aristotle is the first to elaborate on the difference between numerical and qualitative
identity extensively, see Aristotle, Topics (The Internet Classics Archive, 350 B.C.),
Book 1, Part 7; Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 4; Book V, Part 9. For refined
considerations, see Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Metaphysische Abhandlung, ed. Ul-
rich Johannes Schneider (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002); Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Kegan Paul, 1922); Gottlob Frege, ‘Über Sinn
und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 1892, 25–50; Saul
A. Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Identity and Individuation, ed. Milton K. Munitz,
1st ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1971); Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Ne-
cessity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980).
34The same applies to unilingual treaties: the as if it were relation between the treaty and
its text in only one language is also one of qualitative not numerical identity. This is
embodied by the VCLT allowing for the correction of errors under Articles 48(3) and
42
3.2. Preliminary Considerations
As a corollary, the variable language must be regarded as explicitly ex-
cluded by p from the sum of properties rendering the text qualitatively
identical to the treaty, or else there could not be multiple language texts.
On the basis of p, multiple language texts imply that language is irrelev-
ant for the essential property of expressing the full content of the treaty:
once authenticated, any language text must be presumed to express the full
content of the treaty and therefore any other text until proven otherwise.35
In summary, there is only one treaty with one set of terms, the text rep-
resents the treaty, and each text constitutes the definitive text by way of
authentication, wherefore all texts must be considered the same in their
content even though the wordings in the different languages may differ.
Hence, on the basis of p, the answer to the above question must by means
of a logical tautology be that each text constitutes the text (that is, treaty).36
The second proposition on which the VCLT rules are based, henceforth
denoted as q, is that discrepancies between the texts attributable to language
are a material reality:
Few plurilingual treaties containing more than one or two articles are
without some discrepancy between the texts. The different genius of
the languages, the absence of a complete consensus ad idem, or lack of
sufficient time to co-ordinate the texts may result in minor or even major
discrepancies in the meaning of the texts.37
This raises the question whether the point made is one of logical necessity
or merely a fact of life. The former would mean that the practice of states to
79 VCLT. Such errors constitute defects of the text in its intended relation of qualitative
identity with the treaty, and their correction does not imply a change or amendment of
the treaty in substance (the corrected text applies ab initio under Article 79(4) VCLT)
but merely a correction of the identified failure of the text to properly display the
intended property of expressing the full content of the treaty, see ILC, Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 273, para. 6.
35Identity is a transitive relation: if A = B and B = C, then A = C, viz., if A = B and A = C,
then B = C.
36In the technical sense of an analytical truth a priori but essentially redundant statement.
To say that each of the authentic language texts is the text provides no new information;
it states something true while saying nothing really meaningful (in the sense that we
learn nothing new from that statement about the treaty), see Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, passim, by analogy.
37ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6.
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conclude treaties in plurilingual form is fundamentally flawed, whereas the
latter implies that it is only corrupted by practical implementation. From
the presumption that the genius of every language is different, discrepan-
cies seem to follow as a logical necessity.38 We may safely leave this dis-
cussion to the linguists because the corollary of p, that is, all texts are qual-
itatively identical, can only be reconciled with q, that is, most texts differ,
if differences between the texts can be reconciled by way of interpretation.
Otherwise q would amount to not-p, and p and q would contradict each
other.
If q would indeed have to be considered true as a logical necessity, the
exclusion of language as a material factor by p, that is, the practice of states
to conclude treaties in plurilingual form, would have to be questioned as
fundamentally flawed. Hence, the premiss of language being an immaterial
factor implicit in p is challenged by q as unsound. In the face of q, it has to
be reformulated into language ought to be an immaterial factor, because the
principle of unity contained in p requires that there is only one treaty with
one set of terms. Since p may not be immaterial by definition, q must be
shown to be immaterial by way of interpretation, in the sense of although
the expression differs, the meaning is the same.
In summary, we first of all ought to treat any text as if it were the treaty,
because we have no separate underlying agreement at our disposal against
which the text could be gauged other than the one expressed by the texts
themselves. Secondly, based on the principle of unity, we ought to depart
from the assumption that all texts must equal each other in meaning even
if they differ from each other in expression. Crucially, however, both the
content of each text and the sameness of all texts in this respect can be es-
tablished only by way of interpretation in view of q. There is a fundamental
tension between p and q that requires dissolution because p and q contra-
dict each other if q holds true and the difference in expression cannot be
shown to be immaterial in view of p, while q also implies that any text may
single-handedly fail to convey the full content of the treaty (and the other
38According to Ajulo, ‘linguists are unanimous in the view that no language can express
fully any idea primarily conceived in another language’, Sunday Babalola Ajulo, ‘Myth
and Reality of Law, Language and International Organization in Africa: The Case of
African Economic Community’, Journal of African Law 41, no. 1 (1997): 40.
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texts) because of linguistic ambiguities or mistakes in the authentication
process.
As a corollary, because p requires that ‘every effort should be made to
find a common meaning for the texts before preferring one to another’,39
q requires that all texts are considered together for purposes of interpret-
ing the treaty, because to establish whether p holds true, that is, whether q
amounts in fact to not-q after careful consideration, there is no exogenous
variable against which the texts could be gauged, but the texts can only be
gauged against each other and therefore have to be considered together in
order for the interpreter to safely arrive at their common meaning consti-
tuting the true content of the treaty.40
Apart from the Israeli government cited above, this view was strongly
endorsed by Rosenne, who argued for an explicit inclusion of a comparison
of texts among the means of interpretation and concluded that the general
rule of interpretation would be deficient without.41 His proposal has not
been implemented, and its underlying rationale is not supported by the ma-
jority of scholars to date. From the prominent academics in international
tax law, only Klaus Vogel seemed to have adhered to it initially:
With respect to bilingual or multilingual agreements, Art. 33 VCLT provides
. . .that the original versions in each language are equally binding. . . .The do-
mestic judge, therefore, when interpreting treaties cannot and may not limit
39ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
40See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 126, 133–34, however, wrongly applied to cases inwhich a prevailing text ex-
ists, see Chapter 6, s. 6.2; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law,
545–46; Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, 282; Kuner, ‘The In-
terpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 961, with reference to M. Hudson, International
Legislation (1971), vol. V, x; Michael Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation, 1994, Ch.
20, 215, forcefully: ‘Because Article 33 of the VCLT provides that each authenticated
version of a plurilingual treaty is equally authoritative, all such versions should always
be interpreted – because they all comprise one composite treaty.’ This view has also
been held by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Johnson v Olson, 92 Kan. 819 142 P. 256
(1914): ‘The treaty must not only be construed as a whole, but where it is executed in
two languages both are originals and must be construed together’, as quoted by Kuner,
‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 955, 11n.
41ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, vol. I, Part II, Year-
book of the International Law Commission 1966, A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 (United Nations,
1967), 208–10, paras. 7–16.
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himself to the version of the treaty written in his mother tongue; he must
always refer to the foreign version as well.42
But, with reference to Engelen’s research and position, he qualified his view
in the 5th edition of his Commentary by inserting ‘as soon as doubts arise’
between the ‘must’ and the ‘always’.43
In the preliminary general part of his Commentary, Wassermeyer seems
to take the position that always all language texts have to be considered as
long as they are authenticated;44 however, he qualifies his view by stating
42Klaus Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary to the OECD,
UN and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Cap-
ital; with Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, 3rd ed. (London: Kluwer, 1997),
38, para. 72.
43Klaus Vogel and Moris Lehner, eds., Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar
auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 5th ed. (München: Beck, 2008), 141, para. 111,
referring to Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 384. This
has been continued by the 6th German version, edited by Moris Lehner after Klaus
Vogel’s death, see Moris Lehner, ed., Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar
auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen (begründet von Klaus Vogel), 6th ed. (München:
Beck, 2015), 196, para. 111. In contrast, the new 4th English edition still implements
the wording of the 3rd English edition quoted above, equivalent to the 4th German
edition, see Ekkehart Reimer and Alexander Rust, eds., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation
Conventions, 4th ed. (The Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015), 40, para.
87; Klaus Vogel andMoris Lehner, eds.,Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar
auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 4th ed. (München: Beck, 2003), 151, para. 111.
Whether this material difference of the new 4th English edition to the 5th and 6th Ger-
man editions is intentional or merely the result of translating the respective paragraph
in the introduction to the 4th German edition is not entirely obvious. In view of what
the editors state in their preface, the latter seems more likely, however, not guaranteed:
‘As from the 4th edition, the time for exact translations of the German book has elapsed,
Klaus decided to separate the English from the German version and asked us to strive
for a new Commentary – in the tradition of his previous English editions, but as an in-
ternational endeavour with a higher degree of equidistance to national treaty practice
and case law. . . .The result is an almost entirely new book.With the exception of Klaus’s
Introduction, which of course has gained the status of a classic and has undergone only
careful but minor updating, we have started anew. All important developments since
1997 have been integrated.’
44See Franz Wassermeyer, ed., Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppel-
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in his Commentary on Article 3 of the OECD Model that because of the
general presumption of all texts being congruent, it is justified to rely only
on the text in the official language of the state applying the treaty as long
as there is no concrete evidence for a divergence.45
3.3. The VCLT Framework
3.3.1. The Content of Article 33
Article 33 comprises four paragraphs. Paragraphs (1) to (3) enshrine the
principle of unity. Paragraph (1) stipulates equal authority of all authentic-
ated texts unless parties agree otherwise, while paragraph (2) provides that
non-authenticated versions have equal authority only if parties agree so.
Paragraph (3) is a presumption that the terms of the treaty have the same
meaning in each text. The presumption is not based on empirical evidence
but on the principle of unity. In contrast to the underlying principle itself,
however, the presumption is fully rebuttable in view of q and paragraph (4),
in the sense that the presumption ceases to be effective when there is a di-
vergence between the texts.46 In light of q and paragraph (4), paragraph (3)
must be read as stating that the terms of the treaty ought to be assumed to
have the same meaning except when, as a matter of fact, they do not. In the
latter case some further interpretative effort is necessary to reconcile the
texts and establish a common meaning under paragraph (4), which states
that the meaning that best reconciles the texts with regard to the object and
purpose shall be adopted when a divergence cannot be resolved under the
general rule of interpretation.47
In terms of a comparison of texts, this essentially implements the posi-
tion of Special Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock. Based on both concep-
tual and practical considerations, he argued against the explicit inclusion of
besteuerungsabkommen, vol. I (München: Beck, 2016), MA, Vor Art. 1, 37, para. 47.
45See ibid., MA, Art. 3, 54–55, para. 83.
46See Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 955; Peter Germer, ‘Interpreta-
tion of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties’,Harvard International Law Journal 11 (1970): 414; Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung
mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, 300.
47Article 33(4) will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.
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such comparison among the principal means of interpretation. According
to him, including it would be ‘undermining the security of the individual
texts’ and for themost part only contribute to distort interpretation because
of the inherent differences in languages. For this reason, each text should be
interpreted in the context of its own language, and a comparative interpret-
ation should be conducted only if in the course of such separate interpreta-
tion a problem in form of an ambiguity or divergence arises. In addition, he
argued that the inclusion of a comparison would introduce additional prac-
tical difficulties and create an extra burden to the disadvantage of countries
lacking the needed resources.48
Noteworthy, his conceptual argument emphasises p by pointing to the
reality of q. It argues that in order to avoid two-way distortion of each text’s
meaning by idiosyncrasies of the other language transplanted out of con-
text, it is essential to first interpret the texts separately according to their
own idiomatic construction:
It is one thing to admit interaction between two versions when each has
been interpreted in accordance with its own genius and a divergence has
appeared between them or an ambiguity in one of them. But it is another
thing to attribute legal value to a comparison for the purpose of determin-
ing the ordinary meaning of the terms in the context of the treaty; for this
may encourage attempts to transplant concepts of one language into the in-
terpretation of a text in another language with a resultant distortion of the
meaning.49
This does not reject the need for a comparative interpretation altogether, but
only excludes it from the principal elements of interpretation and confines
it to the point in time when interpretation of each text separately has been
concluded and a problem between the outcomes remains. Thus, it is much
more an argument concerning the mechanics of comparing texts than one
against the necessity of such comparison in principle.
48See ILC, Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth
Session Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, II:100, para. 23;
ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:211, para.
35.
49ILC, Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session
Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, II:100, para. 23.
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3.3.2. The Prevailing View
Engelen has formulated the currently prevailing view in his seminal study
on tax treaty interpretation.50 Its fundamental proposition is that courts are
not obliged to compare all texts but, based on Article 33(3), may rely on a
single one for purposes of ‘routine interpretation’.51 Yet, this reliance should
be exercised in good faith, that is, a single text may be relied on only until
either an inclarity in the text used arises or a divergence between the texts
is discovered.52
Engelen’s own position seems to be more advanced. He recognises the
risk that, as a consequence of the routine interpretation approach, textual di-
vergences may be overlooked easily, which leads to misapplication of treat-
ies.Therefore, contracting states may find themselves in the position of hav-
ing violated their international obligations if it is established subsequently
that the text relied on did not accurately reflect the treaty’s meaning.53
Noteworthy, this risk is particularly high for tax treaties. In a normal
state-state dispute under the jurisdiction of an international court each state
will likely argue on the basis of the text in its own language, and the court
will have to deal with the language issue automatically. A taxpayer-state dis-
pute, however, arises within one state under the jurisdiction of that state’s
domestic courts. Hence, as a practical matter, if either party wants to gain
support for its arguments from the other language text, it may have to bring
it to the attention of the court. Engelen more or less ends with a warning in
this respect and draws no further conclusions concerning the application
of the VCLT rules to the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties.
The question arises what exactly we are to understand by ‘routine inter-
pretation’. Neither the VCLT nor its Commentary distinguishes between
different modes of interpretation according to which different principles
would apply. There is only one combined ‘General rule of interpretation’ –
the singular is declaratory in terms of substance.54 In essence, the notion
of ‘routine interpretation’ does not relate to any category of interpretation
50See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 384–88, 419, 546.
51Henceforth referred to as routine interpretation approach.
52See ibid., 388–90, 546.
53See ibid., 389–91.
54UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.
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under international law but is a construct introduced by scholars.
Several authors echo the terminology explicitly,55 whereas others merely
paraphrase the theory behind it.56 Waldock’s argument in favour of relying
on a single text until a ‘difficulty arose’ or, more precisely, until ‘a diver-
gence has appeared between them or an ambiguity in one of them’ serves
as the common point of departure.57 Tabory refers to the ‘absence of a spe-
cific problem’ and provides a scheme of interpretative steps for which she
distinguishes between a ‘problem or lack of clarity’ and a ‘difference of
meaning’.58 Kuner points to the necessity of an ‘allegation’ to be made in
terms of ‘an ambiguity in one version or a difference among versions’,59
whereas Germer refers to an ‘alleged divergence between the different au-
thentic language versions of the treaty’ only.60 Gardiner contrasts scenarios
‘where there is no reason to believe that there is any issue affected by the
choice of language of the text which is being interpreted’ to those when a
‘difference or dispute over interpretation is presented to a court or tribunal’,
in which case a ‘comparison of texts is likely to be essential.’61 Hilf refers to
‘inclarities’ that appear and have to be resolved, or ‘divergences’ between
the texts that appear in ‘whatever way’, have become ‘visible’, the party
55See Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, 198, ‘routine under-
standing’ at 196; Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 361; Kuner paraphrases the theory
behind it, making use of the word ‘routine’, see Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multi-
lingual Treaties’, 954; Arginelli summarises the arguments of a number of scholars
quoting their terminology, see Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties,
248 et seq.
56See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 77; Germer, ‘Interpretation of Plurilin-
gual Treaties’, 412.
57See ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:211,
para. 35; ILC, Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eight-
eenth Session Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, II:100,
para. 23. This immediately begs the question how a divergence – in contrast to an am-
biguity – can ‘arise’ or ‘appear’ without it being raised by someone if only one text is
looked at. The vague language and passive form often found with the proponents of
the routine interpretation approach merely hides the underlying presupposition that
the issue is essentially one of procedural law (discussed in depth below).
58Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, 196, 177.
59Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 954.
60See Germer, ‘Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, 412.
61Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 360.
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‘stumbles on’, or is ‘confronted with’.62 In his comprehensive treatment of
the issue, he most thoroughly elaborates the crucial argument at the core of
the routine interpretation approach, namely, that a state may be considered
to have acted in line with its international obligations in good faith as long
as it does not wilfully risk misapplication of the treaty by continuing to rely
on a single text in the face of either inclarities or divergences.63
Drawing on Hilf, Engelen concludes that a single text can be relied on
as long as its interpretation leads to a ‘clear’ and ‘reasonable’ result and
no divergence ‘has come to light’, albeit under the risk that actual diver-
gences between the texts may stay undetected, which bears the danger of
treaty misapplication.64 In this context, he implicitly connects the criterion
of clarity to the wording of Article 32(a) and (b) for defining its scope and
concludes that when the interpretation of a single text under the general
rule of interpretation leads to an ambiguous, obscure, absurd, or unreason-
able result, the interpreter first has to refer to the other text(s) before having
recourse to supplementary means:
In conclusion, it is submitted that, when the interpretation of any one au-
thentic text in accordance with Article 31 VCLT leaves the meaning ambigu-
ous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, the
Vienna Convention system of interpretation and, in particular, the principle
of good faith requires the interpreter to first have recourse to the other au-
thentic texts in order to determine the meaning before recourse is had for
this purpose to the supplementary means of interpretation mentioned in
Article 32 VCLT.65
In summary, the fundamental proposition of the routine interpretation
approach is that any party to a treaty may in good faith rely on any single
text in isolation as long as the following two conditions are fulfilled:
c1: The text relied on is clear.
c2: There is no divergence between the texts.
62Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 72, 77, 80, 82.
63See ibid., 77–82, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, s. 7.6, in the context of state
responsibility.
64See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 390–91.
65Ibid., 390.
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Regarding condition c1, I agree with Engelen that clarity is to be defined
in terms of an interpretation under Article 31 not leaving the meaning am-
biguous or obscure or leading to a result that is manifestly absurd or un-
reasonable, that is, the scope of clarity is demarcated by Article 32(a) and
(b), or else the attribution of different weights by the VCLT to the differ-
ent means of interpretation would be upset. A wider colloquial definition
of inclarity that would imply a treaty could be classified as unclear before
all texts have been consulted to elucidate its meaning and, in consequence,
recourse to supplementary means to determine the treaty meaning could
be had before looking at the other texts does not find representation in
Articles 31–33.66 All texts are per definition of context under Article 31(2)
authentic means of interpretation, and supplementary means may be used
to establish the treaty meaning only in case an interpretation considering
all authentic means leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to
an absurd or unreasonable result. Apart from that, supplementary means
may be used only to confirm but not contest the meaning arrived at under
Article 31.
Regarding condition c2, some authors stress the importance of a diver-
gence being alleged by a party to the dispute. Engelen refers to the ICJ de-
cision on the territorial dispute between Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad,
which seems to follow this rationale:
The Treaty was concluded in French and Arabic, both texts being authen-
tic; the Parties have not suggested that there is any divergence between
the French and Arabic texts. . . .The Court will base its interpretation of the
Treaty on the authoritative French text.67
For additional support he quotes the American Law Institute, according to
which courts ‘may consider any convenient text unless an argument is ad-
dressed to some other text’.68 This line of argument will be subject to in-
66This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, s. 4.4.2.
67Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), ICJ (Annual Reports of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 1994), 6; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under Interna-
tional Law, 388–89.
68The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, vol. 1, 1987, 199, para. 2; see Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties
under International Law, 384–85. Noteworthy, this stance marks a departure by the
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depth considerations below; however, we may record already that the sug-
gestion does not necessarily correspond to the wordings of Article 33(1)
and (4), which only refer to cases of divergence in general and differences
inmeaning disclosed by a comparison of the texts, that is, to instances when
some kind of divergence exists, without delimiting the ways this has been
established or specifying who has instigated a comparison.
3.3.3. Critique of the Prevailing View
In the opinion of the proponents of the routine interpretation approach, Art-
icle 33 as a whole contains no obligation to conduct a comparison when the
text interpreted is clear, but the interpreter may rely in such case on the pre-
sumption in Article 33(3) as long as no divergence rebuts it. The argument
rests on the absence of any divergence but remains silent as to how that
condition has been established. Unlike an inclarity, however, a divergence
might not come to the attention of the interpreter without a comparison
of texts.69 In order for the argument of the routine interpretation approach
to be valid, it must be the case that the presumption actually gets rebutted
whenever a divergence rebutting it exits, or else reliance on the presump-
tion does not work as presupposed by the routine interpretation approach.
Hence, we may test its validity for the case of tax treaties with the help of
a simple thought experiment. The fundamental theorem looks as follows:
Proposition r1: Based on the presumption in Article 33(3), states may in
good faith rely on any single text in isolation if no cases exist or can be
conceived in which a divergence necessarily stays undisclosed while
interpretation of the text chosen leads to a clear result.
Proposition r2: Such cases exist or can be conceived for tax treaties.
Conclusion r1+r2: States cannot in good faith rely on any single text in
isolation; for tax treaties the presumption in Article 33(3) is rebutted
by default, and courts are obliged to compare all texts under Article
31(1) and (2), as they are part of the context.
American Law Institute and US Secretary of State from their previously held views, see
Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 955, with reference to Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §147(1)(i), 1965, andG. Hackworth,
Digest of International Law (1927), vol. V, 265.
69See Tabory,Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, 199; Kuner, ‘The Inter-
pretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 958.
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If we accept r1, the argument hinges on r2. For purposes of the following
discussion, it is assumed that the reader will agree with r1, so that an extens-
ive discourse about the principle of good faith and its application, which lies
beyond the scope of this study, is unnecessary.70 It is difficult to delineate
the scope of good faith in its application as a legal principle, because it rests
on the broader and less tangible moral concepts of honesty, fairness, and
reasonableness.71 Hence, there may be room to contest r1. Notwithstand-
ing, interpretation in good faith is an essential element of the pacta sunt
servanda rule if that rule ‘is to have any real meaning’72 – all rights and ob-
ligations under the treaty must, in their spirit as well as according to their
letter, be put into effect by the parties to the best of their abilities.73
Rejecting r1 would result in a softening of this legal obligation if we must
concede that correct interpretation is a matter of chance. As acknowledged
by the drafters of the VCLT themselves, divergences between texts of pluri-
lingual treaties are not a remote contingency but a considerable empirical
reality, if not even to be assumed a necessary result of the ‘different genius
of the languages’ a priori.74 This implicitly rejects Hilf’s and Engelen’s ar-
gument that states must be considered to conform to their international
responsibilities in good faith unless they wilfully ignore divergences, in the
sense that they might have a point if undetected divergences were a remote
contingency, but not when the existence of undetected divergences must be
considered systemic, in which case not consulting the other texts is as good
as wilfully ignoring divergences.
On the basis of the Natexis case discussed by Arruda Ferreira and
Trindade Marinho,75 the thought experiment conceived above can be
conducted to show that r2 is fulfilled for tax treaties. Imagine a bilingual
70For in-depth considerations, see Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under Interna-
tional Law, 33–34, 124 et seq.; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties,
154–58; Joseph F O’Connor, Good Faith in International Trade (Aldershot: Dartmouth
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991), Ch. 8.
71See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 123.
72ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:219, para. 5.
73See Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 363–68.
74See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6.
75Conseil d’État, Société Natexis Banques Populaires v France; Arruda Ferreira and Trindade
Marinho, ‘Tax Sparing and Matching Credit’.
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treaty the two texts of which are based on the OECD Model, but one says
‘subject to tax’ where the other says ‘liable to tax’, all other things being
equal. Both wordings are sufficiently unambiguous but mean different
things, namely, a tax is effectively paid versus a tax may potentially be
paid. This divergence between the texts will not disclose itself by looking
at one text in isolation, because the avoidance of double taxation as object
and purpose is not unequivocal in this respect: both subject and liable to
tax avoid double taxation. Therefore, interpretation of each text in isolation
under Article 31 may lead to two conflicting meanings, each of which may
be regarded as manifest and applicable by the judge if considered only by
itself.
Natexis may be considered a case exemplifying this. The issue raised by
it, that is, the difference in meaning between the Portuguese incidido and
the French supporté, is akin to the issue of difference in meaning between
liable and subject to tax in the OECD Model.76 Arguably, what happened
in Natexis is that the divergence resulted in the French text failing to con-
vey the full scope of the treaty’s object and purpose. Alternatively, the con-
clusion may be that the Conseil d’État simply made a mistake by missing
the true point of the object and purpose when interpreting the tax sparing
clause,77 provided that one agrees with the contention of the present au-
thor and the authors Arruda Ferreira and Trindade Marinho that the court
interpreted the treaty wrongly.78 In any case, it is safe to assume that there
76See Arruda Ferreira and Trindade Marinho, ‘Tax Sparing andMatching Credit’, 411, 92n.
77See ibid., 413.
78Natexis is not a case for which the position of the court could be defended by the reason-
ing that if one of two texts has a wider meaning, the court should adopt the narrower
one that harmonises with both texts and is doubtless in accordance with the common
intention, as applied by the PCIJ in The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ (Pub-
lications of the Permanent Court of International Justice 1922–1946, 1924). First, in
Mavrommatis the court did not intend to lay down a general rule, but the restrictive in-
terpretation applied was considered appropriate only for that particular case, see ILC,
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 225, para. 8. Second, the reas-
oning per se is hardly appropriate in a case of subject versus liable to tax. The more
restrictive subject to tax does not necessarily harmonise the intentions of the parties:
although it is included in the wider liable to tax, it sometimes means the opposite. This
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, s. 4.3.2. In respect of Conseil d’État,
Ministre du Budget c Ragazzacci, 2012, which may serve as a counterexample toNatexis,
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would have been a bigger chance for a different interpretation of the treaty
if the court had looked into the Portuguese text. In the same vein, it is safe
to assume that a Brazilian court interpreting the treaty would have reached
a different conclusion from the Conseil d’État merely by departing from the
Portuguese text. Such outcome is not in line with the objective of common
interpretation,79 which is inherent in the principle of unity.80 Since the Por-
tuguese text was not considered in Natexis,81 the question arises as to what
might happen if another French taxpayer claims the tax sparing credit in
a French court, now based on the divergence disclosed by the authors Ar-
the object and purpose may be considered to have satisfactorily solved the issue of li-
able versus subject to tax.With reference to the object and purpose being the avoidance
of double taxation, the Counsel d’Etat applied the English text and denied a refund of
the avoir fiscal, a granting of which would have led to double non-taxation because the
taxpayer would not have been subject to any tax in the UK on non-remitted dividends.
This differs from the Natexis scenario because there is still a difference between un-
intended double non-taxation and intended double exemption, which is particularly
important in the context of Natexis and the respective tax sparing clause, the meaning
of which does not necessarily disclose itself if only the text saying ‘subject to tax’ is
considered, because the object and purpose of a treaty is primarily to be obtained from
the text of the treaty, consistent with the textual approach to interpretation prescribed
by the VCLT, see Sinclair,The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 118. Even if the
treaty also states avoidance of abuse to be its goal, not all cases of double non-taxation
must necessarily be considered avoidance cases, see Ingo Jankowiak, Doppelte Nichtbe-
steuerung im internationalen Steuerrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), passim.
79See OECD,Model Tax Convention, 2017, ‘Introduction’, para. 5; Vogel and Lehner,Doppel-
besteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom
Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 142–
45, paras. 113–120; Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions: A Manual on the OECD
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 2001), pt.
E. 26.
80See Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 41, para. 75a; Reimer and Rust,
Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 43, para. 93.
81It should be mentioned that France is not a signatory to the VCLT. Notwithstanding, the
principles of treaty interpretation enshrined in the VCLTmay be considered part of the
corpus of customary international law. Consequently, they may be considered applic-
able also to countries that are not a party to the VCLT, see Philippe Martin, ‘Courts and
Tax Treaties in Civil Law Countries’, in Courts and Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam: IBFD,
2007), 4; Avery Jones, ‘Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, 75; Fothergill v Monarch Airlines
Ltd., 282; Thiel v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, [1990] 171 CLR 338, 356. This will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, s. 5.5.
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ruda Ferreira and Trindade Marinho. If this taxpayer – unlike Société Na-
texis Banques Populaires – would receive the credit with reference to the
Portuguese text, the result would be two differing court decisions and two
different tax treatments for taxpayers in the same situation on exactly the
same issue, that is, there would be a fragmentation of jurisprudence and,
likely, a breach of domestic principles of equality.
Now, althoughwemay indeed argue that an ambiguity of a single text ne-
cessitates reference to the others (as is acknowledged by the proponents of
the routine interpretation approach),82 we cannot make the argumentum a
contrario (argument from the contrary). It does not necessarily follow from
the mere fact of the text used being clear that we may regard its meaning
as the applicable one, because that mere fact alone tells us nothing about
the other texts and their meaning. The Young Loan Arbitration tribunal has
established in this regard that we may not rely on the clearer text automat-
ically because the meaning of the clearer text may not be the correct one in
the light of the object and purpose.83 Hence, without investigation whether
it portrays the correct meaning, giving primacy to one text from the outset
on grounds of it being more clear violates the principle of unity.84
It also violates the principle of effectiveness enshrined in the maxim ut
res magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be
made void), which has a double implication: teleological interpretations ren-
dering the text ineffective must be ruled out; however, because the treaty
must be understood to be intended to achieve some purpose, any interpret-
ation failing to achieve that purpose is equally incorrect.85 Thus, if there
are divergences between the texts of a treaty, we may not automatically
assume that the clearer one more accurately reflects the intended meaning.
82See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 388–90; Gardiner,
Treaty Interpretation, 360.
83See The Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Swiss Confederation, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America v The Federal Republic of Germany, Arbit-
ral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts (Reports of International
Arbitral Awards, 1980), 110, para. 40.
84See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 150–51.
85See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:219, para. 6; Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’, in International Law, ed.
Malcolm D. Evans (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 202.
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The clearer meaning may be more unequivocal with respect to static se-
mantics, that is, it may be well-formed regarding syntax and have a clear
meaning; however, that meaning may not necessarily be the true semantic
meaning because there is a difference between meaning and reference: the
meaning of a term is not necessarily congruent with its referent.86
Article 16 of the OECD Model may serve as an example: texts based
on the English version of the Model will use the term ‘board of directors’,
whereas texts based on the French versionwill read counsel d’administration
ou de surveillance instead. Similarly, texts based on the German translation
will read Verwaltungs– und Aufsichtsrat. The French and German termino-
logy corresponds to the respective French and German two-tier board sys-
tems of corporate organisation, whereas the English wording corresponds
to Anglo-Saxon style one-tier board systems. Hence, if each text is con-
sidered only by itself without a comparative perspective, they may be un-
derstood to refer to two distinct realities. If we assume treaties with Eng-
lish and French or English and German texts with precisely these properties
and underlying one-tier and two-tier board systems, each seems to have a
clear meaning in terms of static semantics when considered only by itself,
because the terms ‘board of directors’, counsel d’administration ou de sur-
veillance, and Verwaltungs- und Aufsichtsrat refer to clearly defined sets of
persons under domestic law;87 however, they do not refer to the same set,
and their referents may not correspond to the meaning to be established by
reconciling the meaning of the texts under Article 33(4).88
Now, if we may not assume that the clearer text more accurately reflects
the meaning when divergences between the texts have arisen, we may also
not assume that the text we are looking at conveys the one true meaning of
86See Frege, ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, 25–50; Hilary Putnam, ‘Meaning and Reference’,
The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 (August 1973): 699–711. Reference merely consists
in ‘a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g. names,
mental states, pictures) and objects’, Marga Reimer and Eliot Michaelson, ‘Reference’,
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer ed. (Stanford
University, 2016), before Introduction.
87The term ‘member of the board of directors’ is not defined in the OECD Model; there-
fore, it has to be interpreted according to domestic law ‘unless the context otherwise
requires’, OECD, Model Tax Convention, 2017, Article 3(2).
88See Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 956–57.
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the treaty merely because it is clear, even if no divergence has been raised.
Therefore, all texts must be compared to ensure that they provide the same
meaning even though each of them may convey a clear meaning when con-
sidered only by itself.89 With its interpretation of the presumption in Art-
icle 33(3), the routine interpretation approach creates a kind of interpreter’s
paradox concerning the interpretation of plurilingual treaties, analogous
to Erwin Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment colloquially known as
‘Schrödinger’s cat’:90 without a comparison, the interpreter cannot know
whether a divergence exists and, consequently, cannot know whether he is
required to conduct a comparison because the presumption in Article 33(3)
must be considered rebutted. This fundamental indeterminacy of the treaty
meaning resolves only when the interpreter makes the comparison and dis-
covers the meaning of all texts, that is, the interpreter’s action determines
the outcome.Therefore, the meaning of a single text interpreted in isolation
may not be considered clear in the sense of conveying the one true meaning
of the treaty. It may appear clear, but it remains indeterminate as long as
all texts have not been compared.91 In the words of Lord Wilberforce (by
analogy but nevertheless pertinent):
There it is not only permissible to look at a foreign language text, but ob-
ligatory. What is made part of English law is the text set out ‘in the First
Schedule’, i.e. in both Part I and Part II, so both English and French texts
must be looked at. Furthermore, it cannot be judged whether there is an incon-
sistency between two texts unless one looks at both.92
In summary, the fundamental proposition of the routine interpretation
approach may be considered valid and sound only when c1 and c2 are both
true. As formulated by its proponents, its stronger form presupposes that
‘if c1, then c2’, while its weaker form considers it sufficient for the funda-
mental proposition to be valid when c1 is true as long as nobody contests
c2. Both forms suffer from failure to acknowledge that c2 does not follow
89See Lang, ‘Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und authentische Vertragss-
prachen’, 405.
90See Erwin Schrödinger, ‘Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik’, Die
Naturwissenschaften 23, no. 48 (1935): 807–12.
91See Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, 301.
92Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 272 (emphasis added).
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analytically from c1 a priori, but whether c2 is true is a matter independent
from c1 and subject to empirical evidence. Therefore, the implicit presump-
tion of the routine interpretation approach in terms of the stronger form
is invalid as long as c2 is not established empirically by a comparison of
all texts. As regards the weaker form, such would treat the proposition ‘if
c1, then c2’ as a natural assumption subject only to a contingency of c2 to
be false, justifying not to look into the matter of whether c2 is true as long
as nobody contests it. But, as is also established case law,93 c1 is not suffi-
cient to justify the fundamental proposition of the routine interpretation
approach by itself, because clarity of a single text considered in isolation is
not a sufficient criterion under the VCLT framework of interpretation. In
addition, the thought experiment conducted has shown that, at least for tax
treaties, failure of c2 to be true cannot be considered a mere contingency
to be safely neglected in good faith until proven otherwise, but must be
considered a systemic problem. Therefore, an assumption for c2 to be true
without further investigation cannot be considered sound practice in view
of Article 26 VCLT.
3.4. The Impact of Domestic Procedural Law
The question arises whether procedural law has any bearing on the matter,
that is, whether the argument brought forward may depend to some extent
on the legal system from which one is departing.94 In a state-state dispute
under the jurisdiction of an international court, both parties are prone to
argue on the basis of their own language text. Tax proceedings, however,
are taxpayer-state disputes under the jurisdiction of the national courts of
one contracting state. Therefore, both parties have an incentive to argue on
the basis of the text in that state’s official language and, if the routine in-
terpretation approach is accepted, are less prone to look at the other text(s).
93See Young Loan Arbitration, 110, para. 40.
94In this section, the issue is discussed from the perspective of international law. Regard-
less of the conclusions, the anatomy of the current international tax system with na-
tional courts presiding over disputes that include international aspects remains to have
an important impact on the application of tax treaties in practice. Therefore, Chapter
7 will return to the matter from the domestic law perspective.
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In consequence, it less likely that divergences are raised while it is not less
likely that they exist.
Given this, the issue in question is whether the presiding court is under
an obligation to compare all texts, under no obligation but free to do so or
not, or prevented from comparing all texts. Based on all the aforesaid, my
conclusion has been strongly in support of the first. The view traditionally
advanced by scholars (which underlies the routine interpretation approach)
is that the answer depends on domestic procedural law and, in particular,
on whether and to what extent the court has to apply the law ex officio (by
right of office) subject to the principle of iura novit curia (the court knows
the law).95
The role of courts and the implementation of iura novit curia differs
between jurisdictions and, in particular, between civil and common law.96
In common law countries, the job of courts seems to be to decide disputes
on the basis of the arguments put before them. Although courts are not
precluded from raising arguments about something that the parties have
not pleaded and will do so concerning matters of public interest,97 it seems
95Parties do not need to plead the law, but it is the duty of the court to apply the appropri-
ate legal rules to the dispute brought before it, irrespective of what is pleaded by the
parties, see Mattias Derlén,Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law (Kluwer
Law International, 2009), 315 et seq; Lisa Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the CISG:
Resolution of the Faux Procedural Black Hole’, in Towards Uniformity: The 2nd Annual
MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference, ed. Lisa Spagnolo and Ingeborg Schwenzer (The
Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2011), 183; Lang, ‘The Interpretation of Tax
Treaties and Authentic Languages’, 20–21.
96See Frederick A. Mann, ‘Fusion of the Legal Professions?’, Law Quarterly Review 93
(1977): 369; Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law, 315. According
to Jacobs, however, a stark contrast between civil and common law in this respect is
misplaced, but the issue is rather one of degree between different jurisdictions, both
civil and common law, see Van Schijndel and van Veen v SPF, Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral Jacobs, Joined Cases C–430/93 and C–431/93 (ECR I–4705, 1995), paras. 33–35 and
41. Spagnolo suggests that ‘some version of iura novit curia exists in all jurisdictions.
Judges are presumed to know and empowered to apply the law, or at least the domestic
law. A “strict” approach to iura novit curia obliges the court to ex officio identify and
apply the substantive law it considers applicable to the case. A “soft” approach to iura
novit curia authorizes this, but does not demand it’, Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and
the CISG’, 185–186.
97For example, courts will refuse to enforce illegal contracts, see Bank of India v Trans
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not to be meaningful to suggest that they are legally obliged in this respect.
We may reformulate the routine interpretation approach accordingly:
Since the VCLT contains a presumption that ‘The terms of the treaty . . .have
the same meaning in each authentic text’,98 but no explicit instruction for
the judge to establish the truth of that presumption – only directions what
to do once the presumption has been rebutted, the duty to rebut the pre-
sumption is not covered by the VCLT but an issue to be determined under
domestic procedural law.99 Consequently, as long as domestic procedural
law attributes a passive role to the court presiding, failure of the parties to
the dispute to claim not-c2 is as good as c2 being true, and the judge may
in good faith rely on c1 alone to justify application of the routine interpret-
ation approach, that is, Article 33(3) may be understood to sanction treaty
interpretation on the basis of a single text in isolation as long as that text is
clear and nobody comes along to displace the presumption.
Formulated like this, the proposition appears valid, however, disturb-
ing on several accounts. As has been acknowledged by the drafters of the
VCLT, divergences must be expected to constitute the rule not the excep-
tion.100 Therefore, such reliance on the presumption contained in Article
33(3) downplays q and the need to defuse it via interpretation, basing itself
on the exception rather than the rule, which per se does not inspire confid-
ence in the interpretation effort. As we have seen, clarity of a single text by
itself is not a sufficient criterion to rely on for purposes of interpretation
Continental Commodity Merchants Ltd. & J. N. Patel, [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 427, 429, per
Bingham J.; Singh Butra v Ebrahim, [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 11, C.A., 13, per Lord Den-
ning; United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada, [1983] AC 168, HL, 189, per Lord
Diplock; Van Schijndel and van Veen v SPF, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para. 35;
Trevor C. Hartley, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law: The Major European Systems
Compared’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (1996): 288; Rainer Haus-
mann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’, The European
Legal Forum, Section I, no. 1 (2008): 6. Hence, according to Spagnolo, it may be more
correct to characterise this not as absence but a soft implementation of iura novit curia,
see Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the CISG’, 186.
98UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 33(3).
99See, by analogy, Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the CISG’, 184.
100See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6; Hilf,
Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 24; Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual
Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 82.
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under the VCLT framework. The outcome may be that ‘the tribunal may
find itself interpreting a text on the faulty assumption that it reflects the
meaning of the treaty as a whole, when in fact it contradicts the intended
meaning.’101 Consequently, such approach weakens p and fails to consist-
ently serve the pacta sunt servanda rule in practice.
In addition, since national procedural rules vary, so will outcomes. De-
pending on whether and to what extent the principle iura novit curia is
implemented in domestic procedural law, the presiding court may consider
itself to be obliged, free, or prohibited to refer to the other texts.102 Against
this state of affairs speaks that if tax treaties must be presumed to be ‘inten-
ded to reconcile national fiscal legislations and to avoid the simultaneous
taxation in both countries’,103 which necessitates some degree of common
interpretation,104 the realisation of such goal cannot be partly imposed on
the taxpayer (who is not even party to the treaty) but should be the full
responsibility of the courts of the contracting states because it must be con-
sidered the duty of the court presiding to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that its authoritative interpretation is the correct one.105 As Kuner observes,
‘if states are to see any value in concluding treaties, then the primary goal
of interpretation must be to reach a correct evaluation of their intent as
101Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, 199.
102See, by analogy, Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the CISG’, 183–84.
103Raoul Lenz, ‘Report on the Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions’ (Interna-
tional Fiscal Association, 1960), 294.
104See Vogel and Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der
Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 142–45, paras. 113–120; Klaus Vogel and Rainer
Prokisch, ‘Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions’, General Report (Rotter-
dam: International Fiscal Association, 1993), 62–63; Ekkehart Reimer, ‘Seminar F: Die
sog. Entscheidungsharmonie als Maßstab für die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungs-
abkommen’, Internationales Steuerrecht, no. 15 (2008): 554, s. 4.3; Klaus Vogel, ‘Über
Entscheidungsharmonie’, in Unternehmen Steuern: Festschrift für Hans Flick zum 70.
Geburtstag, ed. Franz Klein et al. (Köln: Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag KG, 1997), 1055–6;
Hans Flick, ‘Zur Auslegung von Normen des Internationalen Steuerrechts’, in Von der
Auslegung und Anwendung der Steuergesetze, ed. Günther Felix, Festschrift für Armin
Spitaler (Stuttgart: C.E. Poeschel, 1958), 158.
105This certainly applies in countries where the court is supposed to apply the law ex officio
subject to the principle iura novit curia, see Lang, ‘Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungs-
abkommen und authentische Vertragssprachen’, 405–6.
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expressed in the treaty.’106
Not only outcomes will differ but, depending on their domestic proced-
ural law, the burden of interpretation is divided unevenly between coun-
tries. Those that do not (or only softly) implement iura novit curia are sanc-
tioned to favour the text in their own official language and disregard the
others, which in substance violates the equal authenticity of all texts de-
clared by the treaty. If this leads to a situation that each treaty partner ap-
plies only its own text and a divergence between the texts is not detected
simultaneously by both treaty partners, the treaty will be split into two sets
of terms in violation of the principle of unity.
Results will vary not only between the contracting states but also within
jurisdictions. Two decisions of the same court on equivalent facts fulfilled
by two different taxpayers may differ if the taxpayer in the later proced-
ure raises the issue of a relevant divergence, whereas the taxpayer in the
earlier one had failed to do so. Such fragmentation of jurisprudence may be
questionable in view of applicable domestic law principles of equality and
legal certainty in the context of a general mission of courts to ensure con-
sistency in the application of law, as for example is the case for the Dutch
Hoge Raad, the German BFH, the French Conseil d’Etat, the Belgian Cour
de Cassation/Hof van Cassatie, and the US Tax Court.107
In view of all this, the question arises whether the fundamental proposi-
tion of the routine interpretation approach as reformulated above is sound.
When deciding the dispute as brought before it by the parties, the court
has to ensure that the international obligations covered by the treaty are
served,108 not only the law as argued by the parties. Failure to correctly in-
106Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 962.
107See Peter J. Wattel, ‘Tax Litigation in Last Instance in the Netherlands:The Tax Chamber
of the Supreme Court’, Bulletin for International Taxation 70, nos. 1 – 2 (December 2015),
s. 2.1; Rudolf Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal Fiscal Court: An Overview’, Bulletin for
International Taxation 70, no. 1/2 (December 2015), ss. 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.4, 4.5; PhilippeMar-
tin, ‘The French Supreme Administrative Tax Court’, Bulletin for International Taxation
70, no. 1 (2016), s. 3; Martin, ‘Courts and Tax Treaties in Civil Law Countries’, 7–9;
Myriam Ghyselen and Bernard Peeters, ‘The Court of Cassation as the Supreme Body
of the Judiciary in Belgium’, Bulletin for International Taxation 70, nos. 1 – 2 (Decem-
ber 2015), s. 1.2; Keith Fogg, ‘The United States Tax Court – A Court for All Parties’,
Bulletin for International Taxation 70, no. 1/2 (December 2015), s. 2.
108UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 26.
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terpret the treaty will result in a breach of those obligations.109 Hence, the
primary concern for the court should be to apply the correct principles of
interpretation. National procedural rules should be evaluated in respect of
their compatibility with those principles. If the conclusion is in the negative,
they must be discarded under Article 27 VCLT, which prohibits any party
to ‘invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty.’
In other words, national procedural law may not limit the application of
the VCLT principles of interpretation, but those principles take precedence.
The extent to which domestic procedural rules may be applied legitimately
is confined to the extent they do not impair the obligation of the contracting
state to perform its duties under the treaty.110 As pointed out by Lord Scar-
man (by analogy but nevertheless pertinent), ‘We may not take refuge in
our adversarial process, paying regard only to the English text, unless and
until one or other of the parties leads evidence to establish an inconsistency
with the French.’111
In summary, the applicable principles of interpretation are provided by
the VCLT. If those principles require a comparison of all texts in order for
them to be applied correctly, such is the duty of the court presiding over
the dispute; absence of argument by the parties to the dispute invoking the
other text(s) cannot affect such obligation.112
109Concerning our example based on the Natexis case, the real issue at stake is not that as a
result of neglecting the other text the taxpayer is unduly taxed, but that the balance of
taxing rights agreed on by the treaty partners and implemented via reciprocal restric-
tions of their sovereign taxing rights under the treaty is upset. In consequence, the tax
sparing credit is soaked up by the residence state in violation of the treaty.
110See, by analogy, Spagnolo, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the CISG’, 190–97.
111Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 293 (emphasis added).
112Nollkaemper provides a good summery account of the argument concerning the obliga-
tion of national courts to apply the VCLT rules of interpretation: ‘A first ground which
can provide a justification for the application of international rules of interpretation in
domestic courts is that such application may be an intrinsic part of the performance
of international obligations. This obligation to perform a treaty in good faith is then
extended to the principles of interpretation of treaties. There are two variations of this
argument. A strong version would say that there is a freestanding obligation to ap-
ply international principles of interpretation (the pacta sunt servanda principle would
then apply to the Vienna Convention . . .itself) and that this obligation would rest on
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Hence, we are back at the question of whether the interpretative frame-
work of the VCLT requires a comparison of all texts in order to ensure the
intended result, which has been answered in the affirmative for tax treaties.
The VCLT does not explicitly state this requirement, but it follows from a
valid combination of the supplied principles. All texts have to be compared
to establish the one true meaning of the treaty because of the otherwise
inherent indeterminacy attributable to an object and purpose that is not un-
equivocal in its application, wherefore clarity of any single text considered
in isolation is not sufficient to ensure that themeaning so established effects
what the parties to the treaty intended.
The fundamental proposition of the routine interpretation approach as re-
formulated, that the obligation to compare all texts is an entirely exogenous
variable to be established under domestic procedural law because the VCLT
is tacit in terms of explicit imperative language concerning such obligation,
must be rejected as unsound in view of the dictum that every reasonable
effort must be made to find a common meaning of all texts and no single
text must be preferred over the others until such effort is fully exhausted.113
national courts. Article 26 of the VCLT stipulates that “every treaty in force” has to
be performed in good faith – apparently not excluding the VCLT itself. Though the
VCLT is not expressly drafted in terms of “obligations”, it would seem that the entire
rationale of the treaty is that states are not at liberty to apply or refrain from applying
the provisions of the treaty. In that sense, the principles of interpretation, as a mat-
ter of obligation, have to be applied by states. . . .A weaker version of this argument
is that while states . . .may not be obliged to give effect to principles of interpretation
as a freestanding obligation, such principles inform the meaning and application of
the primary norms. Application of such principles may then not be obligatory as such,
but may be required to the extent that this would be necessary to ensure the effective
application of the international norm subject to interpretation. A failure to give effect
to an international obligation with the meaning and content it has at the international
level may constitute a wrongful act, for giving effect to an international norm that is
devoid of its international normative context may well be giving effect to a different
norm’, André Nollkaemper, ‘Grounds for the Application of International Rules of In-
terpretation in National Courts’, in The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic
Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence, ed. Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 37–38. The issue of state respons-
ibility will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, s. 7.6.
113See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7. Art-
icle 2 DARS, which lists the elements of internationally wrongful acts, refers to the
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3.5. A Refutation Based on General Hermeneutics
Above I have refuted the routine interpretation approach in respect of the
specific principles codified in the VCLT. In this section I shall add a refut-
ation based on general hermeneutics and the fundamental intention of the
VCLT to establish the textual meaning of a treaty:114
breach of an obligation and not a rule in letter (b). Its Commentary clarifies that ‘What
matters for these purposes is not simply the existence of a rule but its application in
the specific case. . . .The term “obligation” is commonly used in international judicial
decisions and practice and in the literature to cover all the possibilities’, ILC, Draft Art-
icles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries;
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
Document A/56/10, vol. II, Part 2, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001,
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (United Nations, 2001), 36, para. 13.
114Although concerned with a particular type of texts that, to some extent, have their own
logic, Articles 31–33 are not drafted as detailed technical instructions fundamentally
different from normal techniques of interpretation, but as general ‘principles of logic
and good sense’, which are merely supplemented by specific conventions regarding ca-
nonical means, see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:218–
26.This raises the question whether and to what extent treaty hermeneutics may ‘claim
any independent systematic significance’ from general hermeneutics, or whether the
former must be regarded merely ‘as a special application of’ the latter, see Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed.
(London; New York: Continuum, 2004), 321, by analogy. Treaty hermeneutics displays
some particular contours in this regard; however, the particularities that may be iden-
tified to distinguish interpretation of treaties from that of texts in general resemble
accentuations rather than clear demarcations completely separating treaty from gen-
eral hermeneutics. As pointed out by Arnold, ‘The basic interpretive approach set out
in Art. 31(1) should not strike anyone as novel. . . .The same three major elements –
the ordinary meaning of words (text), context, and purpose – form the foundation for
the interpretation of language generally. Tax legislation and tax treaties are no differ-
ent in this regard’, Arnold, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, 5. Therefore, a broader
perspective may be instructive: the thought and methodologies generated by general
hermeneutics may prove useful in the context of contemplating treaty interpretation,
and a historical perspective concerning the development of hermeneutics as a discip-
line may enable us to better classify scholarly theories and reject overcome ideas. This
is particularly so because the VCLT rules provide only a general framework, while
their application in detail is left to the interpreter, who is still required to apply a solid
hermeneutic approach in general, see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, 218, para. 4.
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‘[T]he ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract
but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose.’115
Accordingly, the meanings of terms in a treaty are not to be confused with
their literal meaning but must be considered in their contextual relation to
other terms in the text and the purposive structure of both the provisions
they are part of and connected with, as well as the treaty as a whole.116
In its particular relation to treaty interpretation, this implements the idea
of the hermeneutic circle, which has been introduced by Friedrich Schlei-
ermacher in a series of lectures in the beginning of the 19th century.117
115Ibid., II:221, para. 12.
116See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia vThailand), Preliminary Objections, 32: ‘the Court
considers that it must interpret Thailand’s 1950 Declaration . . .as a whole and in the
light of its known purpose, . . .words are to be interpreted according to their natural and
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur’; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United
Kingdom v Iran), 104; Inland Revenue Commissioners v Commerzbank, 297–298, per
Mummery J;Memec Plc v Inland Revenue Comissioners, [1998] STC 754, 766g; Fothergill
v Monarch Airlines Ltd, 272, 279, 285, 290, 294, per Lords Wilberforce, Diplock, Fraser
and Scarman; Sportsman v IRC, [1998] STC (SCD) 289, 293: ‘There is no such thing as
an abstract ordinary meaning of a phrase divorced from the place which that phrase
occupies in the text to be interpreted’; Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 121; Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.4.4. Regarding legal hermeneut-
ics, this may be traced back to Roman law: ‘Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua
particula eius proposita iudicare vel respondere’ (it is unlawful to pass judgement or ex-
pert opinion according to any provision of a law without considering the whole law),
see Okko Behrends et al., Corpus Iuris Civilis II: Digesten 1-10, 1st ed. (Heidelberg: C.F.
Müller, 1995), 114. Concerning language in general, see Gottlob Frege, Die Grundla-
gen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl
(Breslau: Verlag von Wilhelm Koebner, 1884), s. 62: ‘Only in the context of a sentence
do words have any meaning’, translation by John Wallace, ‘Only in the Context of a
Sentence Do Words Have Any Meaning’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2, no. 1 (1977):
144–46, 144; Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, s. 3.3: ‘Only the proposition
has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.’
117Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik: mit besonderer Beziehung auf
das Neue Testament (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1838), 36–37, 39. Mantzavinos provides an Eng-
lish translation of one of Schleiermacher’s formulations: ‘that the same way that the
whole is, of course, understood in reference to the individual, so too, the individual can
only be understood in reference to the whole’, C. Mantzavinos, ‘Hermeneutics’, in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall ed. (Stanford University,
2016), s. 2.This is not intended to submit logically circular reasoning – the circle is but a
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Schleiermacher’s deliberations have been pivotal for the development of
hermeneutics as a discipline: they mark the historical point at which the
division into subject specific theoretical constructions is overcome and a
general theory of hermeneutics as a fundamental discipline is developed.118
metaphor. In Schleiermacher’s view, interpretation is a holistic task: all linguistic, psy-
chological, and historical elements have to be considered together in light of each other.
Single text passages can only be understood in the context of the text to which they
belong, which in turn can only be understood in its overall context.The interpreter can-
not consider everything all at once but has to begin somewhere, expand his focus, and
work his way towards full comprehension. From reading single text passages, he may
develop a provisional understanding of them and, in their comparative consideration,
the text as whole, which he may then refine by considerations of the psychological
and historical context. The result may be reapplied to the individual passages to refine
their interpretation, which in turn leads to an improved overall understanding, and so
forth. Interpretation is thus a process of approximation that oscillates between con-
templation of the parts and the whole in light of each other and gradually increases
understanding along a spiral of interactive refinement – hence the image of a circle:
‘Such holism introduces a pervasive circularity into interpretation, for, ultimately, in-
terpreting these broader items in its turn depends on interpreting such pieces of text.
Schleiermacher does not see this circle as vicious, however. Why not? His solution is
not that all of these tasks should be accomplished simultaneously – for that would far
exceed human capacities. Rather, it essentially lies in the (very plausible) thought that
understanding is not an all-or-nothing matter but instead something that comes in de-
grees, so that it is possible to make progress toward full understanding in a piecemeal
way’, Michael Forster, ‘Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher’, in The Stanford Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall ed. (Stanford University, 2017), s. 4. The
VCLT conception is very similar: treaty interpretation is to be regarded a holistic ‘single
combined operation’ – all means are to be thrown into the ‘crucible’ and weighed by
the interpreter in light of each other, see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, 219–220, para. 8. Of course, the court has to start somewhere. Typically,
it begins with a consideration of the words, which are then analysed in an ‘interactive
process’ in light of the other means, see ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Sixty-fifth Session, 6 May – 7 June and 8 July – 9 August 2013’, Doc.
A/68/10 (United Nations, December 2013), Ch. 4, 18, para. 14.
118Although important efforts to establish a hermeneutica generalismay be traced back sev-
eral centuries before him to Dannhauer and others, Schleiermacher’s workmay be seen
as the culmination of this process, see Böhl, Meinrad, Wolfgang Reinhard and Peter
Walter, Hermeneutik: die Geschichte der abendländischen Textauslegung von der Antike
bis zur Gegenwart (Böhlau Verlag Wien, 2013), passim; Joisten, Karen, Philosophische
Hermeneutik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag GmbH, 2009), 17–18, 82, 96–97; Mantzavinos,
‘Hermeneutics’, Introduction.
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Schleiermacher distinguishes between a lax and a rigorous approach to
interpretation. The lax approach departs from the idea that understanding
happens automatically; its goal is merely the avoidance of misunderstand-
ing. Conversely, the rigorous approach departs from the idea that misunder-
standing happens automatically, whereas understanding must be actively
pursued.119 In consequence, the lax approach is content with an exegesis of
single text passages that appear obscure, and therefore remains an agglom-
eration of unconnected sporadic observations,120 whereas the rigorous ap-
proach investigates texts in a systematic manner from the start, considering
the meanings of all terms in their entire context.
Schleiermacher concludes that the lax approach does not qualify as a sci-
entific method, but methodical interpretation must begin from the moment
a reader wants to understand the content of a text, not only once he encoun-
ters passages that make him lose confidence about the level of his under-
standing, because when understanding blurs concerning specific passages,
it is a sign that efforts to understand have been neglected beforehand in a
more fundamental way.The ultimate goal of interpretation is to understand
a text first as good as and finally better than its author.121
119Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik, 29 et seq.
120An example of such approach in the legal context would be Vattel’s view: ‘The first
general maxim of interpretation is, that It is not allowable to interpret what has no need
of interpretation.When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms, – when its meaning
is evident, and leads to no absurd conclusion, – there can be no reason for refusing to
admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents. . . .Since the sole object of the
lawful interpretation of a deed ought to be the discovery of the thoughts of the author
or authors of that deed, – whenever we meet with any obscurity in it, we are to consider
what probably were the ideas of those who drew up the deed, and to interpret it accordingly.
This is the general rule for all interpretations. It particularly serves to ascertain the
meaning of particular expressions whose signification is not sufficiently determinate’,
de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ss. 263 and 270. It is obvious how such would fail in the
context of plurilingual treaties when interpreting a single text in isolation, mistaking
its interpretation for the meaning of the treaty. As established above, clarity of a single
text in isolation is no definitive criterion for the meaning of a plurilingual treaty in the
absence of a prevailing text, see also Young Loan Arbitration, 110, para. 40.
121See Schleiermacher,Hermeneutik und Kritik, 32. According to Schleiermacher, every text
is conceived and must be understood from a double perspective, namely, the totality
of language and the totality of the author’s thought process. From this he deduces two
fundamental hermeneutic methods that he labels ‘grammatical’ and ‘psychological’.
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This conception resonates with the VCLT general rule of interpretation.
The stipulation that the meaning of the treaty is not the literal but the or-
dinary meaning arrived at under an interpretation of its terms in good faith
in their context and in the light of their object and purpose paraphrases
Schleiermacher’s rigorous approach to interpretation. Larenz and Canaris
submit a similar conception concerning legal texts in general when they
conclude that
It would be a misconception to assume that legal texts would require in-
terpretation only where they appear to be particularly ‘dark’, ‘unclear’, or
‘contradictory’. Rather, all legal texts are, as a cardinal rule, both capable of
being interpreted and in need of interpretation.Their need for interpretation
is not a ‘shortage’ that could be remedied by efforts to draft an as precise as
possible final version, but will remain for as long as not all legislation, court
rulings, and even contracts will be drawn up exclusively in a symbolised
sign language.122
Also Schleiermacher’s formulated goal of understanding the text first as
good as and finally better than its author resonates. Treaties are drafted
in general terms to be applied to a wide variety of scenarios, which are
not all imagined by the drafters in detail. When applying the treaty to the
facts of a particular case, the judge first has to understand the intentions
of the contracting states as expressed in the treaty text(s) as good as the
contracting states themselves and finally better in the sense that he has to
judge how these intentions should apply to particular circumstances the
The first concerns understanding of an expression in relation to the language it is part
of, while the second understands any utterance as part of a speakers life process. The
grammatical method then attempts to understand a text on the basis of the total use of
language by a given lingual community, employing linguistic and literary knowledge,
while the psychological method attempts to duplicate the thought process of the author
from a historical perspective, employing knowledge of the author’s entire work as well
as the work of his contemporaries in order to comprehend the entire background of the
author’s thinking. Both are equally important in understanding a text and, therefore,
have to be employed on an equal footing in the interpretative process, as a result of
which understanding a text better than its author becomes possible from a historical
vantage point.
122Larenz and Canaris, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 26, with reference to Hart’s
‘open texture’ argument, see Hart, The Concept of Law, 123.
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contracting parties did not foresee.123
In contrast, the currently prevailing view concerning plurilingual treaty
interpretation, that it is save to ignore the other language texts as long as
no problem in form of an ambiguity or divergence arises, appears like a for-
mulation of the lax approach. Certainly, any comparable suggestion would
not be accepted as a sound method of interpretation in the discourse on
general hermeneutics since Schleiermacher.124
3.6. Reliance on the Original Text
When judges are faced with a divergence between the texts of a treaty, the
natural reflex may be to give preference to the one they can identify as the
text of negotiation and drafting.125 Scholars who have engaged in compar-
ative studies of court decisions have identified such practice and provided
comprehensive argument in its favour. Hardy leads the way: based on im-
perative reasoning, he concludes that in the case of incompatible texts there
must be an obvious drafting error. Such would not justify declaring the
treaty as defective, but only the text with the error. It would then be normal
123See Gadamer, Truth and Method, 324: ‘The judge who adapts the transmitted law to
the needs of the present is undoubtedly seeking to perform a practical task, but his
interpretation of the law is by no means merely for that reason an arbitrary revision.
Here again, to understand and to interpret means to discover and recognize a valid
meaning. The judge seeks to be in accord with the “legal idea” in mediating it with the
present.’
124In respect of its theoretical conception, the routine interpretation approach may be
placed historically within the corpus of hermeneutic approaches that had focussed
predominantly on the interpretation of single dark passages, before the holistic turn ef-
fected by Schleiermacher, see Böhl, Meinrad, Wolfgang Reinhard and PeterWalter,Her-
meneutik, passim; Joisten, Karen, Philosophische Hermeneutik, passim. Even so it seems
unlikely that its reasoning (by analogy) would have been accepted by the prominent
hermeneutic theorists preceding Schleiermacher. For example, Saint Augustine, who
according to Heidegger provided ‘the first “hermeneutics” in grand style’, see Heide-
gger, Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity, 9, forcefully rejected interpretation of
a single translation in isolation as an unsound method and source of errors, see Saint
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine: A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fath-
ers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. 2 (Buffalo: The Christian Literature
Company, 1887), Book II, Ch. 11–12, paras. 16–18.
125Henceforth referred to as the original text.
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in such case to rely on the meaning of the original text because of it most
closely implementing the agreement of the contracting parties; however,
this would depend on the circumstances of the treaty’s conclusion, that is,
if (and to what extent) the negotiators were directly involved in the draft-
ing of the other texts, or whether those happened to be mere translations
by translators.126
Although supported by many scholars, this approach is not in line with
the VCLT.127 Before discussing this in detail, it is important to note that
Hardy’s pre–VCLT reasoning does not convince based on its own construc-
tion. His conclusion contradicts his own premiss that the point of agree-
ment on the common intention is the time of the treaty’s conclusion.128 If
at that time the treaty does not confer any superiority to the original text,
granting it decisive power over the others violates that clear common inten-
tion. As Hardy himself admits, the two principles of the superiority of the
original text and the equivalence of texts are mutually exclusive by defini-
tion.129
His supporting arguments of clear drafting errors and translation short-
comings also fail to convince. Such would have been identified and, if at all
possible, corrected by applying the means provided by Articles 31–33 be-
fore concluding that the meanings of the texts are incompatible. Once we
126See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 105, 151–52. Similar suggestions are made by Sinclair, The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, 152; Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties,
231–32, 241; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 205–6; Lang, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties
and Authentic Languages’, 21–22; Dinah Shelton, ‘Reconcilable Differences? The Inter-
pretation of Multilingual Treaties’, Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
20 (1997): 637; Josef Schuch and Jean-Philippe VanWest, ‘Authentic Languages and Of-
ficial Translations of the Multilateral Instrument and Covered Tax Agreements’, inThe
OECD Multilateral Instrument for Tax Treaties: Analysis and Effects, ed. Lang, Michael
et. al. (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2018), 84.
127See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:226, para. 9; Avery
Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.7.1.3; Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Perspective of International
Law’, in Multilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law, ed.
Guglielmo Maisto (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 92.
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arrive at the conclusion that the texts are incompatible after exhaustion of
all interpretative means provided by the VCLT, the suggestion that there is
a clear drafting error or translation mistake is unhelpful because a criterion
on the basis of which the defective text could be identified without doubt
is lacking, especially in the case of only two texts contradicting each other
without a third or more texts as additional context.
The argument that a choice must be made in all cases between texts with
incompatible wordings is invalid when the texts are equivalent concerning
the provision granting equal authority to all texts. Any other provision the
wording of which turns out contradictory between the texts cannot render
the provision granting equal authority to all texts defective, but must be
considered defective itself in view of such provision, that is, the provision
granting equal authority to all texts cannot at the same time be the reason
for and the object of the deficiency of other provisions. The conclusion
cannot be that because another provision is defective in view of the pro-
vision granting equal authority to all texts, the equal authority of all texts
must be modified. Rather, if no obvious error is identified in one text un-
der the application of Articles 31–33 and healed by interpretative means or
via agreement of the contracting states under Articles 48 and 79 VCLT, the
conclusion must be that the contradictory provision itself is defective and
the parties either failed to agree on the matter of the provision or failed to
properly express their agreement.130
Nevertheless, Arginelli picks up Hardy’s reasoning and goes as far as to
proclaim that because of it being the text in the language of negotiation
and drafting, it would be ‘illogical, unreasonable and unfair’ not to give the
original text special relevance, wherefore it should be treated as a ‘proxy for
the travaux préparatoires’ to reconcile apparent differences in meaning.131
130See Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 39, para. 72a. The 6th German
edition erroneously abandons this view still held by the 4th and 5th German editions
(Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet
der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der Grundlage der Musterab-
kommen (begründet von Klaus Vogel), 197, para. 112a), see next chapter, 30n. In contrast,
the new 4th English edition upholds Vogel’s earlier view (Reimer and Rust, Klaus Vogel
on Double Taxation Conventions, 41, para. 88). Whether this is intentional or the result
of translating the 4th German edition is not entirely obvious, see above, 43n.
131See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 231–32.
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In order to argue his suggestion, he conducts a survey of the arguments
of other scholars in support of this view, the travaux préparatoires of the
VCLT, and case law.132
He acknowledges that during the discussions at the ILC’s 874th meeting
the proposal of Mr Verdross to include an explicit provision giving prefer-
ence to the original text in case reconciliation of texts proved impossible
did not gather support.133 Yet, he contends that the idea of a treaty being
negotiated and drafted in a certain language conferring special weight to
the text in that language was generally recognised by the ILC, from which
he concludes that such a fact should be taken into account to the effect
that the intentions of parties ‘should be derived primarily from the draf-
ted texts and the supplementary means of interpretation’.134 As most grave
argument in support of his view he postulates a deficiency of translation
by definition citing Hardy and Rosenne,135 according to whom there is ‘all
the difference in the world between a negotiated version and one produced
mechanically by some translation service, however competent’.136 A sim-
ilar view has been put forward by the joint dissenting opinion in the Young
Loan Arbitration,137 which has influenced many scholars such as Sinclair.138
The argument deserves some consideration. Advocates of this view seem
to equate the proposition ‘X is a translation of Y’ with the proposition ‘X
fails to properly portray the meaning of Y in an equivalent manner’. But
unless one is convinced that there is no such thing as a proper translation
guaranteeing equivalence in meaning, the latter does not necessarily follow
132See ibid., 231–40.
133See ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:208,
para. 5, 210 para 22, 210–211, paras. 33–34 and 37.
134Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 232–36 (emphasis added).
135See ibid., 232.
136Shabtai Rosenne, ‘The Meaning of “Authentic Text” in Modern Treaty Law’, in An Inter-
national Law Miscellany (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 450.
137See Young Loan Arbitration, 140, paras. 40–41.
138See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 152. A similar position is
taken by Lang, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages’, 23–24;
Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, 290; Shelton, ‘Reconcilable
Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 637; Schuch and West, ‘Au-
thentic Languages andOfficial Translations of theMultilateral Instrument and Covered
Tax Agreements’, 84–85.
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from the former, that is, the latter does not qualify as an analytic propos-
ition a priori. Of course, translation is a process that may result in errors;
however, their existence may only be established in the light of empirical
evidence on grounds of the criteria laid down in the VCLT, that is, a yard-
stick to identify and measure the error is necessary. The view that there is
no such thing as a proper translation is not compatible with the accepted
international practice of states to conclude treaties with equally authoritat-
ive texts in different languages, the principle of unity, and the presumption
of equal meaning in Article 33(3). If one would subscribe to it, one would
in consequence be compelled to change the common practice concerning
the conclusion of treaty instruments as well as the underlying principles
themselves. Thus, any argument conferring general superiority to the ori-
ginal text implicitly based on the supposition that translation into another
language cannot create a text of equivalent meaning must be rejected – at
least in view of the status quo.139
In summary, there is no principle implemented in the VCLT rules that the
original text should be given more weight over the others, and the VCLT
Commentary explicitly denies such suggestion.140 As pointed out by Special
Rapporteur Sir Humphrey Waldock in the ILC’s 874th meeting, the defects
of the initially drafted text may be the source of the problem rather than the
solution; hence, any notion that the initially drafted text should necessarily
139For linguists this may of course be a topic of debate, see, e.g., Sergio Bolaños Cuéllar,
‘Equivalence Revisited: A Key Concept in Modern Translation Theory’, Forma y Fun-
ción, no. 15 (August 2010): 60–88, and Anthony Pym, ‘On History in Formal Conceptu-
alizations of Translation’, Across Languages and Cultures 8, no. 2 (January 2007): 153–
66; however, such discussion lies outside the scope of the subject matter at hand. As
long as states officially designate translated texts as equally authentic, faulty transla-
tion can only be an issue of errors and unwittingly introduced differences on a case by
case basis that are identified via the interpretative means provided by the VCLT, and
any supposition that translations are by definition inferior must be refused. The mere
fact that a text is a translation tells us nothing about whether it correctly conveys the
meaning of the treaty or its relative value versus the other texts in this respect, but its
value for interpretative purposes is determined by its status as authentic text alone.
140See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:226. para. 9; ILC,
Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:210–11, paras.
22, 33–34.
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prevail must be rejected.141 Like any other text, the original text may have
more or less weight depending on further evidence that shows there was
an obvious translation problem and the faulty translation does not suit the
object and purpose of the treaty; however, what is decisive in such case is
that there is indeed an identified particular translation error not in line with
the intentions of the contracting parties, not that the text happens to be a
translation.
The views of Hardy, Arginelli, and others in respect of the interpretative
value of the original text boil down to an implicit petitio principii (begging
the question) that runs counter to Articles 31–33. They do not interpret
but revise them. That courts in practice resort to the original text does not
establish its decisive weight as a matter of principle. Such recourse may
be justified in any particular case as outcome of an interpretation under
Articles 31–33, but not merely because of it being the initially negotiated
and drafted text while the others are translations. For example, in the of-
ten quoted LaGrand case the court observed in the proceedings that the
French text, the meaning of which it confirmed as applicable over that of
the English text invoked by the US, was the original one; however, it based
its decision on Article 33(4) and a corresponding analysis of the object and
purpose, which established the prevalence of the meaning as suggested by
the French text, not on the mere fact that the French text happened to be
the original one.142
In his conclusion, Arginelli rephrases his views. The imperative vocabu-
lary used in his analysis is replaced by subjunctive form:
However, the preceding positive analysis shows that the drafted text (i.e. the
text that has been discussed upon during the negotiations and eventually
drafted as result thereof) may sometimes be given more weight than the
other texts for the purpose of construing the treaty, since there is a reason-
able presumption that it may reflect more accurately the common intention
of the parties, in particular where the treaty negotiators were not involved
in the subsequent drafting and examination of the other authentic texts.143
141See ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:210–11,
para. 33; Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 366–69.
142See LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), ICJ (Annual Reports of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 2001), paras. 100–102; Gaja, ‘The Perspective of International
Law’, 97.
143Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 241 (emphasis added).
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In substance, this echoes again the considerations of Hardy, Rosenne, and
the joint dissenting opinion in the Young Loan Arbitration with respect to
the need of taking the individual facts and circumstances of how the authen-
ticity of the texts was established into account; however, the subjunctive
form concedes that the value of the original text is an exogenous variable
that must be evaluated case by case based on an extrinsic yardstick, and
a definite statement in its favour based on existing legal principles is not
possible. The conjured up ‘reasonable presumption’ cannot be a surrogate
for a mere ethical judgement but must be filled with considerations based
on the principles enshrined in the VCLT, according to which alone the rel-
evance of the original text must be evaluated. The mere consideration that
a particular text has been the text of negotiation and drafting is not part of
these principles and may therefore not be subsumed under the surrogate
‘reasonable presumption’.
On a final note, ascribing special relevance to the original text is also
in friction with the routine interpretation approach supported by many of
the quoted scholars at the same time. If such special relevance would be
conceded, the routine interpretation approach could be applied only asym-
metrically with respect to ones own language, namely, by the country the
official language of which happens to be the language of the original text,
whereas the other country would always be urged to ultimately rely on the,
from its perspective, ‘other’ text. Thus, the combination of both views is
fundamentally incompatible with international law in the sense of impli-
citly allowing one country to prefer its own language while the other is
either limited in its choice or at minimum always has to consult the de-
cisive original text as well. This not only violates the equal authenticity of
texts, that is, the principle of effectiveness in view of a final clause declaring
such equal authenticity, but also the fundamental principle of the sovereign
equality of states.144
144UN, Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945), Article 2(1). A thorough dis-
cussion of the principle lies outside the scope of this study. The interested reader is
referred to Ulrich K. Preuß, ‘Equality of States – Its Meaning in a Constitutionalized
Global Order’, Chicago Journal of International Law 9, no. 1 (2008): 17–49; Hans Kelsen,
‘The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization’,
The Yale Law Journal 53, no. 2 (1944): 207–20; Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Na-
tions: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.,
1950), 50 et seq.
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4.1. ResearchQuestions
The considerations submitted in the previous chapter raise three questions
concerning practical application: First, should recourse to supplementary
means be had when interpreting any single text before recourse to the oth-
ers, or only after a comparison with respect to a common meaning? Second,
what weight should be given to supplementary means in relation to Article
33(4) – should recourse to the former be had over the latter, or should the lat-
ter take precedence? Third, how does renvoi to domestic law implemented
by model conventions and tax treaties affect interpretation in plurilingual
cases?
4.2. Preliminary Considerations
It is likely that the judge will (have to) consider a problem posed by a par-
ticular case from several angles before concluding that there exists a differ-
ence between the texts an application of all means provided by the VCLT
cannot resolve. The most efficient sequence may to some extend depend on
the type of problem faced; however, considerations of how much weight to
attribute to what means under what circumstances are a significant struc-
tural element of the VCLT – they affect the outcome of every interpretation
and need to be taken into account or misinterpretation may result.
The critic may object that because the intention of the drafters of the
VCLT has been to codify only a few general ‘principles of logic and good
sense’ and not the exact conditions of their application, the ‘unity of the
process of interpretation’ as a ‘single combined operation’ is implied: all
means are to be thrown into the ‘crucible’ and evaluated without any sug-
gestion of a rigid mechanical order.1 I do not dissent – on the contrary, I
1See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:218–20, paras. 4–5,
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firmly support a holistic approach that comprises considerations of all ne-
cessary means, which in my view includes the other language texts as long
as they must be considered equally authoritative.
My point, however, is that the VCLT framework establishes different rel-
ative weights to be attributed to authentic and supplementary means.2 This
in turn allows for contemplation of the proper sequence to structure the
process of interpretation, because the judge cannot read everything at the
same time but, as a spatio-temporal being, has to begin somewhere and look
at all materials one by one. As the ILC has pointed out, the idea of a ‘single
combined operation’ is not to be understood literally as a consideration
of everything all at once, but rather as a consideration of all the different
means in a holistic manner attributing appropriate weights to them, which
reminds of Schleiermacher’s conception of interpretation as a process of
gradual approximation:
Just as courts typically begin their reasoning by looking at the terms of the
treaty, and then continue, in an interactive process, to analyse those terms
in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty, the
precise relevance of different means of interpretation must first be identi-
fied in any case of treaty interpretation before they can be ‘thrown into the
crucible’ in order to arrive at a proper interpretation, by giving them appro-
priate weight in relation to each other. The obligation to place ‘appropriate
emphasis on the various means of interpretation’ may, in the course of the
interpretation of a treaty in specific cases, result in a different emphasis
on the various means of interpretation depending on the treaty or on the
treaty provisions concerned. This is not to suggest that a court or any other
interpreter is more or less free to choose how to use and apply the different
means of interpretation.3
Now, I do not disagree with the contention that as long as the judge con-
siders all necessary means, keeps the fundamental distinction between au-
thentic and supplementary means in mind, and attributes the appropriate
8–9; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, Chs. 3–4, 148–154, 164,
203, 231–241.
2See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:220, para. 10 et seq.;
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 117; Engelen, Interpretation of
Tax Treaties under International Law, 408–13, Tabory, Multilingualism in International
Law and Institutions, 218. This will be discussed in more detail below.
3ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Sixty-fifth Session, 6 May – 7
June and 8 July – 9 August 2013’, 18, paras. 14–15.
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emphasis accordingly, he may enter into this process from any angle; how-
ever, if he were to begin for example by a consideration of supplementary
means, which by their very nature allow for a wider array of conclusions
and therefore may be ‘misleading’,4 he would run the danger of imposing a
conviction formed on their basis on his subsequent reading of the text.5
In summary, the suggestion that application of the VCLT principles is not
mechanical does not mean that it should not be methodical. As Paul Ricoeur
has said, ‘If it is true that there is always more than one way of construing
a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal.’6 Before we examine
the role of supplementary means in this context, it is useful to demarcate
the scope of Article 33(4).
4.3. The Scope of Article 33(4)
Article 33(4) specifies that whenever a difference of meaning between the
texts persists after application of Articles 31 and 32, the meaning that must
be considered to best reconcile the different meanings on grounds of the
object and purpose shall be chosen.7 This means two criteria must be satis-
fied: First, the meaning chosen under application of Article 33(4) must be
one considered to in some way reconcile the different meanings established
beforehand under application of Articles 31 and 32 even though they could
not be made to conform under such application. Second, the criterion re-
lied on to gauge the degree of reconciliation is the object and purpose. This
raises two questions: What is included in the concept of reconciliation, and
how far does the role of the object and purpose extend in this respect?
4.3.1. The Meaning of Reconcile
According to the Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, to reconcile something with
something means ‘to find an acceptable way of dealing with two or more
4ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:220, para. 10.
5This will be argued in more detail below.
6Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (TCU Press,
1976), 79.
7The case of prevailing texts will be discussed in the next chapter.
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ideas, needs, etc., that seem to be opposed to each other’. Clearly, the em-
phasis is on ‘seem’, which implies that the perceived opposition is not con-
tradictory, but common elements can be identified and conciliation is to
some degree possible or the opposition can be overcome in some other way
acceptable. Indeed, we may postulate that the concept of reconciliation ne-
cessitates the possibility of concordance and the absence of logical contra-
diction, because logical contradictions cannot be reconciled by definition.
Propositions a and not-a cannot both be true in the same sense at the same
time. Stating both is not a form of reconciliation but merely means uttering
something of no informative value, departing from the realm of rationality,
and succumbing to the fallacy of ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet8 – the
idea of reconciling a contradiction being a perfect case in point.
When interpreting Article 33 according to VCLT rules, the principle of
non-contradiction must be adhered to with the principle of unity in mind
as fundamental axiom. It follows that divergent texts can by definition only
be reconciled if they are not inherently contradictory and a concordant in-
terpretation is in some way possible with the help of the means codified
as acceptable by the VCLT. Thus, the wording ‘reconcile’ implicitly presup-
poses an inherent property of reconcilability of the divergent texts. If such
inherent reconcilability is not immediately given and reconciliation proves
impossible under the application of the standard means provided for, decis-
ive reference to the object and purpose is stipulated as acceptable means
of last resort to establish the meaning of the treaty,9 that is, the meaning
so chosen must satisfy the requirement of reconcilability in the sense that
if the respective meanings of the texts are mutually exclusive, it must be
manifest that only it could have been intended.
In summary, the scope of Article 33(4) is delimited by a combined applica-
tion of the principle of unity and the principle of non-contradiction. Unless
there is evidence to the contrary, all texts of a treaty must be presumed to
have the same (one true) meaning as stipulated by Article 33(1) and (3). If
evidence to the contrary persists, the unity of the treaty is violated unless
such violation can be overcome with the help of the object and purpose.
8See Chapter 2, s. 2.2.1.
9See UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 33(4); Avery Jones, ‘Treaty
Interpretation’, s. 3.7.1.7.
82
4.3. The Scope of Article 33(4)
Therefore, Article 33(4) in substance only applies to cases that do not pose
contradictions, unless the contradiction can be resolved in the sense that a
decision can be made for one text to reflect the true common intention of
the parties by recourse to the object and purpose as sole decider, which will
depend on whether different degrees of serving the object and purpose can
be discerned.
This reasoning is also implicit in the approach taken by the PCIJ in the
Mavrommatis case:
[W]here two versions possessing equal authority exist one of which appears
to have a wider bearing than the other, it [the court] is bound to adopt the
more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both ver-
sions and which, as far as it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the com-
mon intention of the Parties.10
Commonly,Mavrommatis is discussed by scholars concerning the applicab-
ility of a general ‘principle of restrictive interpretation’,11 that is, whether
a narrower common interpretation must always be preferred to a wider
one that is not necessarily common to all texts. In this context, it is crucial
to note first and foremost – as the VCLT Commentary indeed does – that
‘the Mavrommatis case gives strong support to the principle of conciliat-
ing – i.e. harmonizing – the texts’.12 According to the Oxford Dictionary,
the meaning of harmonise is to ‘Make consistent or compatible’,13 which of
course is possible only if the property of compatibility is already inherent
and can be brought to bear. Contradictions cannot be made consistent or
compatible – that is the very definition of a contradiction.The wording ‘can
be made’ used by the court reflects that the emphasis is primarily on a pre-
supposed possibility of harmonisation, not about the court being bound to
choose the more limited interpretation as the better way to effect such har-
monisation, which still depends on it being doubtless in accordance with
the object and purpose.
10The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 19, as quoted by ILC, Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties with Commentaries, 225, para. 8 (emphasis added).
11See, e.g., Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 77–78; Wouters and Vidal, ‘Non-Tax Treaties’, s. 1.3.5.
12ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 8.
13The definition of conciliate is synonymous: ‘Reconcile; make compatible.’
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The court’s decision is based on the supposition that the more restricted
interpretation is a subset of both interpretations, providing for the inherent
property of compatibility and allowing for an acceptable choice in the par-
ticular case.14 In terms of a general rule, the Mavrommatis approach may
be applied only to cases in which the differing interpretations are not mu-
tually exclusive, and only to the extent it would really be the case that the
more restricted interpretation necessarily always is the more proper one
in respect of the object and purpose, as would be implied by elevating the
Mavrommatis approach to the status of a principle. The ILC consequently
denied it the quality of a general rule,15 but made reconciliation ultimately
a derivative of matching the diverging texts to the object and purpose of
the treaty as the acceptable decisive means of last resort in case reconcili-
ation of the diverging texts under the general rule of interpretation turns
out impossible.16
4.3.2. The Object and Purpose as Decisive Criterion
How can a consideration of the object and purpose, which proved unhelpful
when considered during the application of Article 31, be helpful a second
time around? Engelen seems to imply that Article 33(4) provides for a tele-
ological expansion of the VCLT interpretative framework, in the sense of
opening the textual meaning of ‘object and purpose’ up to a more liberal
investigation into the intentions of the parties ex post.17 In contrast, Avery
Jones emphasises the mere decisive force character of the object and pur-
pose criterion, which by itself does not necessarily support any notion of a
14For in-depth discussions of Mavrommatis, see Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilin-
gual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 76–80; Paul A. Eden, ‘Plurilingual
Treaties: Aspects of Interpretation’ (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network,
March 2010), 6–8; Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 201–2, 236–
37, 293–94.
15See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225–26, para. 8; Gaja,
‘The Perspective of International Law’, 93–94.
16UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 33(4); see Avery Jones, ‘Treaty In-
terpretation’, s. 3.7.1.7; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law,
403–4; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 317–21; Gaja, ‘The Per-
spective of International Law’, 94–98.
17See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 548.
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teleological expansion of the VCLT interpretative framework through the
wording of Article 33(4).18 The idea being that if an interpretation according
to the criteria enshrined in Article 31 considered as a whole turns out incon-
clusive, consideration of the object and purpose alone will enable a decision
for one text.19 In consequence, the object and purpose criterion itself does
not need to be more liberally construed, but a textual interpretation of its
meaning remains prescriptive.
The view of Avery Jones is more in line with the overall context of the
ILC’s rejection of purely teleological reasoning in favour of objective tex-
tual interpretation on the sole basis of the intentions as expressed by the
contracting parties,20 so to be supported at this point. As a corollary, Art-
icle 33(4) does not cover divergences that cannot be reconciled at all in case
the object and purpose criterion fails as well, but presupposes reconcilabil-
ity based on a conclusive textual interpretation of the object and purpose.
Another important corollary to keep in mind for the discussion in the next
chapter is that because of this, Article 33(4) must be interpreted to only reg-
ulate what is supposed to happen when there is no prevailing text, because
the VCLT interpretative framework enshrines the idea that a textual inter-
pretation of a single text under Articles 31 and 32 will always lead to the
establishment of its meaning,21 which prevails in case of divergence.
Attributing decisive force to the object and purpose as ultimate criterion
is coherent with the supposition that the contracting parties intended to
agree, which is a fair presumption given the existence of a treaty and im-
plied good faith on behalf of the parties.This presumption together with the
principle of unity justifies resorting to the object and purpose as ultimate
criterion, because against this background interpretation must depart from
18See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.7.1.7.
19The tribunal in the Young Loan Arbitration refers to the object and purpose as ‘decisive
yardstick’, Young Loan Arbitration, 110, para. 40.
20See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:220, para. 11, 223,
para. 18. For a comparison of approaches, see Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, 114–119; J.G. Merrils, ‘Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation’, in
Australian Year Book of International Law, 1969, 55–82. For a critical appreciation, see
Peter McRae, ‘The Search for Meaning: Continuing Problems with the Interpretation
of Treaties’, Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 33 (2002): 209.
21See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 8.2.2.6.
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the point of view that all texts ought to have the same meaning even if they
appear not to and reconciliation proves difficult.22
In the event of mutually exclusive interpretations, however, the object
and purpose criterion can only function to the extent it can help to identify
the text reflecting the true common intention of the parties, which then
must be assumed to be the text which ‘best reconciles’ all texts, so that the
mutual exclusion can de facto be overcome by reference to the object and
purpose.23 If the object and purpose for some reason fails to help identifica-
tion of the one text reflecting the true common intention of the parties and
the mutual exclusion cannot be overcome as a consequence, the reconcili-
atory approach of Article 33(4) fails to provide a solution.24
Therefore, the argument of Arginelli in its imperative sense, that ‘recon-
cile’ has to be interpreted to mean that the court must attribute a common
meaning to all texts even though a comparative interpretation under Art-
icle 31 failed to establish one, because the expression ‘the meaning which
best reconciles the texts’ in Article 33(4) ‘must be read in its context, which
first and foremost includes the underlying idea of the unity of the treaty
and the connected rule of law, reflected in Article 33(3), that all authentic
texts do have the same meaning’,25 must be rejected. Such can only apply
to cases in which the true intention of the parties can be discerned beyond
reasonable doubt with the help of the object and purpose criterion. If that
proves impossible, we cannot attribute one single meaning to all texts un-
der the VCLT, as it forbids a choice for one meaning based on other criteria
than provided.
In other words, although we have to start from the presumption that all
texts ought to mean the same and employ all efforts to establish that com-
mon meaning in case they appear otherwise,26 we may indeed arrive at the
conclusion that they do not mean the same once the means provided by
the VCLT are all exhausted without success. Article 33(3) only presumes
that the terms of the treaty have the same meaning in each text, which may
22See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 105; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 310.
23UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 33(4).
24See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 548.
25Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 310 (emphasis added).
26See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
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be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Therefore, any imperative under-
standing in the sense ofwhat must not exist cannot exist reads into the VCLT
and may result in reading into treaties, which runs counter to the VCLT’s
intended textual approach to interpretation.
Returning to our hypothetical example based on the Natexis case, the
wording ‘liable to tax’ includes both cases of liable and subject to tax and
liable but not subject to tax, whereas the wording ‘subject to tax’ excludes
all cases of liable but not subject to tax. For the latter subset of cases, liable
and subject to tax are by definition mutually exclusive concepts because
subject to tax demands that tax is paid, whereas the intention behind liable
to tax in such case is that, effectively, no tax is paid. In consequence, the
Mavrommatis approach would lead to the wrong result every single time,
which justifies its rejection as a general rule by the ILC, because it proves
that cases may exist for which the assumption that the more limited inter-
pretation is always a compatible subset of the wider interpretation, which
would be a necessary condition for applying theMavrommatis approach as
a general rule, is invalid. Hence, the lowest common denominator may not
be relied on generally to effect reconciliation.27
When one text says ‘liable to tax’ while the other says ‘subject to tax’,
the object and purpose fails to decide the case as a means of last resort,28
as both liable and subject to tax equally conform to the object and purpose
of avoiding double taxation, while effective double non-taxation may not
necessarily be in conflict with any object and purpose of avoiding fiscal
evasion.29 The mere conclusion that in view of the unity of the treaty there
must be an obvious drafting error is of no help because without further
evidence it would be impossible to determine which text embodies the er-
ror, and the VCLT forbids the designation of a single text as the applicable
one if such choice cannot be made on grounds provided by Articles 31–33.
Therefore, the only available conclusion is that the treaty is defective in the
sense that the parties either failed to agree or failed to properly convey their
27See ibid., II:225–26, para. 8; Sinclair,TheVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 149–51;
Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 205.
28Unless the context and supplementary means allow for further inferences as to the
true intentions of the contracting parties, for example, through formulations obviously
aimed at double exemption or clear evidence of drafting errors.
29See Jankowiak, Doppelte Nichtbesteuerung, passim.
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agreement on the point in question.30
Vogel has identified real life examples of defective tax treaties.31 The case
of the Agreement on Reparations from Germany quoted by Mr. Bartos in
the ILC’s 770th meeting may serve also as an example to the extent that
mere surveillance and active management are mutually exclusive concepts
and no further evidence concerning the true intentions of the contracting
parties can be derived from the texts and supplementary means.32 Another
prominent case concerned the Italy-Ethiopia (1889) treaty of Wichale (Uc-
ciali).33 Article XVII of the Amharic text stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia
‘may’ use the government of the King of Italy for all dealings with other
powers or governments, whereas the Italian text read ‘must’ instead. Italy
proclaimed a protectorate over Ethiopia based on the Italian text. Ethiopia
repudiated the claim. This finally led to war, Italian defeat in the battle of
Adwa 1896, and acknowledgement of Ethiopian independence.34 Clearly,
must is a universal proposition while may is not, that is, mandatory and
optional are contradictory concepts – there is no middle ground between
them.35
30See Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 39, para. 72a. The 6th edition
erroneously abandons this view held until the 5th edition by stating that ‘a situation
not regulated by the treaty is not to be assumed, not even as ultima ratio, but a consid-
eration of the object and purpose will almost always lead to a congruent interpretation,
if necessary by relying on the lowest common denominator’, Lehner, Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf demGebiet der Steuern vom Einkom-
men und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen (begründet von
Klaus Vogel), 197, para. 112a. As discussed above, this view rests on an erroneous inter-
pretation of the wording ‘reconcile’, mistakenly elevating the Mavrommatis approach
to the status of a general principle, which it has been denied by the ILC. The lowest
common denominator may not always represent the true object and purpose, as in our
example of liable versus subject to tax.
31See Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 39, para. 72a; Reimer and Rust,
Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 40–41, para. 88.
32See ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, vol. I, Yearbook
of the International Law Commission 1964, A/CN.4/SER.A/1964 (United Nations, 1965),
319, para. 65.
33See Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 953, 4n.
34See Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Treaty of Wichale’.
35Contradictions are subject to the logical principle of tertium non datur (law of excluded
middle), i.e., all universal propositions must either be true or false, see Russell, The
88
4.3. The Scope of Article 33(4)
During the drafting period of the VCLT, the problem of cases with non-
reconcilable meanings had been raised most comprehensively by the Amer-
ican delegation,36 which also stressed that difficulties in reconciling the
texts may not only arise because of differences in wording but also on a
conceptual level, namely, when two legal systems are involved in which
the same term means something different, or when a term has a particular
legal meaning in one systemwithout direct correspondence in the other. As
will be discussed in depth in the final part of this chapter, this is particularly
relevant in the case of tax treaties.
It is only consistent that the ILC changed the wording of Article 33(4)
from the initially proposed ‘a meaning which is common to both or all the
texts shall be preferred’ and the later ‘a meaning which as far as possible
reconciles the texts shall be adopted’ to the final ‘themeaningwhich best re-
conciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty’.37
Both rejected draft wordings presuppose that there is always a common
meaning that can be chosen to reconcile the texts at least to some degree.
They cannot be applied to contradictory texts because they provide no fur-
ther means to resolve a contradiction, which has been rightly observed by
Mr Kearney from the American delegation, who also pointed out that con-
tradictory meanings are a common phenomenon in practice.38
To the extent these draft wordings should be understood to state that the
meanings of the texts are different (in the sense that the difference cannot
Problems of Philosophy, Ch. 7. Aristotle is the first to formulate the principle as a fun-
damental logical axiom a priori, see Aristotle, On Interpretation (The Internet Classics
Archive, 350 B.C.), s. 1, part 9.
36See UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 March
– 24 May 1968, Official Records, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, A/CONF.39/11 (United Nations, 1969), 188–89,
paras. 39–43; 442, para. 38; UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First
and Second Sessions Vienna, 26 March – 24 May 1968 and 9 April – 22 May 1969, Official
Records, Documents of the Conference, A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2 (United Nations, 1970), 151.
37ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, Article 75(2);
ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:208,
Article 73(4); UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 33(4).
38See UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 March
– 24 May 1968, Official Records, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 188, para. 40.
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be resolved, as literally stated) and, at the same time, congruent (implying
the difference can be resolved), but without providing any further means to
effect that congruency (apart from an implicitly assumed commonmeaning
that can, however, as literally stated, not be observed), they are nonsensical
in the sense of being contradictory, as has been rightly pointed out by Mr
Paredes in the ILC’s 770th meeting.39 Concerning this, the wording ‘a mean-
ing which as far as possible reconciles’ is no improvement over the initial ‘a
meaning which is common to both or all the texts’, because with contradict-
ory meanings there is no ‘as far as possible’ but only an either-or.Therefore,
it is invalid to maintain with Sur that the wording ‘as far as possible’ would
allow the interpreter to remove divergences among the texts even when
actual reconciliation proves impossible.40
The final wording adopted by the VCLT resolves this deficiency to the
extent that an evaluation in respect of the object and purpose as single de-
cisive criterion can indeed help to overcome the divergence. Contrary to the
earlier draft wordings, which effectively implemented theMavrommatis ap-
proach of smallest common denominator as a general principle, the mean-
ing chosen under the final wording does not necessarily have to be the one
as far as possible common to all texts but may be the meaning not common
to all texts if a final evaluation in respect of the object and purpose would
indicate so with decisive force. In our hypothetical example based on the
Natexis case that meaning would be the one of liable but not subject to tax.
In summary, if one text says A while the other says not-A, and their mu-
tual exclusiveness cannot be overcome by a consideration of the object and
purpose as sole decider, the treaty must be considered defective in view of
the prescribed textual approach to interpretation, as the interpreter must
not read an agreement into the treaty that is not covered by its text. There-
fore, such cases fall outside the scope of Article 33(4).
39See ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, para. 63.
40See Serge Sur, L’interprétation en droit international public, vol. 75 (Paris: Librairie
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1974), 274.
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4.4. Use of Supplementary Means
Now that the scope of Article 33(4) is defined, we may think about how sup-
plementary means fit into the process. The VCLT wording seems to imply a
clear order of steps. Article 33(4) refers to the ‘application of articles 31 and
32’, and Article 32 refers to the meaning established under ‘application of
article 31’. Neither Article 31 nor Article 32 mentions Article 33. Therefore,
recourse to supplementarymeans seems to precede application of the latter;
however, Article 32 distinguishes between two different uses, thereby de-
limiting the overall use of supplementary means. Its particular drafting sep-
arates the two different uses not via self-contained paragraphs but merely
via two parts of the same sentence. This begs the question whether the ref-
erence to Article 32 in Article 33(4) extends to the entire article including
the second part of its sentence and its letters (a) and (b), or only to the first
part.41 In order to answer this question, a look under the hood of Article 32
is necessary.
4.4.1. Fundamental Principles
Article 32 establishes that the authentic means of interpretation codified in
Article 31 are of higher authority in the interpretative process than supple-
mentary means.42 The latter may be used only to confirm but not contest
41Henceforth, when only the first part is implied, it will be cited as Article 321 for purposes
of disambiguation.
42Contra: Arnold, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, 7–8. The distinction Arnold draws
between weight and use is not convincing. He fails to make clear how exactly weight
should be considered different from use in substance and effect. Delimiting the use of
something is equal to delimiting its weight in the overall use of everything to be con-
sidered. Stating that one may use certain means only in a limited role is synonymous
to stating that they have less weight. And this is precisely what Article 32 instructs:
supplementary means may be used only to confirm but not contest the meaning estab-
lished under Article 31 apart from exceptional cases, see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties with Commentaries, 222–223, paras. 18–19. Arnold’s submissions to the con-
trary are merely speculative: he submits a purposive interpretation of his own that is in
flagrant disregard of the wording, context, and object and purpose of Article 32, simply
based on his personal observations concerning practice and an invocation of ‘common
sense’. As the ILC has stressed, the holistic approach to interpretation prescribed by
the VCLT means ‘not to suggest that a court or any other interpreter is more or less
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the meaning established under Article 31,43 and recourse to them is by no
means mandatory but merely ‘permissible’,44 as is reflected by the wording
‘Recourse may be had’.45 More liberal use to actively determine the treaty
meaning is permissible only if Article 31 leaves the meaning ‘ambiguous or
obscure’, or ‘leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.46
The VCLT Commentary stresses that Article 32 does not ‘provide for al-
ternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to aid
an interpretation governed by the principles contained in article 27.’47 This
implies that even when supplementary means may be used to determine
the meaning because the outcome of Article 31 may not be applied for reas-
ons specified in Article 32(a) and (b), the meaning so derived has to remain
within the scope demarcated by the principles enshrined in the general rule
and cannot be just any meaning.
Consequently, judges must apply prudence when having recourse to sup-
plementary means and avoid substituting them for the terms of the treaty.48
Apart from exceptional cases, supplementary means may be used merely as
additional support, and a conclusive interpretation of the text reached on
the basis of Article 31may not be challenged by conflicting alternative inter-
free to choose how to use and apply the different means of interpretation’, ILC, ‘Report
of the International Law Commission on the Sixty-fifth Session, 6 May – 7 June and 8
July – 9 August 2013’, 18, paras. 14–15.
43UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 321.
44ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
45UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32 (emphasis added).
46Ibid., Article 32(a) and (b). The ICJ had stressed already in 1948 that recourse to the
travaux préparatoires is not an automatic exercise but requires sufficient reason to be
justified: ‘The Court considers that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently, it does
not feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory
work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself’, see Conditions of Admis-
sion of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1948), 63; reiterated
in Ambatielos (Greece v United Kingdom), Preliminary Objection, ICJ (Annual Reports
of the International Court of Justice, 1952), 45.
47ILC,Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19. Draft Article
27 became Article 31 in the VCLT.
48See Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 276–77, 294–96, per Lords Wilberforce and Scar-
man.
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pretations on the basis of supplementary means.49 This safeguards correct
treaty application and legal certainty because taxpayers may rely on the
meaning reflected by the wording officially approved to correctly express
the intentions of the contracting states, without that meaning being con-
trolled by extrinsic material that may not even be publicly accessible.50
4.4.2. Application to Plurilingual Treaties
In line with the dictum that the fundamental principles of interpretation
are to be no different for plurilingual treaties than they are for unilingual
ones,51 the above should also be the guiding principles when interpreting
plurilingual treaties.This raises two questions: First, when may we seek res-
cue in supplementary means – before or after a comparison of texts under
application of Article 31? Second, when are we to invoke Article 33(4) –
before or after having recourse to supplementary means?
It is not difficult to imagine the situations to which the criteria of ambigu-
ity and obscurity refer in respect of a unilingual treaty, namely, situations
in which an interpretation under Article 31 has lead to either several dif-
49See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:222–23, paras. 18–
19. The travaux préparatoires may be misleading, as they are a collage of all positions
taken by the contracting parties during the negotiation phase; what matters is the fi-
nal compromise that made it into the text, see ibid., II:220, para. 10; Martin Ris, ‘Treaty
Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a Proposed Amend-
ment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, Boston
College International and Comparative Law Review 14, no. 1 (1991): 112–13; see also the
views expressed by the Yugoslavian government during the VCLT discussions, ILC,
Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session In-
cluding the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, II:361. The earlier word-
ing ‘as far as possible’ of Draft Article 73(2), ILC, Documents of the Sixteenth Session
Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, vol. II, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission 1964, A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/Add.1 (United Nations,
1965), 206, is an example that, although it was abandoned in favour of the final word-
ing of Article 33(4) saying something completely different, has nevertheless influenced
the views of several authors, see, e.g., Tabory,Multilingualism in International Law and
Institutions, 202; Sur, L’interprétation en droit international public, 75:274.
50See Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 279–80, 288, per Lords Diplock and Tullybelton;
Wouters and Vidal, ‘Non-Tax Treaties’, s. 1.3.4.
51See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
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ferent but equally plausible meanings or no clearly discernible meaning at
all.52 The same applies to plurilingual treaties; however, there ambiguity
or obscurity may not only be an issue of each or both texts but also arise
between texts.53
Imagine the following scenario: the text in one language read in isola-
tion means A, although B is a possible but less manifest meaning. For the
text in the other language, the situation is exactly reverse. Given that legal
language lacks the precision of a purely formal language like mathematics
or computer code and any language has its own idiomatic idiosyncrasies,
such cases may be common. If any text is interpreted in isolation, there
is no problem of ambiguity because each text has a manifest meaning. In
consequence, Article 32(a) may not be invoked. If we would adhere to the
routine interpretation approach, the result would be different interpreta-
tions depending on the text used and, in the worst case, a misapplication of
the treaty.
How about if the judge examines the travaux préparatoires when inter-
preting a single text and comes to the conclusion that he needs to apply
B? Such approach is problematic because not considering the other texts
while having recourse to supplementary means in their active role violates
the fundamental principle of different weights to be attributed to authentic
and supplementary means. The other texts are part of the context defini-
tion in Article 31(2) and thus constitute authentic means to be considered
in order to derive the ordinary meaning before it can be dismissed in favour
of applying Article 32(a). In other words, all means provided by Article 31
have yet to be exhausted, and it would be premature to claim that the or-
dinary meaning is ambiguous or obscure. Hence, before basing his decision
on supplementary means, the judge must first consult the other texts.
52See the definitions of ambiguous and obscure in the Oxford Dictionary. For example, be-
cause of its wording being ‘consistent with either interpretation’, the ICJ found Article
95 of the General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras (1906) inconclusive,
wherefore it had recourse to the travaux preparatoires, see Rights of Nationals of the
United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America), ICJ (Annual Re-
ports of the International Court of Justice, 1952), 209–13; Ris, ‘Treaty Interpretation and
ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, 122–23.
53See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
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Indeed, the other texts may heal the ambiguity in a way that recourse
to Article 32(a) will not become necessary but remain precluded. Imagine
that one text employs the grammatically imprecise wording X. X means
A, but B could be implied because of the imprecise formulation. Interpret-
ation under Article 31 points to A, but B cannot be ruled out. The other
text, however, employs wording Y, which is the grammatically precise for-
mulation of A and rules out B. Optionally, A is confirmed via recourse to
the travaux préparatoires. Thus, the ambiguity is healed without recourse
to supplementary means in their active role; they have not been used to de-
termine the ordinary meaning but merely to confirm the choice made under
Article 31.
As regards Article 32(b), the situation is more complex. Prima facie, its
wording conjures up associations of avoidance scenarios under domestic
GAARs: the law is reasonable in general but when stood up on its head
and applied to facts that were not foreseen, the outcome may be considered
absurd or unreasonable in view of what the law intended. In the VCLT con-
text, however, one may ask how the interpretation of a single text ‘in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’ could
ever turn out to be ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’54 – the criteria in
Article 31 surely cover abusive scenarios violating good faith or the object
and purpose.55
The wording ‘manifestly’ emphasises that supplementary means may
only play a decisive role in limited situations that in all reasonableness
cannot be considered to be what the parties intended.56 According to the
Oxford Dictionary, it means ‘In a way that is clear or obvious to the eye or
mind’, that is, the asserted absurdity or unreasonableness must be obvious
for anybody and not merely arguable. Such situations must be considered
to be limited to drafting errors or other material defects.57 In the absence
54UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32(b).
55See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.4.3.
56See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
57See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 540–44. For example,
the ‘Descriptive Minute’ of the Dutch-Belgian Boundary Convention (1843) contained
inconsistent language, according to which several plots of land were simultaneously
assigned to the Netherlands and Belgium. Without elaborating on its methodology,
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of such obvious material defect, any suggestion of an unreasonable result
seems to amount to a teleological supplementation of the VCLT interpretat-
ive framework, as it would require a yardstick beyond good faith, ordinary
wording, context, and object and purpose on the basis of which the judge-
ment could be made.58
The supplementary means cannot provide that yardstick themselves be-
cause theymay only confirm but not contest an interpretation under Article
31, that is, they may be used only to determine the meaning once an inter-
pretation under Article 31 has led to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable
result. Article 32(b) presupposes that the judgement of the text being absurd
or unreasonable has been made already. Under Article 32(b) the interpreter
may have recourse to supplementary means only to heal such situation but
not to establish its presence, that is, he may not use supplementary means
to establish whether he may use them to determine the treaty meaning.59
Therefore, the only possible conclusion would be to assume an extrinsic
yardstick that could then only consist in the intentions of the contracting
parties according to which the outcome must be considered absurd or un-
reasonable, but which are not expressed in the text, as otherwise an inter-
pretation under Article 31 could not have turned out manifestly absurd or
unreasonable in the first place. Such conclusion runs counter to the clear
intentions of the drafters of the VCLT.60
the ICJ had recourse to the travaux preparatoires, see Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land (Belgium v Netherlands), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice,
1959); Ris, ‘Treaty Interpretation and ICJ Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards
a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties’, 123–24.
58The wording ‘absurd’ is less problematic in this respect because its scope is more nar-
row, providing less argumentative leeway. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘Wildly
unreasonable, illogical, or inappropriate.’
59See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
60See ibid., II:220–21, para. 11, 222–223, paras. 18–19. Prima facie, the wording of the Polish
Postal Service case cited by the VCLT Commentary seems to suggest that a ‘liberal’ in-
terpretationmay be possible under Article 32(b). Considering the overall VCLT context,
however, the wording ‘liberal construction’ in the judgement and the ILC’s reference to
it may not be construed to support teleological interpretation, but must be considered
only to imply a more liberal use of supplementary means under exceptional circum-
stances, see Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ (Publications of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, 1925), 39–40. Such reading fits with the subordinate role of
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Unless there is an obvious drafting error rendering the text inconsistent,
it seems unintelligible how the interpretation of a unilingual treaty under
Article 31 could ever lead to an absurd or unreasonable result if the possib-
ility of teleological reasoning is excluded.61 In any case, recourse to Article
32(b) is subject to the same argument as recourse to Article 32(a) outlined
above: if the interpretation of a single text under Article 31 leads to a mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable result, such judgement cannot be regarded
final before the other texts have been consulted. Therefore, the interpreter
has to consult all other texts before relying on supplementary means.62
Let us return to our example from above. Both texts are compared, but
no decision for either A or B can be made. The next step depends on how
we classify this situation. If we would classify it as an ambiguity falling
under Article 32(a), recourse to supplementary means would be warran-
ted. Against this may be argued that, based on the principle of effective-
ness, Article 33(4) should take precedence because the diagnosed problem
is one between texts – precisely what Article 33 has been devised for. Ap-
plying Article 32(a) renders Article 33(4) an empty provision because the
supplementary means and reinforces it by stressing that liberal use is strictly confined
to a limited set of scenarios.
61I may simply lack the imagination (or the experience of a judge); however, I challenge
the reader to present a case that disproves my conclusion in this respect. The two cases
referenced by the ILC as examples do not qualify in my opinion, see ILC, Documents of
the Sixteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 57,
para. 16. As this is not a core issue here, I added my take on these cases in Appendix
B to substantiate my assertion for the interested reader. Reference to absurdity in line
with Article 32(b) is common in India, see Vik Kanwar, ‘Treaty Interpretation in Indian
Courts: Adherence, Coherence, and Convergence’, inThe Interpretation of International
Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence, ed. Helmut Philipp Aust
and Georg Nolte (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 239–64, 247; how-
ever, apart from drafting problems mostly in terms of treaty provisions in violation of
constitutional law, see, e.g., Ram Jethmalani v Union of India, Supreme Court of India,
2011, para. 61: ‘However, the fact that such treaties are drafted by diplomats, and not
lawyers, leading to sloppiness in drafting also implies that care has to be taken to not
render any word, phrase, or sentence redundant, especially where rendering of such
word, phrase or sentence redundant would lead to a manifestly absurd situation, par-
ticularly from a constitutional . . .perspective. The government cannot bind India in a
manner that derogates from Constitutional provisions, values and imperatives.’
62See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 390.
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argumentative ground covered by supplementary means is much broader,
which makes it unlikely that Article 33(4) could ever be of help after a con-
sideration of them fails to resolve the problem.
Indeed, what is likely to happen in this scenario is that the judge will look
for a purposive interpretation on the basis of supplementary means to de-
cide whether A or B has been intended, which is precisely what Article 33(4)
prescribes – only by other means. But, recourse to supplementary means
in their limited active role is intended only as an aid when consideration
of the text alone leaves the judge at a loss. Hence, Article 32(a) should be
resorted to only after all authentic means (including the object and purpose
as sole decider) have been exhausted, as otherwise the fundamental weight
distribution between authentic and supplementary means intended by the
VCLT is upset. This conclusion is supported by recourse to supplementary
means being merely ‘permissible’,63 whereas Article 33(4) forms part of the
prescriptive VCLT rules.
Let us consider a variation of the above scenario to make it even more
obvious: now one text states A and the other B, both excluding each other.
The answer to the question of how to treat this case depends again on how
we classify it. Again we may view it as an ambiguity resulting from differ-
ent manifest meanings of the two texts, which would warrant application
of Article 32(a) – the difference to the original scenario is merely a mat-
ter of degree. Again this effectively crowds out application of Article 33(4)
because it is hardly conceivable that a judge could not to come up with a
purposive argument based on supplementary means and, in the unlikely
event this would happen, that Article 33(4) could be of any assistance there-
after. Now, it is rather obvious that this is precisely a scenario covered by
Article 33(4), and any suggestion to have recourse to supplementary means
instead clearly violates the principle concerning their lesser weight as well
as the principle of effectiveness.
Such approach would not only render Article 33(4) an empty provision
but also Article 32(b). Article 32(a) already does the job, and Article 32(b)
does not apply consecutively because Article 32 refers to an ‘interpretation
according to article 31’ only. Conversely, failure of Article 33(4) to resolve
the problemmay be considered an absurd or unreasonable result in the face
63ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
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of a treaty, which suggests that parties actually intended to agree. Hence, it
seems sensible to resort to Article 32(b) after and not before Article 33(4) has
failed, because the quest of Article 33(4) is to establish the ordinarymeaning
on the basis of the textual object and purpose as sole decider, whereas the
idea behind Article 32(b) is to allow precedence of an alternative meaning
based on supplementary means under exceptional circumstances.64
The whole classification problem is merely the result of the particular
drafting of the VCLT, which factors the issue of plurilingual form out of
the conception of the general rule and confines it to a separate Article. In
this context, it is important to note that Articles 31 and 32 employ the term
‘meaning’ in a different sense fromArticle 33. Article 31 reads ‘A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose’. Thus, it refers to the meaning of the treaty. In fact, Article 31
only talks about the treaty, not the text. The term ‘text’ only appears once
as part of the definition of context in Article 31(2).
Article 32 then refers to the meaning of the treaty via its reference to
Article 31, that is, ‘the meaning resulting from the application of article 31’.
Article 33 also implies the meaning of the treaty overall when referring to
‘meaning’, but it uses the term in a dual sense: as meaning of the treaty and
as meaning of each text, which ultimately must be brought in concordance
with the meaning of the treaty, that is, the meaning common to all texts.65
This difference in use results from the different subject matters of the art-
icles and their particular drafting. Articles 31 and 32 are drafted in terms of
general principles of interpretation in the abstract, for which the notions
‘meaning of the treaty’ and ‘meaning of the text’ implicitly converge as if
a unilingual treaty were implied. The topic of plurilingual form, for which
the two notions may diverge, is shifted in its entirety to Article 33.
Now, the abstract principles enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 apply irre-
spective of the number of texts: in the case of a unilingual treaty the term
‘meaning’ as meaning of the treaty refers to the meaning of the single text,
whereas in the plurilingual scenario it refers to the meaning common to
64See ibid., II:223, para. 19.
65As outlined above, themeaning common to all texts is the one truemeaning of the treaty,
not necessarily a meaning all texts share as lowest common denominator.
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all texts. In consequence, when the same definitions of ambiguous, obscure,
absurd, and unreasonable applied to treaties in the abstract66 are applied to
plurilingual treaties, we cannot claim to have arrived at a situation in which
the meaning of the treaty may be judged as fundamentally ambiguous if we
yet have to take the other texts into account, as we still need to consider
the full context and, if necessary, the object and purpose as sole decider in
order to establish the ordinary meaning of the treaty with final certainty be-
fore we can consider the result fundamentally ambiguous.67 Otherwise, the
notions of fundamental ambiguity and divergence blend into each other.
The drafting of the VCLT, however, suggests that they are demarcated
from each other because it dedicates a separate article to plurilingual form:
‘ambiguous’, ‘obscure’, ‘absurd’, and ‘unreasonable’ are intended to refer to
problems of the treaty meaning in general, whereas ‘divergence’ is intended
to refer to problems between texts that need to be resolved first in order to
establish the treatymeaning or, in case that remains impossible, a persistent
difference in meaning between the texts to which then the individual con-
cepts of fundamental ambiguity may be applied. If the drafters of the VCLT
had intended to resolve problems between texts by recourse to supplement-
ary means, having Article 33(4) would be unnecessary except for residual
cases in which Article 33(4) is needed analogous to Article 31 as a legal basis
the content of which (in the sense of what better fulfils the object and pur-
pose) has to be determined by recourse to supplementary means. Reducing
the function of Article 33(4) to this narrow role, however, runs counter to
the idea of relying first and foremost on the text when interpreting a treaty.
Article 32 does not reference Article 33 explicitly because it takes over the
abstract perspective of Article 31 and regulates merely permissible use of
supplementary means as an additional aid to interpretation in general.68 To
66Henceforth referred to as fundamental ambiguity.
67In essence, we have only established single text not fundamental ambiguity. Concerning
the abstract perspective of Articles 31 and 32, single text and fundamental ambiguity
implicitly converge; however, one must not lose sight of Article 32(a) and (b) being
drafted with the latter in mind, which only equals single text ambiguity in case of a
unilingual treaty. The classification confusion arises if the idea of fundamental ambigu-
ity conceived in the abstract is simply transposed to the plurilingual scenario without
explicit distinction between single text and fundamental ambiguity.
68See ibid., II:222–23, paras. 18–19.
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suggest otherwise would imply that a consideration of the authentic means
of interpretation should be conducted only up to the point when the opera-
tion of Article 33(4) would become necessary. At that point the interpreter
would be suggested to switch to the application of supplementary means in
their active role under Article 32(a) and (b) and return to authentic means
under Article 33(4) only if that fails to resolve the problem.The implied back
and forth between authentic and supplementary means seems inconsistent
with the overall hierarchical weight attribution implemented by the VCLT
and, as argued, the principle of effectiveness.
In view of these considerations, the following is submitted: A literal read-
ing of Article 32 and Article 33(4) does not fit with a textual interpretation
in the light of their context and object and purpose, since it would suggest
reliance on supplementary means of interpretation for the active determin-
ation of the treaty meaning before all authentic means are exhausted. An
alternative determination of the treaty meaning under Article 32 is accord-
ing to its own wording only allowed once an interpretation with the help of
authentic means has turned out ambiguous or obscure, or has lead to a res-
ult which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. With plurilingual treaties
such cannot be declared before recourse to the other texts has been had.
As it is the task of Article 33(4) to establish the ordinary meaning by
recourse to the object and purpose as sole decider, it may be regarded as
an extension of Article 31 for plurilingual cases, with its explicit reference
to Article 32 being only a partial reference to the first part,69 in the sense
that the application of Article 31 has established a common meaning of the
prima facie diverging texts that has then been confirmed by supplementary
means under Article 321, that is, the interpretative rule in Article 33(4) does
not need to be invoked. This mere partial reference implements a relation-
ship with Article 32 analogous to Article 31, in the sense that supplement-
arymeans are supplementary both to the general rule and the interpretative
69It is noteworthy in this respect that Article 33(4) only cites Article 32 without adding
letters (a) and (b). This general reference causes the ambiguity discussed here, because
of the particular drafting of Article 32; however, if we assume the omission to be inten-
tional – which is not entirely unreasonable because, at least in principle, the principle
of effectiveness implies that drafting is intentionally precise rather than unintention-
ally vague – the conclusion presented here is even covered by the literal wording of
Article 33(4).
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rule in Article 33(4), which is consistent with the general intention to permit
recourse to supplementary means merely as an aid, whereas Article 33(4)
forms part of the prescriptive VCLT rules.
After Article 31 fails to reconcile the texts in a way that can be confirmed
by a consideration of supplementary means, recourse should be had first to
Article 33(4). If the object and purpose as sole decider fails to resolve the
problem, we may resort to supplementary means as an aid to establish a
common meaning to the incongruent meanings of the texts, as such situ-
ation may be classified as a situation of fundamental ambiguity in view of
the existence of a treaty that suggests the parties intended to agree on the
issue in question. Conversely, Article 32 should not be applied directly to
divergences between texts, because they are first and foremost the domain
of Article 33(4). The outcome concerning the overall meaning of the treaty
may be classified as fundamentally ambiguous only after Article 33(4) has
failed, in which case supplementary means may be resorted to in their act-
ive role.
This sequence makes sense from a practical perspective, as the reason
for relying on supplementary means is a problem in form of an unresolved
divergence between the texts the interpreter is confronted with, which im-
plies that a comparison of them has already taken place. In the course of
such comparison, all authentic means including the object and purpose as
sole decider should be exhausted before recourse to supplementary means
is had, or else the comparison is incomplete. This does not imply a different
system of interpretation violating the dictum quoted above, but only adapts
the system devised in the abstract to work as intended for the concrete case
of multiple texts by establishing the ordinary meaning of the treaty as the
meaning common to all texts.
At this point the question may be asked whether depending on the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of a case there may be good arguments to
support another approach, for example, if the root of the problem is an ob-
vious mistake resulting in two texts being different in a way nobody could
have intended as opposed to two texts trying to say the same but failing.
Consider the treaty UK-Denmark (1980). Its final clause declares the texts
in English and Danish as ‘equally authoritative’, and its Article 28(3) reads
‘Payments made by an individual who is resident in a Contracting State
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. . .to a pension scheme established in and recognised for tax purposes in
the other Contracting State may be relieved from tax’. The words ‘and re-
cognised for tax purposes in’ were, by mistake, omitted from the statutory
instrument giving effect to the treaty in the UK,70 whereas the published
Danish text implemented the correct wording.71 For each single text con-
sidered in isolation, there is no problem of ambiguity or unreasonableness;
the issue is one of differing personal scopes between the texts of the treaty
and the UK statutory instrument implementing the English text.
In a hypothetical scenario in which a UK judge would only draw on the
statutory instrument and apply the routine interpretation approach because
no party raised the issue, the potential outcome would be a misapplication
of the treaty. If the issue is raised, it should automatically resolve via refer-
ence to the signed copy. A judge should have no problem referring to the
originally signed instrument even though it is not the one implemented in
domestic law. Indeed, he is required by international law to apply the pro-
visions of the concluded treaty and cannot invoke the statutory instrument
as relieving him of this duty without breaching Articles 26 and 27 VCLT. If
he fails to look up the signed copy, the travaux préparatoires should imme-
diately resolve the issue because they will document the existence of the
missing phrase. Hence, no need to invoke Article 33(4).
Let us suppose the different wording would not only be an error of the
UK statutory instrument but also be the wording of the English text. If we
assume that the Danish wording is the one intended, a look into the travaux
préparatoires will, in all likelihood, reveal so. Elaborate object and purpose
considerations on the basis of the texts, however, will not prove helpful
when dealing with a list of conditions for obtaining relief, as obtaining re-
lief for contributions to a foreign pension scheme is not a question of double
taxation. In a tax credit system, double taxation is the normal starting point.
The treaty provides relief by reference to domestic law, and double exemp-
tion is not normally possible. Under the approach submitted here, the result-
ing failure of the object and purpose criterion to reconcile the texts could be
considered an unreasonable result. This would warrant recourse to supple-
70S.I. 1980 No. 1960; however, the text published by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
contains the correct wording.
71BEK 6 of 12/2 1981.
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mentary means under Article 32(b), which, in all likelihood, would produce
the proper outcome; however, in view of the particular facts and circum-
stances, such detour seems like a moot exercise.
Let us consider another example in which the mistake is less obvious.
The English text of Article 13(7) in the UK-Netherlands (1980) treaty with
equally authoritative English and Dutch texts reads ‘to levy according to its
law a tax chargeable in respect of gains from the alienation of any property
on a person’. In the Dutch text the crucial bit translates to ‘levy tax on gains
from the alienation of property of a person’.72 Although a provision the
literal wording of which is geared towards the treatment of the tax object
placed in a treaty fundamentally drafted to apply to tax subjects is odd and
necessarily a source of difficulty, such provisions are not unknown in tax
treaties.73 Therefore, a consideration of the texts alone on the basis of Article
33(4)may turn out to be amoot exercisewhile the travaux préparatoiresmay
quickly reveal that one text happens to be a bad translation; however, the
routine interpretation approach to interpret a single text in isolation under
Articles 31 and 32may lead to wrong results, while considering Article 32(a)
and (b) after a comparison of texts under Article 31 but before Article 33(4)
bears the risk that, erroneously, an interpretation entirely autonomous from
the principles contained in Article 31 and Article 33(4) is adopted because
supplementary means may allow for a wider array of conclusions.
The ICSID decision on the BIT Turkey-Turkmenistan (1992) in Kiliç may
serve as an illustration of the latter.74 Although not necessarily the out-
come as such, the reasoning of the court may be rejected. The English text
of the BIT implies that submission of disputes by investors to local courts
72See Stéphane Austry et al., ‘The Proposed OECDMultilateral Instrument Amending Tax
Treaties’, Bulletin for International Taxation 70, no. 12 (October 2016), s. 3, 18n.
73For example, Germany-US (1989), Article 1(7), based on United States, Income and Cap-
ital Model Convention, 2016, Article 1(6); see Richard Xenophon Resch, ‘Tax Treatment
of US S-Corporations under the Germany-US Tax Treaty’, European Taxation 49, no. 3
(2009): 122–28; Richard Xenophon Resch, ‘Case Closed: Tax Treatment of United States
S-Corporations under the Germany-US Tax Treaty – Treaty Benefits for Hybrid Entit-
ies’, European Taxation 54, no. 5 (2014): 192–97.
74Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, ICSID, Case
No. ARB/10/1 (Washington, D.C.: International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 2012).
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before arbitration are optional, whereas the Russian text implies them to
be mandatory, with submission to arbitration being possible only after a
final award at the local courts has not been granted within one year. The
final clause of the BIT declares both texts as equally authentic. From testi-
mony of linguistic experts the court concluded that ‘attempting to interpret
the relevant English text in accordance with Article 31 of the VCLT leaves
its meaning ambiguous or obscure. In these circumstances, it is appropri-
ate for the Tribunal to consider supplementary means of interpretation as
permitted under Article 32 of the VCLT.’75
The court then considered the circumstances of the conclusion of the BIT
as supplementary means and found that Turkey had entered into several
BITs with the Turkic states within the narrow time frame of five days, all
of which included substantially identical arbitration provisions requiring
mandatory recourse to domestic courts before submission for arbitration.
From this the court concluded that the English text of the BIT should be
interpreted as requiring mandatory recourse to local courts as well, as such
reading ‘best reconciles the interpretation of the texts, having regard to the
circumstances surrounding their adoption.’76 With respect to Article 33(4)
the court added the following:
To the extent that it might not be possible to resolve the possible difference
in meaning of the English and Russian text through the application of Art-
icles 31 and 32, the Tribunal can, in accordance with the principles reflected
in Article 33(4) of the VCLT, adopt the meaning which would best reconcile
the two texts.
To the extent that this had been necessary – and the Tribunal concludes
that it is not – the Tribunal would have had no hesitation in concluding that
the ambiguity of the English text could only be reconciled with the clearly
mandatory Russian text by the determination that the English text also re-
quired a mandatory recourse to the local courts. This follows, because what
is plainly mandatory cannot be optional, but what may either be mandatory
or optional, can be seen as mandatory.77
75Ibid., para. 9.17.
76Ibid., para. 9.21.
77Ibid., paras. 9.22–9.23. Noteworthy, the court seems to interpret the reference to Article
32 in Article 33 as referring to the article in its entirety and, therefore, to consider its
letters (a) and (b) as preceding application of Article 33(4). Symptomatically, the latter is
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Questions of interpretation are for the court, so the court is right not
to straight away follow the suggestions of the linguistic experts to reinter-
pret the English text according to grammar and phrasing considerations
alone, but to declare the necessity of further considerations because the
text considered turned out ambiguous.78 As next step, however, the court
went straight away to supplementary means on the basis of Article 32(a),
whereas it should have done so only after an interpretation under Article
33(4) would have failed. To suggest that themeaning of the treaty is ambigu-
ous before it has been interpreted in the light of all texts is premature – that
the meaning of one text considered in isolation appears ambiguous is not
sufficient to establish the truth of such contention. Instead of considering
only the wording of a single text ambiguous, the court mistakenly treated
the treaty as being fundamentally ambiguous.
It seems likely that considerations based on the object and purpose would
not lead to a definite result, because both mandatory and optional submis-
sion to local courts before arbitration serve the same general purpose, only
in different ways. Hence, it might not be possible for the court to establish
the one true meaning given it faces two conflicting texts simply stating the
opposite of each other.Therefore, Article 32(a) and (b) would be next in line,
and the order of recourse to authentic versus supplementary means based
on the hierarchy between them might not have mattered all that much con-
cerning the outcome.
Notwithstanding, we may see from this case how giving preference to
supplementary means over Article 33(4) could go wrong in practice. The
primary argument of the court based on the circumstances of the BIT con-
clusion is relatively thin. In particular, it does not pay enough attention to
the bilateral treaty relationship between the contracting parties. That the
other BITs Turkey concluded at the same time with the other Turkic states
found no longer necessary, i.e., Article 33(4) is effectively rendered an empty provision.
As a result, the VCLT interpretative framework is stood up on its head: instead of using
supplementarymeans to confirm an interpretation based on authentic means, the court
does the opposite, i.e., it confirms an interpretation it derives from what it considers to
be supplementary means by an interpretation then to follow supposedly from applying
Article 33(4), both of which are, however, questionable in itself besides the inversion
(see below).
78See ibid., paras. 9.14–9.16.
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contained equally drafted provisions all implementing mandatory submis-
sion to domestic courts before submission for arbitration sure tells us some-
thing about Turkey’s treaty policy, but nothing much about Turkmenistan.
For the argument to be more credible, the court should at least have ven-
tured to gain some insight into Turkmenistan’s treaty policy concerning
arbitration.79
The argument of the court is simply one from analogy and involves no
further considerations concerning context and object and purpose, not even
from an examination of the travaux préparatoires.80 Notwithstanding, espe-
cially the evaluation of the English text by the linguistic experts in combin-
ation with some further indications from Turkish official translations not
discussed here in detail render the conclusions of the court more plausible
than not;81 however, all these considerations are not of conclusive force
and would not qualify if in conflict with an evaluation on the basis of the
object and purpose under Article 33(4). Instead of setting itself up to arrive
at a meaning ‘governed by the principles contained in article 27’,82 which
provide the general parenthesis even for a determination of the meaning
on the basis of supplementary means, the court’s approach led it to arrive
at any meaning somehow plausible in view of the general circumstances.
The last comment of the court concerning Article 33(4) indicates that it
simply chose the meaning it considered more likely rather than doing what
Article 33(4) really requires, namely, an in-depth examination of the treaty
texts against the background of the expressed object and purpose. Instead
of focussing on how to reconcile the texts, namely, in the way the VCLT
79At the time, however, Turkmenistan only had one other BIT with Spain (1990) signed
and in force, which would have made deduction of a consistent treaty policy difficult.
80It is questionable whether the other BIT’s concluded really fall under the scope of Article
32 as ‘circumstances of its [the treaty’s] conclusion’ (emphasis added), as is seemingly
assumed by the court.
81Additional political considerations the court did not explicitly elaborate on to bolster
its argument, such as the situation of Turkmenistan being a newly independent state
and Turkey being one of the first countries recognising the independence of all Turkic
states, which in turn makes it likely that Turkmenistan would have made some conces-
sions to Turkey’s treaty policy even if it had a different one itself, may be considered
to point in the same direction.
82ILC,Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19. Draft Article
27 became Article 31 in the VCLT.
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prescribes, it treated reconciliation as an end in itself to be effected by any
means. Ironically, its reasoning that ‘what is plainly mandatory cannot be
optional, but whatmay either bemandatory or optional, can be seen asman-
datory’83 is simply a conceptual mistake. Contrary to its view, the choice
for either mandatory or optional in such situation is no reconciliation at all
because nothing ‘may either be mandatory or optional’ at the same time.
In summary, the approach suggested here by me is submitted as a
matter of good practice in order to eliminate the pitfalls entailed in any
other approach. Consideration of the object and purpose criterion under
Article 33(4) before recourse to supplementary means may never lead to
an improper result, as the argumentative scope is much narrower than
that provided by supplementary means. Either it will lead to a solution
based on the object and purpose, which may only be confirmed but not
contested by supplementary means, or it will not lead to any solution at
all, in which case recourse to supplementary means follows as next step.
Recourse to Article 33(4) will in the worst case prove unhelpful, whereas
direct recourse to supplementary means both before considering the other
texts and applying Article 33(4) may in the worst case lead to improper
results. Of course, in a mistake situation the task is to find the cause for
it, for which the preparatory materials may prove to be more helpful than
Article 33(4); however, unless the result is such that it is obvious nobody
could have intended it, the approach suggested here is recommended as a
fail-safe method.
The considered examples point again to a critical problem of plurilingual
tax treaties. Differences between texts with respect to wordings that define
personal scope or types of income may not always affect the avoidance of
double taxation, but the issue at stake may be rather the sharing of the
tax base between the contracting states. Therefore, considerations of the
object and purpose as sole decider on the basis of the text alone may not
prove helpful. This is a problem because there is abundant opportunity for
such differences to occur, and the reason may not necessarily be careless
translation but rooted in the idiomatic properties of language.
Consider the New Skies decision of the Delhi High Court concerning roy-
83Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, para. 9.23.
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alties under the Netherlands-India (1988) tax treaty.84 Article 12(4) of the
treaty defines royalties as ‘payments of any kind received as a considera-
tion for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of any patent, trade
mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience.’ The final clause
declares the Dutch, Hindi, and English texts as authentic and designates
the English text as prevailing in case of a divergence between the Dutch
and Hindi texts. Let us disregard the prevalence of the English text for the
moment and assume equal authority of all texts. The court only relied on
the English text and was led down a track of extensive deliberations by
domestic law considerations concerning the meaning of ‘secret formula or
process’. Sanghavi provides a summary:
InDirector of Income Tax v. New Skies Satellite BV (New Skies), the Delhi High
Court belaboured the short issue of whether the adjective “secret” qualifies
only the noun ‘formula’ or the two nouns ‘formula’ and ‘process’ in the
definition. At the root of the confusion was the very similar term ‘royalty’,
which is very similarly defined in the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (ITA
1961) as ‘any consideration . . .for . . .the use of any . . . , secret formula or
process or trade mark or similar property’. Early decisions in this regard
had suggested that a payment for the use of a process – not necessarily a
secret process – would be considered to be a royalty for the purposes of the
ITA 1961.This interpretationwas subsequently confirmed by a retrospective
legislative clarification, the validity ofwhichwas upheld by theMadrasHigh
Court in Verizon Communications Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. ITO. A large part
of the Court’s 50–page decision was dedicated to the question whether the
comma, appearing after the word ‘process’, changed the interpretation of
the term ‘royalties’ for the purposes of the tax treaty.85
In contrast to the previous scenarios, a comparison of texts would have
provided for a quicker route to resolve the issue because the Dutch text
uses the expression een geheim recept of een geheime werkwijze, that is, the
adjective ‘secret’ is used twice to explicitly qualify both nouns ‘formula’ and
‘process’. This is necessary in Dutch for proper idiomatic phrasing because
84Director of Income Tax v New Skies Satellite BV, ITA 473/2012, 2016.
85Dhruv Sanghavi, ‘Found in Translation: The Correct Interpretation of “Secret Formula
or Process” in India’s Tax Treaties’, British Tax Review, no. 4 (2016): 411–12.
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nouns have a gender and here two nouns of different genders are combined:
the neuter recept and the gender werkwijze.86
Even without consulting the Dutch text it seems obvious that with re-
spect to the enumeration of ‘any . . . , secret formula or process, or’ the ad-
jective ‘secret’ relates to both nouns, as this is standard idiomatic phrasing
in English. The alternative meaning the court was led to contemplate by its
reference to domestic law requires a different wording to really be manifest,
for example, ‘any . . . , secret formula, or process’. That the Dutch text uses
the adjective twice is merely incidental for purely syntactic reasons. If both
nouns had the same gender, the enumeration would follow the same logic
of using the adjective only once to apply it to both subjects, which is the
ordinary idiomatic phrasing for such enumerations.
Using the adjective twice in English would be foolproof formulation re-
commendable for legal drafting, but not doing so hardly renders the text
ambiguous. The proper ordinary meaning that this is an enumeration and
the adjective applies to both subjects is manifest from its ordinary gram-
matical phrasing, whereas the alternative meaning considered by the court
requires additional reasoning to become manifest. In view of the Dutch text
it becomes abundantly clear that the adjective ‘secret’ is intended to qualify
both ‘formula’ and ‘process’, and there can be no notion that the English text
remains ambiguous or that there would be a difference between the texts.
Thus, recourse neither to Article 33(4) nor supplementary means is needed.
The case, however, raises the question of how the feature of tax treaties to
refer to domestic law affects interpretation in plurilingual scenarios.
4.5. Special Considerations concerning Tax Treaties
Tax treaties commonly feature renvoi clauses modelled on Article 3(2) of the
OECD and UN Model Conventions.87 This introduces an additional layer of
complexity to the issue at hand, because such clauses implement a situ-
ation in which the meanings of terms in the treaty intentionally have an
asymmetric scope depending on the domestic laws of the treaty partners,
86See ibid., 413–14.
87Henceforth, ‘Article 3(2)’ will be used to refer to both renvoi clauses in Model Conven-
tions and corresponding provisions in actual treaties.
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attributable to the need to connect two different tax systems and ensure
that domestic taxation and treaty relief are equally matched to effectively
implement the treaty’s object and purpose of avoiding double taxation.88
The interaction between Article 3(2) and final clauses granting equal au-
thenticity to several texts requires the texts to make Article 3(2) compatible
with Article 33 and integrate potentially asymmetrical meanings of treaty
terms introduced by the reference to domestic law.89 Under Article 3(2),
88See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 7.1; Edwardes-Ker, Tax Treaty Interpretation,
173, s. 12.01. This asymmetry is mostly confined to terms concerning types of income
that need to connect the different domestic tax systems at the treaty level, whereas in
respect of other terms contextual meanings will usually apply because of the need for
a symmetrical common meaning, see Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 8.2.4.2.1.
Much has been written about Article 3(2). Its interpretation is a fiercely discussed topic,
as it is a rule of interpretation directly contained in all important Model Conventions
andmost effective tax treaties, wherefore it must be considered in addition to the VCLT.
Its application is of high impact both on the contracting states with respect to the bal-
ance of effective taxing rights implemented by the treaty through reciprocal double tax
relief via exemption and credit, and the taxpayer in respect of how much tax he has
to pay where and overall. The debate about Article 3(2) has been intense and fruitful
in the sense that a consensus to follow the qualification of the source state in case of
qualification conflicts has been adopted by the OECD, see OECD, Model Tax Conven-
tion, 2017, Commentary on Articles 23A and 23B, paras. 32.1–32.7; for a summary of
the underlying argument see Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 7.6.1. The debate
is continuing in view of the practical relevance, see, e.g., Seminar D: Article 3(2) and
the Scope of Domestic Law, 66th IFA Congress in Boston, 2012. Much will continue to
be written also in view of the not diminishing number of cases in which its application
plays a role, see Mónica Sada Garibay, ‘An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 3(2) of
the OECD Model (2010)’, Bulletin for International Taxation 65, no. 8 (2011). An extens-
ive consideration of all arguments concerning Article 3(2) is way beyond the scope of
this study, which will focus as much as possible on the limited issue of its interaction
with Article 33 and assume familiarity of the reader with the overall debate including
the most relevant literature and case law.
89See Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen, MA, Vor Art. 1, 37, para. 47. Article 3(2) must not be understood to
simply override the principles of interpretation codified in the VCLT, by way of the
principle specialia generalibus derogant (the specific derogates from the general), see
Edwin van der Bruggen, ‘Unless the Vienna Convention Otherwise Requires: Notes on
the Relationship between Article 3(2) of the OECDModel Tax Convention and Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, European Taxation 43, no.
5 (2003): 142–56, 154–155; John F. Avery Jones et al., ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties
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the contracting states may interpret the treaty differently according to the
meaning of terms in their domestic laws ‘unless the context otherwise re-
quires’; however, each contracting state must in principle be able to depart
from any text because of the principle of unity and the equal authority of
the texts. If country A interprets term X as F while country B interprets it as
G, and this is so intended by the treaty, that is, the context does not require
otherwise, X must allow for both F and G to be included in the expressed
agreement, as each country must be able to interpret either text to reach
the intended meaning. The principle of unity is preserved in this situation
by the stipulation to follow the qualification of the source state in a quali-
fication conflict.90 Country A may not interpret term X as F based on one
text and as G based on another, but country A must be able to interpret X
as F while country B must be able to interpret X as G, based on either text.
Thus, term X in either text must allow to be construed both as F and G.
This is embodied also in the concept of context as implied by Article 3(2),
which differs from that employed by Article 31.91 The meaning of the latter
is relatively narrow and intended to differentiate authentic from supple-
mentary means, attributing different weights to them for their use in the
interpretative process. In contrast, the meaning of the former is intended to
establish whether an existing domestic law meaning of a term should not
be applied. Therefore, it is much broader and does not attribute different
weights to different interpretative means, which remains an exercise left to
the interpreter. Basically, it includes any material relevant and, certainly, all
material listed in the VCLT, including all texts.92 Consequently, Article 3(2)
does not contrast domestic law and context as opposites,93 but its concept
with Particular Reference to Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model – II’, British Tax Review, no.
2 (1984): 104.
90See OECD, Model Tax Convention, 2017, Commentary on Articles 23A and 23B, paras.
32.1–32.7.
91See Avery Jones et al., ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to
Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model – II’, 104.
92See van der Bruggen, ‘Unless the Vienna Convention Otherwise Requires’, 155; Avery
Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, ss. 6.2 and 8.1.
93Domestic law meanings represent definitions of terms incorporated by reference of Art-
icle 3(2) into the treaty. As part of the text, they are within the context definition of
Article 31(2). Since the concept of context under Article 3(2) is broader and includes
all interpretative means included in the VCLT definition of context, it also necessarily
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of context includes the domestic law meanings of both contracting states,94
while domestic law itself may be the only context necessary to decide that
it should not be applied.95
In essence, many terms of a tax treaty are intended as conceptual ab-
stractions that are comprehensive enough to allow for asymmetric inter-
pretation according to the domestic laws of both contracting states.96 Yet,
we may not conceive of Article 3(2) as splitting the treaty in two, with sep-
arate texts in the official languages of the contracting states for terms that
are to have the meaning they have under their respective domestic laws,
as this would be in direct contradiction to the principle of unity and the
final clause declaring all texts as equally authentic. Rather, Article 3(2) is
intended to complete the treaty where it remains indistinct conceptually.
Since many terms in a treaty are intended as conceptual abstractions
to be determined either symmetrically via an autonomous interpretation
or asymmetrically via domestic law in order to connect two different tax
systems and ensure that domestic taxation and treaty relief are equally
matched, both to implement the treaty’s object and purpose of avoiding
double taxation, the wording of Article 3(2) has to be understood as having
such conceptual scope. Avery Jones notes the following in this respect:
It is relevant that domestic law may not use the precise expression used
in the OECD Model. For instance, UK tax law refers to ‘land’ rather than
‘immovable property’, does not use ‘profits of an enterprise’, uses ‘disposal’
rather than ‘alienation’ in relation to capital gains, and ‘earnings’ rather
than ‘salaries, wages and other similar remuneration’ in relation to employ-
ment income. It would be contrary to the purpose of the OECD Model (and
a tax treaty based on it) not to apply the equivalent domestic law in such
cases. This suggests that ‘term’ in article 3(2) of the OECD Model should be
given a wide meaning, not restricted to identical words, but, rather, to the
equivalent domestic law concept. . . .The width of the meaning of ‘term’ can
be even more extreme where a tax treaty provides that, in cases of different
includes both domestic law definitions.
94See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, ss. 6.2, 8.1, and 8.2.2.1; OECD, Model Tax Con-
vention, 2014, Commentary to Article 3, para. 12.
95See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, ss. 8.2.2.3 and 8.2.4.
96See Gaja, ‘The Perspective of International Law’, 99–100; Wim Wijnen, ‘Some Thoughts
on Convergence and Tax Treaty Interpretation’, Bulletin for International Taxation, no.
11 (2013): 575.
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meanings of two language texts, a third language version is to prevail or
where the only official version of a tax treaty is in a third language (see sec-
tion 3.5.2.). As domestic law will not be written in the third (or sole other)
language, there will never be an identical word in domestic law and so it is
essential to give a meaning to “term” that conveys the equivalent concept.97
Crucially, the same understanding has to be applied when – deliberately
or incidentally – actual domestic law terms are used in the respective lan-
guage texts of a treaty. Such may frequently happen (particularly for terms
denoting types of income) because domestic law technical terms may be
simply what OECD Model terms literally translate to in the languages of
the treaty partners, treaty negotiators discuss treaty provisions using their
domestic law technical language with the laws of their countries in mind
(and particularly with respect to their understanding of what certain types
of income imply), or the treaty is indeed intended to apply asymmetrically
concerning the point in question.98
The pitfall of this is that – especially if only the text in the own language
is consulted – the seemingly obvious reference to domestic law may trick
the interpreter into overlooking the term in question to constitute first and
foremost a general abstraction that, of course, may default to its domestic
law meaning if so intended, which can however be determined only when
analysed against the background of both contexts implied by Articles 3(2)
and 31(2), or else mismatches in qualification may result that lead to double
taxation or double non-taxation unintended by the treaty.99
97Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 7.2.1.
98See Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen, MA, Vor Art. 1, 37, para. 47.
99See Klaus Vogel, ‘Conflicts of Qualification: The Discussion is not Finished’, Bulletin for
International Taxation, no. 2 (2003): 41–44, Case 2, 43–43; John F. Avery Jones, ‘Conflicts
of Qualification: Comment on Prof. Vogel’s and Alexander Rust’s Articles’, Bulletin for
International Taxation, no. 5 (2003): 184–86, Response by Prof. Vogel, 186. Vogel dis-
cusses this as a ‘conflict of qualification’ not resolved by the application of the OECD
approach to interpret the method article, laid out in the OECD Commentary on Article
23A and 23B, paras. 32.1–32.7. I use a different terminology, i.e., ‘mismatch’, because
the OECD Commentary seems to reserve the terminology ‘conflict of qualification’ to
cases in which taxation or non-taxation by the source state and the resulting double
taxation or double non-taxation is (otherwise) ‘in accordance with the provisions of
the Convention’, whereas I view Vogel’s case as one in which the ‘divergence is based
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Vogel devises such a case between Austria and Germanywith respect to a
taxpayer being an Austrian national who alternates between both countries
(sometimes on the same day, so accumulating stays in each exceeding six
months) without having a permanent home in either.100 The case is based on
the tax treaty Austria-Germany (2000), which is unilingual in German and
contains the wording gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt in the residence tie-breaker
provision 4(2)(b).101 This is not only a literal translation of the OECDModel
wording ‘habitual abode’ but also a defined concept in both the domestic
laws of Austria and Germany resulting in unlimited tax liability.
Crucially, however, both domestic law concepts differ from the habitual
abode concept in the OECD Model and each other. In particular, German
domestic tax law contains a fiction of any stay with a duration of more
than six months automatically constituting an habitual abode,102 whereas
the OECD conception does not implement any such fiction concerning a
specific length of time.103 Austrian domestic law, on the other hand, spe-
cifies that whenever unlimited tax liability depends on the taxpayer’s ha-
bitual abode, he will become subject to unlimited tax liability if he stays
longer than six months in Austria whether or not he actually establishes an
habitual abode, which will depend entirely on factual circumstances.104
not on different interpretations of the provisions of the Convention but on different
provisions of domestic law’, ultimately being a case of treaty misapplication to be dis-
tinguished from a ‘conflict of qualification’ as understood by the OECD Commentary
(see below).
100Vogel, ‘Conflicts of Qualification: The Discussion is not Finished’, Case 2, 43–43.
101Article 4 of the treaty is modelled on Article 4 of the OECD Model.
102Article 9(2) AO. The AEAO to Article 9 AO, para. 1, asserts an ‘irrefutable presumption’
in this respect.The duration of more than six months does not have to be uninterrupted
or contained in a single tax year but must not be merely transitory. Interrupted stays
are to be evaluated as to whether they still constitute a single stay overall, interrupted
only by short absence (attributable, e.g., to vacation) and connected by the intention
to continue the stay as embodied in the factual circumstances. Merely private stays
with a duration of less than one year are not taken into account, as well as cases in
which the taxpayer only works in Germany but lives abroad and does not regularly
stay overnight, see Article 9(1)–(2) AO in combination with AEAO to Article 9 AO,
paras. 1–2.
103OECD, Model Tax Convention, 2014, Commentary on Article 4, para. 19, replaced by
paras. 19–19.1 in 2017.
104Article 26(2) BAO in combination with Article 66(2) JN.
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In Vogel’s fictional scenario the taxpayer becomes subject to unlimited
tax liability both in Austria and Germany under their respective domestic
laws. In Austria because of his stay of more than six months, however,
without establishing an habitual abode, and in Germany as a result of estab-
lishing an habitual abode because of his stay of more than six months. The
taxpayer receives dividend and interest income from third countries, which
ultimately falls under Article 21 of the treaty, requiring the tie-breaker rule
to decide residence for treaty purposes.
Despite acknowledging that the context seems to require an autonomous
interpretation of the OECD Model term ‘habitual abode’,105 Vogel neverthe-
less suggests an interpretation ultimately based on domestic law:
[S]ubparagraph b) does not specify the time of a stay which would qualify
it as being ‘habitual’, and they merely add that the length of this time must
be ‘sufficient’. Thus, though the core of the term ‘habitual abode’ can be de-
termined by autonomous interpretation, its ‘boundaries’ remain indistinct.
To this extent, therefore, the reference to domestic law provided by Art. 3(2)
persists.106
In consequence, Article 4 in combination with Article 3(2) would cause Aus-
tria to consider the taxpayer resident in Germany for treaty purposes be-
cause he has an habitual abode in Germany but not in Austria under the
assumed factual circumstances, whereas Germany would consider the tax-
payer resident in Austria for treaty purposes because he has an habitual
abode in both states according to the six months fiction, wherefore resid-
ence is ultimately decided based on nationality under Article 4(2)c. The res-
ult is double non-taxation of the dividend and interest income.107
The question is whether the interpretation of Article 4 in combination
with Article 3(2) applied by Vogel – which he himself admits to be contro-
versial108 – is really correct, or whether this is a case for which the context
105For conclusive argument in this respect, see Vogel and Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsab-
kommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen
und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 440–41, para. 203–
206; Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen, MA, Art. 4, 55–59, paras. 74–77.
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requires otherwise. Avery Jones rejects Vogel’s view, pointing to the pitfall
outlined above Vogel falls victim to:
I suggest that the fact that Germany uses an identical expression (or rather
an identical expression in the German translation of the OECD Model) in
its internal law is insufficient to cause Art. 3(2) to apply internal law, par-
ticularly in light of the Commentary, when the result of doing so is that
both Austria and Germany would resolve the dual residence in favour of the
other state, leaving the taxpayer a resident of neither, which is not exactly
in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty. The case for using
internal law to define a type of income is much stronger because the res-
ult is that the treaty exemption or relief corresponds exactly to the internal
law tax charge; for other expressions, there is a much stronger argument
for the term to mean the same in both states. Dual residence would not be
resolved in the same way in all states if one state happens to use one of the
expressions in Art. 4(2) in its internal law. If there is a conflict between the
two states’ interpretations, it has to be resolved by the mutual agreement
article.109
In light of all the aforesaid I strongly agree with Avery Jones. What may
be added to his analysis is that the concept of gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt in
German tax law not only differs from the OECD habitual abode concept as
regards the six months fiction, but also in other respects and in terms of
its context.110 Crucially, according to the OECD Model, the taxpayer may
have an habitual abode at the same time in both contracting states, whereas
under German tax law the taxpayer can only have a single habitual abode at
any point in time.111 Therefore, domestic law itself may be the only context
necessary to decide that it should not be applied, because the conclusion
that the taxpayer has his habitual abode both in Austria and Germany is at
the same time based on domestic law and precluded by it, that is, applying
the German domestic law definition is self-contradicting.
109Avery Jones, ‘Conflicts ofQualification: Comment on Prof. Vogel’s and Alexander Rust’s
Articles’, 186.
110See Vogel and Lehner,Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf
dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der Grundlage
der Musterabkommen, 440, para. 203.
111AEAO to Article 9 AO, para. 3; see BFH, ‘I 244/63’ (BStBl. 1966 III, February 1966); BFH,
‘I R 241/82’ (BStBl. 1984 II, August 1983).
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In summary, when applying Article 3(2), it is crucial to bear in mind that
most treaty terms are first and foremost general abstractions even if any ter-
minology identical to domestic law is used. Neither do treaty terms identical
to domestic law terminology imply they should be interpreted according to
domestic law,112 nor treaty terms different from domestic law terminology
that they should not be interpreted according to it.113
Under a contextual interpretation of habitual abode – in this particular
case considering specifically the domestic laws of both contracting states
and the treaty object and purpose – the correct outcome of Vogel’s fictional
scenario should be one of the following, depending on the particular facts
and circumstances assumed:
(a) The taxpayer has an habitual abode in either Austria or Germany.
(b) He has an habitual abode both in Austria and Germany.
(c) He does not have an habitual abode in either of them.
In other words, there should be a common interpretation concerning the
length of time to be sufficient for qualifying a stay as habitual. As a res-
ult, residence for treaty purposes would be attributed by both Austria and
Germany to the same state based on either the habitual abode criterion or
the nationality of the taxpayer. The outcome suggested by Vogel does not
constitute a ‘conflict of qualification’ as defined by the OECD Commentary
but represents a treaty misapplication attributable to a mismatch in inter-
pretation caused by mistakenly applying domestic law definitions because
the treaty text incidentally featured terminology identical to domestic law,
which should be resolved via a mutual agreement procedure.114
112See Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen, MA, Art. 4, 55–56, para. 74.
113See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 7.2.1.
114The 2017 OECD Model and Commentary update addresses such scenario: ‘Under para-
graph 3, the competent authorities can, in particular, enter into a mutual agreement to
define a term not defined in the Convention, or to complete or clarify the definition of
a defined term, where such an agreement would resolve difficulties or doubts arising as
to the interpretation or application of the Convention. Such circumstances could arise,
for example, where a conflict in meaning under the domestic laws of the two States
creates difficulties or leads to an unintended or absurd result. As expressly recognised
in paragraph 2 of Article 3, an agreement reached under paragraph 3 concerning the
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Unfortunately, confusing treaty concepts with domestic law ones is amis-
take easy to make, as tax treaties will for a variety of reasons often feature
terminology identical to domestic law.115 Therefore, Article 3(2) provides an
additional argument for an obligation to compare texts: in order to define
any treaty term X according to domestic law unless the context does not re-
quire otherwise, one first has to establish the exact term X to be defined, for
which it is necessary to compare all texts. Since the different language texts
may translate treaty term X as F or G in the languages of the contracting
states – which may be terms borrowed from their respective domestic laws
(either deliberately because their domestic law meanings may indeed be in-
tended or incidentally although a contextual meaning may be intended) –
one runs the risk of interpreting X as not-X according to the domestic law
meaning of either F or G if only the text in the own language is looked at.
In summary, for any decision whether a domestic law meaning is to be
applied, both contexts as implied by Article 3(2) and Article 31 including
the domestic laws of both contracting states and the other language texts
need to be considered. Ellis notes in this respect against the background of
specific case law on capital gains:
There are States that, in their national tax systems, do not differentiate
between capital gains and ordinary income. There is case law in which the
meaning of a term used in the Convention prevails over each State’s domestic law
meaning of that term’, OECD,Model Tax Convention, 2017, Commentary on Article 25,
para. 6.1.
115The true lesson of Vogel’s thought experiment is that treaty negotiators are setting
courts up for committing this type of error if they use domestic law terms too indis-
criminately, see, by analogy, Bernhard Grossfield, ‘Language and the Law’, Journal of
Air Law and Commerce 50 (1985): 793–803, 801: ‘If the structure of a particular language
plays an important role in defining our thinking, it may well be that a particular lan-
guage can only express certain legal ideas and that the limits of our particular language
are the limits of our legal reasoning.’ Vogel’s case illustrates that the same applies if the
treaty is in the shared official language of the contracting states. As Kuner has poin-
ted out, ‘The interrelation between legal terminology and the legal system in which
it is used is so strong that substantial differences in usage exist even among States
that (supposedly) share a common language’, Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilin-
gual Treaties’, 957. Hence, treaty negotiators should make an effort to restrict use of
terms with a defined domestic lawmeaning to cases when an asymmetrical application
of the treaty is indeed intended.
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courts of such States have been called upon to interpret the expression
‘capital gain’ laid down in tax treaties and, in order to do so, reverted to
Article 3(2) of the treaty. The courts in these cases decided to interpret the
treaty on the basis of the text drafted in the foreign domestic language since
the difference between the concept of ‘income’ and that of ‘capital gain’
in the other language was perceivable. In order to reach such conclusions,
the courts first considered Article 3(2) but then affirmed that the context
overrides the principle under which the meaning of a term or expression
shall be based on the domestic law of the State applying the treaty – and
certainly the other language of the treaty is a part of the context. The text
of the treaty drafted in the foreign authentic language has therefore been
considered relevant to understanding the contextual meaning of a given
expression.116
Vogel’s fictional scenario is particularly problematic because the treaty at
its base is unilingual in German and contains no definition of gewöhnlicher
Aufenthalt, which makes it hard for any judge not to resort to domestic law:
Regarding Art. 4(2), gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt is not only the German trans-
lation of the OECD Model; rather, it is the wording of all of Germany’s cur-
rent tax treaties (and of Austria’s treaties, and maybe Switzerland’s treaties,
as well). With respect to Germany’s treaties with Austria and Switzerland,
there is not even a version in another language on which one could base an
interpretation which differs from the German domestic one. I have not yet
met a German judge who, in this situation, would be prepared to accept an
interpretation which differs from German domestic law. And where should
he find a criterion to choose between one of the two possible interpreta-
tions?117
How can we reply? Although there is no English text available reading ‘ha-
bitual abode’, it is obvious that gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt is intended to mean
habitual abode as understood by the OECDCommentary and not as defined
under domestic law.118 This is only obscured by gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt in-
116Gaja, ‘The Perspective of International Law’, Appendix, Intervention by Prof. Maarten
Ellis; see cases quoted by Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 8.1.
117Avery Jones, ‘Conflicts ofQualification: Comment on Prof. Vogel’s and Alexander Rust’s
Articles’, Response by Prof. Vogel, 186.
118See Vogel and Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
auf dem Gebiet der Steuern vom Einkommen und Vermögen: Kommentar auf der
Grundlage der Musterabkommen, 440–41, para. 203–206; Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuer-
ung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, MA, Art. 4, 55–59,
paras. 74–77.
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cidentally being the literal translation of ‘habitual abode’ while also being
a defined legal concept under domestic law.119 Both Austria and Germany
are members of the OECD since 1961 (the same applies to Switzerland), and
neither has placed a reservation or observation in the OECD Commentary
concerning the interpretation of Article 4. Hence, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that whenever their treaties are modelled on the OECD Model read-
ing ‘habitual abode’, an autonomous interpretation along the lines of Avery
Jones as quoted above is implied.
Probably for all plurilingual treaties of Austria and Germany with a resid-
ence tie-breaker rule modelled on the OECD Model the German text reads
gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt where the English text reads ‘habitual abode’.120
Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the meaning should be any dif-
ferent when there is only a German text reading gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt
unless the treaty itself or its particular context would provide further in-
dication to the contrary. Granted, such line of reasoning is generally prob-
lematic because of the bilateral nature of tax treaties. In this particular case,
however, a multilateral perspective based on the treaty policy embodied in
the treaty networks of both countries seems warranted for said reasons.
119See Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuer-
ungsabkommen, MA, Vor Art. 1, 37, para. 47.
120See, e.g, Austria-Bulgaria (2010) or Germany-China (2014). Noteworthy, the French texts
of both Austria-France (1993) and Germany-France (1959) use the wording séjourne de
façon habituelle in the residence tie-breaker where the German texts read gewöhnlicher
Aufenthalt, which is equivalent to the wording of Article 4(2)b of the French text of the
OECD Model, see OECD,Modèle de convention fiscale concernant le revenu et la fortune
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010).
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5.1. ResearchQuestion
The previous chapters may have left the reader with unease. If we subscribe
to the arguments refuting the routine interpretation approach, we are at
the same time presented with the real life practical challenges involved
in a comparison of all texts. The situation may look particularly bleak for
tax treaties because disputes about their application have to be decided by
national courts of various levels that may not be sufficiently equipped to
compare all texts.1 While the number of different language texts most com-
monly amounts only to two or three per treaty,2 the problem increases with
the expansion of a country’s treaty network and the addition of languages.
Whereas getting hold of the texts in the other languages may no longer
pose much of a problem in today’s world,3 the expertise to illuminate their
meaning may not be so readily available.4
Even if the judges interpreting the treaty are generally familiar with the
other languages, it may be difficult for them to establish the exact meaning
of any specific expression, in which case recourse to dictionaries, translat-
ors, and legal experts may become necessary.5 Thus, Waldock’s suggestion
that from a pragmatic perspective an obligatory comparison of all texts
seems unreasonable in view of the needed resources and countries being
unequally equipped to follow such prescription in practice remains a fair
1See Gaja, ‘The Perspective of International Law’, 98.
2Exact statistics in his respect will be presented in Chapter 8, s. 8.2.1.
3For a counterexample, see Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v
Turkmenistan, paras. 7.8–7.11.
4See Philip Baker, ‘Recent Developments in the Interpretation and Application of Double
Taxation Conventions’, Fiscalidade – Revista de Direito e Gestao Fiscal, no. 4 (2000): 24.
5See, e.g., Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 273–74, 286–87, 293–94, 300–301; Buchanan
(James) & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd., [1978] AC 141, HL, 152–
53; Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, paras.
1.38, 1.58, and 1.60.
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point.6 This leaves us with an obvious dilemma.
What if we just stick to the routine interpretation approach, tacitly ac-
cept its shortcomings, and hope for the best – no plaintiff, no judge? Even
so the problem does not change in substance but only in degree: the issue re-
mains how to deal with the practical problems associatedwith a comparison
once ambiguities arise or divergences between the texts have been pointed
out. Given the potential for divergences7 together with the ever-increasing
globalisation of commercial and investment activities8 likely accompanied
by respective international tax issues and growing taxpayer awareness out
of self-interest, it is more than likely that the number of cases in which
divergences will play a role and put judges in the predicament outlined
above will grow in the future.9 This sets us back to the practical problems
involved in a comparison of texts whether or not we agree with the argu-
ments presented before or continue to adhere to the routine interpretation
approach.
6See ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:211,
para. 35.
7Linguistic and juridical concordance between legal texts in different languages is hard to
achieve in practice even in case of the most careful drafting, see Rosenne, ‘TheMeaning
of “Authentic Text” in Modern Treaty Law’, 416–23, concerning the efforts spent on
UNCLOS III.
8See Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy,
7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd., 2014), passim.
9In the aftermath of the Natexis case, SA Natixis (formerly SA Natexis Banques Populaires)
filed for tax sparing credits under the French tax treaties with Argentina, China, India,
Indonesia, and Turkey. The French tax administration denied these claims again based
on the argument that the respective treaty clauses should not be read as tax sparing but
matching credit provisions, concerning which a matching credit for income completely
exempt from withholding tax must be explicitly provided for by the wording of the
treaty. Otherwise, the actual payment of at least some (if only minimal) withholding
tax is required for a credit to be granted. The French Administrative Court of Appeal
confirmed this view, basing itself on the decision of the Conseil d’État in Natexis. The
case went again in front of the Conseil d’État, which decided that under the treaty with
China the credit was not conditional upon taxation there. The other treaties, however,
contained different language to the effect that the income, if completely exempt, had to
be so by virtue of special domestic incentive measures for the promotion of economic
development. Since SA Natixis did not prove such had been the case, the Conseil d’État
denied the credit, see Conseil d’État, 9ème et 10ème sous-sections réunies, 25/02/2015,
366680, Inédit Au Recueil Lebon, 2015.
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In summary, comparing all language texts is correct but inconvenient,
whereas the routine interpretation approach is convenient but incorrect.10
And even if it were correct, it would remain convenient only to the extent
no ambiguities arise and nobody raises a divergence, that is, it is no solu-
tion in principle. In order to solve the problem posed by plurilingual form
in a truly pragmatic fashion, this chapter argues the case for an alternative
approach that avoids the necessity of a comparison, is consistent with the
VCLT principles, and is readily available in practice, namely, automatic re-
course to and sole reliance on the prevailing text when such exists,11 which
is the case for the majority of plurilingual tax treaties.12 In addition, the lim-
10It has been suggested that the routine interpretation approach is motivated predomin-
antly by considerations of practical convenience and political expediency, see Kuner,
‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 962; Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger
Verträge, 75; Tabory,Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, 199; Germer,
‘Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, 413.
11Henceforth shortened to sole reliance on the prevailing text.
12Chapter 8 will analyse the global tax treaty network to account for all cases for which
this solution is available, all cases for which it is not necessary because of unilingual
form, and all cases for which a comparison of texts remains obligatory. The solution
of sole reliance on the prevailing text is discussed and submitted here on a theoretical
basis for academic purposes. It may be resorted to in practice; however, given the real-
ity that it is for a variety of reasons customary for courts to rely on their own language
text (at least initially), such suggestion may be dismissed by the practitioner as an aca-
demic ivory tower proposal. Hence, the following modified approach is suggested in
practice: instead of direct recourse to the prevailing text, the text in the own language
is relied on together with recourse to the prevailing text to gauge the result. The other
language text(s) may then be ignored – at least most of the times (see below). Given
that countries tend to choose a language for the prevailing text they have a high level of
familiarity with (and for which Model Conventions coupled with Commentaries exist
that, depending on the circumstances, may be drawn on for purposes of interpretation),
together with a largely uniform choice of prevailing language over the entire global tax
treaty network reducing the amount of third party resources needed, such approach
seems practicable, neither overburdening states nor taxpayers (Chapters 8 and 9 will
put exact numbers to these claims). Indeed, this may come close to what is practice
already, at least by some courts. In ‘I R 48/12’, para. 13, the German BFH employed this
approach in a decision concerning the status of S-Corporations under the Germany-US
(1989) tax treaty in order to establish the exact point in time when the 2006 protocol
would start to take effect. Although the treaty does not feature a prevailing text – this
being an example of the court merely consulting the other text – the approach sugges-
ted here would be analogous concerning method and in the case of a prevailing text
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itations to such approachwill be outlined as well.The fundamental research
question underlying this chapter is whether and to what extent courts are
required to compare the other authentic texts when they have one desig-
nated as prevailing at their disposal, and the hypothesis put forward in this
respect is threefold: (1) The VCLT permits automatic recourse to the pre-
vailing text. (2) Sole reliance on it is justified as long as its interpretation
under Article 31 neither leaves its meaning ambiguous or obscure nor leads
to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. (3) The contrary view
currently supported by many scholars rests on an erroneous interpretation
of Article 33.
5.2. Framing the Issue
The discussion about the use of prevailing texts to date has been framed by
the way in which the drafters of the VCLT have posed the question in the
VCLT Commentary:
The application of provisions giving priority to a particular text in case of
divergence may raise a difficult problem as to the exact point in the inter-
pretation at which the provision should be put into operation. Should the
‘master’ text be applied automatically as soon as the slightest difference ap-
pears in the wording of the texts? Or should recourse first be had to all, or
at any rate some, of the normal means of interpretation in an attempt to
reconcile the texts before concluding that there is a case of ‘divergence’?13
Given this pretext, scholars have commonly discussed the issue along the
same lines, namely, at which point in the interpretative process recourse
all the more warranted. The court interpreted the German text and then confirmed its
interpretation by reference to the English text. Although the formulation of the Eng-
lish text happened to be more precise concerning the specific point in time supporting
the conclusion of the court, there was no suggestion that the German text had been
ambiguous. The practitioner may mentally insert this modified approach every time I
talk about sole reliance on the prevailing text. Shelton discusses various alternatives
from returning to unilingual treaties in Latin to simultaneous negotiation and drafting
by the negotiators in the various languages (as done in the UNCLOS III procedure), see
Shelton, ‘Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’. Since
they are all either less feasible or less effective than the solution proposed here, they
will not be discussed.
13ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
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must be had to an existing prevailing text and up to what point efforts to
reconcile divergent texts should be sustained before the prevailing text is to
be invoked. From its beginning until today the focal point of the discussion
has been whether the slightest difference in expression between the texts
suffices to justify recourse to the prevailing text or whether it would be
necessary to first establish a difference in meaning between the texts that
cannot otherwise be reconciled.14
Framing the issue this way somewhat suggests itself in respect of dis-
putes about tax treaties, in which it is custom for the national courts presid-
ing to rely on their own language text (at least initially). At the same time,
however, framing the issue this way is unfortunate because it conceives of
the prevailing text in terms of a problem rather than a solution, and this
mode of thinking has invisibly guided the discussion of the issue to date
and the answers given. To some extent this is unsurprising because the
drafters of the VCLT failed to provide a definitive answer to their question
but remained indecisive in view of the varied jurisprudence on the issue:
The question is essentially one of the intention of the parties in inserting
the provision in the treaty, and the Commission doubted whether it would
be appropriate for the Commission to try to resolve the problem in a formu-
lation of the general rules of interpretation. Accordingly, it seemed to the
Commission sufficient in paragraph 1 to make a general reservation of cases
where the treaty contains this type of provision.15
Two important preliminary observations may be made about this. First,
it appears that both approaches are in line with the VCLT – neither is ruled
out by the ILC. Second, it is important for the interpreter to determine the
intention of the contracting parties on this point in order to resolve the issue
on a case-by-case basis. Concerning the first observation, if we presume that
the intention behind introducing a prevailing text is to ease interpretation
rather than to encumber it, the issue in question may be posed differently,
namely, the other way around. Given the principle of unity and equal au-
thenticity, the interpreter is free to start with any text, which could equally
14See, e.g., Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 123 et seq.; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 325 et
seq.
15ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
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be the one additionally declared as prevailing and by nomeans has to be the
one in the official language of the country where the case is being decided.
Thus, the question important to answer is whether and under what circum-
stances the interpreter is obliged to have recourse to the other texts if there
is one designated as prevailing at his disposal. This is the way the question
should be posed. Rather than constituting an additional variable increas-
ing complexity for the interpreter, the prevailing text should be conceived
of as a tool to avoid or at least significantly reduce additional complexity
induced by plurilingual form. How exactly this approach fits with the prin-
ciples enshrined in the VCLT will be the topic of this chapter. Concerning
the second observation, given the special focus of this study on tax treat-
ies, an empirical analysis evaluating their factual situation with respect to
the theoretical solution submitted is necessary, which will be provided by
Chapter 8.
5.3. The Contrary Positions
5.3.1. The Permissive Approach
The essence of the permissive approach advocated by me is to conceive of
the prevailing text as a tool to reduce complexity of plurilingual treaty in-
terpretation into a situation of quasi-unilinguality, based on the hypothesis
that the VCLT framework of interpretation allows for sole reliance on the
prevailing text, which has been practised by international courts in several
cases.16 At the same time, it does not rule out reconciliatory comparative
interpretation of all texts as an alternative as long as the result converges
to the meaning of the prevailing text. Reconciliatory comparative interpret-
ation of all texts may still become necessary under certain circumstances,
for example, when an interpretation of the prevailing text under Article 31
16See, e.g., Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria v Greece), PCIJ (Publications of the Permanent Court
of International Justice 1922–1946, 1924), 3–10, ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treat-
ies with Commentaries, 224, para. 4; Aron Kahane Successeur v Francesco Parisi and the
Austrian State, Romanian-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (Recueil des décisions des
tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institués par les traités de paix, 1929), as discussed by Ar-
ginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 327–328.
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leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that is mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable.
The permissive approach is based on what may be called the logical argu-
ment.17 The core of the logical argument is that it does not matter whether
there is a divergence, because the prevailing text can be relied on in any
case; the other texts must always be interpreted to have the same meaning
as the prevailing text, which makes recourse to them unnecessary if the
meaning of the prevailing text is manifest. Either the prevailing text has
the same meaning as the other texts, in which case it may be relied on same
as the others, or it has a different meaning, in which case it must be relied
on while the other texts must be interpreted to concord to its meaning.18 In
the words of Lord Roskill (by analogy but nevertheless pertinent):
I think, like my noble and learned friends, that those writings point strongly
to the conclusion which all your Lordships have reached, that ‘avarie’ in this
context includes ‘partial loss’. Either therefore ‘damage’ in the English text
must be construed so as to include ‘partial loss’, or there is an inconsistency
and the French text as I would interpret it in the light of those writings must
prevail. I do not think it matters by which route that conclusion is reached.19
The complete hypothesis submitted here is comprised of two proposi-
tions and the conclusions drawn from them. First, although it is custom
for national courts to have recourse to their own language text initially,
they may in principle have initial recourse to any text. Second, the prevail-
ing text is at minimum equally authoritative when there is no divergence.
When there is one, it is super-authoritative in the sense that it prevails over
the other texts whatever they may say: a clear meaning of the prevailing
text must be regarded as the one true meaning of the treaty, and a reconcili-
atory comparative interpretation of the other texts is no longer necessary
because its outcome may not depart from the established meaning of the
17Implying that, logically, both methods (interpretation of the prevailing text and recon-
ciliatory comparative interpretation of all texts) should lead to the same result.
18See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 380; Hardy, ‘The In-
terpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 126, with
reference to Foreign Relations of the United States (1923), vol. 2, 1166, 1171.
19Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 301 (emphasis added).
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prevailing text. Hence, automatic recourse to the prevailing text is permit-
ted, and courts may rely on the prevailing text alone as long as its mean-
ing is clear. On the other hand, they are not prevented from reconciliatory
comparative interpretation as long as the outcome does not deviate from
the clear meaning of the prevailing text, and they have to engage in recon-
ciliatory comparative interpretation if the meaning of the prevailing text
remains unclear otherwise.
The first proposition will not be subject to extensive discussion, as it must
be considered uncontroversial. To deny it would mean to deny the prin-
ciple of unity and the authentic status of all texts explicitly declared by the
treaty’s final clause. It is uncontroversial even if only the own language
text is given effect in law through incorporation into domestic legislation,
because by the final clause contained in that same text all texts of the treaty
are declared authentic; therefore, equal recourse to them is warranted under
domestic legislation via the incorporated one.20
The validity of the second proposition and the conclusions drawn from
both will be the main subject of discussion in this chapter. For this purpose,
a notional standard final clause is assumed that, based on the wordings of
Article 33(1) and (4), declares several texts as authentic and one of them as
prevailing in case of divergence,21 as for example implemented in Armenia-
United Arab Emirates (2002):
Done in Abu Dhabi on April 20, 2002, in two originals, in the Armenian,
Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of
divergence the English text shall prevail.
5.3.2. The Restrictive Approach
Contrary to the permissive approach advocated by me, the restrictive ap-
proach currently supported by many scholars and most comprehensively
argued by Arginelli rules out sole reliance on the prevailing text.22 Recourse
20See Buchanan (James) & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd., 152; Avery
Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.7.1.8.
21Specific issues with respect to the actual wordings of tax treaty final clauses in practice
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8, s. 8.3.
22See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 333 et seq. His arguments
will be subject to in-depth considerations in Chapter 6, s. 6.4.
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to it is only permitted as a limited solution for cases in which a reconcili-
ation of texts in the course of a comparative interpretation has proven im-
possible. At the core of the restrictive approach lies a particular interpret-
ation of the term ‘divergence’. According to this view, a divergence war-
ranting recourse to the prevailing text under Article 33 is given only when
a difference in meaning between the texts persists after the application of
Articles 31 and 32 to all texts, otherwise the prevailing text cannot be taken
to prevail. In consequence, decisive recourse to the prevailing text requires
the interpreter to conduct a reconciliatory comparative interpretation first
in order to establish whether the condition of a divergence is fulfilled and
the meaning of the prevailing text may be applied as prevailing.
This view rejects the logical argument, on grounds of Hardy’s supposi-
tion that the interpretation most compatible with all texts is not necessarily
the one suggested by the prevailing text in isolation.23 Based on the assump-
tion that all texts were always intended to mean the same, the existence of a
divergence warranting decisive recourse to the prevailing text is practically
ruled out,24 and Arginelli goes as far as to advocate reconciliatory compar-
ative interpretation to the point that it ought to be conducted instead of
decisive recourse to the prevailing text even if reconciliation is only pos-
sible with the help of supplementary means or by granting decisive weight
to the original text, because such renders recourse to the prevailing text
‘superfluous’.25
The restrictive approach may be traced back to a decision by the Polish
supreme court.26 The court’s reasoning rests on two propositions. First, the
fact that the contracting parties have decided to authenticate more than
one language text must be interpreted as intended to have some legal con-
sequence, namely, that of attributing legal authority to each text.27 Second,
23See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 126, 133–34. This argument will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6, s. 6.2.
24See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 394; Arginelli, The
Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 103, 232, 333–38, 241.
25Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 333.
26Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v The Polish State Treasury, Annual Digest of
Public International Law Cases (1929–1930), Case No. 235, Supreme Court Poland (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1930).
27Concerning this proposition, Arginelli observes that the court only respected the prin-
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the status of the prevailing text is only superior once the existence of a ma-
terial divergence has been established, and such material divergence may
not be said to exist solely because of a mere difference in wording, but its ex-
istence can only be established with the help of all available means of inter-
pretation attributing all possible meanings to all texts. The court concluded
that since the final clause of the treaty has to be interpreted as meaning
that all three texts are authentic and therefore relevant for interpretative
purposes, the superior status of the prevailing text comes into play only
in case the existence of a material divergence is established. Consequently,
any common meaning of all texts always prevails, and a text may be disreg-
arded only insofar as none of its possible meanings may be attributed also
to the text designated as prevailing.28
Several preliminary observations may be made concerning this reason-
ing. The court is of course right to suggest that the plurilingual form of the
treaty must have been intended to have some legal consequence, namely,
that of all texts being authentic. Along the same lines, however, the declar-
ation of one text as prevailing must have been intended to have some legal
consequence as well, namely, that of granting that text prevailing status. In
this respect we will have to discuss the meaning of ‘prevailing’; however,
we may note already that the principle of effectiveness equally applies to
the clause establishing one text as prevailing. Consequently, the court may
have made a mistake in following an interpretation that renders this clause
ineffective and, thereby, may have violated the expressed intentions of the
contracting parties. Such contention will hinge on what is covered by the
term ‘divergence’.
The English text of the treaty subject of the case reads ‘The present Treaty,
in French, in English, and in Italian, shall be ratified. In case of divergence
the French text shall prevail’.29 Thus, itmerely speaks of divergence, without
ciple of effectiveness, as in his view a contrary contention would imply that the con-
tracting parties, by declaring one text as prevailing in case of divergence, nullified their
own intentions expressed by authenticating several texts, see Arginelli, The Interpreta-
tion of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 329.
28See ibid., 329–30.
29Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria; Protocol, Declara-
tion and Special Declaration (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919). The prevailing
French text is equivalent and reads ‘Le présent Traité, rédigé en français, en anglais et
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any further qualification. We will have to see whether the interpretation of
divergence as material divergence the court as well as Arginelli and others
subscribe to, that is, a difference in meaning that cannot be reconciled with
any interpretation of the prevailing text, is truly in line with the VCLT. In
the previous chapter we saw already that any meaning common to all texts
may not necessarily turn out to be the treaty meaning under Article 33(4)
in case of a divergence – such would grant the Mavrommatis approach the
status of a general principle, which it has been denied by the ILC.30
5.4. Interpretation of Article 33(1) and (4)
5.4.1. The Meaning of Prevailing
The Oxford Dictionary defines to prevail as to ‘Prove more powerful or su-
perior’, stemming from the Latin praevalere (to have greater power). Hence,
the meaning of the prevailing text must be considered more authoritative
than the meaning of any other text or all others combined, otherwise we
cannot make sense of the notion of it prevailing. According to the wording
of Article 33(1), the prevailing text does not prevail by default but only con-
ditional upon the existence of a divergence. From this situation originates
the problem of ‘when to apply the prevailing text’.31 As has been convin-
cingly established by Engelen,32 however, this limitation may be the result
of ‘infelicitous drafting’ not intended to create a peremptory norm,33 but
the intention of the contracting parties expressed in the wording of the ac-
en italien, sera ratifié. En cas de divergence, le texte français fera foi.’
30See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225–26, para. 8; Gaja,
‘The Perspective of International Law’, 93–94.
31ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4; see Hardy,
‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 123
et seq.; Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 325 et seq.
32See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 376–79.
33Defined by the VCLT as follows: ‘For the purposes of the present Convention, a per-
emptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character’, UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 53.
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tual treaty final clause remains decisive while Article 33(1) is intended only
as a general reservation of such clauses.34
In essence, the prevailing text may be considered super-authoritative as
a kind of primus inter pares (first among equals) even under the VCLTword-
ing: as authentic text it is at minimum equally authoritative, but of higher
authority when circumstances are such that it ought to be regarded as pre-
vailing. Hence, the existence of a prevailing text may be viewed as creating
a new category of interpretative means in form of the other non-prevailing
texts, because the notion of one text to prevail in case of divergence is just
another way of saying that the other texts can only confirm but not contest
a clear meaning of the prevailing text. In relation to the prevailing text the
others may be viewed akin to supplementary means: recourse to them is
permissible but not mandatory unless an interpretation of the prevailing
text leaves its meaning unclear, in which case recourse to the other texts
becomes mandatory again to determine the meaning of the treaty.35 Versus
supplementary means, however, they retain their status and higher weight
of authentic means, constituting ‘text’ and therefore ‘context’ under Article
31(2).
In summary, when the prevailing text has a clear meaning, that meaning
qualifies as the definitive treaty meaning. Either the other texts say exactly
the same or there is a divergence and their meanings must be reinterpreted
to concur to the meaning of the prevailing text, which constitutes the one
true meaning of the treaty. Hence, the prevalence of the prevailing text may
be regarded as not conditional but quasi-absolute, that is, not really depend-
ent on the de facto existence of any divergence.
This is congruent with the particular object and purpose of Article 33
to establish a relationship of comparative authority between the authentic
texts: looking into the genesis of Article 33, we find that Special Rapporteur
Sir Humphrey Waldock explicitly stated in the ILC’s 770th meeting that
‘article 74 dealt with the texts or versions which could be consulted for
the purposes of interpretation, whereas article 75 was concerned with the
34See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
35See ILC, Documents of the Sixteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, II:65, para. 10.
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comparative authority of texts.’36 The VCLT Commentary speaks in this
respect of the ‘master text’,37 which paraphrases this property of supremacy.
It is also congruent with the overall wording and systematic of Article 33,
which states in paragraph (1) that each text is equally authoritative ‘unless’
circumstances are such that one text prevails, and in paragraph (4) that
‘Except where’ one text prevails, the further prescribed operation shall be
performed. The syntactic placement of the ‘Except where’ condition at the
beginning of paragraph (4) makes clear that what follows only applies if the
condition is not fulfilled.
5.4.2. The Meaning of Divergence
The peculiar term ‘divergence’ in Article 33(1) instead of ‘difference’ like
in Article 33(4) should attract attention because the debate revolves around
when it can be presumed that the condition of a divergence is fulfilled. The
Oxford Learner’s Dictionary defines divergence as ‘the process or fact of
separating or becoming different . . .from what is expected, planned’. Con-
sequently, divergence is a dynamic concept, whereas difference is a static
one. The underlying idea of departing and unintentionally deviating from
an initial situation of equivalence fits with the axiom of the principle of
unity as stipulated by Article 33(1) and (3) and suggests a dynamic meaning
of ‘divergence’ in Article 33, encompassing all possible states of difference
from slightly deviating expressions to complete opposites.
Article 33(1) itself only speaks of divergence in general without provid-
ing any further explicit qualification. In particular, its wording does not
specify whether the term refers to differences in wording or meaning (or
both). In the absence of any such explicit delimitation it is reasonable to
start out with the assumption that the term is used in its broadest sense,
encompassing all differences in wording and meaning whether only prima
facie or material. Such proposition is congruent with the wording of Article
33(1) having ‘texts’ as its implied subject, which allows for the inference
that ‘divergence’ serves as a predicate for the subject ‘texts’. The concept
36ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, para. 60.
Articles 74 and 75 were combined later into one article that in its final version was
included as Article 33 in the VCLT.
37ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
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of text, however, encompasses both its wording and meaning and not only
one of those two more narrow subsets.
In fact, the wording ‘in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail’
is synonymous to the wording ‘in case of divergence between the texts, a par-
ticular text shall prevail’. Our addition between the texts does not change the
meaning and is superfluous if ‘divergence’ relates as a predicate to ‘texts’.
In other words, it may be left out as done by the English text. The Rus-
sian text of Article 33(1) explicitly includes the implied subject and literally
translates to ‘divergence between these texts’.38 Like the English one, the
Chinese, French, and Spanish texts lack the repeated reference to the sub-
ject; however, this divergence does not constitute an irreconcilable differ-
ence in meaning between them and the Russian text or render all others
ambiguous, because the subject ‘texts’ may not be explicitly reiterated but
is still clearly implied. Any interpretation to the contrary is much less mani-
fest and would require additional evidence to impose itself.
In order to support an interpretation of divergence as material diver-
gence, we would need to insert in meaning instead of between the texts. This
would introduce an additional subject, namely, the meaning of texts, which
is only a more narrow subset of texts. In consequence, the overall mean-
ing would be enriched: in meaning could not be deleted without changing
the sense of the whole paragraph. The fact that nothing in this respect is
added to the texts of Article 33(1) makes clear that the intention is not to
delimit the meaning of divergence to material divergences in meaning and
exclude mere differences in expression, even in case the Russian text would
not contain the more precise formulation.
The VCLT Commentary confirms this interpretation by explicitly stating
that ‘a plurilingual treaty may provide that in the event of divergence
between the texts a specified text is to prevail.’39 The wording of the French
Commentary is equivalent and reads ‘Deuxièmement, un traité plurilingue
peut disposer qu’en cas de divergence entre les textes, un texte déterminé
l’emportera.’40 Therefore, the VCLT is an instance of the hypothetical scen-
38Translation with the kind help of Ksenia Levushkina.
39Ibid., II:224, para. 3 (emphasis added).
40ILC, Projet d’articles sur le droit des traites et commentaires 1966. Texte adopté par la Com-
mission à sa dix-huitième session, en 1966, et soumis à l’Assemblée générale dans le cadre
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ario considered in the previous chapter: the formulations of the Chinese,
English, French, and Spanish texts do not say anything different from
the Russian text but are grammatically slightly imprecise, which makes a
less manifest additional interpretation possible, whereas the Russian text
employs the grammatically precise formulation by explicitly repeating the
otherwise implicit subject. The precise meaning is chosen under Article 31
and then confirmed via Article 321.
Article 33(4) may be consulted to deliberate this interpretation because of
its direct reference and systematic connection to Article 33(1).41 It does not
explicitly echo the term ‘divergence’ but implicitly distinguishes between
three different situations that refer to cases of divergence via the wording of
‘difference in meaning’ in combination with the existence or non-existence
of a prevailing text, linking it to Article 33(1): First, a prevailing text exists,
in which case we are referred back to Article 33(1). Second, no prevailing
text exists and there are differences in meaning that can be reconciled by a
comparative application of Articles 31 and 321 to all texts,42 in which case
the problem has been solved already. And third, no prevailing text exists and
there are differences in meaning that cannot be reconciled by a comparative
application of Articles 31 and 321 to all texts, for which a further modus
operandi (mode of operation) is needed and provided by Article 33(4) itself.
Although Article 33(4) concerns itself in substance only with the latter
case by providing an additional interpretative instruction for cases when
Articles 31 and 321 fail to reconcile differences in meaning between the
texts in the absence of a prevailing one, it does not contain any notion that
the term divergence should be delimited to this particular scenario. On the
contrary, its connection to Article 33(1) by direct reference encompasses all
differences in meaning whether or not they are reconcilable by Articles 31
and 321, that is, any divergence, whether material or only apparent.
Such understanding is not impaired by the fact that Article 33(4) expli-
citly only references ‘a difference of meaning which the application of art-
de son rapport sur les travaux de ladite session, vol. II, Annuaire de la Commission du
droit international 1966 (United Nations, 1967), 244, para. 3.
41See Mössner, ‘Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Staatsverträge’, 300.
42In line with the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, the reference to Article 32
must be understood to refer to Article 321 only.
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icles 31 and 32 does not remove’,43 as this must be interpreted in the context
of the provision merely providing a specific instruction for a particular case.
By explicitly mentioning only the particular case of an irreconcilable differ-
ence in meaning, the general case of reconcilable differences in meaning is
presupposed. Since all reconcilable differences have been reconciled along
the way by an application of Article 33(1) in combination with Articles 31
and 321 before the specific instruction contained in Article 33(4) comes into
play, there is no need to explicitly repeat any instructions applying to them.
Both reconcilable differences as well as their reconciliation are implied to
have been the case and taken place already.Therefore, the concept of mater-
ial difference in meaning explicitly described by Article 33(4) entails both:
itself as operand of the latter part of the entire operation (the specificmodus
operandi contained in paragraph (4) of Article 33) and the concept of merely
prima facie difference in meaning as operand of the initial part of the oper-
ation (reconciliatory comparative interpretation under Articles 31 and 321).
The entire operation consists in the two modi operandi reconciliatory com-
parative interpretation under Articles 31 and 321 and application of the in-
terpretative rule contained in Article 33(4) combined, whereas the operand
itself (the divergence) retains its identity and only changes its character
over the course of the operation from merely apparent into material.
The wording ‘when’ of Article 33(4) instead of ‘if’ or ‘in case’ is indicative
in this respect: it does not talk about an imaginable scenario of the inter-
preter encountering a divergence but about the definite case that he has
encountered one. As soon as the normal way to handle it (reconciliatory
comparative interpretation under Articles 31 and 321) has failed, he needs
to implement the particular operation prescribed by Article 33(4). Imple-
menting that special operation presupposes that, beforehand, reconciliatory
comparative interpretation under Articles 31 and 321 has failed and, in con-
sequence, that a divergence, necessitating such reconciliatory comparative
interpretation under Articles 31 and 321, has been present.
In summary, the systematic composition of Article 33 suggests that para-
graph (4) employs the disjunctive standard form of definitions regarding the
43Contra: Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 335, discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6, s. 6.4.
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concept of divergence introduced in paragraph (1).44 That is to say, it com-
bines all conditions that are by themselves each sufficient but not necessary
to establish a case of divergence. Thus, a divergence is either a material dif-
ference in meaning (not reconcilable by the comparative application of Art-
icles 31 and 321) or a merely apparent difference in meaning (reconcilable
by the comparative application of Articles 31 and 321), that is, not a differ-
ence in meaning but a mere difference in expression. Both are covered by
the combined wordings of Article 33(1) and (4), which together provide a
definition per genus proximum et differentiam specificam45 (definition per
category and specific difference) for the definiendum ‘divergence’ through
the definientia reconcilable and irreconcilable ‘difference of meaning’.
Commentators seem to be confused in this respect because of the equi-
vocational use of the term ‘difference of meaning’, namely, both as a per-
sistent (material) and reconcilable (not material) difference in meaning, that
is, a de facto difference in meaning as well as a mere difference in expres-
sion. This fosters imprecise and inconsistent reasoning because persistent
and reconcilable differences in meaning are not only an equivocation but
by definition also mutually exclusive concepts.
The words used by the texts could also be equivalent in the different lan-
guages (for example, ‘control’ in English and contrôle in French) but with
their meaning being different, as in the case brought forward by Mr Bar-
tos in the ILC’s 770th meeting.46 From this also follows that the term di-
vergence cannot be restricted to either ‘difference of expression’ or ‘differ-
44X is F if X is G or X is H, see Pfister, Werkzeuge des Philosophierens, 68. This may escape
the eye because paragraph (4) does not explicitly echo the term ‘divergence’ but only
relates to it via its systematic connection to paragraph (1); however, this only conforms
to the requirement of terminus definitus non debet ingredi definitionem (a term may not
be defined through itself) for any proper definition, with the violation of this require-
ment also known as fallacy idem per idem (explaining the same through the same).
45A conception first developed by Aristotle, see Aristotle, Topics, Book IV, Part 1; Aristotle,
Prior Analytics, Book II, parts 2–3; Pfister, Werkzeuge des Philosophierens, 66.
46See ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, para.
65. For some more examples, see Claudio Sacchetto, ‘The Italian Experience’, in Multi-
lingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties and EC Tax Law, ed. Guglielmo Maisto
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 63–78, 70–73; Shelton, ‘Reconcilable Differences? The Inter-
pretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 4–5. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue,
see Cao, Translating Law, 54–60.
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ence of meaning’, as the expression could be equivalent but the meaning
different and vice-versa. This may explain why ‘divergence’ is used in Art-
icle 33(1) and neither ‘difference of meaning’ nor ‘difference of expression’:
both types of differences needed to be addressed in a way that even cases
of equivalent terms having different connotations in their respective lan-
guages would be covered.
For Article 33(4) to distinguish between three different situations is only
logical. When no prevailing text exists, Article 33(1) only tells us that all
texts are equally authoritative. Hence, we need further guidance for all
situations when (a) any kind of difference appears and (b) the difference
persists, that is, when Articles 31 and 321 fail to produce a clear meaning
common to all texts in the face of (a). Article 33(4) presumes a comparison
of all texts has been undertaken in order to resolve any problems between
them and only provides an additional instruction what to do in case such
has failed. For cases that fall under (a) but not (b), no additional instruction
is needed but Articles 31 and 321 apply (and resolve the case) in line with
the dictum that the fundamental principles of interpretation are not to be
different for plurilingual treaties than they are for unilingual ones.47
Article 33(1) in combination with Articles 31 and 321 is sufficient also
when a prevailing text exists: for a quasi-unilingual situation no further
interpretative instruction on top of the general rule is needed because the
VCLT assumes that a contextual interpretation of a single text in the light
of its object and purpose can always be found,48 unless the text remains am-
biguous or obscure, or the result of its interpretation is absurd or unreason-
able. Concerning this, the only difference between a unilingual treaty and a
plurilingual one with prevailing text is that in the latter case the other texts
are available as additional context to help resolve any residual problems of
the prevailing one and recourse to them takes precedence over recourse to
supplementary means in their active role (see below).
This understanding is consistent with the wording of Article 33(4) start-
ing out with the condition that ‘Except where a particular text prevails in
accordance with paragraph 1’, which implies that what follows is only rel-
evant in such case. Thus, Article 33(4) merely completes Article 31 for pluri-
47See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
48See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 8.2.2.6.
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lingual treaties without prevailing text in order to avoid a gap in the general
rule of interpretation identified by the ILC during the drafting period of the
VCLT.49 It is an extension to adapt the general rule to plurilingual scenarios,
not a distinct rule in its own right, which again is implicit in the dictum that,
fundamentally, the same principles apply whether the treaty is unilingual
or plurilingual.50
For unilingual treaties the rule as provided in Article 31 is complete and
suffices unless the meaning remains unclear. In principle, because of Art-
icle 33(1) in combination with the ‘Except where’ condition in Article 33(4),
the same is true for the quasi-unilingual case of a plurilingual treaty with
prevailing text unless the meaning of the prevailing text turns out unclear.
Treaties without prevailing text, however, require a supplementation of the
general rule to extend it to the scenario of multiple texts, which is provided
by Article 33(4) via Article 33(1) and its connection to Article 31(2) by way
of the shared reference to the text.
5.4.3. Application of the Permissive Approach
Read like this, paragraphs (1) and (4) of Article 33 together suggest the fol-
lowing approach when a prevailing text exists: Interpret the prevailing text
and treat its manifest meaning as authoritative. If the prevailing text is un-
clear, engage in a reconciliatory comparison of all texts and ensure that the
result corresponds to the meaning of the prevailing text. Alternatively, do
the latter straight away. In view of the otherwise equal authenticity, the in-
terpreter can rely on the prevailing text and does not have to bother about
the others as long as he arrives at a clear meaning. On the other hand, he
is not prevented from engaging in a reconciliatory comparison of all texts
49See UN, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session Vienna, 26 March
– 24 May 1968, Official Records, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 188–89, paras. 39–43.
50See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7. The
singular employed by the title of Article 31 is indicative: it makes clear that there is
only one combined general rule of interpretation. Article 33(4) merely adapts the rule
to multiple texts. As a corollary, the meaning of ‘object and purpose’ in Articles 31 and
33(4) is the same.The latter only provides for a different application as sole decider, not
a teleological expansion, see Chapter 4, s. 4.3.2.
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from the start as long as he makes sure the result equals the meaning of the
prevailing text.
What precisely has to happen if the interpreter chooses the first option
and Article 31 does not lead to a clear meaning of the prevailing text (op-
tionally confirmed under Article 321)? Even if the prevailing text happens to
be ambiguous or obscure, it cannot be put aside, because being ambiguous
or obscure does not revoke its status as an equally authentic and, in case of
a divergence, prevailing text.51 Therefore, the court must have recourse to
the other texts to see whether a reconciliatory comparative interpretation
leads to a clear meaning of the treaty under Article 31. Such clear mean-
ing may then be confirmed but not contested by supplementary means, as
supplementary means may be used to derive the meaning only in case a
comparative interpretation of the texts also fails to provide a clear result.52
In terms of the comparison, the ambiguous or obscure prevailing text may
not be left out of the equation but continues to prevail in the sense that the
meaning determined with the help of the other texts must fit within the
overall scope of meanings covered by the ambiguous or obscure wording
of the prevailing text and cannot lie outside.53
If the overall result remains ambiguous or obscure, Article 32(a) may be
invoked. In practice, this boils down to a reconciliatory comparative inter-
pretation of all texts that may either be viewed as such or, alternatively, as a
clarification of the prevailing text with the help of the other texts. It is clear
in this context that invoking Article 32(a) before considering the other texts
as context would upset the fundamental principle of different weights to be
attributed to authentic and supplementary means. Such course of action
would erroneously attempt to derive the treaty meaning from supplement-
ary means before all authentic means to be considered in order to establish
the ordinary meaning have been exhausted, confusing an ambiguity in one
text for a fundamental ambiguity of the treaty.
Conceptually, the same does not apply to the extent the prevailing text
51UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 10 in combination with Article
33(1).
52See Chapter 4, s. 4.4.2.
53See ILC, Documents of the Sixteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, II:65, paras. 9–10.
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turns out to be manifestly absurd or unreasonable, as then such suggestion
would be self-contradictory: one cannot declare the absurd and unreason-
able as a standard for the sensible and reasonable. In such case the inter-
preter must heal the absurdity or unreasonableness of the prevailing text
with the help of the others and supplementary means, as otherwise he is left
with the impasse that there is an obvious divergence that forces him to ap-
ply the prevailing text.54 The prevailing text may not be discarded because
its status as authentic and prevailing text granted by Article 10 VCLT and
the treaty final clause is not revoked by the mere fact of its interpretation
leading to an absurd or unreasonable result. Here the prevailing text has
an unequivocal, albeit manifestly absurd or unreasonable, meaning. Unlike
the first scenario, which could be viewed as a reconciliatory comparative
interpretation of all texts for which all meanings attributable to the ambigu-
ous or obscure prevailing text provided the scope, this case requires that
the defects of the unequivocal meaning of the prevailing text are healed
with recourse to the other texts and supplementary means; however, the
distinction is merely conceptual – an outside observer of the process will
not notice any difference.55
Let us briefly return to the New Skies case introduced in the previous
chapter. There it was discussed as if all texts had been equally authoritative,
however, the Netherlands-India (1988) tax treaty declares the English text
as prevailing.56 Hence, we may use New Skies as a case study to test the
approach submitted here. The court relied solely on the prevailing English
text, which would be permitted as long as its meaning is clear. As argued
54Once more it must be asked how the meaning of a single text can possibly turn out
absurd or unreasonable under Article 31 if teleological reasoning is to be excluded. As
argued in the previous chapter, such cases must be assumed to be restricted to obvious
drafting errors rendering the text inconsistent.
55In view of the analysis presented in the previous chapter, it is submitted that Article
33(4) should be applied before Article 32(a) or (b) are invoked. Since interpretation of
the prevailing text fails to establish a clear meaning, the reconciliatory comparative
interpretation of all texts must include consideration of the object and purpose as sole
decider before resorting to supplementary means. In both scenarios the outcome is to
be supplanted into the prevailing text as constitutive treaty meaning.
56The fact that the final clause declares the English text as prevailing only in case the
Dutch and Hindi texts diverge shall be ignored for the moment. This particular type of
wording will be subject of in-depth considerations in Chapter 8, s. 8.3.3.
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in the previous chapter, the meaning of ‘secret formula or process’ is clear:
the adjective ‘secret’ applies to both nouns ‘formula’ and ‘process’ enumer-
ated before the comma as a matter of standard phrasing. The conjured up
ambiguity is to a large extent not an inherent property of the text but the
result of the court referring to domestic law.
The case nicely exemplifies that the prevailing text does not need to be
unequivocal to be relied on, but that it is enough for it to have a manifest
meaning. Notwithstanding, what matters is that the court considered the
text ambiguous. We can see that the approach proposed here works well
as a corrective in such case. As next step the court should have consulted
the other texts, which would have instantly resolved the problem via the
Dutch one. Instead it continued to disregard them in favour of going to
the bottom of domestic law, considerations of general context in terms of
double taxation, balancing taxing rights between contracting states, India’s
position on the OECD Commentary, and so forth.
In the end the court arrived at the right conclusion, but the case still illus-
trates how relying on a single text while interpreting the meaning of terms
not defined in the treaty via domestic law can go wrong even when applied
to the prevailing text. The VCLT context includes grammar and phrasing,
that is, how things are expressed in all texts. One must distinguish in this
respect between single terms and entire phrases: ‘any secret formula or pro-
cess’ is not a term but an entire phrase that makes a particular sense in the
way it is used in English. If one considers the phrase ambiguous, one must
conduct a comparison with all other texts even under the approach submit-
ted here. Looking immediately to domestic law may go wrong, imposing a
domestic lawmeaning on the actually intended treaty meaning: if the judge
would draw the erroneous conclusion that the phrase is no longer ambigu-
ous but clarified simply by recourse to the domestic lawmeaning, the result
is a misapplication of the treaty.
Hence, we have to attach a big warning sign to the approach of sole reli-
ance on the prevailing text submitted here, because this is a mistake easy to
make in the case of tax treaties. When interpreting a tax treaty, we must not
lose sight of most of its terms being intended first and foremost as general
abstractions subject to an interpretation in light of the two contexts under
Article 3(2) and Article 31 even if the treaty uses terminology identical to
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domestic law. If one considers themeaning of the prevailing text ambiguous
(whether or not such judgement is justified in the eye of the observer), one
must have recourse to the other texts as part of the VCLT context before or
at least while going to domestic law to first establish the actual treaty term
to be defined beyond doubt. Otherwise, one may erroneously transgress the
intended treaty meaning by imposing domestic law.
5.4.4. Evaluation of the Restrictive Approach
The proponents of the restrictive approach promote a less broad meaning
of the term divergence,57 limited to cases of material differences in mean-
ing, that is, differences not reconcilable by a comparison of all texts under
Articles 31 and 32. Their interpretation is based on a different reading of
Article 33(4), essentially conceiving it to distinguish only between two not
three situations: cases where differences in meaning either can or cannot
be reconciled by a comparison of texts under application of Articles 31 and
32.58 Hence their suggested approach in case of a divergence differs from
the one proposed here. It may be summarised as follows: Disregard any pre-
vailing text status and conduct a reconciliatory comparison of all texts.59 In
the course of this, establish whether the divergence is only prima facie or
material. If the latter is the case, adopt ‘the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty’. Alternat-
ively, adopt the meaning of an existing prevailing text.
Although at first sight such reading seems possible, it is inconclusive. It
reads Article 33(4) as if the ‘Except where’ condition were placed at the end
of the provision after ‘shall be adopted’, which could suggest treating the
meaning of the prevailing text as a mere alternative to be used over the
method proposed in paragraph (4) for cases without prevailing texts. But,
57See, e.g., Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 333–38; Engelen, Inter-
pretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 394.
58Since most of them fail to properly distinguish explicitly between the two different func-
tions of Article 32, they end up promoting recourse to supplementary means over Art-
icle 33(4) to resolve divergences.
59Some authors seem to imply that it is sufficient to only compare the divergent texts in
the official languages of the contracting states. This view will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 6, s. 6.4.
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the condition is placed at the beginning, which suggests that what follows
only regulates what is supposed to happen when there is no prevailing text.
Moreover, the prevailing text is referenced in paragraph (1) already, es-
tablishing its general prevalence over the other texts whenever there is a
divergence, and neither paragraph (1) nor (4) expressly delimit ‘divergence’
to exclude any particular types. The substantive interpretation rule in para-
graph (4) is intended and needed only for cases when no prevailing text
exists. If the intention were different, that is, if the prevailing text were to
be invoked only as a prevailing alternative to the specific modus operandi
provided by paragraph (4) for cases without prevailing text when differ-
ences in meaning cannot be resolved by the application of Articles 31 and
321, then the reference to a prevailing text should equally have been con-
fined to paragraph (4) and not extend to the main clause in paragraph (1).
Since the intention behind agreeing on one text as prevailing is to establish
a fundamental comparative order of authority between the texts as stated
byWaldock,60 the prevailing text may not be viewed as amere alternative to
the particular interpretative modus operandi of Article 33(4), to be applied
only after it has been established that this modus operandi would indeed
have to be applied if there were no prevailing text.
As regards the general object and purpose of Article 33, such must be
considered to consist in aiding the ‘Interpretation of treaties authenticated
in two or more languages’, as is provided by its heading. Generally, any
rule of interpretation must be considered to be intended to facilitate and
not hinder interpretation of a treaty,61 which must itself be considered to
be intended to provide legal certainty not uncertainty. As a corollary, the in-
troduction of a prevailing text must be considered to be intended to foster
interpretation and legal certainty, not to encumber it. Although both the
broad and the narrow understanding of the term ‘divergence’ are in line
with this object and purpose, the broad understanding suggested here eases
interpretation to a greater extent by allowing exclusive reliance on the pre-
vailing text in any case (as long as it is clear), without going through the
more complex comparative interpretation of all texts in order to establish a
60See ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session, 11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, para. 60.
61The Oxford Dictionary defines interpretation as ‘The action of explaining the meaning
of something.’
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case of material divergence first.62
It seems rather obvious that the intention behind a prevailing text must
be to avoid having to grind through a comparative interpretation of all texts,
and not to use it only once that grind proves unfruitful. One must not forget
in this context that the ‘different genius of languages’63 will require more
than literal word-for-word translations of expressions.64 A proper transla-
tion must accurately reflect the complete sense of the translated,65 which
may demand an extensive linguistic effort.66 For this reason, different lan-
guage versions of a text will often differ in phrasing and expression pre-
cisely out of the need to convey the same meaning, that is, prima facie dif-
ferences between texts will be common, which has been recognised by the
drafters of the VCLT.67 Hence, even if one would not subscribe to the argu-
ment that a comparison of all texts is obligatory for any serious effort to
interpret a treaty in good faith in the absence of a prevailing text, it is clear
62Clearly, the proponents of the restrictive approach prescribe a narrower interpretation
than intended by the drafters of the VCLT, who remained agnostic about the matter,
see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
63Ibid., II:225, para. 6.
64Such may even be impossible because of the lack of equivalent terms. The DARS serve
as an example. The French text of Article 1 reads ‘Tout fait internationalement illicite de
l’État engage sa responsabilité internationale’ while the English text reads ‘Every inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.’
The French terminology fait internationalement illicite was chosen for two reasons: to
avoid any terminology that had a special meaning under internal law, and to remain
unequivocal about encompassing wrongfulness resulting from omissions by using fait
instead of acte. For the same reason the Spanish text uses the expression hecho inter-
nacionalmente ilícito. Since there is no exact equivalent for the French fait in English,
the English text resorts to ‘act’, which is however intended to also encompass omis-
sions. This is obvious from the text of the DARS, as Article 2 reads ‘There is an inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission’.
In the absence of such obvious context, however, an interpretation of the English text
alone could lead to the conclusion that omissions are excluded from the scope, see ILC,
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 34, para. 8;
35, para. 4.
65The Oxford Dictionary defines translate as to ‘Express the sense of (words or text) in
another language.’
66See Cao, Translating Law, Chs. 2, 4 and 7; Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret
Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, paras. 8.4–8.9.
67See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6.
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that the potential need for such comparison may be rather large in practice.
What would be the purpose then of having a prevailing text if not to as-
sist the judge in his difficult task and relieve him as much as possible from
the burden of a reconciliatory comparative interpretation? It seems an odd
suggestion in the presence of a prevailing text that the judge should still be
required to first compare all texts in order to find out whether he ought to
rely on the prevailing one, because that would be tantamount to saying the
judge must conduct a reconciliatory comparative interpretation in order to
establish whether such was necessary in the first place. To borrow Bertrand
Russell’s words, the restrictive approach ‘is one of those views which are
so absurd that only very learned men could possibly adopt them.’68
5.4.5. Comparison of All VCLT Texts
The VCLT has English, French, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish texts, none
of which is designated as prevailing.69 Hence, all texts have to be compared
to ensure correct interpretation.70 As discussed and explicitly transcribed
by the Russian text, the VCLT intends ‘divergence’ to mean ‘divergence
between texts’. Although there are some additional differences between
the VCLT texts, none of them are material in terms of the interpretation
submitted here. The crucial syntax of Article 33(4) with the ‘Except where’
condition at the beginning, which supports the interpretation that what fol-
lows only applies to situations when no prevailing text exists, is the same
for all.
Besides the addition ‘between these texts’, the Russian text shows no sig-
nificant deviations from the English one.The Russian expressions for ‘diver-
gence’ and ‘prevailing’ are equivalent, and the wordings of paragraphs (2)
and (3) also correspond to their English counterparts. The same goes for the
Chinese text: the translation is complete and accurate, and the expressions
68Bertrand Russell,My Philosophical Development, 1st ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1959), 148.
69UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 85.
70The comparison in this subsection has been conducted with the kind help of Ksenia
Levushkina, Roberto Bernales, Ridha Hamzaoui, Antoine Reillac, and Tian Xu, all nat-
ive speakers in the respective languages of the other texts as well as experts in the field
of international tax law.
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for the English ‘divergence’ and ‘prevailing’ are equivalent. Some minor
syntactic differences attributable to linguistic customs exist in paragraph
(2), but the crucial syntax of paragraph (4) remains the same.
The French text shows a slight difference in paragraph (1): ‘son texte fait
foi dans chacune de ces langues’ literally translates to ‘the text is authorit-
ative in each language’, that is, the word ‘equally’ is not transcribed.71 But,
this does not change the overall meaning of the paragraph: if each language
text is authoritative and none is specified as either more or less authoritat-
ive, then all are equally authoritative, that is, the additional ‘equally’ in the
English text is merely pleonastic. Apart from that, the same terminology of
divergence and différence is employed, while l’emporter is to be translated
with ‘to prevail’. Some dictionaries translate it with ‘to win’ or ‘to have the
upper hand’, which does not differ in substance.
Regarding the Spanish text, the use of discrepancia instead of ‘divergence’
is curious. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the English equivalent ‘dis-
crepancy’ would imply an ‘illogical or surprising lack of compatibility or
similarity between two or more facts’, which inspires an interpretation in
terms of a contradiction, that is, necessarily a material divergence. But, ac-
cording to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language,
which has the authority to establish the definition of concepts in Spanish,
discrepanciamerely implies diversity or disagreement, not necessarily a con-
tradiction. Therefore, not only material divergences are implied. As for the
other terminology, prevalecer translates to ‘to prevail’ and hará fe, although
not a literal translation for ‘authoritative’, implies the same understanding.
5.4.6. Recourse to the VCLT Commentary
The VCLT Commentary may be consulted to confirm but not contest the
interpretation submitted. There are several paragraphs in the Commentary
that directly refer to situations of divergence.72 Paragraph 3 on page 224
speaks of ‘divergence between texts’, which in the absence of any explicit
delimitationmay imply differences both in expression andmeaning because
71The English text reads ‘the text is equally authoritative in each language’ (emphasis
added).
72See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224–25, paras. 3–4,
6–8.
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the ordinary meaning of the word ‘text’ encompasses both its wording and
meaning, same as the word ‘treaty’ (the word ‘text’ stands for) encompasses
both the expressed intentions of the contracting parties as well as the ex-
pressions expressing them.
Paragraph 4 on page 224 seems to contrast differences in expression to
differences in meaning and raises the question of where to draw the line
for an ‘actual divergence’ to exist. Arginelli suggests that the paragraph
clearly distinguishes between differences in wording and meaning, provid-
ing the context for his contention that only amaterial difference inmeaning
qualifies as a divergence.73 But, it is not entirely clear from the paragraph
whether ‘actual divergence’ refers to a material divergence in meaning or
a mere divergence in expression or both, as it deals with a case in which
the tribunal has applied the prevailing text without even investigating the
potential occurrence of any divergence. Hence, the paragraph could be read
to merely differentiate differences in expression that require more thought
than cases of ‘slightest difference’ from those that do not pose real prob-
lems, without implying material differences in meaning. As the case may
be, although it states that the VCLT rules do not stipulate any obligation
to go immediately to the prevailing text upon the slightest difference in
wording, it does not rule out the option to do so either.
The wording ‘appear to diverge’ of paragraph 6 on page 225 first and
foremost refers to merely apparent differences of expression, but the ter-
minology gets extended to a ‘discrepancy between the texts’ and ‘discrep-
ancies in the meaning of the texts’. Especially the latter seems to extend
the scope to material differences in meaning; however, the overall wording
(‘result in minor or even major discrepancies’) makes clear that it refers to
a continuum ranging from the slightest difference in expression to a ma-
terial difference in meaning, focussing on the first. In order to make the
paragraph apply only to material differences in meaning, we would need
to add something to the wording to limit its scope, for example, ‘Few pluri-
lingual treaties containing more than one or two articles are without some
discrepancy between the meanings of the texts’ (emphasised text added).
This would suggest that the principle of unity is broken regularly; however,
without doubt, the intention behind the entire paragraph is to primarily
73See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 336.
150
5.4. Interpretation of Article 33(1) and (4)
address differences in expression that imply differences in meaning resolv-
able via interpretative means, with material differences in meaning being
the absolute exception.
Paragraph 7 on page 225 is peculiar versus the others. It may be read to
employ the expression ‘difference between the texts’ as referring to mater-
ial differences in meaning not resolvable by the comparative application of
Articles 31 and 32, contrasting it to mere differences in expression; how-
ever, it does not draw any conclusions as to whether only one or the other
or both are cases of divergence, because it is not so much concerned with
how to define a divergence but where to locate the reasons for it: in the
ambiguity of one text or a divergence between the texts. Moreover, it does
not concern itself with prevailing texts but deals exclusively with scenarios
of equal authority. Concerning these it concludes that ‘every reasonable
effort should first be made to reconcile the texts and to ascertain the inten-
tion of the parties by recourse to the normal means of interpretation’ before
‘preferring one text to another’.
Paragraph 8 on page 225 only talks about differences in expression, not
meaning. Indeed, it may not be too sensible to speak of differences in mean-
ing in the first place. The distinction between prima facie and material di-
vergences is artificial: obviously, any divergence is at first merely prima
facie before a full interpretative comparison has been conducted, apart from
the most obvious cases of outright contradictions. To distinguish between
prima facie and material divergences before such comparison and suggest
a different treatment based on such distinction concerning whether a com-
parison is to be conducted is based on circular reasoning and therefore non-
sensical.
Based on the principle of unity, the meaning ought to be presumed to
be the same even if expressions diverge unless a difference persists. If the
latter happens, the treaty may be defective if there is no prevailing text and
the situation cannot be resolved by application of the interpretative rule
in Article 33(4). Hence, the principal understanding of divergence must be
one of merely apparent differences that can be reconciled in the course of
an interpretative comparison including recourse to the object and purpose
as sole decider, because the true intention of the parties can be identified
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and, therefore, a choice between the texts can be made.74 Divergences that
cannot be resolved in this way must be considered to lie outside the scope
of the VCLT for cases without prevailing text unless one agrees with the
reasoning brought forward in the previous chapter that they constitute ab-
surd or unreasonable results subject to a further application of Article 32(b)
before the treaty must be considered defective.
In summary, the VCLT Commentary employs varied terminology to dis-
cuss a continuum of situations from mere differences in expression to ma-
terial differences in meaning, contemplated in various contexts from equal
authority to cases with prevailing text. Nowhere does it contain any expli-
cit or implicit suggestion that the notion of divergence should be restricted
to mean only material differences in meaning and courts should rely on the
prevailing text only after having engaged in a reconciliatory comparison
without success. At best, the VCLT Commentary remains indecisive about
the matter: it issues no recommendation but leaves it up to the contract-
ing parties,75 that is, neither reconciliatory comparative interpretation of
all texts nor sole reliance on the prevailing one are ruled out in principle.
This confirms the interpretation submitted here.
5.5. Limitations of the Permissive Approach
The permissive approach is subject to three limitations. First, if the meaning
of the prevailing text remains unclear, recourse to the other texts and sup-
plementary means must be had to establish the treaty meaning. Second, the
reasoning presented assumed a final clause modelled on Article 33(1), that
is, a final clause declaring several texts as authentic and, in addition, one of
them as prevailing in case of divergence; however, Article 33(1) is not inten-
ded to constitute a peremptory norm, but the intentions of the contracting
parties take precedence. Third, the analysis and conclusions presented are
based on the VCLT. Hence, strictly speaking, the VCLT needs to be imple-
mented by the contracting states for them to apply. The first limitation I
have discussed at length above. Concerning practical applicability, actual
74See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 132.
75See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
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formulations of individual treaty final clauses will have to be examined to
establish whether the permissive approach is covered by them, which will
be the topic of Chapter 8. The following briefly considers applicability of
the VCLT concerning actual treaty relationships.
The VCLT was adopted on 22 May 1969, opened for signature on 23 May
1969, and entered into force on 27 January 1980. To date, 116 states have
implemented it byway of accession, succession, or ratification, and 15 states
have signed but not implemented it (a complete list is provided in Appendix
A.2). The VCLT itself stipulates non-retroactivity of its rules:
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present
Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law inde-
pendently of the Convention, the Convention applies only to treaties which
are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention
with regard to such States.
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise estab-
lished, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which
took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry
into force of the treaty with respect to that party.76
Notwithstanding, most states and their courts subscribe to the view that
the VCLT rules of interpretation stipulate what is valid customary interna-
tional law,77 for example, Australia, Germany, and the UK.78 To a certain ex-
tent, this view is shared by states not being signatories, for example, France
and India.79 The situation in the US seems to be ambivalent, caught up in
76UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 4 and 28.
77See Vogel and Prokisch, ‘Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions’, 66–67; Richard
Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, International Law: Cases and Materi-
als, ed. Louis Henkin, 3rd edition (St. Paul, Minn: West Group, 1993), 416; Avery Jones,
‘Treaty Interpretation’, s. 3.1.
78See Bjorge, ‘”Contractual” And “Statutory” Treaty Interpretation in Domestic Courts?
Convergence Around the Vienna Rules’, 64; Alexander Rust, ‘Germany’, in Courts and
Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), s. 11.2.1;Thiel v Federal Commissioner of Tax-
ation, 356; FG Köln, ‘II K 223/85’ (EFG 1987, December 1986); Czech Republic v European
Media Ventures SA, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), 15.
79See Martin, ‘Courts and Tax Treaties in Civil Law Countries’, s. 4.3.2.2; Kanwar, ‘Treaty
Interpretation in Indian Courts’, passim; Ram Jethmalani v Union of India, para. 60,
states that ‘While India is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it contains many prin-
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a historical struggle between internationalist and nationalist paradigms.80
Many lower federal and state courts regularly appeal to the VCLT rules of
interpretation as binding rules of customary international law,81 but the US
Supreme Court hardly ever refers to them.82 Several of its decisions stretch
the VCLT textual approach in favour of making liberal use of extraneous
materials,83 its decision in O’Connor is based on unilateral material not part
of the official travaux préparatoires,84 and in Alvarez-Machain it arguably
decided the case in violation of Article 31(3)c.85
The ICJ has repeatedly recognised ‘The existence of identical rules in in-
ternational treaty law and customary law’.86 It is settled case law of the
ciples of customary international law, and the principle of interpretation, of Article 31
of the Vienna Convention, provides a broad guideline as to what could be an appropri-
ate manner of interpreting a treaty in the Indian context also.’
80See Evan J. Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty In-
terpretation’, Virginia Journal of International Law 44, no. 2 (2004): 431–500, passim.
The US Department of State positions itself as follows: ‘Is the United States a party
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? No. The United States signed the
treaty on April 24, 1970. The U.S. Senate has not given its advice and consent to the
treaty. The United States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.’
(http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm).
81See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001), 433.
82See Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpreta-
tion’, 433–34.
83See, e.g., Air France v Sacks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), 396; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), 700; Eastern Airlines, Inc., Petitioner v Rose Marie Floyd,
et vir., et al., 499 U.S. 530 (1991), 535; Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60
(1993), 84.
84See O’Connor v United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986), 31; Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation’, 453.
85See United States v Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), 668–69, para. 15; Criddle, ‘The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation’, 433; Michael
Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed for and Applied by National
Courts?’, in The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Uniformity, Di-
versity, Convergence, ed. Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (Oxford; New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2016), 21.
86Nicaragua v United States of America –Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1986), 95, para. 177;
see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of
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ICJ to apply the VCLT to cases in which one or even both parties have not
implemented it, on grounds that the VCLT articles reflect customary inter-
national law.87 The same rationale has been applied, for example, by the
High Court of Australia concerning the tax treaty between Australia and
Switzerland:
Those rules [of interpretation recognised by international lawyers] have
now been codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
which Australia, but not Switzerland, is a party. Nevertheless, because the
interpretation provisions of the Vienna Convention reflect the customary
rules for the interpretation of treaties, it is proper to have regard to the terms
of the Convention in interpreting the Agreement, even though Switzerland
is not a party to that Convention.88
With extensive reference to case law of the ICJ, the ITLOS, the WTO Ap-
pellate Body, the ECHR, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
ECJ, and the ICSID, the ILC has confirmed that Articles 31–32 ‘apply as
customary international law’.89 Although it found ‘significant indications
in the case law that article 33, in its entirety, indeed reflects customary in-
ternational law’, the ILC did not pass a final verdict but left the issue open
to be addressed in the future because some courts to date have dealt only
with parts of Article 33 in terms of reflecting customary international law,
whereas others have explicitly stated that it reflects customary international
law as a whole.90 For example, despite the stipulated non-retroactivity, the
ECHR has applied the VCLT principles of interpretation even before the
convention’s entry into force, based on the recognition that ‘its Articles 31
Justice, 1969), 38–39, para. 63; Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v USA), ICJ
(Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 2004), 48. para. 83.
87See Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 19–22, para. 41;Arbitral Award of
31 July 1989 (Guinea Bissau v Senegal), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court
of Justice, 1991), 69–70, para. 48; LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), 501–
2, paras. 99, 101; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), ICJ (Annual Reports of
the International Court of Justice, 1999), 1059, para. 18, 1075, para. 48; Sovereignty over
Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipidan (Indonesia v Malaysia), ICJ (Annual Reports of the
International Court of Justice, 2002), 645, para. 37.
88Thiel v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 356.
89ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Sixty-fifth Session, 6 May – 7
June and 8 July – 9 August 2013’, 13, Conclusion 1(5), and 14–15, para. 4.
90See ibid., 15–16, paras. 5–6.
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to 33 enunciate in essence generally accepted principles of international
law, to which the Court has already referred on occasion.’91
The VCLT itself does not intend its stipulation of non-retroactivity to
constitute a peremptory norm but considers the intentions of the parties
decisive,92 as is explicitly stated by Article 28 VCLT; however, adoption of
the VCLT by itself may not necessarily be taken to count as having ‘oth-
erwise established’ such intention, as domestic constitutional law may pre-
clude such assumption. For example, while stressing that the VCLT rules
of interpretation did not preclude its own view in the particular case de-
cided, the German BFH expressed a strict position concerning the VCLT’s
non-retroactivity, attributable to the relationship between international and
constitutional law under the German legal system:
It is true that since the entry into force of the Assent Act of 3 August 1985
. . .the VCLT has been directly applicable national law. But, Article 4 thereof
only applies to contracts concluded after the entry into force of the Con-
vention, and the tax treaty with Italy was concluded on October 31, 1925,
long before the VCLT came into force. Therefore, the VCLT cannot apply
to the wages paid by X to the applicant for the period from 1 January 1980
to 31 December 1982. . . .International customary law cannot invalidate Art-
icle 59(2) sentence 1 GG, according to which the content of an international
treaty relating to subjects of federal legislation becomes part of the domestic
legal system only on the basis of a statute passing consent. According to Art-
icle 25 GG, customary international law can only be part of the national legal
system insofar as it does not contradict constitutional law. . . .A rule of inter-
pretation of international law relating to an international treaty can by no
means change domestic law without a formal statute of approval pursuant
to Art. 59(2) sentence 1 GG.93
In summary, as regards the reach of the VCLT, the limitation to the ap-
plicability of the permissive approach is not strictly demarcated. If indeed to
be considered customary international law, Article 33 should be regarded as
91Golder v United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 4451/70,
1975), 10, para. 29.
92See Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 85.
93BFH, ‘I R 74/86’ (BStBl. 1990 II, February 1989), Entscheidungsgründe; see also BFH, ‘I
R 20/87’ (BStBl. 1989 II, March 1989), s. II, para. 3.
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applicable without restriction;94 however, domestic legal systematics may
interfere. A deeper analysis of this point apart from the few general obser-
vations presented here lies outside the scope of this study; the interested
reader is referred to the cited sources as a suitable point of departure.
94See Vogel and Prokisch, ‘Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions’, 66–67; Klaus
Vogel, ‘Double Tax Treaties andTheir Interpretation’, International Tax & Business Law-
yer 4, no. 1 (1986): 15; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law,
48–57; Tanja Bender and Frank Engelen, ‘The Final Clause of the 1987 Netherlands
Model Tax Convention and the Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, in A Tax Glob-
alist: Essays in Honour of Maarten J. Ellis, ed. H. P. A. M. van Arendonk, F. A. Engelen
and Sjaak Jansen (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 3; Sinclair in Avery Jones, ‘Interpretation
of Tax Treaties’, 75–76.
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6. The Restrictive Approach: A Critical
Review
6.1. Research Topic
This chapter examines the counterarguments to sole reliance on the prevail-
ing text brought forward by the most adamant advocates of the restrictive
approach in detail. Before commencing with a comprehensive review, it is
useful to first discuss themost important point they have in common, which
has been made initially by Hardy and is relied on without much scrutiny
by other scholars, most prominently Arginelli and Engelen.1
6.2. The Attack on the Logical Argument
This core argument of the restrictive approach, which Hardy repeats twice
in his study, rests on the idea that ‘the interpretation most compatible with
all texts is not necessarily the one suggested by the authentic text viewed
separately’.2 Thefirst is the outcome of a selective comparison duringwhich
the interpretations of all texts are ‘hedged’ against each other and errors are
corrected by cross-examination, whereas the latter is a one-dimensional ex-
ercise by the judge without such corrective ‘hedge’.3 This argument implies
the presumption that as long as there is a common meaning to all texts, no
divergence can be said to exist, in which case any meaning of the prevailing
text not in congruence with the common meaning does not prevail.
Immediately, the question arises why and under what circumstances it
would be necessary for the interpretation of the prevailing text to be hedged
1See Arginelli,The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 337; Engelen, Interpretation
of Tax Treaties under International Law, 380–81.
2Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 133–34. By ‘authentic text’ he means the prevailing text (see below).
3See ibid., 126.
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within the limits of the others. The suggestion seems in friction with the
property of it prevailing, which rather suggests the opposite, namely, that
the interpretations of the other texts are to be hedged within the limits of
the prevailing one. In order to make sense of Hardy’s argument, we must
examine its theoretical foundations. In essence, it rests on the following two
premisses: (1)The notion of divergence is subjective, that is, the existence of
a divergence, which is the precondition for the prevalence of the prevailing
text, can only be established after a close objective examination. (2) Texts
lend themselves to several interpretations, and they may be so ‘obscure or
vague’ that they lend themselves ‘either to no constructions or a virtually
unlimited number.’4
Consequently, if the prevailing text is equivocal, any particular interpret-
ation chosen by the judge may be in conflict with an interpretation arrived
at by a concordant interpretation of all texts after a comparison. Given this,
no interpretation of the prevailing text may be chosen as the prevailing
one without establishment of a divergence, because it may not prevail over
any other interpretation that happens to be in concordance with the other
texts, in which case no real divergence can be said to exist.Therefore, the in-
terpreter must always engage in reconciliatory comparative interpretation
and can rely on the prevailing text only when such turns out fruitless, that
is, only when no single common meaning can be established. Accordingly,
the prevailing text is only a device of last resort, to be applied as a prevail-
ing alternative to the modus operandi provided by Article 33(4) for cases in
which no text is designated as prevailing.
To some extent, this construction is owed to the timing of Hardy’s study
in combination with his inductive method, applied in the absence of the
principles codified in the VCLT (see below). It has become clear from the
analysis in the previous chapter that any delimitation of the term diver-
gence to narrow criteria is not in line with the ordinary meaning of Art-
icle 33. Hardy’s argument relies on contrasting the interpretation suggested
by the prevailing text to an interpretation compatible with all texts, and it
implies the notion that all texts considered together constitute the treaty
versus each text representing it. As discussed in Chapter 3, this suggestion
makes sense for plurilingual treaties without prevailing text because of the
4Ibid., 82.
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otherwise residual indeterminacy of the treaty meaning; however, here we
are considering the case of a quasi-unilingual treaty, as one text is desig-
nated as prevailing. When there is a clear meaning of the prevailing text,
the principle of unity in combination with Article 31 demands that this
meaning is the undivided meaning of the treaty. For cases without prevail-
ing text the previous chapters followed Hardy’s argument because of the
failure of clarity of a single text as a criterion to resolve the inherent inde-
terminacy. When there is a prevailing text with a clear meaning, however,
there is no longer any indeterminacy; clarity of the prevailing text becomes
sufficient as a criterion, or else we could not make sense of the notion of it
to prevail. In summary, Hardy’s argument is valid only for cases in which
no prevailing text exists or cases in which its meaning remains unclear.
It is not necessary for the prevailing text to have only a single meaning to
be clear. When one of its possible meanings is manifest under Article 31, it
constitutes the treaty meaning – much alike the case of a unilingual treaty,
in which it is precisely the task of interpretation to establish the one true
meaning out of all possible ones. If text X means A and text Y (prevailing)
can be read to mean either A or B, B prevails as meaning of the treaty if such
conclusion is manifest according to an interpretation of Y under Article 31
(optionally confirmed under Article 321). To suggest otherwise, that in this
case there would be no divergence and A, common to both texts, needs to
be regarded as the meaning of the treaty, runs counter to the VCLT prin-
ciples: if a consideration of the ordinary wording of the text in good faith
in light of the context and object and purpose establishes a meaning, such
meaning should be regarded as the meaning of the treaty (bearing in mind
that such meaning of the prevailing text is of decisive authority in case the
interpretations of the other texts depart from it).
It is easy to see how a suggestion to the contrary would go wrong when
applied to our example based on the Natexis case. Suppose that the text say-
ing liable to tax would have been declared as prevailing, and an interpret-
ation of it under the VCLT general rule would establish that the effective
payment of a tax would not be necessary for granting a tax sparing credit.
Since liable to tax means both subject to tax and liable but not subject to
tax, following Hardy’s argument would mean that the meaning of the text
saying subject to tax as the commonmeaningwould have to be given prefer-
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ence every time instead of the different manifest meaning of the prevailing
text.
In summary, a common interpretation unequal to the manifest meaning
of the prevailing text constitutes a case of divergence, and the manifest
meaning of the prevailing text prevails. To suggest that such would not
constitute a case of divergence and any common meaning of all texts super-
sedes a different meaning of the prevailing text even though the latter has
been established as manifest under Article 31 runs counter to the intention
of the contracting parties declaring one text as prevailing and contradicts
the interpretative principles enshrined in the VCLT general rule of inter-
pretation. In essence, such suggestion would implement the Mavrommatis
approach as a general rule, which has been explicitly rejected by the ILC.5
Thus, Hardy’s counterargument is only partially valid for cases in which the
prevailing text has no clear meaning, that is, when text X means A while
text Y (prevailing) may mean either A or B and neither can be established
as the manifest under application of Article 31.
One a side note, the unquestioned reliance onHardy’s argument by schol-
ars like Arginelli and Engelen is somewhat curious, as it is inconsistent to
agree with Hardy’s argument for cases in which a prevailing text exists but
deny it for cases without prevailing text. The core of Hardy’s argument is
that the meaning of the treaty is the one common to all texts, not any one
of a single text considered in isolation. It is based on the view that all texts
together constitute the text, which is the essential implication of Hardy’s
argument. If one agrees with it, then it is precisely an argument for com-
paring all texts and a counterargument against the routine interpretation
approach for plurilingual treaties without prevailing text, endorsed by the
quoted scholars.6 In order to be consistent, those advocating Hardy’s argu-
ment for cases with prevailing text would at the same time have to reject
the routine interpretation approach for cases without.
Hardy’s argument may be agreed with partially, but only for cases when
there is no prevailing text or the prevailing text remains unclear. The exist-
5See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225–26, para. 8; Gaja,
‘The Perspective of International Law’, 93–94.
6See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 388–91; Arginelli,The
Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 250–51, 337.
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ence of a prevailing text creates a situation of quasi-unilinguality that al-
lows for a limited routine interpretation approach in the sense of allowing
sole reliance on the prevailing text as long as an interpretation under Art-
icle 31 leads to a manifest meaning. Advocating Hardy’s argument for cases
with prevailing text while denying it for cases without is self-contradicting,
and the unquestioned reliance on it by Arginelli and Engelen seems to boil
down to a mere argumentum ad verecundiam without critical examination
for its consistency with their otherwise advocated positions.
6.3. Hardy’s Search for a Middle Ground
Hardy’s seminal study of 1962 is still one of the most influential works on
the subject of plurilingual treaty interpretation. The joint dissenting opin-
ion in the Young Loan Arbitration, which has been supported by Sinclair in
his Commentary to the VCLT drawn on by many other scholars for their
own positions concerning the weight of the original text, based itself on his
research.7 This warrants a comprehensive review of his views, on top of the
selected arguments already considered.
Starting from the premiss that the primary objective of treaty interpret-
ation is to ascertain the common intention of the contracting parties, the
focus of Hardy’s research is on illuminating the practice of international
courts when texts differ.8 He does, however, not stop at the modest goal of
cataloguing the attitudes displayed by international judges, but his project
is to infer technical rules of interpretation via induction:
Rather than apply deductive processes of abstract logic, the decisions of
international courts and tribunals were scrutinized in order to determine
whether in this matter there existed, if not legal rules, at least some relevant
methods of interpretation – which might be regarded as technical rules –
recognized as proper.9
7See Young Loan Arbitration, 111 et seq; Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 152.
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From the pre–VCLT perspective of 1962, this may have seemed like a
valid project proposal. One may argue that he was only trying to anticipate
thework of the ILC, that is, to observe and formulatewhat the drafters of the
VCLT had not yet codified. Judged from a post–VCLT perspective against
the background of the principles enshrined in it, however, the problems
inherent in his approach become apparent. First and foremost, his goal of
deriving proper technical rules is fundamentally in friction with the VCLT
approach of supplying only a few general consensus ‘principles of logic and
good sense’, not technical rules suitable for mechanical application.10 His
inductive approach in this respect proves problematic methodologically.11
The particularities of case law plus the element of subjectivity employed by
judges considerably blur the picture and make distillation of general prin-
ciples difficult – a comparative evaluation of the reasoning employed by
judges in particular cases is itself an interpretative exercise prone to con-
troversy, introducing elements of variance in the absence of pre-established
general principles on the basis of which the decisions can be evaluated.
In addition, courts always need to decide the particular case at hand, and
different facts and circumstances may lead to different conclusions. From
observations that courts in a set of particular cases favoured the clearer or
more narrow text or the text in the original language of drafting, one may
not necessarily draw the conclusion that this should be a general principle.
The courts may have made this choice for particular reasons found in the
facts of the case; if the facts would have been different, so would have been
the conclusions. Although this is not necessarily an argument in principle,
one must still acknowledge the fundamental difficulty of deriving generally
applicable rules from the judgements of different national and international
courts in an international environment in which general consensus prin-
ciples on the basis of which these judgements could be evaluated had not
been established yet.
Moreover, since courts always only need to judge the particular case at
10See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:218–19, paras. 4–5.
11An extensive discussion of the problems of induction in general is outside the scope of
this study; the interested reader is referred to John Vickers, ‘The Problem of Induction’,
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring ed. (Stanford
University, 2016). For purposes of the current discussion, concentrating on particular
observations concerning Hardy’s work is sufficient.
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hand, their reasoning may leave a lot to be desired for drawing general
conclusions. Compare in this respect Hardy’s own evaluation of the Mav-
rommatis decision:
[T]he Court did not, despite appearances, interpret the words at all; it con-
fined itself to proving that, whether the French or the English version was
taken as a basis, the grant of the concessions to Rutenberg came within the
powers therein defined. Its interpretation was in effect merely a highly lo-
gical piece of reasoning, and the assertion of certain authors that the Court
endorsed ‘limited interpretation’ as a rule for solving discrepancies between
authentic texts is accordingly erroneous.12
Indeed, the question remains how helpful the reasoning of the court is to
establish which text gives the right meaning from a general perspective –
the decision itself stops short of delivering in this respect.
Unsurprisingly, in an international environment made up of different
legal systems without a common hierarchically structured judiciary, a com-
mon law approach looking for precedent is unhelpful in establishing a defin-
itive rule in the face of varied case law. The expectable outcome indeed ar-
rived at by the ILC is a truism: it depends on the intentions of the parties –
unless a clear preference is transcribed in the treaty, neither approach is off-
limits since both are customary.13 Depending on ones perspective, one may
find this to be either a prime example of commonsensical practicality or the
‘English habit of muddling along’, favouring case by case pragmatism over
general principle.14 In any case, it follows that in posing the question as it
has been posed traditionally – that is, whether one has to automatically ap-
ply the prevailing text or conduct a comparison to establish the existence
of a divergence first – the bulk of academic commentators is barking up
the wrong tree: one has to either way only if the treaty itself lays down a
12Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 80.
13See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4.
14For an extensive discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the common law prag-
matic tradition, see Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, Chs. 2–3, verbatim
quotation by Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy (1983), 448, at 130, also
referenced at 4, 43, and 90. The differences of the common and civil law traditions with
respect to the topic of this study will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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definite rule in this respect, otherwise one simply has the option.15
When judging Hardy’s conclusions, it must be taken into account that
especially in pre–VCLT times courts may have gone into a wrong direction
when judged against the later established VCLT principles.16 The interpreta-
tion of ‘divergence’ as material divergence by the Polish supreme court may
be viewed as such a case.17 Unlike the constant laws of nature, the laws of
men are evolutionary, and so is case law.18 This means that in order to be
of any lasting value, inductive generalisations must be evolutionary, too.19
The case examples on pages 82–83 of Hardy’s study illustrate how he
arrives at problematic conclusions based on court decisions not in line with
the principles of the VCLT (Venezuelan Bond and German Reparations). It is
obvious that both decisions may easily come into conflict with the principle
of using the object and purpose as single decisive criterion under Article
33(4) if their conclusions are generalised as technical rules of interpretation.
The resulting idea that always the more narrow meaning of a term should
prevail bears a great danger to go wrong in the context of international
treaties, which employ terms in the role of broader abstractions.20
The idea is exceptionally prone to error in the case of tax treaties because
of the interaction between Articles 33 and 3(2). The consequence may be an
overuse of domestic law definitions not intended by the contracting states,
for example, when there is a domestic law meaning of a term in one of the
states but none in the other – a situation in which the context is likely to re-
15This stance of the ILC implies their conviction that both approaches must lead to a cor-
rect interpretation of the treaty, i.e., that the existence of an actual divergence is not a
necessary precondition for reliance on the prevailing text, or else a definite rule of in-
terpretation would have been called for. Thus, the ILC implicitly submits to the logical
argument and rejects Hardy’s reasoning against it. This coincides with Engelen’s con-
clusion that Article 33(1) is not intended as a peremptory norm, and the requirement of
a divergence to exist the outcome of ‘infelicitous drafting’, see Engelen, Interpretation
of Tax Treaties under International Law, 376–379.
16For a brief summary of the practice of the PCJI and ICJ before the adoption of the VCLT,
see Eden, ‘Plurilingual Treaties’, 5–10.
17Archdukes of the Habsburg-Lorraine House v The Polish State Treasury.
18See Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 298–99, per Lord Roskill.
19See von Kirchmann, ‘Die Werthlosigkeit der Jurisprudenz als Wissenschaft’, 23.
20See Buchanan (James) & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd., 160, per
Lord Salmon.
166
6.3. Hardy’s Search for a Middle Ground
quire otherwise.21 Although there are national courts who have recognised
this, the danger is great that a given court may not pay attention to the
other country’s legal situation when judging a case under its domestic law
that contains a definition of the term, resulting in a misapplication of the
treaty (as in Vogel’s hypothetical case discussed in Chapter 4, s. 4.5).
Another problem of Hardy’s reasoning is its imprecise categorisation of
prevailing texts,22 which does not properly distinguish between authenti-
city and authority but defines the prevailing text as the ‘authentic text’.This
use of terminology is misleading, as it may create the idea that the authen-
ticity of texts is variable. All texts that qualify as authentic under the VCLT
remain so irrespective of one being designated in addition as prevailing, be-
cause authenticity is established by the procedures codified in Article 10
VCLT. Therefore, all texts are equally authoritative in case of concordance,
but the prevailing text is super-authoritative: it prevails over the others if
there is a divergence, however, the others still remain authentic in such
case – they only lose their relative authority versus the prevailing text, not
versus supplementary means.
When applying the proper VCLT categorisation to Hardy’s example,23
the English and Italian texts do not cease to be authentic, and the French text
does not only become authentic when the others differ. This is important
to remember, and some misconceptions by later scholars implying that the
prevailing text only needs to be consulted in an overall comparison of texts
after a comparison of the other texts has resulted in a divergence seem to
be rooted in Hardy’s imprecise categorisation (see below).
Hardy’s analysis then starts out from the assumption that ‘final clauses
21See Avery Jones, ‘Treaty Interpretation’, ss. 8.1 and 8.2.4.
22See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 125.
23The formulation employed by Hardy derives from the wording of the clause he uses as
example, which does not explicitly define the texts as authentic, unlike the majority of
final clauses in tax treaties today (see Chapter 8). As acknowledged by Hardy himself,
however, such explicit definition is not essential: in the absence of a specific provi-
sion, authenticity derives from the mere fact that an instrument has been concluded
in a particular language, see ibid., 74, with reference to Arnold D. McNair, The Law of
Treaties (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), 60. This principle is also laid out in the
VCLT Commentary, see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries,
224, para. 2.
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are nearly always drawn up somewhat automatically’ and, therefore, are
‘more or less stereotyped formulas which are still accepted in diplomatic
parlance but which the courts do not take into consideration because they
have lost their truemeaning’, the wording ‘in case of divergence’ being such
a formula.24 In addition, he asserts that the employed notion of ‘divergence’
is a ‘relatively hazy and subjective’ one.25 Both assumptions raise doubts
in his view concerning the interpretation of such clauses in a ‘rigid’ way,26
and ‘The provisions must therefore generally be construed less on the basis
of the text than in the light of diplomatic practice and, here, as elsewhere,
case law affords the surest guidance in the matter.’27
In consequence, Hardy finds it difficult to define the exact point in the
interpretative process when efforts to reconcile the various texts are to be
abandoned and the prevailing text is to be invoked as decisive. He struggles
with the reasoning employed by the Polish supreme court because it weak-
ens the authority of the prevailing text, wherefore he emphasises the ne-
cessity to define its limits because ‘when the texts can only be reconciled
by reference to the preparatory work, a refusal to apply the authentic text
would render the relevant final clauses wholly meaningless and constitute
a flagrant disregard of the will of the contracting parties.’28 Nevertheless,
based on his rejection of the logical argument discussed above, he rejects
sole reliance on the prevailing text without first establishing that there ac-
tually exists a divergence.
In order to resolve the ambivalence and strike a middle ground between
the two antagonistic approaches applied by courts in practice as observed
by him, he resorts to teleological reasoning by proceeding from the assump-
tion that the intention behind the agreement of parties on a prevailing text
must be considered to be ‘above all, to eliminate any uncertainty that might
arise from the plurality of texts and to provide the judge with a sure and
rapid means of settling any dispute on the subject’; from this he concludes
that ‘to require of a judge that he constantly keep comparing the texts and
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only as a last resort recognize that the authentic text must prevail would
seem contrary to that intention.’29 Consequently, he finally pleads for a re-
latively broad understanding of ‘divergence’, which encompasses mere dif-
ferences in wording as long as they prove somehow problematic, allowing
judges to resort to the prevailing text ‘as soon as a comparison of the texts
no longer suffices to reconcile them’ on grounds that ‘the only type of di-
vergence which the contracting parties would normally have in mind is a
purely verbal or prima facie divergence, for the much more complex notion
of a discrepancy which cannot be solved except by the most subtle process
of construction can only be grasped after exhaustive study of the relevant
case law.’30
Arginelli criticises Hardy for not supplying much argumentative support
for the suggestion that the intention behind final clauses providing for a
prevailing text is to provide courts with a sure and rapid means to settle
disputes.31 To counter Hardy, he suggests that it would be equally plausible
to assume that the intention of the contracting parties consists in providing
‘the interpreter with a single and clear means to construe the multilingual
treaty where no (other) reconciliation appears possible, i.e., where no single
reasonable meaning may be attributed to all authentic texts when they are
interpreted in good faith and the light of the overall context.’32 MaybeHardy
thought his proposition would be sufficiently self-evident and not require
further reasoning – it certainly appears commonsensical. In any case, it does
not follow from any of his premisses but is itself a premiss. Nonetheless,
Hardy’s suggestion is correct, and it has been one of the objectives of the
current study to provide conclusive arguments in its favour on the basis of
the VCLT.
In summary, Hardy’s research and evaluation of the relevant case law
leads him to advocate a somewhat permissive application of the prevailing
text, with some moderation. Although he rejects sole reliance on the pre-
vailing text from a conceptual point of view,33 he accepts it as a ‘second best’
29Ibid., 132.
30Ibid., 132.
31See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 332.
32Ibid., 332.
33See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 126, 133–34.
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pragmatic solution because ‘This method, which has received tacit approval
from the International Court, has one practical advantage which should suf-
fice to ensure its adoption: it is simple, rapid and sure.’34 Hence, it is a bit
misplaced to categorise Hardy as an advocate of the restrictive approach.
He rather seems to want to occupy a middle ground, without being able to
pin-point the exact spot.
The problem of his approach is that he does not arrive at a definite solu-
tion, stating himself that setting an exact limit in the interpretative process
when it would be time to stop trying reconciliation of all texts and resort-
ing to the prevailing text ‘would be somewhat arbitrary’.35 In consequence,
his implicit ‘first best’ solution remains elusive, as applying the supposedly
right amount of moderation and finding this limit remains an exogenous
variable – he can only tell when one has gone too far, namely, when the
reconciliation of texts is effected by recourse to supplementary means over
application of the prevailing text.Thus, Hardy fails his own project of identi-
fying clear-cut technical rules,36 falling victim to his inductive approach in
the face of antagonistic case law. His common sense pulls him towards the
right conclusions, but he fails to provide a sufficient base of arguments for
them while providing arguments in support of the opposite position. On
the whole, he makes two steps forward but one step back.
6.4. Arginelli’s Position
Arginelli’s thesis is the most comprehensive study on plurilingual tax treaty
interpretation to date. At the same time, it provides the most extensive reas-
oning representative of the restrictive approach, which warrants a critical
examination of all his points in addition to those already considered. In
essence, Arginelli pleads for decisive recourse to the prevailing text only
as a method of last resort after all interpretative efforts fail to establish a
meaning common to all texts:
The author submits that, unless some decisive evidence to the contrary is






gences should be construed as requiring the interpreter to compare the
prima facie divergent authentic texts in light of all the available elements
and items of evidence, in order to determine whether a reconciliation is pos-
sible by applying the rules of interpretation enshrined in Articles 31 and 32
VCLT, before relying exclusively on the prevailing text. The apparently di-
vergent authentic texts, therefore, should be construed in light of the overall
context and compared with each other in the quest for a common meaning.
Only where, at the end of the interpretative process, no common meaning
may be reasonably said to exist should preference be given to the meaning
of the prevailing text.37
In order to support his view, he fields seven arguments. His first and core
argument is that because the only possible meaning of any text for inter-
pretative purposes would be the meaning established by applying Articles
31 and 32, no divergence in meaning between the texts may be said to exist
beforehand, that is, the prevailing text can only be said to prevail after the
application of Articles 31 and 32 to all texts has established a divergence.38
In essence, this echoes the reasoning of the Polish supreme court outlined
above and delimits ‘divergence’ to material divergences in meaning that
cannot be reconciled by a comparative application of Articles 31 and 32 to
all texts. As we have seen, however, this is neither supported by the word-
ing of Article 33 nor its context and object and purpose. If one has to take
it to suggest that the comparative application of Articles 31 and 32 to all
texts includes giving preference to supplementary means over the prevail-
ing text under Article 32(a) and (b), it is in flagrant violation of the VCLT
framework of interpretation and the expressed intentions of the contracting
parties declaring one text as prevailing.
As a second argument, he contends that his conclusion fits the VCLT sys-
tem of interpretation best because the requirement to compare the prima
facie diverging texts and construe their meaning on the basis of Articles
31 and 32 before applying the prevailing text preserves as much as pos-
sible the unity of the treaty. This would again be supported by the mere
fact of the prevailing text being relevant only in the case of an actual di-
vergence.39 In order to support the contention, he lists three quotes derived




6. The Restrictive Approach: A Critical Review
from paragraphs 6 and 7 on page 225 of the VCLT Commentary.The quotes,
however, do not support his argument because all three refer to situations
in which none of the texts is designated as prevailing. Concerning this situ-
ation his contention that the texts should be compared before accepting
any interpretation based on a single one would indeed be correct – iron-
ically, however, he rejects it for such scenario by supporting the routine
interpretation approach. Here we deal with a situation in which one text
prevails, and ‘prevailing’ implies a special property distinguishing the pre-
vailing text from the others not sharing that property, which consists in its
prevalence over them, rendering it more authoritative in comparison. The
treaty remains one in law, but the prevailing text represents its one true
meaning with final, overriding authority. Therefore, the existence of a pre-
vailing text renders the treaty quasi-unilingual, that is, the interpretations
of the other texts must converge to the manifest meaning of the prevailing
text. If they do not, they must be reinterpreted to conform to it.40
Arginelli’s suggestion that the prevailing text is relevant only in the case
of a material divergence and his proposed solution to require the interpreter
to compare the potentially divergent texts and establish their meaning first
on the basis of Articles 31 and 32 make little sense. To compare only the
other texts without the prevailing one in order to find out whether the diver-
gence between them is material would be an odd suggestion, not consistent
with the requirements of Article 33(1) and (4) even if we would disregard its
prevailing nature.41 The prevailing text is still at minimum equally authen-
tic; therefore, if a comparison is enacted, all texts including the prevailing
onemust be compared, otherwise the outcome is not definitive. Article 33(4)
explicitly speaks of a ‘comparison of the authentic texts’, which unequivoc-
ally implies all texts. To conclude that there is no divergencewhen the other
texts besides the prevailing one are interpreted to have the same meaning
40See, by analogy, Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 301, per Lord Roskill.
41Thus, the ICSID noted in Kiliç: ‘Moreover, the tribunal’s reasoning in that case seems to
have disregarded the Turkish text. . . .It is not immediately apparent to the Tribunal in
the present case that the Rumeli tribunal’s reliance on the English and Russian versions
alone is consistent with the requirements of Articles 33(1) and (4) of the VCLT. It may
be that the Rumeli tribunal had a reasoned basis for excluding the Turkish text, but it
does not appear to have set out that reasoning in its award’, Kiliç Ĭnşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat
Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, para. 9.9.
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would be premature; their common meaning could still diverge from the
meaning of the prevailing text.
Yet, this is a suggestion sometimesmade in the tax treaty context concern-
ing the standard case of two texts in the official languages of the contracting
states and a prevailing text in a third language. The implied elevation of the
two other texts over the prevailing one may be caused by two intertwined
thoughts. First, the assumption that each country’s courts will use the coun-
try’s official language in legal proceedings and, therefore, rely on the text
in this language as a matter of custom (at least initially). Second, an implicit
extension of the view that a comparison of texts is not required for cases
of routine interpretation. The argument by extension then seems to be that
when problems surface in form of a divergence between the two texts in the
official languages of the contracting states, the third may be disregarded in
good faith if the divergence can be resolved by a comparative interpretation
of the first two.
Although there may be good reasons to refer to the text in the official
language of the proceedings first, this practice is in the international law
context mere custom, not obligation. The judge may have recourse initially
to any text declared as authentic by the treaty’s final clause. Now, even
if one does not subscribe to the argument refuting the routine interpreta-
tion approach for plurilingual treaties without prevailing text submitted in
Chapter 3, which could be extended in an analogous way here, one has to
concede that if a problem urging the interpreter to engage in a comparison
surfaces, the case can no longer be regarded as one of ‘routine interpreta-
tion’. Hence, for consistency reasons, even the proponents of the routine
interpretation approach would have to concede that a comparison of all
texts as part of the context under Article 31(2) becomes obligatory in such
case, not only of two out of three – all the more so when the third one has
been awarded prevailing status by the contracting states.
In summary, when one text is declared as prevailing, the routine inter-
pretation approach gains force as an argument in terms of supporting sole
reliance on it because when c1 is true for the prevailing text, it is immater-
ial whether c2 is true or false, that is, instead of being merely a necessary
condition as in the case without prevailing text, c1 is both a necessary and
sufficient condition for applying the routine interpretation approach to the
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prevailing text. Conversely, the routine interpretation approach completely
loses its persuasiveness to support sole reliance on any or all other texts.
Arginelli’s third argument is a compound of several related points. First,
the submission that his view does not conflict with Article 33(1) and (4) be-
cause paragraph (1) does not state that the other texts are not authoritative
for interpretative purposes but simply provides an option for the contract-
ing parties to declare one text as prevailing in case of divergence, while
paragraph (4) only ‘establishes a rule of interpretation for cases where (i) an
otherwise irreconcilable divergence exists and (ii) the parties did not agree
that a specific text is to prevail in the case of divergence. . . .Article 33(4)
VCLT does not state anything on the interpretative process that should be
followed where the parties agreed that, in the case of divergence, a specific
text is to prevail.’42
Second, the suggestion that neither the wording nor context of Article 33
would support an ‘a contrario reasoning’, that is, from Article 33(4) expli-
citly requiring an interpretative comparison between divergent texts when
there is no prevailing one while remaining silent on the case there is one,
it may not be concluded that when a prevailing text exists, sole reliance on
it should be had instead of an interpretative comparison.43
Third, another variation of the ‘divergence equals material divergence’
argument, namely, that one could not reasonably argue for the term diver-
gence to include a ‘difference of meaning resulting before the authentic
texts are interpreted according to Articles 31 and 32’ on the basis of assum-
ing the wording ‘a difference of meaning which the application of Articles
31 and 32 does not remove’ to imply for such a difference to exist before a
comparative interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 has established so. To
support this contention, he lists the following three pieces of evidence:
(i) the terminology used is different, ‘difference’ v. ‘divergence’;
(ii) in paragraph 8 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft,
the ILC used the term ‘divergence’ as a synonym for ‘difference of
meaning which the application of Articles 27 and 28 does not remove’,
which would actually point to the opposite conclusion;
(iii) paragraph 4 of the commentary to Article 29 of the 1966 Draft is clear
enough in denying the existence, under Article 33 VCLT, of any oblig-




ation for the interpreter to apply the prevailing text as soon as a prima
facie difference between the various authentic texts is put forward.44
Several observations may be made concerning these points. If it were
really true that his view would not be in conflict with Article 33(1) and (4),
this alone would not render it applicable in view of other available options
that may be more manifest. Although it is true that Article 33(1) does not
explicitly state the other texts are not authoritative for interpretative pur-
poses if one text is declared as prevailing, it must not be omitted that when
a prevailing text exists, its meaning is of higher authority, overruling the
interpretations of the other texts in case they diverge.45 It is also true that
Article 33(4) does not explicitly prescribe a particular interpretative process
in case a prevailing text exists; however, such is not necessary: Article 31
applies in line with the dictum that fundamentally no different principles
should apply to the interpretation of plurilingual treaties than to unilingual
ones.46
Article 33(4) does not remain entirely silent concerning prevailing texts.
While distinguishing implicitly between three scenarios as discussed in the
previous chapter, Article 33(4) in substance only concerns itself with the
third one, that is, scenarios in which no prevailing text exists and there
are differences in meaning that cannot be reconciled by the application of
Articles 31 and 321, in which case a further modus operandi is needed and
provided by Article 33(4) itself. When there is a prevailing text, however,
it is Article 31 that applies in combination with Article 33(1) referred to
by Article 33(4) via the initial ‘Except where’ condition. As a result, sole
reliance on the prevailing text becomes optional in the sense that applying
Article 31 to the super-authoritative prevailing text will be sufficient as long
as its meaning is clear. At the same time, the interpreter is of course still free
to compare all texts from the outset, as long as the final outcome converges
to the interpretation of the prevailing text.
Arginelli simply falls victim to a false dichotomy by considering only
44Ibid., 335.
45Concerning the clear intention of the drafters of the VCLT for Article 33 to establish a
comparative authority between texts, see ILC, Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session,
11 May – 24 July 1964, I:319, para. 60.
46See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 7.
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the two opposed alternatives of mandatory sole reliance on the prevailing
text versusmandatory reconciliatory comparative interpretation of all texts,
while excluding the third option of both being optional as long as they lead
to the same result. As conducted in the previous chapter, a comprehensive
analysis of the wording, context, and object and purpose of Article 33 to-
gether with a consideration of supplementary means in form of the VCLT
Commentary leads to an understanding of ‘divergence’ that is opposed to
Arginelli’s narrow conception. Paragraph 4 of the Commentary to Article
29 of the 1966 DraftArticles he quotes as third piece of evidence precisely re-
jects the false dichotomy purported by him. As he rightly observes, it denies
the existence of an obligation for the interpreter to apply the prevailing text
as soon as a prima facie difference between the texts is put forward, how-
ever, such approach is also not ruled out.
Arginelli’s fourth argument is in essence another variation of the ‘diver-
gence equals material divergence’ contention. Its target is Hardy’s sugges-
tion that contracting parties would first and foremost have mere verbal dif-
ferences in mind when drafting final clauses, which would justify recourse
to the prevailing text already upon identification of such verbal differences.
What is curious this time around is Arginelli’s justification for dismissing
Hardy’s proposition:
That, in turn, would entail the extremely recurrent exclusive recourse to the
prevailing text. In such a way, as a matter of fact, any interested party could
unilaterally invoke and obtain the right to rely exclusively on the prevailing
text, whenever it would appear more favourable for it than the other authen-
tic texts, by simply highlighting a prima facie dictionary divergence. In this
respect, the final clause would be transformed into a mere procedural tool
in the hands of interested parties. However, since treaties should be inter-
preted and applied in good faith, it seems reasonable that the prevailing text
is to be preferred to the other authentic texts only insofar the existence of a
divergence between the provisional utterance meanings of those texts have
been ascertained in accordance with the rules of interpretation enshrined
in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, not sufficing in that respect that an interested
party merely put forward a presumed difference of meanings in order to
rely on the potentially more favourable prevailing text.47
47Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 336–37.
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First and foremost, any interested party may at any time rely on any of
the texts designated as authentic by the treaty. That includes the one desig-
nated as prevailing unless the treaty would specify otherwise. A contention
to the contrary would deny the equal authenticity codified in the treaty and
question the principle of unity. Second, the principle in dubio mitius (more
leniently in case of doubt) is not codified among the VCLT interpretative
principles. The VCLT interpretative framework aims to resolve all doubts
concerning the meaning of the treaty, so the category of ‘more or less fa-
vourable’ does not fit here. How could one text be more favourable if the
texts are supposed to mean the same because of the principle of unity, and
how could such be an argument to deny recourse to it? If the prevailing
text would indeed mean something more or less favourable, that is, differ-
ent, one would need to apply it under the VCLT rules. Any notion of a
possibility of abuse of the prevailing text as a procedural tool by an inter-
ested party putting a lid on its right to refer to any text to argue its position
is simply misplaced.
As fifth argument, Arginelli maintains the ‘second best’ solution pro-
posed by Hardy is not coherent with the VCLT framework of interpretation
because his argument is based on the relevance of purely verbal differences,
whereas the VCLT framework is based on a textual not literal approach.This
point is merely another variation of Arginelli’s argument that a reconcili-
atory comparative interpretation has to be conducted first to establish the
existence of a material divergence, and he refers again to his earlier sugges-
tion that Hardy provides insufficient evidence for the assertion that parties
would normally have verbal divergences in mind. In his opinion, it would
be equally plausible for the contracting parties to have only material di-
vergences in mind.48 In addition, Arginelli suggests Hardy to be wrong in
concluding that when reconciliation of the texts is only possible with re-
course to supplementary means, giving such reconciliation preference over
application of the prevailing text would render the final clause providing
for a prevailing text in case of divergence meaningless; in his view, it would
merely render recourse to the prevailing text ‘superfluous’.49
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recourse to any text being part of the context under Article 31(2) and there-
fore carrying more relative weight than supplementary means may not be
regarded a superfluous exercise in case of a divergence or inclarity without
violating the general rule of interpretation and the fundamental weight dis-
tribution between authentic and supplementary means implemented by the
VCLT.50 Such recourse is only superfluous when the interpreted text is the
prevailing text, in which case the other texts lose their authority relative
to it if they say something different and, therefore, lose their interpretat-
ive weight as context under Article 31(2) as long as the prevailing text can
be attributed a clear meaning. Otherwise, all texts should at all times be
compared when there is no prevailing text, because of the residual inde-
terminacy of plurilingual tax treaties.
When there is a prevailing text, it is not conclusive to suggest that only
the other texts should be compared first and supplementary means should
be consulted to actively reconcile divergences or resolve any ambiguity be-
fore recourse is had to the prevailing text. Article 33(4) states ‘a comparison
of the authentic texts’, which unequivocally refers to all texts. Arginelli’s
approach effectively tries to replace the prevailing text by supplementary
means, which conflicts with Articles 31 and 32: apart from exceptional cases,
supplementary means may be consulted only to confirm but not contest a
meaning arrived at by a textual interpretation under Article 31. Arginelli’s
mistake in this respect is somewhat derivative from the view I have refuted
in Chapter 4 that Article 32 in its entirety including letters (a) and (b) pre-
vails over application of the modus operandi in Article 33(4) to invoke the
object and purpose as sole decider. Of course, if one contends subsequently
that the prevailing text is only an alternative to the latter, one must follow
through and reason that application of Article 32(a) and (b) prevails over
sole reliance on the prevailing text to remain consistent.
Arginelli’s suggestion to restrict the relevance of the prevailing text to
cases ‘where the intention of the parties is to provide the interpreter with a
50Arginelli fails to make clear in what way he considers ‘superfluous’ distinct from ‘mean-
ingless’ for purposes of the principle of effectiveness. The Oxford Dictionary defines
meaningless as ‘Having no meaning or significance’ or ‘Having no purpose or reason’,
while superfluous is defined as ‘Unnecessary, especially through being more than
enough’. As regards the principle of effectiveness, the two concepts are synonymous
in the sense of Article 33(4) being rendered an empty provision, never to apply.
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single and clear means to construe the multilingual treaty in case no recon-
ciliation appears possible in light of the ordinary rules of interpretation’51
is purely speculative and not supported by the wording of Article 33. Be-
cause of the placement of the ‘Except where’ condition at the beginning of
paragraph (4) and its direct reference to paragraph (1), comparative recon-
ciliation as necessity comes into play only when there is no prevailing text.
Whatever the other texts may say individually or combined has in the end
no bearing if it deviates from an existing prevailing text.
Arginelli bases his view on a particular reading of Article 33(4), with the
‘Except where’ condition implied to only qualify its modus operandi, as if it
were placed at the end of the paragraph after ‘shall be adopted’ and not at
the beginning. His argument, in essence reading Article 33(4) as implying
a conjunctive not disjunctive definition of divergence in the sense that a di-
vergence exists only if there is a difference in meaning and that difference
cannot be resolved by comparative interpretation,52 rests on circular reason-
ing and is therefore nonsensical: it suggests that only a material divergence
necessitates comparative interpretation or reliance on the prevailing text,
whereas it is necessary to perform a comparative interpretation to estab-
lish the existence of a material divergence in the first place.
As his sixth argument, Arginelli proclaims that comparative interpreta-
tion is more reliable than interpretation of a single text, even when that text
is designated as prevailing. With reference to Hardy’s counterargument to
the logical argument he maintains that if an apparent divergence has been
identified, the lower reliability of single text interpretation would no longer
be acceptable even when that text is designated as prevailing, whereas if no
apparent divergence has been identified, the lower reliability of single text
interpretation of any text would be acceptable because of the presumption
in Article 33(3).53
As pointed out previously, Hardy’s counterargument to the logical ar-
gument Arginelli repeats is only valid when the prevailing text remains
unclear, not when it has a clear meaning. In the latter case, a comparison
with the other texts is no longer necessary to arrive at a reliable result, as
51Ibid., 333.
52See Pfister, Werkzeuge des Philosophierens, 68.
53See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 337.
179
6. The Restrictive Approach: A Critical Review
the essence of a prevailing text is that it prevails, that is, that it overpowers
the other texts if they depart from its meaning. Once it is established that
the prevailing text has a clear meaning, Article 33(3) precisely demands that
the other texts must be interpreted to concord to it.
With his suggestion that reliance on any single text would be acceptable
when there is no alleged divergence but reliance on an existing prevailing
text would not be acceptable when there is one, Arginelli obviously tries
to make his views compatible with the routine interpretation approach he
supports for cases without prevailing text. As already pointed out, it is self-
contradicting to support the routine interpretation approach for plurilin-
gual treaties without prevailing text but deny it for the quasi-unilingual
situation of a prevailing text.
Arginelli’s seventh and final argument is not another substantive point
but only a suggestion that unless there would be a strong indication other-
wise in the treaty considered, the slightly different forms of existing treaty
final clauses do not affect his conclusions because final clauses are nearly
always drawn up automatically, containing a number of more or less ste-
reotypical formulas that courts and tribunals do not really take into consid-
eration because they have lost their true meaning.54
Two points speak against this view. First, Hardy’s contention repeated
by Arginelli is merely speculative and not self-evident. It does not neces-
sarily follow from the mere fact that a clause is drawn up automatically
without much contemplation that its intention is less clear to the contract-
ing parties. On the contrary, the opposite proposition – that is, the more
automatically drawn up clauses are, the more clear and in agreement the
contracting parties are about their intention – seems much more compel-
ling because one may not reasonably consider contracting parties to light-
heartedly put things into a contract they are unsure of. One may compare
the case of severability clauses (also known as salvatorius clauses).55 Many
contracts feature such clauses by default, and their formulation in practice
is fairly standardised. To suggest that because of this the contracting parties
54See ibid., 338.
55A clause providing that it does not nullify the entire contract if any of its clauses is not




have no clear vision of what exactly is implied and the clauses themselves
do not clearly express their intentions would be nonsense.
Second, Arginelli’s suggestion is in opposition to the VCLT’s prescribed
textual approach and the principle of effectiveness. As regards the particular
form of final clauses inserted in treaties, the VCLT Commentary stresses
the importance of the intentions of the contracting parties as expressed.56
Hence, although it may be true that the set of formulations in actual tax
treaties does not show much variance in intention and effect, the different
wordings must still be considered carefully to establish the truth of such
contention.57 Arginelli’s over-evaluation of the condition that the existence
of a material divergence must be established first in order to invoke the
prevailing text, in combination with his assertion that his interpretation
applies whatever the exact wordings of final clauses are, is in friction with
Article 33(1) not being intended as a peremptory norm.
56See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:226, para. 4.
57This will be done in Chapter 8, s. 8.3.3.
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7.1. ResearchQuestion
So far I have discussed the issue at hand from the perspective of interna-
tional law. My conclusion has been that the VCLT requires courts to either
compare all texts of a plurilingual tax treaty or, as a pragmatic solution,
rely on the prevailing text if there is one. The situation of tax treaties be-
ing interpreted by domestic courts applying domestic procedures raises the
question of how this requirement and solution may be operated in practice
from the perspective of the respective jurisdiction.
7.2. Civil versus Common Law
Adetailed discussion of all theworld’s jurisdictions is well beyond the scope
and means of this study; however, they may be grouped according to gen-
eral traits they share despite the fact that the particular ways in which their
institutions, rules, and procedures operate may vary. In order to allow gen-
eral observations, it is necessary to distinguish between legal systems and
traditions. According to Merryman and Perez-Perdomo, a legal system may
be defined as ‘an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules’,
whereas a legal tradition may be defined as a ‘set of deeply rooted, historic-
ally conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in
the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a
legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected, and taught.’1 The two main legal traditions considered here are
civil and common law, as they predominate the legal systems around the
globe.2
1John Merryman and Rogelio Perez-Perdomo,The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to
the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America (Stanford University Press, 2007), 1–2.
2The common law tradition prevails in the Commonwealth of Nations and North Amer-
ica, while the civil law tradition prevails throughout Europe, Latin andMiddle America,
183
7. The View from Domestic Law
Concerning the following discussion from a birds-eye view, the reader
should bear a few things in mind. First, it would be wrong to conceive of
something like a unified civil or common law tradition in view of the dif-
ferences within the families of legal systems. Even though the common law
traditionmay appearmore unified because of the shared heritage of the Brit-
ish Commonwealth, there are significant deviations between different com-
mon law countries.3 Second, the distinction between the two traditions may
be less pronounced in practice than drawn in the abstract – their differences
may to some extent lie in more elusive cultural factors and philosophical
perspectives,4 whereas their substantive laws are both rooted in Roman law,
albeit in different periods.5 In addition, there is an element of convergence
attributable to mutual influences on each other over the course of history.6
In consequence, many countries today have mixed systems.7 In summary,
the intention behind the following paragraphs is to briefly sketch funda-
mental differences relevant to the issue at hand while stressing the point at
and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Traditions based on religious or custom-
ary law will not be discussed here; they are found mainly in the Middle East and Asia,
while Africa is a mix. The University of Ottawa World Legal Systems Research Group
has undertaken a global classification of legal systems and drawn a respective world
map, see http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/index.php.
3See Neil MacCormick, Robert S. Summers, and D. Neil MacCormick, Interpreting Preced-
ents: A Comparative Study (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd., 1997), 3–4.
4See Klaus F. Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch (Köln: Heymanns Verlag GmbH,
1995), s. 70; Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, 79.
5See Franz Wieacker, ‘The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and West-
ern Legal Thought’, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 4, no. 2
(1981): 257–61;Watson, Alan, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture’,Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review 131, no. 5 (1983): 1121–57; Cecilia Siac, ‘Mining Law:
Bridging the Gap Between Common Law and Civil Law Systems’, Mineral Resources
Engineering 11, no. 2 (2002): 217–18.
6See Vivienne O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide: Common Law and Civil Law Traditions’
(International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, March 2012), 33–35; Berkeley
School of Law (Boat Hall), ‘The Robbins Collection: The Common Law and Civil Law
Traditions’ (University of California at Berkeley), 4; Jerome N. Frank, ‘Civil Law Influ-
ences on the Common Law – Some Reflections on “Comparative” and “Contrastive”
Law’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 104, no. 7 (1956): 887–926; Röhl, Allge-
meine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70.
7SeeWorld Legal Systems Research Group, ‘JuriGlobe’ (University of Ottawa); O’Connor,
‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 33.
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the expense of oversimplification. Such necessarily superficial review must
suffice for the purpose of the current study.
In order to contrast the crucial differences between the two traditions,
it is necessary to view them in the context of their historical formation.8
Civil law had several influences, although the main one has been Roman
law in form of the Corpus Juris Civilis, a collection of imperial enactments,
textbooks, and writings of Roman lawyers compiled by order of Emperor
Justinian I of Constantinople from A.D. 529 to A.D. 534. Additional
influences came from local customs, canon law developed by the Christian
church and taught by medieval scholars alongside Roman law, and com-
mercial law emerging in Italy to regulate European trade.9 The political and
economic environment on the European continent of scattered territories,
unifying states, and growing trade fuelled initiatives of scholars educated
in Roman law to rationalise and systematise the law during the early
modern period. Growing together politically and economically required a
more uniform law, and such could only come from abstract legal theory,
not any existing legal system based on local customs, of which there were
too many because of territorial fragmentation. As a result, the role of local
customs gradually diminished in favour of general principles borrowed
from Roman law.10
Another important historical influence on civil law has been the French
Revolution, which provided a strong impetus to the formation of public law
codifying the rights of the individual versus the state.11 Based on the ideas
8Based on this historical approach, emphasis is given to the common law in England. As
said, there are differences between common law countries, and the US in particular
has diverged more from English law than, say, Australia or Canada. For example, the
US Supreme Court has a more liberal approach to using extraneous materials in inter-
pretation, see Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation’, passim.
9See Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Code of Justinian’; O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 9–
10; Merryman and Perez-Perdomo,The Civil Law Tradition, 13; Berkeley School of Law
(Boat Hall), ‘The Robbins Collection’, 2.
10See Berkeley School of Law (Boat Hall), ‘The Robbins Collection’, 2; Röhl, Allgemeine
Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70; van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 100
et seq.
11See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 10; Merryman and Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law
Tradition, 14.
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of Montesquieu and Rousseau, the social contract became considered the
source of all rights, and legal codes the primary source of law.12
During the enlightenment period the scholarly aspirations to unify the
law amalgamated with corresponding desires of rulers, which led to com-
prehensive codification of principles into systematic collections of laws, for
example, the Prussian civil code of 1794 and the French Code Napoléon of
1804,13 however, not without slightly deviating underlying rationales influ-
encing the codes of different systems in their particularities until today –
for example, the French ideal of being accessible to ordinary citizens versus
the German focus on legal precision and comprehensiveness as well as lo-
gically coherent structure.14 Zweigert et al. describe the French Code civil
as ‘a masterpiece from the point of view of style and language’,15 whereas
of the German BGB they say the following:
In language, method, structure, and concepts the BGB is the child of the
deep, exact, and abstract learning of the German Pandectist School with
all the advantages and disadvantages which that entails. Not for the BGB
the simple common sense of the Austrian General Civil Code, the clear and
popular style of the Swiss Code, or the sprung diction of the Code civil, in-
stinct with the ideal of equality and freedom among citizens.The BGB is not
addressed to the citizen at all, but rather to the professional lawyer; it delib-
erately eschews easy comprehensibility and waives all claims to educate its
reader; instead of dealing with particular cases in a clear and concrete man-
ner it adopts throughout an abstract conceptual language which the layman,
and often enough the foreign lawyer as well, finds largely incomprehensible,
but which the trained expert, after many years of familiarity, cannot help
admiring for its precision and rigour of thought.16
For common law the historical and philosophical genesis has been dif-
ferent.17 After the Norman conquest of England in 1066, William the Con-
12See William Tetley QC, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs Civil Law (Codified and
Uncodified)’, Uniform Law Review, no. 3 (1999): 616.
13See Berkeley School of Law (Boat Hall), ‘The Robbins Collection’, 2; O’Connor, ‘Practi-
tioner’s Guide’, 10.
14See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 10.
15Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. Tony Weir,
3rd revised ed. (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1998), 91.
16Ibid., 144.
17See van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 114 et seq.; Röhl, Allgemeine
Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70; Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, 79.
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queror and particularly Henry II18 established a corps of judges to adjudic-
ate local disputes and uphold legal order. Juries were introduced to repres-
ent the local interests of the populace in order to ensure their obedience.19
In contrast to the continent, England always had a centralised legal system
with a king’s high court since the middle ages. Correspondingly, there was
no comparable need to unify locally fragmented legal systems. The point
of departure for the development of law was the king’s judiciary (to which
all common law judges belonged), not necessarily abstract principles, so
the essential quest has been to guard the coherence of adjudication, not to
unify differing local legal systems and adjudication by independent provin-
cial courts.20
Consequently, rather than formulating generally applicable legal prin-
ciples in a comprehensive code, the traditional focus of common law has
been to resolve the dispute at hand on a case-by-case basis,21 which in spirit
may be traced back to the medieval ‘system of writs, or royal orders, each
of which provided a specific remedy for a specific wrong.’22 The idea of lim-
iting the power of judges to a mere application of law, stemming from the
French Revolution, did not influence common law,23 which as fundament-
ally judge-made law retained its feudalistic heritage.24 Rather than by the
ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau of the state and social contract being
the source of all rights, common law has been influenced by Hobbes’s idea
of the individual forfeiting certain rights to the state.25
18Reigned 1154–1189.
19See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 11; Berkeley School of Law (Boat Hall), ‘The Rob-
bins Collection’, 3.
20See Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70; van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators
and Professors, 4–6.
21See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 13–14.
22Berkeley School of Law (Boat Hall), ‘The Robbins Collection’, 3.
23To the contrary, ‘the profoundly English belief that an independent judiciary, and a judi-
ciary with the power to issue practical orders, was more important than any number of
grand theoretical declarations about the Rights of Man . . .gained redoubled force after
the French Revolution when a series of constitutions proclaiming the Rights of Man
were seen by the pragmatic Englishman as so much useless theoretical clutter which
had no practical results’, Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 22.
24See van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 6 et seq., 154.
25See Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 616.
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How are the anatomies of civil and common law systems today shaped
by these historical influences and philosophical underpinnings? In civil law,
the principal source of law is hierarchically structured legislation intended
to comprehensively codify all areas of law in a logical and systematic man-
ner according to general principles.26 According to O’Connor, ‘This reliance
on codes and laws is a central characteristic of the civil law. At the heart
of the civil law lies a belief in codification as a means to ensure a rational,
logical, and systematic approach to law.’27 Case law on the other hand does
not function as a primary source of law; judges are supposed to apply not
create law, based on the strict separation of powers between legislature
and judicature.28 Cases are to be decided based on legislation not preced-
26See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 11–14; Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the
Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’,The American Journal of Comparative Law
15, no. 3 (1966–1967): 424; Siac, ‘Mining Law’, 217.
27O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 11–12.
28See Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 613, as for example in Germany, see Nigel Foster, Ger-
man Legal System and Laws, 2nd ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 1996), 4; Detlev J. Piltz,
‘Macht im Steuerrecht’, in Unternehmen Steuern: Festschrift für Hans Flick zum 70. Ge-
burtstag, ed. Franz Klein et al. (Köln: Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag KG, 1997), 506. Never-
theless, as the German Federal Constitutional Court has pointed out, ‘The traditional
binding of the judge to the law, which is an integral part of the principle of separation
of powers, and thus of the rule of law, has in any case been modified in accordance
with the wording of the GG to “law and justice” (Article 20, para. 3). According to
general opinion, this implies the rejection of a narrow legal positivism. The formula
maintains the awareness that law and justice generally coincide as a matter of fact, but
do so neither necessarily nor always. Justice is not identical with the sum of all written
laws. Given the circumstances, there may exist a surplus in terms of justice vis-à-vis
the positive statutes, which has its source in the sense-total of the constitutional legal
order, and may act as a corrective with regard to the written law; to establish it and
bring it to bear in decisions is the task of courts. The GG does not require the judge
to apply legislative directives to the individual case within the limits of the possible
word-sense. Such a view would presuppose the total gaplessness of the positive legal
order, a state which is justifiable as a fundamental postulate of legal certainty, but un-
attainable in practice. Judicial activity consists not only in recognising and expressing
decisions of the legislature. The task of courts may require particularly that values im-
manent in the constitutional legal order but not or only imperfectly expressed in the
texts of the written laws are revealed and implemented in decisions in an act of eval-
uative knowledge not completely lacking wilful elements. In doing so, the judge must
rid himself of arbitrariness; his decision must be based on rational reasoning. It must
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ent; previous case law is generally non-binding and courts are only bound
by statutes.29
In common law, judicial opinions are (or at least traditionally were) the
principal source of law. Although judges are bound by statutes, they have
the power to make law.30 Statutes only serve as secondary sources of law:
they are not used to codify complete branches of law and implement general
principles but merely to address particular issues,31 implement uniformity,
and complement or correct judge-made law.32 Their number has increased
over time, however, common law is dominated by case law and must be
characterised as uncodified.33 Dainow provides a good general account of
the difference between codes and statutes:
A code is not a list of special rules for particular situations; it is, rather, a
body of general principles carefully arranged and closely integrated. A code
achieves the highest level of generalization based upon a scientific struc-
ture of classification. A code purports to be comprehensive and to encom-
pass the entire subject matter, not in the details but in the principles, and
to provide answers for questions which may arise. . . .[S]tatutes are usually
not formulated in terms of general principles but consist rather of particular
rules intended to control certain fact situations specified with considerable
detail.34
be made clear that the written law does not fulfil its function of solving a legal problem
justly. The judicial decision then closes this gap according to the standards of practical
reason and the “established general vision of justice of the community” (BVerfGE 9,
338 [349])’, BVerfG, ‘1 BvR 112/65’, C, IV, 1. Hence, depending on the legal system in
question and the factual circumstances, the situation may be more complex in practice
than suggested by the oversimplified dichotomy between applying and creating the
law.
29See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 11–12; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common
Law’, 426; Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 4.5.
30See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 23; Siac, ‘Mining Law’, 218.
31Compare, e.g., the law of partnerships in the UK Partnership Act of 1890.
32See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 14, 23; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common
Law’, 425; Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 614.
33See Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 28 et seq.; van Caenegem, Judges,
Legislators and Professors, 39. Certain areas of law have remained constituted almost
entirely by case law, e.g., the law of contracts in the UK, see Siac, ‘Mining Law’, 217 et
seq.
34Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’, 424–25.
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This has a profound impact on the way courts interpret the law and de-
cide cases. Civil law codes require a liberal interpretation, which applies the
underlying principles to actual fact patterns.35 The civil law judge ‘reasons
from principles to instances, . . .silently asking himself as each new prob-
lem arises: “What should we do this time?” ’36 He applies the law by way
of subsuming the facts of a case under the codified principles with the help
of syllogisms, and his point of departure will be the search for the funda-
mental principle governing the subject matter.37 In this context, the travaux
préparatoires traditionally play a significant role as an indispensable source
to help clarify the principles enshrined in the codes.38
In contrast, traditionally, a strict interpretation has been called for in com-
mon law, as common law statutes compile specific instructions:39
A statute is thewill of legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation,
to which all others are subordinate, is, that a statute is to be expounded,
according to the intent of those who made it. . . .The fundamental maxim of
sound interpretation is: ita scriptum est, and it is not the business of courts
to be wiser than the laws and to mould them with judicial views of what is
just or unjust. The letter of the law is the law itself.40
Consequently, investigations into preliminary materials beyond the letter
of the law are discouraged;41 the travaux préparatoires have little relevance
35See ibid., 424.
36Thomas Mackay Cooper, ‘The Common and the Civil Law – A Scot’s View’, Harvard
Law Review 63, no. 3 (1950): 470.
37See Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 259; John F. Avery Jones,
‘Tax Treaties: The Perspective of Common Law Countries’, in Courts and Tax Treaty
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), s. 3.1.7; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’,
431.
38See Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’, 424. In Germany, e.g., clarification
of the legislator’s intentions is part of the historical and teleological methods of inter-
pretation, for which recourse to preparatory materials may be had, see Foster, German
Legal System and Laws, 64; Ekkehart Reimer, ‘Tax Treaty Interpretation in Germany’,
in Tax Treaty Interpretation, ed. Michael Lang (Wien: Linde Verlag Ges.m.b.H., 1998),
125–27.
39See Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70.
40Peter Benson Maxwell and Gilbert H. B. Jackson, The Interpretation of Statutes, 9th ed.
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1946), 1.
41Thedisregard of preparatorymaterials partly has historical reasons: common law judges
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and, as a recent development, may only be used within strict limits, when
the interpretation of a statute otherwise remains ambiguous or obscure, or
leads to an unreasonable or absurd result.42 Contrary to their civil law coun-
terparts, common law judges frown upon syllogistic logic but reason ‘from
instances to principles . . .asking aloud in the same situation: “What did we
have guarded their law making powers versus parliament by way of denying value to
the travaux préparatoires and adopting strict methods of statutory interpretation in
order to minimise parliamentary infringement on their stewardship of the law, see
Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’, 426.
42Pepper v Hart, [1993] AC 593, 617, per Lord Griffiths, and 634, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson; see van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 17; Avery Jones, ‘Tax
Treaties’, s. 3.3.3. As in civil law, the intentions of the drafters are decisive, however, the
perspective on their transposition is different: according to the civil law view, the inten-
tions behind the principles enshrined in the legal text may be investigated via preparat-
ory materials, whereas the English common law view requires the interpreter to only
consider the intentions as expressed in thewritten text and to disregard the preparatory
materials as far as possible. It is clear how this follows from common law statutes be-
ing a set of specific instructions, not a codification of general principles. Once it is time
to enact specific instructions, the process of reflecting on the principles behind them
has already been concluded; it is only necessary to establish what exactly the specific
instructions instruct, so reference to preparatory materials is justified only in case the
instructions turn out to be ambiguous, obscure, unreasonable, or absurd. Concerning
treaty interpretation, however, English courts have increasingly recognised and adop-
ted a more purposive approach as implemented by the VCLT, see Bjorge, ‘”Contractual”
And “Statutory” Treaty Interpretation in Domestic Courts? Convergence Around the
Vienna Rules’, 62–69. In the same vein, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that
‘In interpreting a treaty, the paramount goal is to find the meaning of the words in
question. This process involves looking to the language used and the intentions of the
parties’, The Queen v Crown Forest Industries Ltd. et al, 5393, and ‘Contrary to an or-
dinary taxing statute a tax treaty must be given a liberal interpretation with a view
of implementing the true intentions of the parties. A literal or legalistic interpretation
must be avoided when the basic object of the treaty might be defeated or frustrated
insofar as the particular item under consideration is concerned’, Gladden v Her Majesty
theQueen, 5191. As pointed out earlier, the US approach resembles that of civil law, see,
e.g., Maximov v United States, 299 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1962), 568: ‘The basic aim of treaty
interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties who have entered into agreement,
in order to construe the document in a manner consistent with that intent. . . .And to
give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent with the genuine shared ex-
pectations of the contracting parties, it is necessary to examine not only the language,
but the entire context of agreement. We must therefore examine all available evidence
of the shared expectations of the parties to this Convention.’
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do last time?” ’43 Their point of departure will be the search for a similar
previous case unless a statute applies the text of which is clear, requiring
the judge to give effect to it.44
TheVCLT implements a compromise: although its approach to the use of
supplementary means is more permissive than the common law one, it is
at the same time more restrictive than the civil law approach.45 The VCLT
Commentary to Draft Article 28 reiterates and stresses the primacy of tex-
tual interpretation,46 and it almost seems as if the drafters of the VCLT
would have preferred to deny recourse to the travaux préparatoires alto-
gether unless interpretation under Article 31 would lead to an ambiguous,
obscure, unreasonable, or absurd result.47 They only conceded a more per-
missive use in view of varied international practice, which made such re-
strictiveness feel ‘unrealistic and inappropriate’,48 however, not without
limiting the more permissive use at the same time to a merely confirmat-
ory role concerning the meaning arrived at under a textual interpretation,
subject only to limited exceptions, while emphasising the subordinate char-
acter of ‘supplementary’ means.49 Thus, it may be fair to say that the VCLT
conception concerning use of supplementary means, although being more
permissive, gravitates towards a common law approach, and recourse to
them should be handled more restrictively than the average civil lawyer
would be inclined to have, as has been argued at length in Chapter 4.
Doctrine as developed by legal scholars plays an important role in civil
43Cooper, ‘The Common and the Civil Law – A Scot’s View’, 470.
44See Zweigert and Kötz,An Introduction to Comparative Law, 259; Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treat-
ies’, 11; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’, 431; Atiyah, Pragmatism and
Theory in English Law, 10–13.
45Avery Jones suggests that ‘This makes little difference in practice since supplementary
materials hardly exist in relation to tax treaties’, Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.3.1.
46Draft Article 28 became Article 32 in the VCLT.
47It is noteworthy that all four special rapporteurs on the law of treaties came from a
common law background – only Hersch Lauterpacht had received some of his legal
training in Lviv and Vienna, see Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation’, 11.
48ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 18.
49See ibid., II:223, para. 19. A proposal against implementation of this strict hierarchy of
means in the VCLT in favour of a more liberal use of supplementary means made by
the US chief delegate was decisively rejected by the Vienna Conference, see Criddle,
‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation’, 441–442.
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law systems, especially in areas the law is unsettled, because of the weight
given to the logical and systematic structure of legislation. For every code
there exist regularly updated commentaries by scholars that summarise doc-
trine and case law, and it is common for courts to cite the opinions of aca-
demics.50 Historically, doctrine is inextricably interwoven with the forma-
tion of civil law and, although not a source of law, has retained its influence
on the development of legal systems through its role in legal education and
recourse by lawyers, judges, and legislators.51
Conversely, case law as principal source of law creates precedents and
has led to the principle of stare decisis in common law:52 higher court de-
cisions are binding for lower courts,53 which guards legal certainty through
a uniform basis of case law rather than codification with a focus on com-
prehensiveness as well as logical and systematic structure.54 In the words
of Lord Porter, ‘The common law is a historical development rather than
a logical whole, and the fact that a particular doctrine does not logically
accord with another or others is no ground for its rejection.’55
In consequence, scholarly commentators do not have the same role and
importance in common law as they do in civil law. Rather than to theorise
about legislation on the basis of general principles, the role of doctrine in
common law is to track the evolution of law by way of compiling, classify-
ing, and analysing case law.56 Common law is genetically judge-made law
by the royal judiciary, whereas, traditionally, the role of academic research
50See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 14, 22.
51See ibid., 30–31; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’, 428; Wolfgang Schön,
‘Tax Law Scholarship in Germany and the United States’, Max Planck Institute for Tax
Law and Public Finance Working Paper, May 2016, passim.
52Short for stare decisis et non quieta movere (to stand by decisions and not to disturb
settled matters).
53See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, ss. 3.1.1 and 3.1.7; David A. Ward, ‘Use of Foreign Court
Decisions in Interpreting Tax Treaties’, in Courts and Tax Treaty Law (Amsterdam:
IBFD, 2007), s. 7.3.
54See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 14; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law’,
424–25; Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 614; Schön, ‘Tax Law Scholarship in Germany and
the United States’, passim.
55Best v Samuel Fox & Co. Ltd., [1952] AC 716, 727.
56See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 13–14; Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common
Law’, 428.
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and theory has been marginal.57 The historical development as such may be
half the story: beneath it lies a strong cultural sentiment in favour of prag-
matism over principle – in particular concerning law, which is considered
a practical affair and domain of the practitioner.58
The image of strict reliance on precedent in common law versus complete
disregard for it in civil law is of course an oversimplification. Depending on
the legal system in question, the situation today is a lot more complex.59 In
Germany, for example, decisions by courts including the BFH only bind the
parties to the particular dispute.60 Nevertheless, BFH decisions published
in the federal fiscal gazette establish a persuasive ‘ruling opinion’, which
is generally followed by the lower courts to avoid the risk of being over-
ruled.61 Fundamental changes of well established views in case law by the
BFH that lead to a disadvantage for the taxpayer may for reasons of protect-
ing legitimate expectations only apply non-retroactively to facts that have
arisen after publication in the federal fiscal gazette.62 It is the primary man-
date of the BFH in this respect to preserve unity in the application of law,
that is, to ensure legal correctness and certainty through consistency and
continuity of case law, together with the development of law by adapting
its jurisprudence to improved legal knowledge.63 In addition to this role of
57See van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 53; Atiyah, Pragmatism andTheory
in English Law, 34 et seq., 131 et seq.
58See Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, 80; Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in
English Law, 1–42.
59For a comparative study of several civil and common law countries, see MacCormick,
Summers, and MacCormick, Interpreting Precedents.
60Article 110(1) FGO; see Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Drucksache 15/4549, Nichtanwendung-
serlasse im Steuerrecht’ (Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, January 2005), 1.
61See Ward, ‘Use of Foreign Court Decisions in Interpreting Tax Treaties’, s. 7.4.2; Vogel,
‘Über Entscheidungsharmonie’, 1055–6.
62See Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 4.5.
63See ibid., ss. 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.4, and 4.5. The Federal Ministry of Finance may limit the
application of a BFH decision beyond the particular dispute by issuing an explicit non-
application decree once the BFH has issued its decision for publication in the federal
fiscal gazette; however, it can do so only to avert legal uncertainty and safeguard the
uniformity of taxation with respect to the interplay of the BFH decision with other tax
laws, and not for purely fiscal reasons, see Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Drucksache 15/4549,
Nichtanwendungserlasse im Steuerrecht’, 1; Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen
Bundestages, ‘Der Nichtanwendungserlass im Steuerrecht, Ausarbeitung WD 4–3000–
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the BFH,64 the decisions of the BVerfG bind all courts, including the BFH,
by law.65
Conversely, one must not underestimate the readiness of common law
judges to distinguish new cases from previously decided ones whenever
they see fit, even if the facts appear to be similar.66 Such is not necessarily
seen as contradicting the principle of stare decisis, but naturally flows from
the common lawyer’s focus on pragmatic solutions concerning the concrete
facts and issue at hand rather than general principle.67 In the words of Lord
Halsbury, ‘A case is only authority for what it actually decides. I entirely
deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logic-
ally from it. . . .[T]he law is not always logical at all.’68
080/09’ (Fachbereich Haushalt und Finanzen, 2009).
64Decisions of the BFH cannot be appealed against but may be challenged by way of
constitutional complaints at the BVerfG, which may overrule them if it considers them
to be in conflict with constitutional law, see Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal Fiscal
Court’, s. 4.5.
65Article 31(1) BverfGG. The BVerfG itself is not entirely free in its decisions, but its man-
date is to apply the German constitution (GG), i.e., concerning taxes, the review of
tax laws and decisions of the BFH in terms of their compatibility with the GG, see
Piltz, ‘Macht im Steuerrecht’, 503. Like the BFH in Germany, the French Conseil d’Etat
will equally rely on principles as developed by precedent in line with its mandate to
foster consistency of case law, and the lower courts will treat its decisions as bind-
ing, see Martin, ‘The French Supreme Administrative Tax Court’, s. 3; Martin, ‘Courts
and Tax Treaties in Civil Law Countries’, s. 4.3.4.2; Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.7;
Ward, ‘Use of Foreign Court Decisions in Interpreting Tax Treaties’, s. 7.4.1. In Italy,
too, precedent plays a considerable role in practice concerning the development of
law although in theory not being binding – the decisions of the Corte di Cassazione
establish a ‘prevalent view’ generally followed by lower courts, which are obliged to
comprehensively justify any deviation, see Ward, ‘Use of Foreign Court Decisions in
Interpreting Tax Treaties’, s. 7.4.3. A more comprehensive survey of country practices
in this respect lies beyond the scope of this study.
66See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.7; Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Compar-
ative Law, 269. Historically speaking, binding precedent between hierarchically struc-
tured courts is a modern development in common law. In the middle ages all common
law judges in England were members of the king’s unified judiciary; the question of
binding precedent between higher and lower courts could not even arise and was more
an issue of striking the balance between flexibility and coherence of adjudication, see
Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70.
67See Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 26 et seq.
68Quinn v Leatham, [1901] AC 45, 506. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes in Lochner v New
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Together with the powerful role of judges as law makers, this may be
fuelled by themethods employed in legal education. Law classes in common
law countries are based on interactively discussing case law in small groups,
and students are encouraged to critically reason:
In the common law educational system, a key learning objective is to demon-
strate to students that there can be more than one answer to a particular
question or that there may be no one ‘right’ answer at all. It is important to
contrast this with the civil law system where it is presumed that the codes
and doctrine provide clear guidance and an answer can be easily extracted
without the need for judicial interpretation or creativity in the process. The
common law educational system thus rewards creative and novel interpret-
ations of laws and cases.69
This is mirrored by the practice of lengthy decisions in which the individual
judges extensively outline their arguments under their own name and dis-
senting opinions are recorded, whereas in civil law systems the individual
judges are commonly anonymous, dissenting opinions are not allowed or
published, and styles vary from being short and declaratory to longer and
more argumentative but in any case more abstract and less detailed than in
common law countries.70
All in all, neither does the common law judge refrain entirely from reas-
oning based on principles nor the civil law one from taking previous case
law into account; the difference is rather one of point of departure and
way of thinking, which may result in a different appreciation of similar fac-
tual situations between jurisdictions of the two traditions.71 Practicalities
also play a role. Tax appeals above the First-tier Tribunal require ‘permis-
sion of either the court appealed from or to’ in the UK, and the House of
Lords is very selective of what it will hear.72 The number of relevant cases
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 76: ‘General propositions do not decide concrete cases.’
69O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 32.
70See Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Dissent – Common Law and Civil Law Traditions’, Law
Quarterly Review, July 2007, passim; Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, ss. 3.1.8–3.1.9; Rust,
‘Germany’, s. 11.1.1; Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 30.
71See Dainow, ‘TheCivil Law and the Common Law’, 432; Röhl,Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein
Lehrbuch, s. 70; Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, 67–101; Atiyah, Pragmatism
and Theory in English Law, passim.
72See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.2.
196
7.2. Civil versus Common Law
is much smaller in consequence, which makes consideration of precedent
more feasible in comparison to civil law countries such as Germany, where
the requirement for all courts to fully reason their decisions leads to a pro-
liferation of reasoned judgements, which cannot all be taken into account
because of sheer numbers alone.73 As enumerated by Avery Jones, the total
number of tax appeals at the House of Lords amounted to six direct tax and
three indirect tax cases in 2005.74 In comparison, the eleven senates of the
BFH concluded 2,721 procedures in 2015, while 1,857 remained pending.75
As of 2015, a total of 68,000 decisions of the BFH had been recorded in the
juris database.76
Civil law systems usually feature a sharp separation between private and
public law, which has a profound impact on the structure of the judiciary.
Typically, separate court structures of specialised and hierarchically organ-
ised courts subject to different procedural rules exist for all different areas of
law.77 For common law systems, the distinction is traditionally less marked
and may boil down to merely different types of remedies being involved,
while the courts and procedural rules may be the same for all areas of law.78
In the UK, for example, tax law falls entirely under ordinary not administrat-
ive law. The First-tier Tribunal (Tax) cannot grant administrative remedies
at all, so starting a separate action is necessary when a case concerns an
administrative remedy as well as interpretation of law.79 Although there is
73See Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre. Ein Lehrbuch, s. 70.
74See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.2.
75See BFH, ‘Jahresbericht 2015’, 17.
76See ibid., 10. The civil law countries France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to-
gether have in total almost six times more tax cases than the common law countries
Australia, Canada, and the United States combined (roughly 246,000 versus roughly
42,000), despite having only half the population, andwhereas the numbers differ consid-
erably between the individual civil law countries, differences between the common law
countries never exceed a factor of 1.5, seeWimWijnen, ‘No Taxationwithout Litigation
– How Tax Courts Survive This Adage’, in Obra Conmemorativa, Perspectivas Actuales
de la Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa en Iberoamérica (Mexico City: 80 Aniversario de
la Promulgación de la Ley de Justicia Fiscal, 2016), ss. 4.1–4.3.
77See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 15–16; Merryman and Perez-Perdomo, The Civil
Law Tradition, 85; Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 618.
78See Siac, ‘Mining Law’, 217 et seq.; Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 618.
79See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, ss. 3.1.1 and 3.1.3.
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an administrative court as part of the High Court, the distinction between
administrative law and ordinary law is less marked; in consequence, the
entire court structure is generally more unified in common law systems
with one appeals and one supreme court for all areas of law, whereas lower
courts may be organised by subject matter.80 This difference is mirrored by
the different legal career systems: whereas in civil law countries a differen-
tiated system prepares for different career paths, the common law approach
is more holistic and lawyers may easily switch legal roles over the lifetime
of their careers.81
The role of the common law judge is that of an umpire; although he has
the power to raise issues of law, it is for the parties to the dispute to do so,
whereas the judge will usually restrict himself to the points submitted.82 He
‘is not treated as knowing the law’, but ‘It is a professional duty of repres-
entatives to produce relevant cases whether or not they are in favour of the
party producing them.’83 The focus is not on rights but on remedies.84 In
the UK, for example, the taxpayer must formally claim treaty benefits for
the court to be able to give effect to the treaty.85 It is plain how this follows
from the historical role of the judge to decide the dispute at hand: whatever
is not raised by the parties may not be considered under dispute and there-
fore needs no adjudication. This also affects the burden of proof, which is
80See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 17; Merryman and Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law
Tradition, 88.
81See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 32–33. Since there are no career judges, this al-
most always involves a one-way switch; switching between barristers and solicitors,
although possible, is far less common. Appointing judges from the best practitioners
serves as a way of keeping up standards in the UK, whereas in Germany the final mark
in the bar exam is decisive.
82See A. Giussani, ‘Some Comparative Notes on Tax Litigation’, in Courts and Tax Treaty
Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007), 1; Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.1, s. 3.1.7; R. Fenti-
man, ‘Foreign Law in English Courts’, Law Quarterly Review 108 (1992): 144; Rainer
Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’, 5–6;
O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 24.
83Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.7.
84See Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 618. Historically, English law proceeds from duties,
fromwhich rights based on obtainable remedies flow in turn, not the other way around,
see Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 18 et seq.
85See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.3.2.
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entirely on the parties; the court may not find the facts itself.86
In civil law systems, the judge occupies the central role in legal procedure;
it is his duty to apply the law ex officio, that is, he does not rely on the
submissions of the parties, but all issues of fact and law are his domain
while parties do not have to call for any points of law at all.87 It is plain
again how this corresponds to the historical role of the judge to apply the
law as codified: contrary to his common law counterpart, he has to know the
law and apply it to every situation brought before him.88 This again affects
the burden of proof. In Germany, for example, it is for the court to inquire
the facts; issues of burden of proof for the taxpayer or tax administration
only arise when the facts remain in doubt.89
In contrast to civil law systems where written form prevails, proceed-
ings and evidence tend to be predominantly oral in common law systems.
Although it is now usual for there to be written skeleton arguments and wit-
ness statements, witnesses are normally cross-examined on the contents of
their statements.90 The reason for this may lie in the historic roots: in the
beginning of common law, local juries were made up of mostly illiterate
people, which necessitated oral proceedings.91
In order to examine how these general traits of the civil and common law
traditions affect the issue of multiple language texts, the particular legal sys-
tems of the UK92 and Germany will be compared by the following sections.
86In the UK, the burden of proof in tax cases is normally on the taxpayer because all
relevant facts reside with him, see ibid., ss. 3.1.1 and 3.1.4.
87See Martin, ‘Courts and Tax Treaties in Civil Law Countries’, s. 4.1.1; Mellinghoff, ‘The
German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 3.4; Giussani, ‘Some Comparative Notes on Tax Litig-
ation’, 1; O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 18.
88Together with the focus on general principle, this may explain the traditional anonymity
of judges in written decisions and the restrictive attitude towards dissenting opinions.
The court only administers the law but does not make it, and in such role there is little
place for self-standing dissent of individual judges.
89See Rust, ‘Germany’, s. 11.1.2; Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 3.4.
90See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.7; Siac, ‘Mining Law’, 217.
91See O’Connor, ‘Practitioner’s Guide’, 11.
92When referring to the UK, it must be borne in mind that Scotland may be considered
a mixed system featuring elements of civil law, not in terms of codification but con-
cerning legal thinking, see Lord Macmillan, ‘Two Ways of Thinking’, passim; Atiyah,
Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 9; Tetley, ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 592–93.
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7.3. Common Law: United Kingdom93
A submission by a party to a tax appeal that the equally authoritative text in
another language had a different meaning from the English text would nor-
mally need to be supported by expert evidence, which is possible because
that issue would be classified as a question of fact. As was said by Lord
Scarman in Fothergill, ‘the court may receive expert evidence directed not
to the questions of law which arise in interpreting the convention, but to
the meaning, or possible meanings (for there will often be more than one),
of the French. It will be for the court, not the expert, to choose the mean-
ing which it considers should be given to the words in issue.’94 Although,
as Lord Wilberforce said, ‘If a judge has some knowledge of the relevant
language, there is no reason why he should not use it: this is particularly
true of the French or Latin languages, so long languages of our courts. . . .In
all cases he will have in mind that ours is an adversary system: it is for the
parties to make good their contentions. . . .They may call evidence of an in-
terpreter, if the language is one unknown to the court, or of an expert if the
word or expression is such as to require expert interpretation’.95
There is no example that can be quoted in relation to tax treaties, although
it is fair to say that there has been little litigation on tax treaties anyway.96
The nearest example is a non-tax treaty case concerning whether a tax was
prohibited by the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation,
93I claim no knowledge of common law or its procedures, and in preparing this section
have relied on the case quoted and comments by one of my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Avery
Jones, who would like to acknowledge helpful comments made by Julian Ghosh QC.
94Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 293. Fothergill is an unusual case in which the only
authentic text of the treaty was French, which had been legislated in UK law together
with a non-authentic English translation and a statement that the French text prevailed.
The French text was undoubtedly law in the UK but the quoted statements indicate that
its meaning was a fact thus enabling expert evidence to be given, although there was
none in the case.
95Ibid., 273–74. It is probably the case today that a judge would be less likely to use his
own knowledge than at the time of that case.
96About 17 cases since the year 2000 of which 11 concerned treaties in English only. Most
of the remainder did not have much scope for considering the other language, being
either factual or dealing with treaty language such as ‘place of effective management’
or ‘not less favourably levied’.
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which has equally authoritative texts in English, French, Spanish, and Rus-
sian.97 The judge recorded:
Mr Haddon-Cave [counsel for the Claimants] placed strong reliance on the
French, Spanish and Russian texts of Article 15 as supporting the Claimants’
interpretation of ‘fees, dues or other charges’. The French is ‘droits, taxes ou
autres redevances’; the Spanish is ‘derechos, impuestos u otros grávemenes’. (I
have omitted the Russian text because of the difficulty of inserting the Cyril-
lic letters.) I said during Mr Haddon-Cave’s opening submissions that the
French taxes seemed to me to point clearly to taxes being within the prohib-
ition.This led to the evidence of Richard Littlewood, the Head of Translation
and Interpreting at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, being belatedly
put in by the Treasury. His evidence is based on his professional knowledge
of French and Spanish, and on the advice of colleagues in relation to Rus-
sian. His view is that taxe in the French text is used in the strict sense of ‘a
compulsory levy of the same nature as a tax but intended to finance a partic-
ular public service and payable only by the users of the service’ (see Cornu,
Vocabulaire juridique); and that if it had been intended to denote a tax in the
English sense, impôt would have been used. On this basis, the French text
does not refer to taxes in the English sense. He accepted, however, that taxe
often means ‘tax’, as in taxe à la valeur ajoutée. However, both the Spanish
and the Russian texts use words that unequivocally translate as ‘taxes’.98
The procedure is not typical of a tax appeal first, because this was a ju-
dicial review case in which witness evidence is uncommon.99 Secondly, it
would be more common for each party to produce its own expert if there
was a language issue and for the judge to decide which he preferred and
why. Here it was the judge’s remark during the hearing that led to the
Treasury, which was a party to the appeal, producing a witness from the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office at short notice.100 The evidence suited
the claimant, as can be seen from the first sentence of the quotation, and so
it would not have wanted to produce contrary expert evidence.
97The first three are the original languages; Russian was added by a 1977 Protocol.
98R (on the Application of) Federation of Tour Operators v HM Treasury, [2007] EWHC 20622
(Admin), 52.
99It should be emphasised that tax is not classified as administrative law in common law,
as outlined above.
100This is unusual as normally expert evidence required a direction from the court as part
of the preparation of the case and the evidence has to be served on the other party.
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But what is typical is that, having raised the language issue, the judge al-
lowed expert witness evidence followed by giving the parties the opportun-
ity of making submissions about how the different language texts should be
resolved. A judge would never decide a language issue from his own know-
ledge of the language without giving the parties the opportunity to disagree
with his interpretation and without allowing them to make submissions on
how any differences should be resolved.
The judge first tried to reconcile the texts with the aid of subsequent
practice,101 finding substantial evidence that was inconsistent with the
claimant’s contention. He also considered the travaux préparatoires,
although saying that this was strictly unnecessary, and noted that they
contained nothing against this conclusion. Finally, he considered a Belgian
Conseil d’Etat case in favour of the claimant’s contention, finding the
reasoning unclear,102 particularly as to whether it had considered the
English text or subsequent practice; and a Swiss case in which the point
had not been argued from which he derived no assistance. The judge
therefore did not need to consider Article 33 VCLT.
It is difficult to judge whether in many cases the other language is just
ignored. Because treaty cases often involve large sums they tend to be well
prepared and both parties are quite likely to have considered the possibility
and rejected it. This is particularly the case for the tax authority which may
well have been in contact with the other state’s tax authority in connection
with the case during which a language difference may well be considered.
Lord Diplock said of the Vienna Convention in Fothergill:
By ratifying that Convention, Her Majesty’s Government has undertaken
an international obligation on behalf of the United Kingdom to interpret
future treaties in this manner and since under our constitution the function
of interpreting the written law is an exercise of judicial power and rests with
the courts of justice, that obligation assumed by the United Kingdom falls
to be performed by those courts.103
On the basis concluded above that the VCLT requires a state, and hence
a judge, to consider all language texts, the question arises how this might
101Article 31(3)(b).
102Part of the problemwas caused by the typically highly-condensed reasoning of the Court
which was unfamiliar to an English court.
103Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 283.
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be achieved in a common law system in which the judges perform a more
passive role than a civil law judge. A judge will therefore need to rely on
the parties assisting him in doing so.104 It is suggested that first, it should
be understood that all language texts should be before the judge. Secondly,
the tax authority, which also has a role as part of the state in complying
with international obligations, should be expected to make submissions on
the meaning of the other language texts. Both suggestions would have to
rely on custom rather than on any provision of law.
7.4. Civil Law: Germany
In theory, as it is the duty of the court to apply the law and inquire all
facts ex officio subject to the principle iura novit curia, issues of the other
language texts having a different meaning from the German text would not
need to be submitted and evidenced by a party to a tax appeal. The parties
are consulted and obliged to provide all statements of fact truthfully and
in full; they may submit particular evidence such as expert opinions on the
other language texts, but the court is in its considerations neither obliged
to follow their submissions nor limited to a consideration of them.105
Since it is the responsibility of the court to inquire the facts, neither the
taxpayer nor the tax administration has the burden of proof; however, the
party that would benefit if a certain fact would be evidenced loses the case
when that fact remains unproven.106 Therefore, each party has a strong in-
104A practical point which makes it less likely for the parties or the judge to raise language
issues is that the other language version of a tax treaty is unlikely to be in the papers
before the judge because, although presented to Parliament for information in a treaty
series, Parliament gives effect in domestic law only to the English language version
and other language versions are not reproduced in any of the normal tax sources.
105Article 76(1) FGO; see Rust, ‘Germany’, s. 11.1.2; Mellinghoff, ‘TheGerman Federal Fiscal
Court’, s. 3.4. The tax administration as locus of assessment and first instance of appeal
is subject to a similar obligation as the court to inquire all facts under Article 88(1) AO,
whereas the taxpayer is obliged again under Article 90(1) AO to answer all requests of
the tax administration truthfully and in full; see Rust, ‘Germany’, s. 11.1.1.
106For example, the taxpayer has the burden of proof that he satisfies the requirements for
a tax treaty’s application, because such is favourable to him, see Rust, ‘Germany’, s.
11.1.4.
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centive to provide as much evidence as possible.107 In general, a court will
request and review all relevant documents irrespective of their language,
and only in case not all judges understand the language will a translator be
hired.108
Given that Germany has a system of specialised tax courts at all levels
of the judiciary, a high familiarity of judges with the issues of tax treaty
interpretation as a result of multiple language texts must be presupposed.
Hence, on the basis of all the aforesaid, one would assume that the other
language texts are regularly referred to by judges in practice whether or
not the issue is raised by any party to the dispute.
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the other language texts to be refer-
enced.109 That this is done on initiative of the court is obvious in some
cases. For example, in ‘I R 369/83’ the BFH referred to the Italian text to
confirm its interpretation that the taxpayer did not have a fixed base in
Italy through which he provided his consultancy services.110 The Italian
text of the treaty translated the German wording fester Mittelpunkt111
with sede fissa,112 not the literal punto centrale or centro. Whereas the
latter would simply indicate a geographical location not necessarily at the
disposal of the taxpayer, sede fissa implies the holding of that location by
him. For its reasoning the court had recourse to a dictionary.113
In another example, the FG Cologne as court of first instance referred to
the English text of the treaty protocol in order to confirm its interpretation
of the German text and contradict the interpretation submitted by the tax-
payer.114 In contrast to the German wording of its Article XVII para. 5, the
English text of the protocol leaves no doubt as to the point in time when it
107See ibid., s. 11.1.2.
108See ibid., s. 11.2.5.
109See Ekkehart Reimer, ‘Germany: Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, European Taxation,
December 1999, 465; Reimer, ‘Tax Treaty Interpretation in Germany’, 128.
110BFH, ‘I R 369/83’ (BStBl. 1988 II, February 1988).
111Literally ‘fixed centre’, meaning fixed base.
112Article 7, Germany-Italy (1925), replaced since by Germany-Italy (1989).
113E. Bidoli – G. Cosciani, 1957, Italienisch-Deutsch, 817.
114FG Köln, ‘2 K 3928/09’ (EFG 1853, April 2012), para. 56, concerning Germany-US (1989),
protocol of 1 June 2006.
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takes effect. The BFH confirmed the reasoning.115
In other cases it is not entirely obvious on whose initiative the other lan-
guage text is referred to. For example, in BFH ‘I R 63/80’ it seems the initial
reference to the Spanish text came originally from the tax administration
to support its contention that the employment income of the taxpayer did
not satisfy the condition of Article 15(2)b of the tax treaty Germany-Spain
(1966),116 rendering the compensation he received for his secondment to a
Spanish company taxable in Germany because the German not the Spanish
company should be regarded as the employer. It is possible, however, that
the initial reference to the Spanish text came from the Federal Ministry
of Finance, which joined the appeal proceedings to side with the taxpayer
against the tax administration.117 Its intervention that Germany’s right to
tax was successfully limited because Article 15(2)c qualified the term per-
sona used by Article 15(2)b in terms of who counts as employer is the first
reference to the Spanish text in the decision. The BFH picked up the argu-
ment to decide in favour of the taxpayer, upholding the initial decision by
the court of first instance.118
Although there are several cases in which the other language texts have
been considered, this is not true consistently for all case law on tax treaties.
The reason for the omission, whether the other language texts are just ig-
nored or have been consulted but found irrelevant and therefore not been
further elaborated on, is difficult to judge and quantify. One imaginable
reason could be the strong influence of doctrine in Germany.119 With the
115BFH, ‘I R 48/12’ (BB 3108, June 2013), para. 13. For a summary, see Resch, ‘Case Closed’.
116Replaced since by Germany-Spain (2011).
117The Federal Ministry of Finance as well as the Ministries of Finance of the individual
federal states may join appeal proceedings at the BFH as party upon own initiative
or invitation by the BFH, in order to provide considerations important to the case at
hand or the interpretation and application of tax law in general, see Mellinghoff, ‘The
German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 2.5.
118BFH, ‘I R 63/80’ (BStBl. 1986 II, August 1985); FG Düsseldorf, ‘VII 484/77’ (EFG 1980,
January 1980).
119See Rust, ‘Germany’, s. 11.1.1. It is common practice of the BFH to cite opinions by
academics, see, e.g., BFH, ‘I R 48/12’. In addition, university professors are authorised
to attend proceedings at the BFH in support of a party, ‘if this is relevant to a case and
there is a need for this in the circumstances of an individual case’; their statements
are regarded as pleadings of the party they accompany (unless they are immediately
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routine interpretation approach in place as prevailing view, judges without
foreign language proficiency could simply feel comfortable in discarding
the necessity to look at the other texts until they are confronted with an am-
biguity or divergence, whereas for judges having the respective language
skills, checking the other language texts by default may be the natural
course of action. A change in doctrine should bring about a more consistent
practice.
7.5. Comparison per Type of Dispute
How may the different systems be expected to perform in terms of pluri-
lingual tax treaties? In order to evaluate the situation, we may distinguish
between disputes in which either one or both parties have recourse to the
other language text(s), and those in which neither party does.
Concerning the first type of dispute, both systems may be viewed as per-
forming well albeit in different ways. In Germany, the court does not de-
pend on the submissions of the parties. Theoretically, this could mean that
the other language text gets ignored even if a party pleads it, but since the
duty of the court is to apply the law ex officio, such is not conceivable in
practice if the points raised are relevant. Although the court is not limited in
terms of investigating all sources of evidence it sees fit,120 it may in practice
rely on its own knowledge of the foreign language or the help of dictionar-
ies.
In the UK, the meaning of foreign language texts seems to be treated as
fact not law, somewhat analogous to foreign law.121 Although there is no
withdrawn or corrected by the party under Article 62(7) FGO), see Mellinghoff, ‘The
German Federal Fiscal Court’, s. 3.2. Several current BFH judges have academic résumés
and hold appointments as honorary professors, see Mellinghoff, ‘The German Federal
Fiscal Court’, ss. 5.5–5.6. Also for cases involving private international law it is common
for judges to resort to academic expert opinions concerning evidence on foreign law,
see Rainer Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’,
8.
120Articles 81 and 155 FGO (in combination with Article 293 ZPO, which is to be applied
correspondingly).
121Concerning the treatment of foreign law, see Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.4; Rainer
Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’, 2–3, in
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clear principle stated to this effect, it may be inferred from expert evidence
concerning the meaning of the foreign language text being allowed, which
would not be the case if it would be considered an issue of law.122 Facts
have to be proven to the judge by the parties pleading them,123 for which
the testimony of competent experts is required;124 the other party is not
obliged to bring by experts of their own, but will regularly do so if the issue
is contested.125
The judge will decide based on the evidence provided and will not con-
sider any questions of fact or law not pleaded by the parties.126 The advant-
age of this approach is that because of having expert testimony, the quality
of evidence provided should be high, that is, the system is well geared to-
wards dealing with a problem of language appropriately once set in motion.
On the other hand, if the meaning of the foreign language text would in-
deed be regarded strictly as a matter of fact, the role of the court as umpire
operating under the assumption of ignorance prevents it from investigat-
ing any evidence not put forward.127 Consequently, divergences between
the texts will not be considered in the second kind of dispute when they
have not been raised.128
terms of the historical genesis: ‘The fact doctrine is based on the old distinction between
the courts of admiralty and the courts of common law. While the former had jurisdic-
tion in matters with a foreign element, the latter decided on purely domestic issues.
When the Common Law Courts extended their jurisdiction to matters with a foreign
element in the 18th century they were bound to treat foreign law as fact because the
only “law” they could apply was English common law’, 10n.
122See Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 274, 293, per Lords Wilberforce and Scarman. For
an example, refer to R (on the Application of) Federation of Tour Operators v HMTreasury,
52, as quoted above.
123In tax litigation the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, so in an appeal procedure it is for
him to prove his case in fact and law; ‘an assessment “stands good” unless displaced
by evidence.’ Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.4.
124The question of competence is for the court to decide; what matters is practical experi-
ence, not necessarily qualification.
125See Rainer Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’,
13; Hartley, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law’, 283–84.
126See Rainer Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative Analysis’,
6, 13.
127See ibid., 13; Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.4.
128For Canada the practice may differ because of the constitutional equality of English and
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Not all is well in Germany either. In principle, the German system is
better equipped for dealing with disputes of the second type because the
court applies the law ex officio subject to the principle iura novit curia and,
therefore, may consider other language texts on its own initiative irrespect-
ive of any ambiguity in the German text; however, such does not happen
consistently in all cases. The routine interpretation approach as prevailing
view in doctrine may be responsible. On the whole, the outcome may not
be that much better than in the UK: divergences may be overlooked on a
larger scale because interpreting the German text alone may be considered
sufficient by courts.
The practice to look at other language texts may be less common in other
civil law countries to beginwith. For example, although the Austrian VwGH
has occasionally looked at other language texts,129 it regularly refers to the
German text only.130 The same seems to apply for Spain.131 For purposes of
this study, it is sufficient to appreciate the problem in principle; a compre-
hensive survey of country practices in this respect lies beyond the scope of
this study and is left to future research.
7.6. Evaluation of the StatusQuo
From all the aforesaid it is clear that domestic procedural law plays a pivotal
role in litigation involving tax treaties. In combination with the routine in-
terpretation approach as orthodoxy, it curbs proper application of tax treat-
ies by establishing specific procedural prerequisites for the consideration of
French, i.e., the court may compare the French text of the treaty on its own account,
see, e.g., Conrad M. Black v Her Majesty the Queen, [2014] TCC 12, para. 25.
129VwGH, ‘2210/60 VwSlg 2707 F/1962’ (RIS, September 1962), as quoted by Johannes Hein-
rich and Helmut Moritz, ‘Austria: Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, European Taxation,
April 2000, 142–52, 148, 50n; more recently: VwGH, ‘2013/15/0266’ (RIS, June 2015), as
discussed by Michael Lang, ‘Austria: Entertainers under Article 17’, in Tax Treaty Case
Law around the Globe 2016, ed. Eric Kemmeren et al. (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2017).
130See Michael Lang, ‘Tendenzen in der Rechtsprechung des österreichischen Verwaltungs-
gerichtshofs zu den Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen’, IFF Forum Für Steuerrecht, 2012,
38.
131See José Calderón and Dolores Piña, ‘Spain: Interpretation of Tax Treaties’, European
Taxation, October 1999, 381.
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all texts in form of a requirement for the parties to plead them. Furthermore,
procedural law determines to what extent and by which means a judge will
examine the content of foreign language texts.132
For the UK and most other common law countries, this means that since
in tax litigation the burden of proof is almost always on the taxpayer, failure
of him or his advisers to appreciate the foreign language text and raise a
divergence in his favour will lead to it not being considered by the court
and the revenue winning the case on improper grounds.133 Effectively, this
levies a ‘tax on the dumb’.134
In addition, there are economic disincentives to pleading foreign lan-
guage texts, as suchmay increase the costs of an already costly procedure135
via retaining expert witnesses and incurring additional advisory expenses
for an uncertain benefit.136 According to Wijnen, the higher costs associ-
ated with tax proceedings in common law countries are one reason for the
considerably lower number of cases in comparison to civil law countries.137
Moreover, interpretation of treaties and foreign language texts can be a
132See, by analogy, Rainer Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative
Analysis’, 1.
133See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.4.
134See, by analogy, Gerd Rose, ‘Über die Entstehung von “Dummensteuern” und ihre Ver-
meidung’, in Die Steuerrechtsordnung in der Diskussion: Festschrift für Klaus Tipke zum
70. Geburtstag, ed. Joachim Lang (Köln: Dr. Otto Schmidt Verlag KG, 1995), 153–64. Rose
defines taxes on the dumb as ‘tax expenses that would not have arisen if the taxpayer
would have achieved the same economic goal under a smart application of existing
[legal] planning opportunities differently’, 153 (he excludes illegal conduct explicitly
as not acceptable means). In particular, he distinguishes between two types of taxes on
the dumb: those of a simple order, being the result of ignorance or a lack of informa-
tion, and those of a higher order, being the result of lacking strategic deliberation, see
Rose, ‘Über die Entstehung von “Dummensteuern” und ihre Vermeidung’ 154 et seq.
Therefore, failure to appreciate the other language texts and raise a corresponding di-
vergence may be classified as a simple tax on the dumb. Of course, the legislator does
not intend to tax lack of intelligence; however, this is what results from its conduct,
which seems intolerable in the context of tax equality as a fundamental goal, see Klaus
Tipke, Die Steuerrechtsordnung, Bände 1–3, 1st ed. (Köln: Otto Schmidt Verlag, 1993),
Bd. 3, 1370, as referred to by Rose, 153–154.
135See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.10.
136See, by analogy, Rainer Hausmann, ‘Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law – a Comparative
Analysis’, 6.
137Wijnen, ‘No Taxation without Litigation – How Tax Courts Survive This Adage’, s. 4.1.
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subtle affair, and a provisional evaluation by oneself or ones advisers may
lead to the erroneous conclusion that there is nothing to be gained from in-
voking the other language text(s).138 Not everybody eligible for the benefits
granted by a tax treaty is a multinational enterprise with abundant financial
resources and access to the best and most experienced advisers.
Finally, pleading the other language text(s) by default to secure all op-
tions may appear as a potentially dangerous strategy, because there is no
prohibition of reformatio in peius (change to the worse) in UK procedural
law, that is, the court is not prevented from increasing the tax assessment
if its evaluation of the evidence suggests so.139
One’s evaluation of this situation may be a matter of perspective. Tipke’s
view cited above, that taxes on the dumb are intolerable in respect of tax
equality as a general goal, may be a natural position to assume from a civil
law perspective with focus on general principle, codified rights, and courts
applying the law ex officio subject to the principle iura novit curia. From a
common law perspective of judge-made law resolving the dispute at hand
in a pragmatic fashion based on precedent with the court functioning as
umpire granting remedies, the position that a point not raised by a party
needs no remedy may seem equally natural.
Looking at it from the position of the taxpayer may be the wrong per-
spective altogether. For the other state, which is the actual party to the
treaty but not the dispute, the outcome may be that the reciprocal sharing
of taxing rights as intended by the treaty is upset. This raises the issue of
state responsibility.
Hilf develops an elaborate formulation of the routine interpretation ap-
proach based entirely on this question.140 Although he acknowledges that
it amounts to a violation of the treaty when a state tentatively applies an
interpretation of a single text that does not correspond to the treaty’s true
138Effectively turning a simple into a higher order tax on the dumb.
139See Avery Jones, ‘Tax Treaties’, s. 3.1.4. In Germany, the risk is less prevalent because the
court is forbidden to worsen the assessment, see Rust, ‘Germany’, s. 11.1.2. Neverthe-
less, if the tax authority has issued its assessment under reservation of reconsideration
on the basis of Article 164 AO, it may change the assessment within a grace period of
four years for direct taxes under Article 164(2) and (4) AO in combination with Article
169(2)2 AO.
140See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 76–83.
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content, he frames the issue in terms of the questionwhat parties can expect
from each other. For him the issue boils down to a question of responsibility
and compensation in case the party that has relied on a single text sees itself
confronted with a claim for remedy and fulfilment of its treaty obligations
retroactively.141
He starts from the premiss that the agreement of parties on equally au-
thentic texts expresses their trust in each correctly reflecting the full con-
tent of the treaty.142 From this he concludes that reliance on a single text
is justified as long as the meaning of it is clear and the state organ apply-
ing the treaty ‘does not stumble on or is not confronted with a divergence’,
because in his opinion such conduct is not ‘culpable’ in the sense of not in-
curring any state responsibility itself, notwithstanding the responsibility to
remedy actual violations of the treaty should they result, which he regards
as a separate matter.143
Thus, he splits the issue in two by viewing it through the lens of state
responsibility: the conduct of interpreting a single text in isolation and the
conduct after the fact, once it has turned out that this has established a res-
ult in violation of the treaty for which the other party claims remedy. In his
view, the first would not incur any state responsibility as long as done ‘bona
fide’, that is, does not constitute a violation of any substantive treaty oblig-
ation under the condition that no inclarity or divergence has arisen and
purposefully been ignored,144 whereas the latter incurs state responsibility
in case of failure to successively remedy a treaty violation being a factual
situation under objective criteria.145 Crucial to his view is the assumption
that the trust of each party in each single text correctly reflecting the full
content of the treaty is justified as long as there is no inclarity and no diver-
gence has arisen in ‘whatever way’, or else it would be justified to attribute
141See ibid., 77–79.
142See ibid., 80.
143See ibid., 82. The expressions he uses in German are nicht vorwerfbar and kein vorwerf-
bares Verhalten, which literally translate to ‘not blameable’ and ‘no blameable conduct’.
144Despite the toned down language of ‘no blameable conduct’, this is what he implies.
145See ibid., 79, 82. This echoes Hardy’s view that ‘since the texts are presumed to agree,
each party is justified in following its own version as long as the application of the
treaty gives rise to no dispute between the parties’, Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Pluri-
lingual Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 117.
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the risk of treaty misapplication to the parties and hold them responsible if
they stick to relying on a single text regardless,146 which is then picked up
by Engelen to formulate his own view.147
The rules of state responsibility had been selected already as one of the
subjects of the codification conference held inThe Hague in 1930 under the
auspices of the League of Nations.148 After the second world war, the matter
was picked up by the ILC in 1949 as one of their fourteen provisional topics
selected for codification.149 Since then the work of the ILC has lead to the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with Commentaries,150 which were noted, welcomed, and commended by
the General Assembly to the attention of states in 2001.151 The recommend-
ation has been repeated,152 however, without resulting in a diplomatic con-
vention and binding treaty to date. Therefore, customary international law
applies;153 however, the DARS may be considered as its crystallisation,154
as they heavily draw on case law of international courts and, despite their
146See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 80.
147See Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 390–91.
148See Hunter Miller, ‘The Hague Codification Conference’, The American Journal of Inter-
national Law 24, no. 4 (1930): 675.
149See ILC, Summary Records and Documents of the First Session Including the Report of the
Commission to the General Assembly, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1949 (United Nations, 1956), 281, para. 16.
150For a concise overview of the historical background, development, and content, see
James Crawford, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2012.
151UN, ‘General Assembly Resolution 56/83’, Doc. A/56/589 & Corr. 1 (United Nations,
December 2001).
152UN, ‘General Assembly Resolution 59/35’, Doc. A/59/505 (United Nations, Decem-
ber 2004), UN, ‘General Assembly Resolution 62/61’, Doc. A/62/446 (United Nations,
December 2010), UN, ‘General Assembly Resolution 65/19’, Doc. A/65/463 (United Na-
tions, December 2010).
153According to Rosenne, customary international law is comprised of ‘rules of law derived
from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them
to act that way’, Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (Oceana
Publications, 1984), 55.
154For purposes of the discussion at hand, they are treated as such; a more comprehensive
approach lies beyond the scope of this study, for which a few general observations
must suffice. The interested reader is referred to James Crawford, State Responsibility:
The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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non-binding status ‘ad referendum’ (subject to agreement by other parties),
are widely approved of and drawn on in turn, also by the ICJ.155
The notion of wilfully risking treaty misapplication as a condition im-
plied by Hilf and Engelen carries the suggestion of intent being necessary
to constitute a violation of ones international obligations, which raises the
question whether such qualifies as a general rule. The DARS deny such sug-
gestion – what matters is the objective content of the obligation at stake:156
Thus there is no exception to the principle stated in article 2 that there are
two necessary conditions for an internationally wrongful act – conduct at-
tributable to the State under international law and the breach by that con-
duct of an international obligation of the State. The question is whether
those two necessary conditions are also sufficient. It is sometimes said that
international responsibility is not engaged by conduct of a State in disregard
of its obligations unless some further element exists, in particular, ‘damage’
to another State. But whether such elements are required depends on the
content of the primary obligation, and there is no general rule in this re-
spect. . . .
A related question is whether fault constitutes a necessary element of the
internationally wrongful act of a State. This is certainly not the case if by
“fault” one understands the existence, for example, of an intention to harm.
In the absence of any specific requirement of a mental element in terms of
the primary obligation, it is only the act of a State that matters, independ-
ently of any intention.157
155Crawford, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, 2,
for example in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), ICJ (Annual Reports
of the International Court of Justice, 1997), 38–55, paras. 46, 50, 79, 83 (referencing
an earlier version of the DARS). The ICJ defines customary international law on the
basis of which it decides disputes as ‘international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law’, UN, ‘Statute of the International Court of Justice’, June 1945,
Article 38(1)(b). Thus, the two substantive constituents of customary international law
are ‘the actual practice and opinio juris [opinion of law] of States’, Continental Shelf
(Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of
Justice, 1985), 29, para. 27; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1996), 253,
para. 64; North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 44, para. 77.
156See Hans Pijl, ‘State Responsibility in Taxation Matters’, Bulletin for International Taxa-
tion, no. 1 (2006): 42–43.
157ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, II, Part
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The extent to which good faith implies such ‘specific requirement of a
mental element’ justifying the suggestion of intent as a necessary precon-
dition is debatable. Supposedly, the argument would be that Article 33(3)
warrants the belief that one has done everything required to fulfil ones ob-
ligations in all honesty, fairness, and reasonableness as long as no problem
of ambiguity has appeared and no divergence has been raised when inter-
preting a single text in isolation.158 Effectively, this treats reliance on Article
33(3) as a surrogate for conduct in good faith and a waiver of the obligation
to consider all of the context under Article 31(2); however, it seems not jus-
tified to claim that one has put all treaty obligations into effect in their spirit
as well as according to their letter and to the best of ones abilities if one at
the same time knowingly accepts that actual divergences stay undetected
because they are not raised by anyone in the process, resulting in a misap-
plication of the treaty in violation of Articles 31 and 26 VCLT. Certainly not
if undetected divergences are systemic as argued in Chapter 3, but arguably
neither if they were a mere contingency (thus, Hilf and Engelen may not
even have a point to begin with).
The approach by Hilf to distinguish between obligations of conduct and
result, with only a failure of the latter counting as a violation in the ab-
sence of wilful neglect because of Article 33(3), is unfounded. Article 12
DARS states that ‘There is a breach of an international obligation by a State
when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by
that obligation, regardless of its origin or character’, and with reference to
case law of the ICJ and the ECHR its Commentary makes clear that any dis-
tinctions between obligations of conduct and result are neither ‘exclusive’
nor ‘determinative’.159 Rather, parties may be considered to have accepted
a multitude of obligations of conduct and result in order to achieve the ob-
jectives of a treaty.160 Even in cases in which the obligation is identified as
primarily being one of the latter, the conduct cannot be separated from the
result as a basis for determining whether there is a breach of obligation:
2:36, paras. 9–10.
158See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 77.
159ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, II, Part
2:56–57, para. 11.
160Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 77, para. 135.
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‘But, in order to decide whether there had been a breach of the Convention
in the circumstances of the case, it [the ECHR] did not simply compare the
result required . . .with the result practically achieved. . . .Rather, it examined
what more Italy could have done to make the applicant’s right ’effective’.161
The question therefore remains whether reliance on a single text in isol-
ation may be considered in good faith because of Article 33(3), not whether
state responsibility is invoked concerning the actual outcome in hindsight.
The approach of Hilf to confine the matter to the issue of invoked state
responsibility must be rejected because state responsibility is only a sec-
ondary concern.162 What matters is whether there is a breach of a primary
obligation under the treaty, which depends entirely on the terms of the ob-
ligation itself:
In every case, it is by comparing the conduct in fact engaged in by the State
with the conduct legally prescribed by the international obligation that one
can determine whether or not there is a breach of that obligation.The phrase
‘is not in conformity with’ is flexible enough to cover the many different
ways in which an obligation can be expressed, as well as the various forms
which a breach may take.163
The VCLT Commentary makes clear that Article 33(3) is not intended as
a waiver of the obligation to compare texts but to assure that the principle
of unity is observed in all cases. It presumes the terms of a treaty to have
the same meaning in all texts in order to stress that the interpreter is not
justified ‘in simply preferring one text to another’ but required to undertake
‘every reasonable effort’ in order to ascertain the common intentions of the
161ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, II, Part
2:57, para. 11. The ECHR itself notes the following: ‘The Italian authorities, relying on
no more than a presumption . . . , inferred from the status of “latitante” which they at-
tributed to Mr. Colozza that there had been such a waiver. In the Court’s view, this
presumption did not provide a sufficient basis. . . .It is difficult to reconcile the situation
found by the Court with the diligence which the Contracting States must exercise in or-
der to ensure that the rights guaranteed . . .are enjoyed in an effective manner’, Colozza
v Italy, European Court of Human Rights (Application no. 9024/80, 1985), 10, para. 28.
Thus, negligence is ruled out on top of intent.
162See Pijl, ‘State Responsibility in Taxation Matters’, 39.
163ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, II, Part
2:55, para. 2.
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parties, that is, the one true meaning of the treaty, not of any single text.164
TheCommentary makes these observations mainly concerning cases of am-
biguities, but they must be understood as generally applicable because of
what is demanded by the principle of unity being a presumption of law.165
In the face of q and r2 this implies that ‘every reasonable effort’ must be
understood to exclude relying on a single text in isolation,166 at least in the
164See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, paras. 6–8. The
same follows directly from the wording of the general rule in Article 31.The interpreter
has to interpret the treaty ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ It can
hardly be claimed that he has done so if he arrives at a wrong result when relying on
a single text, see Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 963, 73n.
165Noteworthy, paragraph 7 on page 225 of the Commentary reads ‘A term of the treaty
may be ambiguous or obscure because it is so in all the authentic texts, or because it
is so in one text only but it is not certain whether there is a difference between the
texts, or because on their face the authentic texts seem not to have exactly the same
meaning. But whether the ambiguity or obscurity is found in all the texts or arises from
the plurilingual form of the treaty, the first rule for the interpreter is to look for the
meaning intended by the parties to be attached to the term by applying the standard
rules for the interpretation of treaties.’ Hence, what is talked about is indeterminacy as
a result of a divergence between texts, and fundamental ambiguity as a result of terms
being equally ambiguous in all texts, not ambiguity of a single text in isolation.
166In this respect, the WTO Appellate Body has stated the following: ‘As we have observed
previously, in accordance with the customary rule of treaty interpretation reflected
in Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention . . . , the terms of a treaty authenticated in
more than one language – like the WTO Agreement – are presumed to have the same
meaning in each authentic text. It follows that the treaty interpreter should seek the
meaning that gives effect, simultaneously, to all the terms of the treaty, as they are
used in each authentic language. . . .We also note that, in discussing the draft article
that was later adopted as Article 33(3) of the Vienna Convention, the International Law
Commission observed that the “presumption [that the terms of a treaty are intended
to have the same meaning in each authentic text] requires that every effort should be
made to find a commonmeaning for the texts before preferring one to another”’,United
States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lum-
ber From Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Report of theWTOAppellate Body, 2004), 22, para.
59, 50n, square brackets in the original. And: ‘We agree, however, that the Panel’s de-
scription of “price suppression” in paragraph 7.1277 of the Panel Report reflects the
ordinary meaning of that term, particularly when read in conjunction with the French
and Spanish versions of Article 6.3(c)1, as required by Article 33(3) of the Vienna Con-
vention’, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Report of the
WTO Appellate Body, 2005), 159, para. 424.
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case of tax treaties, as has been argued at length in Chapter 3. As is admitted
by its proponents, the routine interpretation approach sanctions a standard
of tentative interpretation possibly in violation of treaty obligations and
subject to retroactive correction.167 Articles 31–33 in combination with Art-
icle 26 VCLT, however, require the interpreter to give effect to the common
intentions of the parties.
In other words: divergences do not ‘arise’ – they either exist or not. If
they exist, they are either detected or not, and they can be detected only
by comparing all texts. Treaties are to be interpreted ‘in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.168 By looking
only at one language text, the interpreter may fail on all three accounts: he
may fail to appreciate the true object and purpose, he may fail to appreciate
the full context, and he may fail to appreciate the intended wording, which
may be misrepresented by the text looked at. In consequence, he may viol-
ate Article 26 VCLT. In its strong form, the currently prevailing view rests
on circular reasoning: it proclaims that looking at a single text is sufficient
as long as there is no divergence, whereas the establishment of a diver-
gence requires a comparison of texts. Therefore, it is disproven by means of
a reductio ad absurdum.169 The weaker form in essence suggests that diver-
gences do not matter as long as they are not raised by anyone, that is, as
long as they remain undetected. Such contention must be rejected in view
of the VCLT principles: what matters is that the common intention of the
contracting states as expressed by the treaty are being served, not whatever
167See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 78; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treat-
ies under International Law, 391.
168UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1).
169Defined by the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as ‘Disproof of
a proposition by showing that it leads to absurd or untenable conclusions’. Its theor-
etical foundation and terminology is commonly attributed to Aristotle, see Nicholas
Rescher, ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James
Fieser and Bradley Dowden, 2018, s. 1; however, use of similar techniques can be traced
back to Socrates, Zeno of Elea, Xenophanes of Colophon, and Parmenides of Elea, see
Susanne Bobzien, ‘Ancient Logic’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta, Winter ed. (Stanford University, 2016), s. 1.2; Daigle, Robert W., The
Reductio ad absurdum argument prior to Aristotle (San Jose, C.A.: SJSU ScholarWorks,
1991), passim.
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may be expressed by any single text considered in isolation, which may be
at variance. Consequently, what matters is not that divergences remain un-
detected but that they are excluded, that is, that they are either ascertained
not to exist or resolved by way of interpretation to arrive at the one true
meaning of the treaty implementing the common intention of the contract-
ing states. If this may be precluded by looking at one text alone as has been
shown for tax treaties, interpretation in good faith requires consideration
of all texts as long as they must be considered equally authoritative under
Article 10 VCLT and the treaty final clause, and Article 33(3) may not be
interpreted as a waiver of that obligation, as otherwise divergences may go
unnoticed, and the treaty may be misapplied in violation of Articles 31–33
and 26 VCLT.
In case the outcome of a court decision relying on a single text in isola-
tion violates the common intentions of the parties concerning the reciprocal
sharing of taxing rights, state responsibility may be invoked by the affected
state, any other state, groups of states, or the international community as a
whole for the protection of collective interests.170 But, is such likely in tax
cases, which must be considered off the radar in this respect? Maybe in a
case like Natexis, in which not only the taxpayer loses his tax sparing credit
but also a loss of billions of foreign direct investment must be feared as a
result.171 The taxpayer may provoke remedy in individual cases via mutual
agreement procedures; however, they are focussed on resolving the single
issue at hand and commonly remain unpublished, so they neither create
precedent nor foster development of treaty interpretation in general.172
In summary, with the routine interpretation approach in place and not
challenged and replaced by the international community, the status quo is
170ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Articles
42–48 with Commentaries.
171Instead of invoking state responsibility, however, it is more likely for the other state to
simply change its domestic law in order to counteract the effect, e.g., by levying 0.1%
of tax instead of 0% in the Natexis scenario, see Arruda Ferreira and Trindade Marinho,
‘Tax Sparing and Matching Credit’, 402–3.
172See Kees van Raad, ‘International Coordination of Tax Treaty Interpretation and Ap-
plication’, in International and Comparative Taxation: Essays in Honour of Klaus Vogel,




an invitation for states to favour their own language text and for taxpay-
ers to game the system, that is, to only raise divergences whenever they
are favourable and remain silent otherwise. The losers are states and tax-
payers who, unwittingly, suffer the losses of treaty misapplication in con-
sequence. I harbour some doubts whether my arguments will convince the
average common lawyer, to whom my approach and methodology based
on axiomatic-deductive reasoning may seem ‘beyond the pale’;173 however,
there is no denying that divergences between the texts of a treaty are com-
mon and will not necessarily disclose themselves if not raised by a party
to the dispute.174 Therefore, an element of arbitrariness in tax assessments
and court decisions is the inevitable outcome of the status quo, especially
in common law countries for said reasons. In this respect I shall close my
personal evaluation with a quotation by David Hume that, althoughwritten
with poll taxes in mind, I find nevertheless fitting:
But the most pernicious of all taxes are the arbitrary. They are commonly
converted, by their management, into punishments on industry; and also,
by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous, than by the real burden
which they impose. It is surprising, therefore, to see them have place among
any civilized people.175
7.7. Solutions
How can the problems introduced by domestic procedural law be remedied?
Even if the approach to rely on the prevailing text is generally adopted,
173Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 13.
174As happened, e.g., in Foster & Elam v Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), in which the
US Supreme Court had recourse only to the English text and later had to correct itself
after a discrepancy with the Spanish text was raised, employing a rather symptomatic
excuse: ‘The Spanish part of the treaty was not then brought to our view, and we then
supposed that there was no variance between them. We did not suppose that there
was even a formal difference of expression in the same instrument, drawn up in the
language of the other party’, see Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’,
958, with reference to Henry P. de Vries, ‘Choice of Language’, Virginia Journal of
International Law 3 (1963), 32–33, and United States v Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51
(1833).
175David Hume, ‘Of Taxes’, in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty
Fund, Inc., 1987), II.VIII.7.
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882 plurilingual (734 bilingual) tax treaties without prevailing text remain
currently in place, which (besides France) are mainly treaties of the major
common law countries (see next chapter). For civil law countries such as
Germany, the problem may resolve automatically given the conditions –
a change in the prevailing view abandoning the routine interpretation ap-
proach may be sufficient to bring about consistent practice because of the
strong influence of doctrine; however, in the case of common law countries
such as the UK, a change in doctrine will hardly bring about a change in
practice, as its function is different and its influence on practice marginal.
In consequence, action will be required. As suggested, the intended result
could be achieved by an extension of the professional duty of the repres-
entatives or the revenue to always compare the other texts and raise issues
regardless of whether they are in favour of their own position.176 Thismakes
sense from the perspective of state responsibility because Article 4 DARS,
which attributes the acts or omissions of organs of a state to that state ac-
cording to the principle of its unity, conceives of such organs in the broadest
possible sense, including federal as well as municipal tax authorities.177
176In the UK, an extension of the professional duty could be achieved by the professional
bodies or a practice direction by the judges, who could for example say that all lan-
guage texts should be put before the judge. In Germany, the tax administration as first
instance of appeal is under Article 88(1) AO already subject to the requirement to in-
quire all the facts irrespective of the submissions of the taxpayer, see Rust, ‘Germany’, s.
11.1.1. A change in the prevailing view abandoning the routine interpretation approach
should therefore bring about consideration of the other language text(s) already at the
level of assessment. A sure way to implement this would be via a circular from the
Federal Ministry of Finance.
177ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 4
and Commentary, 40–42, paras. 1–13.
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8.1. ResearchQuestion
The previous chapters raise the question to what extent the complexities of
plurilingual interpretation can be avoided with respect to actual tax treat-
ies. This question may be subdivided into the following three research ques-
tions: First, how many tax treaties avoid the problem altogether by being
unilingual? Second, how many plurilingual tax treaties provide for a pre-
vailing text the final clause of which allows for sole reliance on it? Third,
how many plurilingual tax treaties do not provide for a prevailing text or
provide for one but the final clause does not allow for sole reliance on it? In
addition to answering these questions, this chapter begins to contemplate
how policies of individual countries affect the global landscape, and what
general policy recommendations may be deduced from these observations.1
1Policy choices of individual countries as well as cooperative global policy choices or
even mere emerging patterns are subject to a complex mix of national and interna-
tional political and historical factors that are hard to discern in terms of their influence
on observable outcomes. Quantifiable patterns in the treaty network of an individual
country provide some clues concerning the underlying policy choices; however, the
global tax treaty network is made up of bilateral relationships in which the policies of
the treaty partners affect each other. The result depends on a mix of political goals, his-
torical influences, asymmetric bargaining power, economic trade-offs, and reciprocal
concessions. The line between what may serve as a clear indication for a certain policy
and what is mere speculation is blurry and sometimes hard to draw. A comprehensive
analysis considering all relevant factors in individual cases lies well beyond the scope
and means of this study, which will for the most part limit itself to presenting the clues
given by the investigated data.
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8.2. Use of Prevailing Texts
8.2.1. Global Analysis
When we look at the entire sample, we find that roughly one-quarter of all
treaties is unilingual while three-quarters are plurilingual; however, almost
60% of the plurilingual ones have a prevailing text.2 Hence, only roughly
30% of all treaties are plurilingual treaties without prevailing text,3 while
70% are either unilingual or have a prevailing text.
Table (8.1): All Treaties
Treaties No. w PT w/o PT %global w PT %PL w/o PT %PL
global 3844
UL 967 25.16%
PL 2877 1700 1170 74.84% 59.09% 40.67%
Regarding the number of authentic languages employed by the 2,877
plurilingual treaties, we find the following: roughly 40% have two texts,
only about 15% of which designate one as prevailing; roughly 57% have
three texts, about 88% of which designate one as prevailing; only about 3%
have four texts, about 94% of which designate one as a prevailing; and less
than 1% have five texts, all of which designate one as prevailing. Thus, the
standard scenario for plurilingual tax treaties is either two or three texts. In-
stances with more than three texts are few, and no tax treaty has more than
five texts. Whereas the vast majority of bilingual treaties has no prevail-
ing text, the relation is almost exactly reverse for trilingual treaties, most
2Three Tunisian treaties in force provide for two prevailing texts instead of one: Pakistan
(1996), Malta (2000), and Iran (2001) all have both English and French prevailing texts;
the first two have three authentic texts (English, French, Arabic) while the latter has
four (English, French, Arabic, Persian). These treaties will be commented on in more
detail below; for the purpose of the figures presented in this section they are not sep-
arately accounted for but lumped together with treaties featuring one prevailing text.
3Henceforth, whenever the addition ‘plurilingual’ is superfluous because of the context,
it is omitted in order to condense the text. The phrase ‘treaties without prevailing text’
always implies plurilingual treaties only; unilingual treaties will be mentioned separ-
ately when referred to.
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of which feature a prevailing text. Moreover, almost all treaties with more
than three texts feature a prevailing text. From this we may conclude that
the main function of additional language texts is to provide for a prevailing
text, and the problem of additional interpretational complexity is mostly
confined to bilingual treaties.
Table (8.2): Number of Authentic Languages (All Plurilingual Treaties)
AL No. w PT w/o PT %global w PT %AL w/o PT %AL
2 1138 169 966 39.56% 14.85% 84.89%
3 1628 1426 198 56.59% 87.59% 12.16%
4 94 88 6 3.27% 93.62% 6.38%
5 17 17 0 0.59% 100.00% 0.00%
When we subtract all terminated treaties from the sample, 3,358 treat-
ies in force or yet to come into force remain. The proportions of unilingual
and plurilingual treaties relative to all treaties hardly change, whereas the
proportion of treaties with prevailing text as percentage of all plurilingual
treaties increases by almost 5%. This is attributable to two factors: (1) a de-
creased proportion of bilingual treaties versus an increased proportion of
trilingual ones, and (2) increases in both the proportions of bilingual and
trilingual treaties with prevailing text.
Table (8.3): Global Tax Treaty Network
Treaties No. w PT w/o PT %total w PT %PL w/o PT %PL
Total 3358
UL 847 25.22%
PL 2511 1622 882 74.78% 64.60% 35.13%
Hence, we may conclude that the policy to implement a prevailing text has
become more popular over the decades. In total, almost three-quarters of
all treaties in force or yet to come into force are either unilingual or have a
prevailing text, that is, the problem of additional interpretational complex-
ity attributable to plurilingual form is confined to roughly one-quarter of
today’s global tax treaty network.
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Table (8.4): Number of Authentic Languages (Global Tax Treaty Network)
AL No. w PT w/o PT %total w PT %AL w/o PT %AL
2 905 168 734 36.04% 18.56% 81.10%
3 1496 1349 143 59.58% 90.17% 9.56%
4 93 88 5 3.70% 94.62% 5.38%
5 17 17 0 0.68% 100.00% 0.00%
The numbers for terminated treaties reveal that between January 1960
and August 2016 a total of 486 treaties have been terminated, roughly one-
quarter of which has been unilingual and three-quarters plurilingual. This
corresponds to the overall averages, that is, nothing has changed in terms of
the relative potential to conclude unilingual treaties. Out of the terminated
plurilingual ones, however, only roughly one in five had a prevailing text.
Table (8.5): Terminated Treaties
Treaties No. w PL w/o PL %total w PT %PL w/o PT %PL
Total 486
UL 120 24.69%
PL 366 78 288 75.31% 21.31% 78.69%
Almost 85% of all terminated treaties have been replaced by new treat-
ies of the same type between the same countries. Out of the not replaced
plurilingual treaties, only one out of ten had a prevailing text. As regards
replaced treaties, roughly 27% have been unilingual and 73% plurilingual.
Out of the originally unilingual ones, roughly 46% have been replaced by
plurilingual treaties and the rest by unilingual ones. Almost 90% of all ori-
ginally unilingual treaties replaced by plurilingual ones have been replaced
by treaties with prevailing text, whereas out of the originally plurilingual
ones, less than 10% have been replaced by unilingual treaties. The vast ma-
jority (almost 80%) of plurilingual treaties replaced by unilingual ones had
no prevailing text, same as roughly three-quarters of those replaced again
by plurilingual ones. Almost half of the treaties originally without prevail-
ing text have been replaced by ones with prevailing text, while only one
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treaty with prevailing text has been replaced by one without, which has
been replaced by a unilingual treaty in turn.4





PL w/o PT 58 90.63%
PL w PT 6 9.38%




UL NC 60 53.57%
UL to PL 52 46.43%
UL to PL w PT 46 88.46%
UL to PL w/o PT 6 11.54%
PL 302 72.95%
PL to UL 29 9.60%
PL w/o PT to UL 23 79.31%
PL w PT to UL 6 20.69%
PL NC 273 90.40%
PL NC w/o PT 207 75.82%
PL NC w PT 66 24.18%
PL w/o PT to w PT 103 49.76%
PL w/o PT NC 104 50.24%
PL w PT to w/o PT 1 1.52%
4Belgium-Norway (1967).
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8.2.2. Time-Series Analysis
Although the above analysis contains a dynamic perspective with respect to
the effects of termination, the overall picture at this point is still fairly static.
A time-series analysis is required to evaluate the global development.5 This
shows that from the 1960s throughout the 1990s, the number of tax treaties
has more than doubled per decade. The absolute number of treaties con-
cluded per decade remained high in the 2000s, but the high growth rates of
the previous decades slowed down: the number of treaties per decade no
longer doubled but only equalled the number of the 1990s.
Table (8.8): Treaties per Decade
Decade PD w term PD w/o term CM w term CM w/o term
1960-69 176 92 176 92
1970-79 345 225 521 317
1980-89 671 413 1192 730
1990-99 995 975 2187 1705
2000-09 1048 1044 3235 2749
2010-16 609 609 3844 3358
As revealed by the data, the major expansion of the global tax treaty net-
work has been taking off as late as the 1990s: roughly 80% of all tax treaties
in force today have been concluded since 1990. The 1970s and especially
1980s may be viewed as a first wave of expansion in which most of the ini-
tial 20% of today’s global tax treaty network has been concluded; therefore,
almost all treaties concluded byOECDmembers, amounting to roughly two-
thirds of the entire global tax treaty network, are within the ambit of some
version of the OECD Model.6
5Decades have been chosen as suitable time interval. From now on, all figures exclude ter-
minated treaties unless specified otherwise, in order to represent the global tax treaty
network as is.
6In total 590 treaties betweenOECDmembers and 1,689 treaties betweenOECDmembers
and non-members, amounting to 17.57% and 50.30% of the global tax treaty network,
respectively. Appendix C provides some insight concerning treaties by OECDmembers
concluded before the OECD Models.
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Figure (8.1): Per Decade Treaty Growth Rate
Figure (8.2): Cumulative and per Decade Growth of the Global Tax Treaty Network
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Although the number of unilingual treaties has continued to grow in ab-
solute terms throughout the decades, they have been vastly outgrown by
plurilingual ones. Treaties before 1960 were mostly unilingual, but the situ-
ation reversed as early as 1960, and the gap between unilingual and pluri-
lingual treaties has continued to widen since in favour of the latter. Note-
worthy, the gap has increased in leaps along the waves of expansion. Dur-
ing the initial wave the gap widened steadily from 60:40 to 65:35, whereas
along the major wave in the 1990s it leaped to roughly 78:22. The gap nar-
rowed during the 2000s and, based on the numbers of 2010 to August 2016,
has widened again to roughly 80:20. The cumulative figures suggest that
the numbers logarithmically approach a relation of 75:25, whereas the leap
in the per decade numbers from 1990 onwards seems to indicate that the
potential for unilingual treaties is approaching exhaustion faster than the
potential for plurilingual ones, that is, unilingual treaty growth may not
continue in the same proportion.
In summary, conclusion of treaties without prevailing text has been a
policy choice mainly of the beginning periods of the global tax treaty net-
work. It reached its peak in the 1990s and has declined since: per decade
conclusions of treaties without prevailing text exceeded those with for the
last time in the 1980s. In the wake of the major expansion of the global tax
treaty network during the 1990s, concluding treaties with prevailing text
became the predominant policy choice. This is also visible from the pre-
dominant choice for treaties without prevailing text to be terminated and
the fact that almost all treaties terminated to date have been concluded up
to 1990. During the 1990s, per decade conclusions of treaties with prevailing
text already exceeded those without by a factor of 2:1, which increased to a
factor of 3:1 in the 2000s. In cumulative terms, treaties with prevailing text
started to outnumber those without by the 1990s, and their total number
doubled to almost twice of the latter in the 2000s.
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Figure (8.3): Per Decade Growth of Unilingual and Plurilingual Treaties
Figure (8.4): Cumulative Growth of Unilingual and Plurilingual Treaties
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Figure (8.5): Per Decade Growth of Plurilingual Treaties with/without Prevailing Text
Figure (8.6): Cumulative Growth of Plurilingual Treaties with/without Prevailing Text
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Figure (8.7): Per Decade Terminated Treaties
Figure (8.8): Per Decade Terminated Treaties as Percentage of All Terminated Treaties
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8.2.3. Group Analysis
The preceding analysis allows us to draw general conclusions concerning
global developments; however, not every treaty is of equal importance. In
order to arrive at a balanced view, we have to examine the policy of indi-
vidual countries, regions, and political groupings.7 Treaties without prevail-
ing text are not evenly spread out, but roughly two-thirds (581) of them are
concentrated in the treaty networks of nine countries: France, Canada, the
UK, Luxembourg, Germany, the US, Switzerland, Ireland, and South Africa.
Almost 85% (748) of them are concentrated in the treaty networks of four-
teen countries, that is, the previous nine plus Spain, Italy, Malta, Belgium,
and Australia.
Table (8.9): Concentration of Plurilingual Treaties without Prevailing Text
Country Treaties UL PL PL w/o PT PL w/o PT %PL
Canada 97 0 97 97 100.00%
France 139 34 105 104 99.05%
United States 77 23 54 53 98.15%
Australia 55 24 31 29 93.55%
United Kingdom 132 43 89 81 91.01%
Luxembourg 85 17 68 60 88.24%
South Africa 86 36 50 40 80.00%
Ireland 78 25 53 42 79.25%
Malta 74 24 50 32 64.00%
Germany 108 5 103 56 54.37%
7This section will mainly look at aggregate data for certain groups. In order to gauge the
effects of the identified group policies, a count of the number of treaties for each group
in total and as a percentage of the global tax treaty network is provided in Appendix
D.1. The categorisation into groups featured in this section is only meaningful to a cer-
tain extent, and all conclusions drawn have to be taken with a grain of salt. All groups
will to some extent remain heterogeneous because they bundle countries with differ-
ent policies. In order to calibrate the picture developed in this section, each country
has to be analysed on its own merits. This will be done within limits in the following
section. In this section, policies of individual countries will be referenced only to gauge
aggregated group data concerning certain key observations. Missing percentage points
after the comma in some groups concerning the numbers of treaties without prevail-
ing text are attributable to a few treaties that implement a different mechanism to treat
divergences in form of a MAP. These few treaties are not included here in the count of
treaties without prevailing text and will be considered separately later.
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Country Treaties UL PL PL w/o PT PL w/o PT %PL
Belgium 102 38 64 30 46.88%
Spain 99 16 83 38 45.78%
Switzerland 119 14 105 48 45.71%
Italy 109 7 102 38 37.25%
Not all of these countries have the same policy. Canada, France, the US,
Australia, the UK, Luxembourg, South Africa, and Ireland all seem to have
a dominant policy of not concluding treaties with prevailing text irrespect-
ive of their treaty partner.8 The motivations behind the numbers may still
differ for each country. At the same time, the overall outcome comprised
of bilateral relationships will be influenced by the policies of their respect-
ive treaty partners. The assumed preference of the listed countries not to
conclude treaties with a prevailing text may be only one side of the coin:
their treaty partners may share the sentiment or want to avoid granting
linguistic advantages.
Given that the native tongues of most countries in this list are either
English or French, the political potential for agreeing on prevailing texts
may exhaust itself to some extent in the conclusion of unilingual treaties.
France, the US, the UK, and Australia all have sizeable proportions of uni-
lingual treaties: the UK and US of roughly 30%, France of roughly 25%, and
Australia of well over 40%.
For countries like Canada and Luxembourg, on the other hand, the avail-
ability of multiple official legal languages domestically may strongly influ-
ence their policies concerning treaties. This is particularly obvious in the
case of Canada, which completely rejects the option of concluding unilin-
gual treaties even when sharing an official language with the treaty partner,
whereas Luxembourg has concluded a proportion of 20%. Canada’s policy
8Noteworthy, however, the UK has eight fairly recent treaties with English prevailing
texts, i.e., Uzbekistan (1993), India (1993), Latvia (1996), Malaysia (1996), Taiwan (2002),
Bahrain (2010), Tajikistan (2014), and the United Arab Emirates (2016). Not all of them
are with countries having English as official language, and three of them are fairly
recent. The prevailing texts may be attributable to policies of the respective treaty part-
ners or indicate a recent policy change on the side of the UK to implement English
prevailing texts when politically feasible. Whether the latter proves to be true remains
to be seen.
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is attributable to domestic law: its constitution provides that English and
French have equal status; all federal lawsmust be adopted in both languages,
and each language version is to be equally authoritative, while its Official
Languages Act stipulates that all international treaties should be authentic-
ated in both official languages.9
Concerning the others, Ireland and South Africa have a strong general
policy in disfavour of prevailing texts but display a propensity of roughly
20% to agree to them depending on their treaty partner. Noteworthy again
are the sizeable proportions of over 30% unilingual treaties in the case of
Ireland and over 40% in the case of South Africa. Malta displays a disfavour
of prevailing texts, too, but already with a higher propensity to agree to
them in roughly one-third of all cases. In addition, it has a relatively high
share of over 30% unilingual treaties.
Although each features a sizeable absolute number of treaties without
prevailing text, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy seem not
to have a predominant policy either way but to conclude treaties with or
without prevailing text on a roughly equal basis depending on the treaty
partner. Germany appears to be tilted in disfavour of prevailing texts; how-
ever, it recently published its own Model Convention with a final clause
providing for one,10 that is, Germany’s own policy is shifting in favour of
prevailing texts if it ever was different to begin with.
For the other four, the numbers are reverse. Italy is most clearly in fa-
vour of implementing prevailing texts. Like Germany, it has a relatively low
propensity of about 5–6% to conclude unilingual treaties. Switzerland has
with almost 12% the highest propensity among the three, which may be at-
tributable to the availability of several domestic official languages: twelve
of Switzerland’s fourteen unilingual treaties are with German, French, or
Italian speaking countries in German, French, or Italian, while only two are
in English with Norway (1987) and Taiwan (2007). With over 16%, Spain has
a higher propensity to conclude unilingual treaties as a consequence of the
9Constitution Act, 1982, 16 and 18(1), Official Languages Act, 1985, 10(1); see Sasseville,
‘The Canadian Experience’, 36.
10BMF, Basis for Negotiation for Agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (Germany:
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2013), henceforth referred to as German Model.
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shared native tonguewith all of Latin America except Brazil: fourteen of the
sixteen unilingual treaties in its tax treaty network are unilingual in Span-
ish with Latin American countries; the remaining two are with Morocco
(1978) and Tunisia (1982) in French.
The high proportion of almost 40% unilingual treaties in Belgium’s tax
treaty network is not attributable to its ability to draw on several domestic
official languages, as thirty-seven of its thirty-eight unilingual treaties are
in English with countries not sharing a common language, while only the
treaty with France (1964) is in French. Together with the lower proportion
of treaties without prevailing text versus those with, this indicates that Bel-
gium has a preference against plurilingual treaties without prevailing text.
It issued its own Model Convention in 2007, which features a final clause
codifying a unilingual treaty.11 This shows that Belgium itself favours uni-
lingual form; prevailing texts appear to be its second choice when feasible,
while it accommodates the policies of its treaty partners not to implement
one.
Almost all of these fourteen countries are big players in the global eco-
nomy and international tax system: their treaties cover large cross-border
flows of capital, goods, and services, and their policies reverberate through-
out the global tax treaty network. When we look at all treaties concluded
between OECD members, we see that the ratio of unilingual to plurilin-
gual ones roughly conforms to the global average, whereas the ratio of
treaties with prevailing text to those without is roughly 44:56. For treat-
ies between members and non-members, this ratio is more than reversed to
roughly 62:38 in favour of prevailing texts. Treaties between non-members
show a ratio of roughly 80:20 in favour of prevailing texts. The proportions
of unilingual versus plurilingual treaties are almost the same for all three
groups, roughly conforming to the global averages of one-quarter versus
three-quarters, that is, the potential for unilingual treaties is not influenced
by member status and does not bias the potential for treaties with prevail-
ing text. Generally speaking, this means that non-members have a higher
propensity to implement prevailing texts, and this policy remains dominant
11The Kingdom of Belgium, Belgian Draft Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention Of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
2007, henceforth referred to as Belgian Model.
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even when concluding treaties with members, whereas within the OECD
the policy against prevailing texts dominates. In this context, a comparison
with the countries that participate as active key partners in the work of
OECD bodies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa) is illustrat-
ive: they show a clear preference for prevailing texts, which would be even
more decisive if South Africa would be subtracted from the list.
Table (8.10): OECD, NOECD and OECDKP Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
OECD-OECD 24.07% 75.93% 43.75% 56.03%
OECD-NOECD 26.23% 73.77% 61.80% 37.72%
OECD any 25.67% 74.33% 57.02% 42.56%
NOECD-NOECD 24.28% 75.72% 80.29% 19.71%
OECDKP-OECD 18.59% 81.41% 67.72% 32.28%
OECDKP-NOECD 16.97% 83.03% 76.24% 23.76%
TheG20 countries display a similar pattern: for treaties between them the
ratio of treaties with prevailing text versus those without is roughly 43:57,
however, the propensity to conclude unilingual treaties is with roughly 10%
significantly below the global average. The proportion of treaties with pre-
vailing text increases between G20 members and non-members, but only
to roughly equal the proportion of those without, while the proportion of
unilingual treaties remains below the global figure, despite doubling. This
may be attributable to the group’s composition including many countries
with a dominant policy against prevailing texts, and a reduced willingness
of countries to grant linguistic advantages to economically powerful treaty
partners.
Table (8.11): G20 Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
G20-G20 10.24% 89.76% 42.95% 57.05%
G20-NG20 20.50% 79.50% 52.00% 47.80%
G20 any 19.28% 80.72% 50.80% 49.02%
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As regards the tax treaty network of the CW,12 the proportion of unilin-
gual treaties is with over 60% between members high in comparison, while
the ratio of treaties with prevailing text versus those without is 50:50. This
means that the problem of plurilingual form does not arise much within
the CW because of the potential for unilingual treaties (most countries in
the CW are either native English-speaking or have English as official lan-
guage), while half of the plurilingual ones provide for a prevailing text. For
treaties between CW and third countries, the proportion of treaties without
prevailing text rises to almost 60%, while the proportion of unilingual treat-
ies decreases to less than a quarter. This points again to a strong policy
preference of the leading CW countries against prevailing texts, in addition
to a possible reluctance of states to grant linguistic advantages. India, an
important player in the global economy and international tax system, has
a diametrically opposed policy to the other CW countries: out of its one
hundred tax treaties, only four are unilingual and 93% of the plurilingual
ones feature a prevailing text.
Table (8.12): CW Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
CW-CW 61.26% 38.74% 50.00% 50.00%
CW-NCW 23.96% 76.04% 41.45% 58.29%
CW any 30.57% 69.43% 42.30% 57.47%
Concerning all treaties between countries of the European Union
including EFTA members but excluding France, Ireland, Malta, and the
UK,13 the proportions of unilingual and plurilingual treaties roughly
correspond to the global averages. For treaties between members and
non-members, the propensity to conclude unilingual treaties is below the
global average, whereas the propensity to conclude plurilingual ones is
above.The proportions of treaties without prevailing text versus those with
are close to the global averages for both groups; however, the preference
12Commonwealth of Nations including former members, prospective members, and other
former British colonies that have not been members.
13Henceforth abbreviated as EU.
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for the latter is stronger between EU countries. Thus, in contrast to the
excluded ones, the overall policy for the rest of the EU countries is clearly
in favour of prevailing texts.
Table (8.13): EU Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
EU-EU 25.75% 74.25% 72.69% 26.57%
EU-NEU 22.04% 77.96% 65.17% 34.49%
EU any 22.77% 77.23% 66.60% 32.98%
Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States including former
members and associate states (CIS) display a dominant policy in favour of
prevailing texts. There are hardly any unilingual treaties both between CIS
countries and between CIS and third countries, and treaties with prevailing
text outnumber those without by roughly 4:1.
Table (8.14): CIS Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
CIS-CIS 0.00% 100.00% 81.08% 18.92%
CIS-NCIS 2.38% 97.62% 78.28% 21.72%
CIS any 2.23% 97.77% 78.46% 21.54%
TheArabWorld (AW) has a clear preference for prevailing texts. All treat-
ies between AW countries are unilingual, while roughly 80% of all treaties
with third countries feature a prevailing text. As regards the treaty networks
of all AW countries, roughly 15% treaties without prevailing text remain.
Table (8.15): AW Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
AW-AW 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AW-NAW 9.95% 90.05% 80.08% 19.33%
AW any 20.90% 79.10% 80.08% 19.33%
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Three quarters of all treaties between LatinAmerican countries excluding
CARICOM members (LA) are unilingual in Spanish, while the remaining
are plurilingual without prevailing text, all with Brazil. The latter does not
display a decisive policy with respect to prevailing texts: treaties with pre-
vailing text versus those without are divided roughly 53:47 in its treaty net-
work. As for treaties between LA and third countries, treaties with prevail-
ing text make up almost two-thirds of all plurilingual treaties, correspond-
ing roughly to the global average, whereas the proportion of unilingual
treaties remains much lower overall. In summary, LA countries favour pre-
vailing texts once the potential for concluding unilingual treaties in Spanish
is exhausted.
Table (8.16): LA Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
LA-LA 75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 100.00%
LA-NLA 8.26% 91.74% 64.93% 35.07%
LA any 14.57% 85.43% 63.13% 36.87%
Over 80% of all treaties between African countries excluding the Arab
World (AF) are unilingual, while the remaining ones are all without prevail-
ing text. Concerning treaties with third countries, still a higher proportion
than globally is unilingual while roughly two-thirds of the others lack a pre-
vailing text. This high proportion of unilingual treaties and the clear policy
against prevailing texts may be attributable to the widespread use of Eng-
lish and French as official languages and the British and French influence.
Table (8.17): AF Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
AF-AF 80.49% 19.51% 0.00% 100.00%
AF-NAF 42.31% 57.69% 32.82% 67.18%
AF any 46.44% 53.56% 31.53% 68.47%
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The remaining Asian countries that were neither considered as part of
CW, CIS, EU, AF, or AW (AS)14 display an overwhelming policy preference
for treaties with prevailing text. Between AS countries almost 30% of all
treaties are unilingual and 90% of all plurilingual ones feature a prevailing
text. For treaties with third countries, these percentages drop to roughly
20% and 80%, respectively.
Table (8.18): AS Treaties
Treaties UL PL PL w PT %PL PL w/o PT %PL
AS-AS 29.82% 70.18% 90.00% 10.00%
AS-NAS 21.34% 78.66% 79.35% 20.65%
AS any 22.04% 77.96% 80.15% 19.85%
8.2.4. Per Country Analysis
This section drills down a bit further into the global tax treaty network in
order to obtain a more detailed view with respect to individual countries.
It must be borne in mind, however, that every bilateral treaty is the result
of a reciprocal trade-off between the interests and policies of the contract-
ing states. In consequence, the aggregate data of actual treaty outcomes
examined here will never mirror the policy of any particular country in
pure form. Amuch broader and deeper investigation into all linguistic, legal,
political, economic, and historical factors influencing the outcome for every
particular treaty would be necessary in order to develop a complete under-
standing of every country’s policy and motivations. For purposes of this
study, an aggregated data analysis is sufficient to further gauge the results
of the previous sections, with the necessary caution in mind.
In general, themore treaties a country has in its network and the stronger
the results lash out in either direction, the more robust the conclusions
drawn concerning that country’s policy will be. Therefore, the countries
analysed have been divided into three groups: all countries with 60 or more
14China, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.), Korea (Rep.), Laos, Mon-
golia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam.
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treaties (G1), all countries with 30 or more but fewer than 60 treaties (G2),
and all countries with 15 or more but fewer than 30 treaties (G3). Countries
with fewer than 15 treaties are not considered. Furthermore, each of the
three groups is divided into two sub-groups: countries that have English as
official language versus countries that do not.
Almost all countries of G1 that do not have English as official language
display a predominant policy in favour of prevailing texts well above the
global average. Russia, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Italy, and Den-
mark are near the global average, which is still almost two-thirds in favour
of prevailing texts. Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and (to some extent) Ger-
many seem not to have a decisive policy but happy to accommodate the
preference of their treaty partners.15 Only Luxembourg and France display
a clear policy against prevailing texts.
Table (8.19): G1 NEOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Egypt 91.89% 66 37
Indonesia 90.91% 69 44
Estonia 89.80% 60 49
United Arab Emirates 87.69% 80 65
Korea (Rep.) 86.49% 90 74
Croatia 85.96% 63 57
Slovenia 85.71% 60 56
Kuwait 85.48% 70 62
Thailand 85.37% 66 41
Ukraine 80.82% 73 73
Morocco 80.39% 67 51
Turkey 80.00% 83 65
Vietnam 80.00% 72 65
Romania 79.76% 90 84
Hungary 78.95% 82 57
Belarus 78.79% 69 66
Czech Republic 77.59% 91 58
Cyprus 76.92% 64 39
Japan 76.32% 68 38
Bulgaria 76.19% 71 63
15As alreadymentioned, the GermanModel stipulates a policy in favour of prevailing texts
while the Belgian one stipulates a policy in favour of unilingual treaties.
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Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Portugal 76.06% 78 71
China 75.47% 108 106
Slovak Republic 72.88% 69 59
Netherlands 72.46% 99 69
Finland 71.11% 80 45
Qatar 69.23% 74 65
Russia 68.13% 91 91
Poland 67.07% 88 82
Norway 66.67% 94 42
Sweden 65.79% 92 38
Austria 64.00% 93 75
Italy 62.75% 109 102
Denmark 60.98% 81 41
Switzerland 54.29% 119 105
Belgium 53.13% 102 64
Spain 46.99% 99 83
Germany 44.66% 108 103
Luxembourg 11.76% 85 68
France 0.00% 139 105
The situation differs for G1 countries having English as official language.
Canada, the US, and the UK have a strict policy against prevailing texts.
Conversely, India and Malaysia display a dominant policy in favour. All the
others range in the middle but well below the global average. Singapore
and Pakistan may be considered not to have a decisive policy of their own
but to settle with the preference of their treaty partners. The same seems to
apply to Malta, whereas both South Africa and Ireland range so far below
the global average that it rather seems they agree to prevailing texts only
as a concession to particular circumstance.
Table (8.20): G1 EOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
India 96.88% 100 96
Malaysia 85.53% 83 76
Singapore 47.06% 88 51
Pakistan 44.44% 64 36
Malta 36.00% 74 50
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Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Ireland 20.75% 78 53
South Africa 20.00% 86 50
United Kingdom 8.99% 132 89
United States 1.85% 77 54
Canada 0.00% 97 97
For G2 countries not having English as official language, the situation
is similar to the equivalent sub-group of G1. Almost all display a strong
preference in favour of prevailing texts well above the global average. Mex-
ico, Turkmenistan, and Chile still decisively favour prevailing texts, while
Brazil and Algeria seem to have no clear-cut policy. Only Mauritius seems
to disfavour prevailing texts.
Table (8.21): G2 NEOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Greece 95.12% 58 41
Syria 94.74% 32 19
Bahrain 94.44% 42 36
Iran 93.88% 50 49
Latvia 92.16% 59 51
Bosnia and Herzegovina 92.00% 38 25
Serbia and Montenegro 90.00% 38 30
Georgia 88.68% 55 53
Macedonia (FYR) 88.00% 52 50
Uzbekistan 86.27% 53 51
Israel 85.42% 57 48
Kazakhstan 85.37% 43 41
Albania 85.29% 43 34
Lithuania 85.19% 54 54
Lebanon 83.33% 33 12
Azerbaijan 82.98% 48 47
Jordan 81.82% 33 22
Armenia 80.43% 46 46
Saudi Arabia 79.41% 38 34
Oman 79.31% 36 29
Moldova 76.09% 47 46
Tajikistan 75.86% 31 29
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Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Iceland 72.73% 47 33
Taiwan 71.43% 30 21
Venezuela 70.00% 34 30
Mexico 66.67% 58 48
Turkmenistan 65.00% 40 40
Chile 64.00% 33 25
Tunisia 58.06% 55 31
Brazil 53.13% 33 32
Algeria 50.00% 35 22
Mauritius 36.36% 52 22
As regards G2 countries with English as official language, the situation
is divided. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Hong Kong seem to be strongly in
favour of prevailing texts, whereas Australia has a strict policy against them.
The Philippines, New Zealand, and Barbados display a less strict policy but
still disfavour prevailing texts.
Table (8.22): G2 EOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Sri Lanka 87.23% 47 47
Bangladesh 86.67% 32 15
Hong Kong 66.67% 35 18
Philippines 30.43% 43 23
New Zealand 26.09% 49 23
Barbados 20.00% 32 20
Australia 6.45% 55 31
For G3 countries the sample sizes are small, so the conclusions drawn
should be viewed with extra caution. Nevertheless, for G3 countries not
having English as official language, the situation seems comparable to the
respective sub-groups of G1 and G2. Most countries of this sub-group have
a preference for prevailing texts well above the global average, while Libya
and Argentina are in its close proximity. Only Senegal and to some extent
Ecuador have a strong preference against prevailing texts.
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Table (8.23): G3 NEOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
San Marino 87.50% 21 16
Mongolia 86.96% 28 23
Uruguay 81.25% 20 16
Kyrgyzstan 80.00% 25 25
Liechtenstein 80.00% 19 10
Panama 78.57% 16 14
Serbia 78.26% 26 23
Libya 66.67% 16 12
Argentina 56.25% 20 16
Ecuador 25.00% 16 12
Senegal 0.00% 17 11
As regards G3 countries with English as official language, Sudan and
Seychelles are clearly in favour of prevailing texts, while most others are
decisively in disfavour. Only Ethiopia and Nigeria display no clear prefer-
ence. Given the small sample sizes, however, part of the numbers may be
coincidental or depending on the treaty partners rather than pointing to a
country’s own policy.
Table (8.24): G3 EOL Treaties
Country PL w PT %PL Treaties PL
Sudan 100.00% 18 5
Seychelles 66.67% 29 12
Ethiopia 50.00% 20 12
Nigeria 50.00% 16 6
Isle of Man 40.00% 22 5
Kenya 33.33% 16 6
Jersey 28.57% 25 7
Guernsey 20.00% 22 5
Botswana 20.00% 16 5
Zimbabwe 18.18% 19 11
Zambia 9.09% 27 11
Trinidad and Tobago 9.09% 16 11
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8.3. Types of Wording
Now that we have a clear view to what extent sole reliance on prevailing
texts is available in principle (and to what extent the problem does not arise
in the first place because of unilingual form), we need to establish how far
the permissive approach may be applied to actual tax treaties, that is, to
what extent formulations of treaty final clauses in the global tax treaty net-
work permit sole reliance on existing prevailing texts. As Article 33(1) does
not constitute a peremptory norm in this regard,16 such investigation into
the intentions of the contracting states as expressed in their treaties is ne-
cessary.
8.3.1. TOW Classification
The final clauses used in the global tax treaty network can be classified into
nine different types of wording, which I have labelled numerically from
TOW1 to TOW9. TOW1 represents the case of plurilingual treaties without
prevailing text. In its most basic form the treaty is simply concluded, signed,
and sealed in two or more copies and languages without its final clause
specifying its linguistic properties, as for example in Norway-Switzerland
(1956), having German and Norwegian texts:17
In witness whereof, the plenipotentiaries of the two States have signed this
Convention and thereto affixed their seals. Done at Oslo, 7 December 1956.
Strictly speaking, mentioning the linguistic properties is not necessary
because, in the absence of a specific clause, authenticity derives from the
mere fact that an instrument has been concluded in a particular language.18
Therefore, each signed and sealed text must be treated as equally authentic.
16See ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 4; Engelen,
Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 376–79.
17Unless otherwise indicated, English wordings of non-English final clauses are taken
from unofficial English translations provided by the IBFD Tax Treaties Database.
18UN,Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 10; see ILC,DraftArticles on the Law
of Treaties with Commentaries, II:224, para. 2; Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual
Treaties by International Courts and Tribunals’, 74, with reference to McNair, The Law
of Treaties, 60.
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This basic form is no longer common but still exists in a handful of older
treaties. Amore elaborate variety of the basic form references the languages
but without specifically commenting on their authenticity, as for example
in South Africa-United States (1947):
Done at Cape Town, in duplicate, in the English and Afrikaans languages,
the tenth day of April, 1947.
In general, that is, applicable to all types of wording and all different
forms of each, the number of signed and sealed copies does not necessarily
need to equal the number of language texts, as for example in Costa Rica-
Romania (1991):
Done in quadruplicate at San José, Costa Rica, on 12 day July 1991, in the
Spanish and Romanian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
The standard form of TOW1 used most widely today does not only men-
tion the number of texts and languages but also explicitly comments on
equal authenticity in a variety of marginally different but in substance equi-
valent formulations, for example, ‘both texts being equally authoritative’,19
‘both texts being equally authentic’,20 ‘each text being equally authentic’,21
‘all three texts being equally authentic’,22 or ‘the two texts having equal
authenticity’.23
In a few special cases the treaty is concluded only in one language, while
the final clause specifies that a translation in the language of the other con-
tracting state shall be made, agreed on, and then be treated with equal au-
thority, as for example in Belarus-United Kingdom (1995):
Done in duplicate at London this 7th day of March 1995 in the English lan-
guage. A translation of the Convention into the Byelorussian language shall
be made and agreed by the Contracting States before ratification, that text
having the same authority as the English text.
19See, e.g., United Kingdom-Greece (1953), having English and Greek texts.
20See, e.g., Germany-France (1959), having German and French texts.
21See, e.g., Ireland-Switzerland (1966), having English and French texts.
22See, e.g., Belgium-Bulgaria (1988), having French, Dutch, and Bulgarian texts.
23See, e.g., Luxembourg-United States (1996), having English and French texts.
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In some of these cases the final clause outlines the process by which the
latter translation is to gain equal authenticity, as for example in Kazakhstan-
United States (1993):
Done at Almaty this 24th day of October 1993, in duplicate, in the Russian
and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. A Kazakh lan-
guage text shall be prepared, which shall be considered equally authentic
upon an exchange of diplomatic notes confirming its conformity with the
English language text.24
TOW2 is the first case of treaties designating one text as prevailing. Its
most basic form lists the number of copies and authentic languages, and
mimics the wording of Article 33(1) concerning its condition to designate
one text as prevailing, as for example in Armenia-United Arab Emirates
(2002):
Done in Abu Dhabi on April 20, 2002, in two originals, in the Armenian,
Arabic and English languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of
divergence the English text shall prevail.
Almost all treaties with TOW2 final clauses add ‘any’ or ‘between texts’
or both to the wording,25 for example, ‘In case of any divergence, the Eng-
lish text shall prevail’,26 ‘In case of divergence between texts, the English
text shall prevail’,27 or ‘In case of divergence between any of the texts, the
English text shall prevail’.28 These wordings explicitly heal the slight im-
precision in the formulation of Article 33 (with exception of the Russian
text) on which TOW2 is based and which induces the proponents of the
restrictive approach to mistakenly equate ‘divergence’ with the more nar-
row concept of material divergence. The first wording makes clear that any
24Noteworthy, conformity only with the English text has to be confirmed, which seems to
confer more importance on it despite the equal authenticity of the Russian text. Hence,
this might be a rare case in which a court could plausibly reason to give preference
to the English text on the basis of the treaty itself pointing to this intention of the
contracting parties.
25Only three additional TOW2 treaties are without such qualifier: China-Russia (1994),
Hungary-Qatar (2012), and Russia-Vietnam (1993).
26See, e.g., Czech Republic-Lebanon (1997), having Arabic, Czech, and English texts.
27See, e.g., Albania-India (2013), having Albanian, English, and Hindi texts.
28See, e.g., Denmark-Slovenia (2001), having English, Danish, and Slovenian texts.
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divergence is sufficient to trigger the condition, obviously including mere
differences in expression. The latter two explicitly add the subject ‘texts’ of
the predicate ‘divergence’, which is only implicit in the wording of Article
33(4) via its link to Article 33(1).29 This makes clear that ‘divergence’ means
divergence between texts, which can be any kind of divergence, that is, a
difference in expression as well as a difference in meaning.
There exist a few minor variations of TOW2 formulations that, however,
do not change the meaning in substance. Some use the term ‘divergency’
instead of ‘divergence’,30 while others use different ways to designate one
text as prevailing by using the term ‘authoritative’,31 denoting one text as
the ‘operative one’,32 stipulating that divergences ‘shall be resolved in ac-
cordance with’ or ‘on the basis of’, or that ‘the interpretation shall be given
in accordance with’ a particular text.33
TOW3 is the second case of treaties designating one text as prevailing.
The major difference from TOW2 is the explicit reference to interpretation.
The most basic form lists again the number of copies and authentic texts,
designating one as prevailing in case of divergence of (or in) interpretation,
as for example in Finland-Switzerland (1991):34
Done in duplicate at Helsinki this 16th day of December 1991, in the Finnish,
German and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic. In the
case of divergence of interpretation the English text shall prevail.
The majority again adds ‘any’ or ‘between texts’ to the wording to read ‘In
case of any divergence of interpretation’ or ‘In case of divergence in inter-
29Only as far as the Chinese, English, French, and Spanish texts are concerned, i.e., most
treaties with a TOW2 final clause implement the more precise wording of the Russian
text by explicitly repeating the subject.
30See, e.g., Kuwait-Sri Lanka (2002), having Arabic, English, and Sinhala texts with the
English one prevailing.
31See, e.g., Cameroon-Tunisia (1999), having Arabic and French texts with the French one
prevailing.
32See, e.g., India-Mauritius (1982), having Hindi and English texts with the English one
prevailing.
33See, e.g., Kuwait-Spain (2008), havingArabic, English, and Spanish texts with the English
one prevailing, Libya-Serbia (2009), having Arabic, English, and Serbian texts with the
English one prevailing, and Indonesia-Russia (1999), having English, Indonesian, and
Russian texts with the English one prevailing.
34See, e.g., Bulgaria-Lebanon (1999) for a case of ‘divergence in interpretation’.
249
8. Applicability of the Permissive Approach
pretation between texts’,35 or otherwise varies the wording without affect-
ing its meaning in substance by using ‘divergency’ or ‘differences’ instead
of ‘divergence’,36 or by paraphrasing the concept of prevailing.37
A handful of treaties extends the wording to the effect of broadening the
scope, for example, ‘In case of divergence on interpretation or application,
the English text shall prevail’,38 ‘In the case of divergence of interpretation
or of any inconsistency the English text shall prevail’,39 or ‘In case of any
divergence between any of the texts and in the interpretation, the English
text shall prevail’.40 The first wording is not much different from the stand-
ard TOW3 form, but the latter two may be viewed as cases of TOW2 and
TOW3 combined because of their formulations.
Three treaties with TOW3 wordings deviate from the standard formula-
tion by referring to a divergence or difference in meaning between the texts
instead of a divergence or difference in interpretation.41 As cited above,
three treaties of Tunisia designate two texts as prevailing instead of one.
Finally, there exist a handful of treaties that are concluded in English but
stipulate that translations in the official languages of the contracting states
shall be made and exchanged through diplomatic channels.42
35See, e.g., Brazil-China (1991), having English, Portuguese, and Chinese texts with the
English one prevailing, and Albania-China (2004), having English, Albanian, and
Chinese texts with the English one prevailing, respectively.
36See, e.g., Poland-Sweden (2004), having English, Polish, and Swedish texts with the Eng-
lish one prevailing, and Algeria-Turkey (1994), having French, Arabic, and Turkish
texts with the English one prevailing, respectively.
37See, e.g., Armenia-Malaysia (1987): ‘In case of any divergence of interpretation, the inter-
pretation shall be made in accordance with the English text’; Denmark-Russia (1996):
‘In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall be used as a ref-
erence’; Iceland-Spain (2002): ‘In case of any divergence of interpretation, it shall be
resolved in accordance with the English text’; Kazakhstan-Macedonia (2012): ‘In case
of any divergence of interpretation of this Agreement the Contracting States refer to
the text in English’; Kazakhstan-Russia (1996): ‘In the case of emergence of deviations
in the interpretation of this text, the Russian text shall override.’
38Italy-Syria (2000).
39Estonia-Latvia (2002).
40Serbia and Montenegro-Slovenia (2003).
41New Zealand-Taiwan (1996), Taiwan-United Kingdom (2002), and Israel-Turkey (1996).
42United Kingdom-Uzbekistan (1993), Iran-Syria (1996), Pakistan-Tunisia (1996), Iran-
Tajikistan (1998), Malta-Tunisia (2000), Tunisia-Iran (2001). According to their word-
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TOW4 is the third instance of treaties designating one text as prevailing,
being a variation of both TOW2 and TOW3 in the sense that all texts are
declared as equally authentic while in case of divergence (of interpretation)
between the first two or three the third or forth, respectively, shall prevail,43
as for example in Estonia-Germany (1996):44
Done at Tallinn this 29th day of November 1996 in two originals, each in the
Estonian, German and English languages, all three texts being authentic. In
the case of divergent interpretation of the Estonian and the German texts
the English text shall prevail.
The Netherlands-India (1988) treaty subject of the New Skies decision dis-
cussed previously is another example of TOW4, using the wording ‘shall
be the operative one’ instead of ‘shall prevail’.
TOW5 represents the case of unilingual treaties. In its standard form it
references its language and the number of copies, as for example in Egypt-
India (1969):
Done in duplicate at Cairo this twentieth day of February, 1969, in the Eng-
lish language.
Analogous to TOW1, there still exist a few treaties that do not explicitly
declare the language, for example, Australia-United States (1982):
Done in duplicate at Sydney this sixth day of August 1982.
TOW6 is the fourth instance of treaties declaring one text as prevailing.45
In contrast to TOW2, TOW3, and TOW4, it does not refer to cases of diver-
gence but to cases of doubt, as for example in Thailand-Vietnam (1992):
ings, the later translations shall be treated as equally authentic, while in case of diver-
gence of interpretation the English text shall prevail.
43Again with a small number of minor variations in formulation that have no effect in
substance, e.g., the use of ‘divergency’ instead of ‘divergence’.
44Kyrgyzstan-Switzerland (2001) is an example of four equally authentic languages (Ger-
man, English, Kyrgyz, and Russian), with the English text prevailing in case of a diver-
gence of interpretation between the other three.
45Australia-India (1991) is the only example of a TOW6 final clause that paraphrases ‘pre-
vailing text’ with ‘operative text’.
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Done in duplicate at Hanoi on this 23rd day of December, one thousand
nine hundred and ninety-two Year of the Christian Era, each in the Thai,
Vietnamese and English languages, all texts being equally authoritative, ex-
cept in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.
TOW7 is a special case of plurilingual treaties not designating one text
as prevailing but instead prescribing application of the treaty MAP as an al-
ternative solution to cases of divergence, as for example in Germany-Spain
(2011):
Done in duplicate in Madrid on the 2nd day of June 2010, in the English and
Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence
of interpretation between any of the texts, it shall be resolved in accordance
with the procedure regulated under Article 24 of this Convention.
TOW8 is another special case of treaties designating one text as prevail-
ing, with the defining criterion being a dispute in the interpretation and/or
application of the treaty, as for example in Iran-Malaysia (1992):
Done in duplicate at Tehran this 11th day of November 1992, each in Bahasa
Malaysia, Persian and the English languages, the three texts being equally
authentic. In the event of there being a dispute in the interpretation and the
application of this Agreement, the English text shall prevail.
Finally, TOW9 is a substantive variation of TOW4 in which only the first
two texts are declared authentic, whereas the text designated as prevailing
in case of divergence is not, as for example in Germany-Japan (1966):
Done at Bonn this 22nd day of April 1966, in six originals, two each in the
German, Japanese and English languages. The German and Japanese texts
are equally authentic and, in case there is any divergence of interpretation
between the German and Japanese texts, the English text shall prevail.
Two treaties with TOW9 final clauses show a significant variation regard-
ing their formulation to paraphrase prevalence, namely, Hungary-Uruguay
(1988) and Poland-Uruguay (1991):
[B]oth texts being equally authentic and existing a third text in English,
which, in case of interpretation of this Convention, shall be taken into con-
sideration as a reference.
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8.3.2. TOW Usage
Now that we have classified all types of final clause wordings in the global
tax treaty network, we can take stock and proceed to quantify the extent
of actual use for each type. An examination of our entire sample shows
that there are three main wordings in use: TOW5, TOW1, and TOW3. The
first two are each implemented by roughly a quarter of the global tax treaty
network, while the third is implemented by almost 29%. The remaining 20%
are unevenly distributed between the six other types of wording. TOW2 and
TOW4 cover a seizable number of treaties each, so they are relevant from a
practical perspective. TOW2 is the more important, implemented in about
10% of all treaties, while TOW4 is only implemented by roughly 6%. TOW6
and TOW8, which cover seventy-five and twenty-nine treaties, respectively,
still have some practical relevance, while TOW7 and TOW9 together are
implemented only by ten treaties, that is, less than half a percent of the
global tax treaty network.
Table (8.25): TOW Distribution
TOW No. w term %global (w term) No. w/o term %total (w/o term)
1 1170 30.44% 882 26.27%
2 374 9.73% 355 10.57%
3 992 25.81% 963 28.68%
4 216 5.62% 197 5.87%
5 967 25.16% 847 25.22%
6 84 2.19% 75 2.23%
7 7 0.18% 7 0.21%
8 30 0.78% 29 0.86%
9 4 0.10% 3 0.09%
In line with the previous findings, we see that TOW1 has suffered most
from termination of treaties in proportional terms, whereas TOW3 has en-
joyed the largest gain. All other types of wording have only beenmarginally
affected by termination. For the first five types of wording, the development
over time from the 1960s to the 2000s46 shows that TOW1 and TOW5 have
46For the 2010s, all curves slope downwards because they represent the numbers only up
to the cut-off date.
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steadily increased in absolute terms until the end of the 1990s; however,
whereas TOW5 treaties continued to increase per decade throughout the
2000s (albeit with a slowed down growth rate), TOW1 treaties peaked in
the 1990s and declined in the 2000s.
TOW3 had outgrown all other types of wording by the end of the 1980s
and surged in popularity by the 1990s, steeply outgrowing all others. The
growth rate has decreased over the 2000s but remains steeper than for all
other types of wording. TOW2 shows steady growth as well but lags behind
TOW3 in popularity. It made a major leap in the 1990s along the general
wave of expansion of the global tax treaty network, but its growth rate has
not been as steep as that for TOW3 and decreased over the 2000s. TOW4 has
made a small jump in the 1990s but started to stagnate in terms of treaties
per decade throughout the 2000s.
The percentage numbers of all treaties per decade show the steady pro-
portional decline of TOW1 and TOW5 since the 1970s. Whereas TOW5 has
flattened out at a percentage share of roughly 20% during the 2000s, TOW1
has continued its decline. If the numbers for 2010 to August 2016 may be
taken as an indication of the further trend, TOW1 will stabilise its percent-
age share throughout the 2010s at roughly 20%.
TOW2 and especially TOW3 have increased largely in percentage share
of treaties per decade from the 1980s onward (TOW3 to a roughly 35% share
and TOW2 to a roughly 13% share), together accounting for almost half of
all treaties concluded in the 2000s. If the numbers for January 2010 to Au-
gust 2016 may be taken as an indication of the further trend, TOW3 sta-
bilises at its 35% share while TOW2 manages to further increase towards
the 15% mark throughout the 2010s. TOW4 peaked in the 1990s and has
decreased towards a percentage share of roughly 5% to date.
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Figure (8.9): TOW of Treaties per Decade
Figure (8.10): TOW as Percentage of Treaties per Decade
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8.3.3. TOW Interpretation
Now that we have a complete measure of all types of wording used by treat-
ies in the global tax treaty network, we need to examine their suitability in
terms of sole reliance on the prevailing text. As TOW1 represents plurilin-
gual treaties without prevailing text and TOW5 represents unilingual treat-
ies, they are not relevant here. TOW2 does not need to be discussed in detail
because it corresponds to the wording of Article 33(1), that is, the previous
discussion applies. In short, the conclusion is that the permissive approach
is applicable and we may resort to sole reliance on the prevailing text for
all treaties featuring a TOW2 final clause, subject to the outlined limita-
tions. TOW7 is a special case: instead of implementing a prevailing text,
the contracting states agree to use the treaty MAP in cases of divergence.47
TOW7 appeared for the first time in the treaty France-United Arab Emirates
(1989) and remained a singular instance for two decades. In recent years, it
has been implemented by Spain in six instances.48 Whether this marks a
sustainable new direction in Spain’s treaty policy that will manage to influ-
ence other countries remains to be seen. In summary, the types of wording
to be considered here are TOW3, TOW4, TOW6, TOW8, and TOW9.
The first impulse of any court may be to initially refer to the text in the
country’s official legal language; however, such is by no means mandatory.
The equal authenticity of all texts implies that the judge may choose any of
them as initial reference, including the one designated as prevailing. Hence,
concerning sole reliance on the prevailing text the crucial two questions to
ask are not whether the judge is allowed to automatically go to the prevail-
ing text and whether he is allowed to rely on it exclusively, but whether the
wording of the particular treaty final clause contains anything that prevents
47In line with the general purpose of MAPs, the conception of ‘divergence’ employed by
TOW7 must be considered one of material divergence, limited to cases when problems
persist after exhaustion of all interpretative means provided by the VCLT, that is, when
no commonmeaning of the texts can be established under application of Articles 31–33,
leading to taxation not in accordance with the common intentions of the contracting
states, see OECD, Model Tax Convention, 2017, Commentary on Article 25, paras. 1–3,
7, by analogy. Otherwise, TOW7 would lead to a proliferation of MAP cases given the
likelihood of divergences in expression.
48Albania (2010), Cyprus (2013), Germany (2011), Oman (2014), Pakistan (2010), Qatar
(2015).
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him from taking the prevailing text as initial reference and, if not, whether
the meaning he arrives at by interpreting the prevailing text alone is such
that he can spare himself from comparing it to the others.
The first question I shall now answer for all types of final clauses identi-
fied, whereas the second is one that courts may need to answer on a case
by case basis. I have already answered it in principle, that is, the court has
to refer to the other texts only if the interpretation of the prevailing text
under Article 31 leads to a meaning which is either ambiguous or obscure,
or must be considered an absurd or unreasonable result. In all other cases,
the court may rely on the prevailing text alone.
TOW3 is less broad than TOW2 because it refers to divergence in/of inter-
pretation instead of (any) divergence (between texts) in general.That seems
to imply not every difference in expression is a reason to rush headlong into
action as long as it does not lead to differing interpretations. This raises the
question of what is meant by ‘divergence in interpretation’: Does it mean
any different interpretation brought forward by any party interpreting the
treaty, different interpretations the texts prima facie lend themselves to in
general, or different meanings of the texts arrived at by the court under its
authoritative interpretation?
Without doubt, the proponents of the restrictive approach would have
it to mean the latter; however, the question is irrelevant because there is
nothing in TOW3 that prevents the court from initial reference to the pre-
vailing text. Once a manifest meaning of the prevailing text has been es-
tablished, such cannot be challenged by any different interpretation on the
basis of any or all other texts. As we have seen previously, Hardy’s counter-
argument to the logical argument does not hit home. It follows that for all
treaties featuring a TOW3 final clause the court may resort to sole reliance
on the prevailing text.
This even applies to the few treaties that use themore narrow ‘divergence
in meaning’ formulation. Although this implies a material divergence in
the sense suggested by the proponents of the restrictive approach, because
‘meaning’may be understood not to be any interpretation by anyone but the
final authoritative interpretation by the court, there is otherwise nothing
in TOW3 that prevents the court from resorting to the prevailing text as
equally authentic in the first place. In consequence, the logical argument
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applies and whether a divergence of another text from the prevailing one
is material or not is irrelevant in this respect.
The conclusion is also not different for the particular TOW3 formulations
that paraphrase ‘prevailing’, because all of them establish a comparative au-
thority of texts. The only exception are the three Tunisian treaties designat-
ing two texts as prevailing. Essentially, this transforms TOW3 into a TOW1
scenario of two equally authoritative texts, necessitating a comparison of
them to arrive at the one true meaning of the treaty.
TOW4 appeared for the first time in the treaty Germany-Iran (1968) and
is the preferred policy choice of Germany (82.61% of all treaties with pre-
vailing text), the Netherlands (80% of all treaties with prevailing text), and
Switzerland (56.14% of all treaties with prevailing text). It is also fairly popu-
lar in a few other countries, for example, Oman, Chile, Russia, and Syria. In
absolute terms, the Netherlands have themost TOW4 treaties (40), followed
by Germany (38), Switzerland (32), and Russia (21). Both the Netherlands
and Germany have TOW4 as final clause in their Model Conventions.49
TOW4 is the most equivocal and difficult to interpret of the nine types.
Using the final clause in the treaty Netherlands-Russia (1996) as example,
Bender and Engelen provide a comprehensive discussion of TOW4.50 In es-
49De Regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Nederlands Standaardverdrag, 1987,
henceforth referred to as Dutch Model; BMF, German Model.
50Bender and Engelen, ‘The Final Clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax Convention
and the Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, 13 et seq. They quote the clause as
follows (emphasis added): ‘DONE at Moscow this 16th day of December 1996, in du-
plicate, in the Netherlands, Russian and English language, the three texts being equally
authentic. In case there is any divergence of interpretation between the Netherlands
and Russian texts, the English text shall prevail.’ The originally signed English copy,
however, reads as follows (emphasis added): ‘Done at Moscow, on 16 December 1996,
in duplicate, in the Dutch, Russian and English languages, the three texts being equally
authentic. In case there is any divergence of interpretation between the Dutch and Rus-
sian texts, the English text shall be operative.’ The difference is not material but curi-
ous. It may be a consequence of Bender and Engelen translating from the Dutch text:
‘GEDAAN te Moskou, de 16e december 1996, in tweevoud, in de Nederlandse, Russische
en Engelse taal, zijnde de drie teksten gelijkelijk authentiek. Ingeval de Nederlandse en
de Russische tekst verschillend kunnen worden uitgelegd, is de Engelse tekst beslissend.’
The literal English translation of the Dutch beslissend seems to be ‘decisive’. In any
case, this exemplifies that the two wordings ‘shall prevail’ and ‘shall be operative’ are
equivalent in meaning.
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sence, their conclusion boils down to TOW4 implementing the restrictive
approach. Since the final clause in question states that the English text only
prevails in case the Netherlands and Russian texts diverge, they argue that
the logical argument does not apply, as a result of which the English text
may only be resorted to as decisive after it has been established that the
other two diverge from each other. Sanghavi arrives at the same conclu-
sion in his discussion of New Skies.51 Bender and Engelen’s argument reads
as follows:
However, this reasoning [the logical argument] cannot be applied here
without hesitation, since the final clause of the Netherlands-Russian tax
treaty does not invest the English text with a decisive authority in each
and every case of divergence between the texts, but only in case there is
a divergence of interpretation between the Netherlands and Russian texts.
In other words, there is no legal presumption in favour of the English text
in case there is a divergence of interpretation between this text on the
one hand, and the Netherlands and Russian texts on the other. Therefore,
it would not be correct to presume that the English text is decisive from
the very outset. Disregarding the Netherlands and Russian texts in this
way would clearly not be in accordance with the intention of the parties
in designating the all [sic] three texts as equally authentic, and thus
authoritative for purposes of interpretation. In fact, the presumption that
each text has the same meaning implies that the burden of proof lies on the
party invoking the rule that the English text prevails. In other words, in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Netherlands, Russian and
English texts are presumed to concord; therefore, in order to activate the
supremacy of the English text, it must first be shown that the Netherlands
and Russian texts are divergent.52
This reasoning is not compelling in terms of the clause analysed, that is,
TOW4.53 Being part of the treaty, the final clause must be interpreted in ac-
cordance with its ordinary wording, context, and object and purpose,54 and
the context consists first and foremost in the entire text.55 Therefore, the
51See Sanghavi, ‘Found in Translation’, 414.
52Bender and Engelen, ‘The Final Clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax Convention
and the Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, 15.
53Instead, it applies to TOW9 (see below).
54UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1).
55Ibid., Article 31(2).
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second sentence of the final clause designating the English text as prevail-
ing in case the Netherlands and Russian texts diverge must be interpreted
in the context of its first sentence declaring all three as equally authentic.
As Bender and Engelen themselves stress, this implies that all three texts
are first and foremost equally authoritative and usable for purposes of in-
terpretation without restriction.56
Thewording of the provision is misleading in this respect. When the pre-
vailing condition in the second sentence is read out of context, that is, not
in light of the first sentence, it may be misunderstood in the sense that only
the Netherlands and Russian texts need to concur, and whatever then the
situation of the English text is in such case may be disregarded, whereas in
reality the interpretations of all three texts have to concur because of their
equal authority declared in the first sentence of the provision. Otherwise,
the English text would be treated as being of lesser authority when the two
other texts are equal in meaning but of superior authority when they di-
verge. Such is incompatible with the principle of unity and the wording of
TOW4 declaring all texts as equally authentic. Article 33(4) is unequivocal
in this respect: the double reference to the texts clearly implies all texts.
Imagine the crucial scenario that the Russian and Netherlands texts are
indeed concordant but their unified meaning diverges from the English text.
Bender and Engelen reason that because all three texts are from the start
equally authoritative and the prevailing condition fails to render the Eng-
lish text superior in case the Netherlands and Russian texts concur, this
scenario is equivalent to a treaty with two language texts that diverge but
are equally authoritative. In consequence, the principles of Articles 31–33
should be applied analogous to such case minus what to do when there is
a text declared as prevailing, as the case is not one in which the English
text may be regarded as such.57 Therefore, a comparison should be enacted
first under Article 31. If that fails, the interpretative rule of Article 33(4)
implementing the object and purpose as sole decider should be invoked.
Let us examine this case in some more detail. For this purpose, let us
denote the English text as E, the Netherlands text as N, and the Russian
56See Bender and Engelen, ‘The Final Clause of the 1987 Netherlands Model Tax Conven-
tion and the Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties’, 14.
57See ibid., 17.
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text as R. Let us further suppose for the moment that the one true meaning
of the treaty is A. The principle of unity and equal authenticity of all three
texts declared in the first sentence imply N=R=E=A as point of departure.
So, obviously, if N says A, R says A, and E says A, then A. The prevailing
condition for E in the second sentence of the clause implies that if N says
A, R says B, and E says A, then A. Similarly, if N says B, R says C, and E
says A, then A. Hence, in any of these cases, any text that says something
different from whatever E says is to be reinterpreted to mean what E says.
Now, if N says B, R says B, and E says A, then, possibly, B? This does not
register as a particularly sensible suggestion, but the conclusion should be
A again. Of course, we do not know beforehand that the one true meaning
of the treaty is A; however, in all cases but the last the one true meaning
gravitates to whatever E says. If both N and R say B, then E should say B for
it to be the one true meaning of the treaty. If the meaning of E is different,
there must be something wrong: we cannot rely on N=R=B to conclude
N=R=E=B in the face of E=A, since E is at the very least equally authentic.
Do we really need a comparison of all texts to decide this case as Bender
and Engelen suggest?The English text is clearly identified as always prevail-
ing in terms of a divergence between the other texts, that is, the English text
must be presumed to better represent the parties’ intentions than the other
two. If we assume that the general intention of the final clause is to ease in-
terpretation rather than to complicate it, while it cannot be its intention to
ever confer lesser weight on the English text than the others because of its
first sentence, it seems not sensible to suggest that the English text prevails
in some cases but is subordinated in others, that is, that the outcome of any
comparative interpretation under Articles 31 or 33(4) could ever turn out to
establish E=B because of N=R=B instead of N=R=A because of E=A.
Looked at from the other way around, there is nothing in TOW4 that pre-
vents the court from initially looking at the English text, since it is declared
as equally authentic. It seems not sensible to suggest that the contracting
parties, whose common intention must be assumed to be making interpret-
ation easier not more complicated, would agree that the English text pre-
vails for all scenarios except for one, which would make it impossible for
any court to rely on the prevailing text without first excluding that said
scenario in every case to be decided.
261
8. Applicability of the Permissive Approach
From a purely practical perspective, it does not seem to be in line with
the object and purpose of designating a third text in a well-known third
language as prevailing if that text cannot be relied on before the text in
the unfamiliar language of the other country is consulted.58 Coined to our
example of Netherlands-Russia (1996), such would imply that the judge on
either side would be obliged to compare either the Dutch or Russian text to
the one in his own language before being able to rely on the English text;
however, it must be assumed that the idea behind introducing a prevailing
third text in English in the first place has been to avoid having to deal with
the (from each other’s perspective) arcane language of the treaty partner in
all day to day applications of the treaty.
Given all these considerations, it is submitted that TOW4 must be inter-
preted contextually in the sense that although factored out by the literal
formulation of its second sentence viewed in isolation, the case of the other
texts concurring while saying something different from the one declared
as prevailing is equally implied by TOW4 as a case of divergence invoking
the prevailing condition. As a corollary, TOW4 is only a complicated vari-
ation in formulation but not in substance from TOW2 and TOW3, and sole
reliance on the prevailing text is available for all treaties with TOW4 final
clauses as well.
TOW6 appeared for the first time in the treaty Germany-India (1959),
which has been terminated since.59 In the beginning, TOW6 has been pop-
ular with Germany, Italy, and Israel: for roughly a decade from 1959 to
1968 the first ten treaties implementing TOW6 were all by them. Germany
has changed its policy since to implement mainly TOW4, but still has four
treaties implementing TOW6. Israel still has five treaties with TOW6.60
Only Italy has with twenty-nine treaties still a sizeable proportion of its
treaty network implementing TOW6 (45.31% of its treaties with prevailing
text). Otherwise, TOW6 seems modestly popular with Greece andThailand,
which have twelve and eleven treaties implementing TOW6 (30.77% and
31.43% of their treaties with prevailing text), respectively, while the most
58See Arginelli,The Interpretation ofMultilingual Tax Treaties, 132–33, 386n, albeit wrongly
applied to an example of TOW9.
59Germany-India (1995) implements TOW4 instead.
60Israel now mostly favours TOW3 (53.66% of all its treaties with prevailing text).
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recent specimen were concluded not too long ago in the 2000s.61
TOW6 is even broader than TOW2 and TOW3. Given the likelihood of
differences between different language texts already discussed at length,
every case constitutes a case of doubt. Whether the clause is intended to
apply only to cases of actual doubt arising with the court interpreting the
particular treaty at hand for a specific factual reason is again an irrelev-
ant question. There is nothing in TOW6 that would forbid the court to go
directly to the prevailing text, and all other texts have to be interpreted to
converge to its meaning if they say something different. Therefore, also all
treaties with TOW6 final clauses lend themselves to sole reliance on the
prevailing text.
The same conclusion applies to TOW8. Once a case has reached court, it
is fairly safe to assume that there is a dispute about the interpretation and
application of the treaty.62 Again, however, this is irrelevant. There is noth-
ing in TOW8 preventing the court from directly referring to the prevailing
text, and all interpretations of the other texts must converge to its meaning.
Therefore, also all treaties with TOW8 final clauses lend themselves to sole
reliance on the prevailing text.
TOW8 is represented only marginally in the global tax treaty network. It
appeared first in the treaty India-Kenya (1985). Since then it has beenmostly
used by Malaysia, which is the only country with a significant number of
treaties with TOW8 final clauses (23), amounting to 35.38% of all its treaties
with prevailing text. The only other country having more than one treaty
featuring a TOW8 final clause is Myanmar.63
Finally, TOW9 is a peculiar scenario in that only the texts in the official
languages of the treaty partners are declared authentic, whereas the text
prevailing in case of them diverging from each other is not. In consequence,
the court may not go to the prevailing text from the outset, since it is not
equally authentic and therefore of lesser authority than the others. Only
once the other texts are found to diverge may the prevailing text be invoked.
61Greece-Malta (2006) and Bahrain-Thailand (2001).
62Disputes about the interpretation and application of tax treaties arise mostly between
taxpayers and contracting states, not between the contracting states themselves. Hence,
it is unreasonable to assume that the term ‘dispute’ as used in TOW8would be intended
to apply only to the latter, not the former or rather any dispute.
63Thailand (2002), Malaysia (1998), Korea (Rep.) (2002).
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The way this can be done also differs for the two variations of TOW9.
The original wording of TOW9, which first appeared in the treaty Germany-
Japan (1966), is equivalent to TOW4, however, without the prevailing text
being declared as equally authentic. To this wording the whole argumenta-
tion of Bender and Engelen concerning TOW4 quoted above applies. Indeed,
the entire restrictive approach discussed at length in Chapters 5 and 6 may
be viewed as a particular interpretation of Article 33(4) applying in practice
only to this particular variation of TOW9, at least as far as tax treaties are
concerned.64
In order to find out whether there really is a divergence, the court can-
not spare itself the comparison of the texts in the languages of the two
contracting states declared as authentic, because the prevailing text only be-
comes authoritative when they diverge. In terms of the example developed
in the case of TOW4, if E=A and either N=A and R=B or N=B and R=C,
then N=R=E=A. When N=R=A, however, it is immaterial whether E=A or
E=B, but the one true meaning of the treaty remains A. Thus, regarding
TOW9, the prevailing text functions only as an alternative to the special
modus operandi of Article 33(4) using the object and purpose criterion as
sole decider.
This line of reasoning depends on whether the prevailing text has been
subject to signature, ratification, or any authentication procedure stipulated
by the treaty same as the other texts at the time of conclusion, because au-
thentic status is bestowed on any text by the conditions specified in Article
10 VCLT. As interpreted, TOW9 suggests that the prevailing text is not an
authenticated text but merely an official version prepared at the conclu-
sion of the treaty or the negotiated and initially drafted version kept as a
reference without being authenticated. Otherwise, failure of TOW9 to ex-
plicitly label the prevailing text as authentic may be considered a drafting
error, that is, TOW9 is merely a wrongly formulated TOW4 and the inter-
64Thefinal clause of the 1930 arbitration treaty between theUnited States andChina consti-
tutes an example of TOW9 outside the tax treatyworld. It features equally authoritative
English and Chinese texts but a French prevailing text in case of divergence between
the other two, see Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International
Courts and Tribunals’, 126–27, with reference to Treaties, Conventions, International
Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers,
1923–1937, Vol. 4, 4022.
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pretation submitted above in respect of TOW4 applies. That there is only
one treaty in force with this wording of TOW9 and only two others with
a variation of it suggests the latter.65 Whatever is the case is not investig-
ated here, but TOW9 is simply upheld as a genuine wording and available
policy choice for countries, while the factual conditions necessary for it are
assumed as given.
For the latter variation of TOW9 implemented in Hungary-Uruguay
(1988) and Poland-Uruguay (1991), the process of interpretation is different
conceptually. In the original variation the prevailing text ‘prevails’ over
the others once they are found to diverge. Consequently, the other texts
would have to be reinterpreted to converge to the meaning of the one
declared as prevailing, that is, the exercise is very much one of interpreting
the prevailing text and then attributing the outcome to the others. In the
latter variation, however, the third text ‘shall be taken into consideration
as a reference.’ Consequently, the third text has more or less only the status
of an additional text, not that of one truly prevailing, that is, the exercise is
one of augmenting the context used to interpret the other texts in light of
the meaning of the third. This fits better with the interpretation of TOW9
as a genuine wording and policy alternative than the original wording,
which appears more like a drafting error.
In summary, courts may not resort to sole reliance on the prevailing text
for treaties with a TOW9 final clause, subject to the condition that TOW9
is not a drafting error. As the case may be, out of the entire global tax treaty
network only three treaties employ TOW9.
8.4. Summary Observations
The preceding analysis has shown that, since the 1990s, prevailing texts
have emerged as predominant global standard, while almost all final clause
wordings implementing a prevailing text allow for sole reliance on it. Today,
additional interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual form is con-
fined to merely one-quarter of all tax treaties in force. Three-quarters of
65Japan-Netherlands (1970) did also employ a TOW9 final clause of the original variation
but has been terminated and replaced by Japan-Netherlands (2010), which is unilingual
in English.
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today’s global tax treaty network do not pose a problem because of uni-
lingual form or existing prevailing texts in combination with final clauses
allowing for sole reliance on them. The residual quarter being plurilingual
without prevailing text is not evenly distributed over the global tax treaty
network but concentrated in the treaty networks of a handful of countries,
which are however almost all big players in the global economy and inter-
national tax system, so their policies continue to weigh against the global
trend and affect large portions of the global flows of capital, goods, and
services. Therefore, coordination at the multilateral level may be necessary
to eliminate remaining additional interpretational complexity induced by
plurilingual form, together with its associated economic cost.
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9.1. Research Topic
Tax treaties have their roots before the second and even first world war.1 In
their magnitude, however, they are a post–second world war phenomenon:
their growth in numbers did not take off until the 1960s after the adoption
of the OECD Model, and their big expansion only happened by the 1990s
1The first tax treaties recorded in the IBFD database were concluded between the Ger-
man Empire and states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the first world war.
Their roots can be traced back to the Prussian industrial code of 1845 (Preußische Geset-
zessammlung 1845, 41), in which the German term for PE (Betriebsstätte) first appeared,
indicating the total space used for the conduct of a business. The terminology was in-
troduced into tax law in 1885 (Preußische Gesetzessammlung 1885, 327) in order to dis-
tribute the taxing rights between Prussian municipalities, eliminate double taxation,
and decrease the administrative burden on the local tax authorities. This led to the Law
of the North-German Federation to Eliminate Double Taxation in 1870 (Gesetz wegen
Beseitigung der Doppelbesteuerung, Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen Bundes 1870,
119). The tax treaty Prussia-Austria/Hungary (1899) for the first time mentioned cri-
teria defining a PE, structured as a positive list with a generic catch-all clause at the end.
It was followed domestically by the German Double Tax Law of 1909 (Doppelsteuerge-
setz, Reichsgesetzblatt 1909, 332), and internationally by several treaties before and after
the first world war, see Richard Xenophon Resch, ‘The Taxation of Profits without a
Permanent Establishment’, in Permanent Establishments in International Tax Law, ed.
Michael Lang, Mario Züger, and Hans-Jörgen Aigner, vol. 29, Schriftenreihe Zum In-
ternationalen Steuerrecht (Wien: Linde Verlag Ges.m.b.H.), 475–500; Joachim Dieter
Kolck,Der Betriebsstättenbegriff im nationalen und im internationalen Steuerrecht (Mün-
ster: Universität, Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, Dissertation, 1974), passim; Wasser-
meyer, Doppelbesteuerung: Kommentar zu allen deutschen Doppelbesteuerungsabkom-
men, MA, Vor Art. 1, 41–44, paras. 71–80; Christian von Roenne, ‘The Very Beginning
– The First Tax Treaties’, in History of Tax Treaties: The Relevance of the OECD Docu-
ments for the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, ed. Thomas Ecker and Gernot Ressler (Vi-
enna: Linde, 2011), 19–39. For a compilation of all the historical documents drafted in
preparation of the OECD Model Convention of 1963 and the older convention draf-
ted under the auspices of the League of Nations after the second world war, go to
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org.
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alongside the growing interdependence of the world’s national economies
and their integration into a globalised economy.2 Today’s global tax treaty
network has emerged in the era of ‘linguistic nationalism’, in which it has
become custom to conclude international instruments in several languages
instead of universally accepted ones such as Latin and French for the pre-
ceding eras;3 however, like other bilateral treaties, they show a higher tend-
ency than multilateral ones to employ a particular third language as lingua
franca in form of a prevailing text.4 In some cases linguistic nationalism is
fully overcome and unilingual treaties are concluded in a universally accep-
ted lingua franca.
The present chapter investigates the use of English (and French) as lingua
franca for tax treaties. This is of relevance in the current context because
English and French are the official languages of the OECD Model Conven-
tion and Commentary, which may provide an additional argument for sole
reliance on existing English or French prevailing texts.5 In addition, the of-
ficial languages of the contracting states and their general proficiency in
English (or French) may be factors that influence their policy choice. There-
fore, an investigation into these factors may help to shed some more light
on the observations made so far.
9.2. Global Analysis
Most treaties (83.92%) in the global tax treaty network have English as lan-
guage of at least one of their texts, whereas French only plays a limited role
(7.68%). The proportion of treaties with neither English nor French texts is
equally marginal (8.40%). Termination of treaties over time has affected the
overall composition to the effect that the proportion of treaties with neither
English nor French texts has decreased by almost a quarter, which has been
absorbed entirely by a proportional increase of treaties with an English text,
2See Dicken, Global Shift, passim.
3See Hardy, ‘The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and
Tribunals’, 72; de Vries, ‘Choice of Language’, 26.
4See Gamble and Ku, ‘Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties’, 241 et seq.
5An in-depth appraisal of this argument would warrant a separate study; in order not to
reproduce the work of others already engaged with the topic, the reader is referred to
Lang, ‘The Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Authentic Languages’.
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while the proportion of treaties with a French text has remained roughly
the same. This indicates an increasing tendency towards the already wide-
spread use of English as authentic language, whereas French is stagnating
in relative terms at its marginal level.
When we consider only all plurilingual treaties without prevailing text,
we see that still over 70% have English, 16% have French, and slightly over
12% have neither as authentic language. This points again to the conclu-
sion that a relatively high proportion of English-speaking countries have a
policy of not implementing a prevailing text. In addition, it suggests that
English receives a boost once prevailing texts are implemented.
Table (9.1): Treaties with English or French Texts
Treaties eng AL fre AL neither
Global No. w term 3135 304 405
Total No. w/o term 2818 258 282
%global w term 81.56% 7.91% 10.54%
%total w/o term 83.92% 7.68% 8.40%
+/- 2.36% -0.23% -2.14%
PL w/o PT w/o term 631 148 110
%PL w/o PT w/o term 70.98% 16.65% 12.37%
The language distribution for all unilingual treaties shows that roughly
three-quarters of them are in English. Other languagesmost used are Arabic
and Frenchwith shares of 8.97% and 7.56%, respectively. Behind Spanish and
German with shares of 3.90% and 1.42%, respectively, the combined share
of the remaining seven languages is merely 1.53%.
Table (9.2): Language Distribution of Unilingual Treaties
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A look at the treaties for each individual language reveals that, apart
from the English ones, they merely exhaust the potential of sharing a native
tongue or official language, that is, none of the other languages is used as
true diplomatic language.The 73 Arabic treaties are all betweenmembers of
the AW, the 29 Spanish treaties between Spanish-speaking LA countries and
Spain, and the 12 German treaties between Germany, Austria, Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg. As for the 64 French treaties, the situation
slightly differs but essentially leads to the same conclusion. Roughly two-
thirds of them are between countries in which French is either the native
or official language, or used as lingua franca (most of them being members
of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie). The remaining are
all between such countries and third countries, with the only exception of
Greece-Italy (1964),6 that is, only in the case of one treaty is French used as
true diplomatic language.
For unilingual treaties in English, the situation is different. Matching
them to the countries having English as official language shows that Eng-
lish unilingual treaties between them only amount to 25% of all English
unilingual treaties, while almost 40% are between countries having English
as official language and countries that do not, and almost 35% are between
countries not having English as official language. This means that there is
a considerable number of countries not having English as official language
that use English as true diplomatic language between themselves, and/or ac-
cept it as diplomatic language with English-speaking treaty partners, that
is, when conceding a hypothetical linguistic advantage.
6It may be worth mentioning in this context that Greece joined the Organisation interna-
tionale de la Francophonie in 2004, while Italy seems to have retained a policy of using
French as diplomatic language to a certain degree (see below).
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Table (9.3): Distribution of English Unilingual Treaties
Treaties %eng UL %UL %total
UL w/o eng 23.38% 5.90%
eng UL 76.62% 19.33%
eng UL EOF 25.89% 19.83% 5.00%
eng UL EOF-NEOF 39.91% 30.58% 7.71%
eng UL NEOF 34.21% 26.21% 6.61%
The numbers for treaties with prevailing text reveal that the overwhelm-
ingmajority (almost 95%) of them use English as language for the prevailing
text.The remaining percentage points are mostly distributed between forty-
seven treaties with a French prevailing text and thirty-six with a Russian
prevailing text. Three treaties constitute a special case of two prevailing
texts (English and French) each. The residual two treaties are one treaty
with a Croatian and one with a Portuguese prevailing text.7 The thirty-six
treaties with a Russian prevailing text are all treaties between CIS members
or between them and Germany or Poland. As far as the forty-seven treaties
with a French prevailing text are concerned, ten are between countries in
which French is either the native or official language or generally used as
lingua franca, while twenty-six are between such countries and third coun-
tries. The remaining eleven are all between third countries.8
7Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia (2004) and Portugal-Timor Leste (2011). Noteworthy,
the Portugal-Timor Leste treaty has both an English and a Portuguese text but declares
the latter as prevailing. The Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia treaty has no English text
but three texts in Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian.
8Germany-Iran (1968), Hungary-Italy (1977), Italy-Spain (1977), Argentina-Italy (1979),
Italy-Portugal (1980), Italy-Sweden (1980), Italy-Slovak Republic (1981), Czech
Republic-Italy (1981), Bulgaria-Italy (1988), Italy-Netherlands (1990), Italy-Venezuela
(1990). Noteworthy, 10 of the 11 treaties are Italian ones, and they all have been con-
cluded before the beginning of the major expansion of the global tax treaty network
in the 1990s. Thus, it seems as if Italy had retained a policy of using French as lingua
franca up to 1990.
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Table (9.4): Language Distribution of Prevailing Texts







In summary, almost two-thirds of all treaties in the global tax treaty net-
work are either unilingual in English or have an English prevailing text.
The share of French is marginal, and its use as true diplomatic language
even more so. All other languages are used as unilingual or prevailing lan-
guage only to a limited extent, confined to certain linguistic, geographical,
or political regions, that is, they merely exhaust the potential for unilingual
treaties attributable to a shared native or official language. Even French is
more important as a language for unilingual treaties than as a prevailing
language for plurilingual treaties.
An exception to this is Russian, which is used as a prevailing language
by CIS members, where Russian is still official language of several countries
and regions. Other than that there has been no tendency of Russia as a super
power to extend the reach of Russian as diplomatic language to its entire
sphere of influence, neither before nor after the coldwar.This finding for tax
treaties is consistent with the research of Gamble and Ku for other bilateral
treaties.9 Noteworthy, 7 of the 36 treaties with a Russian prevailing text
are treaties between CIS members and either Germany or Poland.10 This is
striking because CIS members have a high propensity to use English for
9See Gamble and Ku, ‘Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties’, 261–62. Only the mul-
tilateral COMECON treaties were unilingual in Russian, see Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance, Income and Capital Tax Treaty (Individuals) (IBFD, 1977); Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, Income and Capital Tax Treaty (Companies) (IBFD, 1978).
During its existence from 1949 to 1991, Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam were
members of the COMECON.
10Poland-Uzbekistan (1995), Germany-Uzbekistan (1999), Poland-Georgia (1999), Poland-
Tajikistan (2003), Germany-Azerbaijan (2004), Germany-Kyrgyzstan (2005), Germany-
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prevailing texts with third countries (see below), so it seems that Germany
and Poland have been accommodating in granting linguistic advantages.
Given that these treaties are all fairly recent, this may indicate a current
bargaining strategy in treaty negotiations.11
Table (9.5): Language Distribution of Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts
















Termination of treaties has increased the total share of English as lan-
guage for unilingual treaties and prevailing texts from roughly 61% to 65%.
This increase is attributable to a proportional increase in treaties with pre-
vailing text, caused mainly by a large number of replaced treaties originally
without prevailing text, which even overcompensates a slight reduction in
the relative proportion of English unilingual treaties. In contrast, French
increased its relative share only marginally and plays no truly significant
role from a global perspective.
Georgia (2006).
11Owing to the historical context, the availability of human resources proficient in Russian
may play a role.
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Table (9.6): Changes through Termination
Treaties eng UL/PT fre UL/PT
w term total 2,364 127
w/o term total 2,186 114
+/- total -178 -13
%total w term 61.50% 3.30%
%total w/o term 65.10% 3.40%
UL w term 754 72
UL w/o term 649 64
+/- UL -105 -8
%UL w term 77.97% 7.45%
%UL w/o term 76.62% 7.56%
PL w term 1,610 55
PL w/o term 1,537 50
+/- PL -73 -5
%PL w term 55.96% 1.91%
%PL w/o term 61.21% 1.99%
9.3. Time-Series Analysis
Given the overwhelming choice for English as language for prevailing texts,
the numbers over time hardly surprise.The share of English prevailing texts
has with roughly 79% been lowest in the 1970s and equal or over 90% during
all other decades, slowly increasing towards 98%. Nevertheless, we need to
be cautious with conclusions concerning the trend character of the data.
Each treaty has been concluded at one point in time subject to an individual
linguistic and political context. Hence, the data provides no indication of
the likelihood that treaties currently with a French prevailing text would
be replaced by treaties with an English one if terminated and renegotiated.
As regards changes through termination, the numbers show that the per-
centage change from no prevailing text to an English prevailing one has
been highest with 38.74%, followed by no change in having no prevailing
text (33.11%) and no change in having an English prevailing text (21.19%).
All other changes are only marginal. As far as replaced unilingual treat-
ies are concerned, the percentage shares of unchanged English unilingual
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treaties and of English unilingual treaties replaced by treaties with English
prevailing text are dominant with 46.43% and 40.18%, respectively. All other
changes are only marginal. In particular, the numbers concerning changes
from French into English are too minuscule to draw any significant conclu-
sions, apart from the observation that such change is not common.
Figure (9.1): English Prevailing Texts as Percentage of All Prevailing Texts per Decade
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Table (9.7): Terminated and Replaced Unilingual Treaties
lang R UL %R UL
eng UL to eng UL 52 46.43%
eng UL to PL w eng PT 45 40.18%
eng UL to PL w/o PT 4 3.57%
fre UL to fre UL 3 2.68%
fre UL to eng UL 1 0.89%
fre UL to PL w eng PT 1 0.89%
fre UL to PL w/o PT 1 0.89%
Table (9.8): Terminated and Replaced Plurilingual Treaties
lang R PL %R PL
eng to eng PT 64 21.19%
eng to n PT 6 1.99%
fre to fre PT 3 0.99%
fre to eng PT 2 0.66%
PL w/o PT NC 100 33.11%
PL w/o PT to eng PT 117 38.74%
PL w/o PT to fre PT 3 0.99%
Concerning the growth of English unilingual treaties and prevailing texts
over time versus the cumulative growth of all treaties, we see that the rela-
tions have exactly reversed over the decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, English
unilingual treaties and prevailing texts made up roughly 35% of the global
tax treaty network. By the 2010s their share increased to roughly 65%. The
development has been swift. When the first wave of expansion kicked into
gear in the 1980s, the share of English unilingual treaties and prevailing
texts already increased to almost 50%.
The figures for unilingual treaties alone show that the share of English
treaties quickly jumped to over three-quarters by the 1980s and remained
at this level in a stable fashion over the decades. The per decade figures of
English unilingual treaties as percentages of all cumulative treaties per dec-
ade and all cumulative unilingual treaties per decade display a big leap from
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roughly 58% in the 1960s to roughly 68% in the 1970s and over 87% in the
1980s. Their share decreased again to roughly 78% by the 1990s, bottomed
out at roughly 72% in the 2000s, and increased again to almost 79% in the
2010s. This may indicate that the potential for English unilingual treaties is
reaching saturation; the residual quarter is comprised mostly of unilingual
treaties between countries sharing a common native or official language
other than English.
Concerning the combined figure of English unilingual treaties and Eng-
lish prevailing texts, whichmodels the entire use of English as lingua franca
by tax treaties, the per decade figure jumps from roughly 37% during the
1970s to roughly 57% during the 1980s, then starts to logarithmically ap-
proach a percentage share of roughly 73% by the 2010s. This seems to indic-
ate that the potential for English unilingual and quasi-unilingual treaties is
approaching exhaustion if no major policy impetus happens globally, that
is, the remaining relative growth potential for English as lingua franca is
located with the pool of treaties without prevailing text because of the past
policy choice of certain countries for such treaties.
On the whole, we can identify a widespread and increasing use of English
as lingua franca for tax treaties, albeit slowing down. The figures confirm
the trend observed by Gamble and Ku for other bilateral treaties concerning
the reversal of significance between English and French by the 1960s,12 and
show a swift emergence of English as dominant lingua franca for tax treaties
since.
12See Gamble and Ku, ‘Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties’, 245 et seq.
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Figure (9.2): Growth of English Unilingual Treaties




In order to acquire a balanced view, we have to group the data again. Treat-
ies betweenOECDmembers display large proportions of English unilingual
treaties (83.80%) and treaties with English prevailing text (95.41%). Never-
theless, the combined share of English unilingual and quasi-unilingual treat-
ies is with 51.86% relatively low. This is attributable to the large number of
plurilingual treaties without prevailing text. Noteworthy, however, almost
two-thirds (66.14%) of all intra–OECD plurilingual treaties without prevail-
ing text have English as one of their authentic languages. For countries that
otherwise accept English as language for prevailing texts, a comparison of
texts in cases of treaties without prevailing text has to be considered less of a
difficulty if the other text is in English. In consequence, although not used as
lingua franca for treaties without prevailing text, the otherwise general use
of English as lingua franca still reduces overall interpretational complexity,
albeit only for countries the official languages of which are the languages
of the other (non-English) texts.
For treaties between OECD members and third countries, the figures al-
most equal the figures for treaties between OECD members, although the
combined share of English unilingual and quasi-unilingual treaties is with
65.13% significantly larger, owing to the reduced number of treaties without
prevailing text. In addition, the proportion of treaties without prevailing
text having English as authentic language is increased to roughly 70%.
As regards treaties between non-members of the OECD, the proportion
of English unilingual treaties is reduced but still at almost two-thirds, while
the proportion of English prevailing texts is with over 90% roughly as large
as for the previous two groups. The combined share of English unilingual
and quasi-unilingual treaties is with over 70% again increased compared to
the previous groups, owing to a reduced number of treaties without pre-
vailing text in combination with a large number of them having English
authentic texts (80%).
In summary, English is used as lingua franca roughly half of the time
between OECD members. In addition, it is an authentic language in almost
two-thirds of all other cases because of the strong impact of the English-
speaking countries, which for the most part have a strict policy in disfavour
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of prevailing texts. For treaties with third countries their impact decreases,
and use of English as lingua franca increases to almost two-thirds of all treat-
ies.The use of English as lingua franca ismorewidespread in the non-OECD
world, encompassing almost three-quarters of all treaties, while English is
still an authentic language of four out of five treaties without prevailing text.
As far as the OECD key partners are concerned, the proportions of English
unilingual treaties are roughly 95% for treaties both with OECD members
and third countries, while all prevailing texts are in English. Their use of
English as lingua franca amounts to almost three-quarters for treaties with
OECD members and almost 80% for treaties with third countries.
Table (9.9): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (OECD)






Table (9.10): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (OECD)






The situation of treaties between G20 countries resembles that of treaties
between OECD countries, as many of the countries heavily weighing on the
intra–OECD figures also influence the G20 ones.The others increase the fig-
ures in favour of English, which is almost exclusively the language of choice
for unilingual treaties and prevailing texts. The overall use of English as lin-
gua franca is with 47.59% lower than in the OECD case, owing to the larger
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number of treaties without prevailing text. The same is true for treaties
between G20 members and third countries. The shares for unilingual treat-
ies and prevailing texts resemble those for treaties between OECDmembers
and non-members, while the overall use of English as lingua franca is with
54.84% again significantly lower. Combined with the large number of treat-
ies without prevailing text having English as authentic language, this may
point to the conclusion that, on top of the strong policy preference of some
English-speaking countries against prevailing texts, countries are reluctant
to grant linguistic advantages to economically powerful treaty partners.
Table (9.11): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (G20)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
G20-G20 94.12% 98.44%
G20-NG20 75.40% 95.28%
Table (9.12): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (G20)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
G20-G20 47.59% 75.29%
G20-NG20 54.84% 73.45%
Unsurprisingly, the numbers for the CW are more homogeneous. Intra–
CW all unilingual treaties and prevailing texts are in English, while the use
of English as diplomatic language is slightly above 80%. In addition, all treat-
ies without prevailing text have English as one of their authentic languages.
Thus, the number of cases inwhich a comparison of texts could be necessary
is limited from the outset, while there is always an English text available.
This may influence the general attitude of common lawyers towards the im-
portance of comparing texts. For treaties between CW members and third
countries, the use of English for unilingual treaties and prevailing texts is
both still close to 100%, indicating that the rest of the world accepts English
as lingua franca when making the choice for one, while the comparably
lower overall share of 53.64% for all English unilingual treaties and prevail-
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ing texts combined points to the policy of CW countries to conclude treaties
without prevailing text, together with a general reluctance of countries to
grant linguistic advantages.
Table (9.13): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (CW)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
CW-CW 100.00% 100.00%
CW-NCW 93.52% 99.08%
Table (9.14): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (CW)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
CW-CW 80.63% 100.00%
CW-NCW 53.64% 98.91%
Thefigures for treaties between EU countries and between them and third
countries are roughly in the same ballpark, except for the percentages con-
cerning treaties without prevailing text having English as an authentic lan-
guage. Although this percentage is roughly 70% for the latter group, it is
with roughly 11% exceptionally low for the first group, indicating greater
linguistic diversity. The use of English as lingua franca is around 70% of all
treaties for both groups.
Table (9.15): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (EU)





Table (9.16): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (EU)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
EU-EU 72.05% 11.11%
EU-NEU 67.39% 71.68%
Unsurprisingly, given the linguistic, historical, and political context, CIS
members do not use English as lingua franca between themselves but al-
most exclusively conclude treaties with Russian prevailing texts.13 Concern-
ing treaties with third countries, however, CIS members show little reluct-
ance to use English as lingua franca. English is used almost exclusively for
prevailing texts, as well as for almost 85% of all unilingual treaties. In total,
English is used as lingua franca for three-quarters of all treaties.
Table (9.17): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (CIS)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
CIS-CIS 0.00% 3.33%
CIS-NCIS 84.62% 97.85%
Table (9.18): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (CIS)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
CIS-CIS 2.70% 0.00%
CIS-NCIS 76.78% 58.62%
The AW figures resemble those for the CIS. Between AW countries, Ar-
abic is used exclusively. For treaties between AW and third countries, how-
ever, the percentages for English unilingual treaties (64.29%) and prevailing
texts (92.36%) are lower than in the CIS case, which is attributable to the
use of French in North Africa. The multilateral agreements both between
13Russian is still either official or second state language in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, and Tajikistan, as well as in several regions in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
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the the members of the Arab Economic Union14 and the members of the
Arab Maghreb Union15 are unilingual in Arabic,16 while for the latter an
unofficial French translation is provided by the Tunisian authorities.
Table (9.19): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (AW)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
AW-AW 0.00% 0.00%
AW-NAW 64.29% 92.36%
Table (9.20): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (AW)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
AW-AW 0.00% 0.00%
AW-NAW 73.00% 68.37%
LA countries do not use English as lingua franca when concluding treat-
ies between themselves but rely exclusively on Spanish or, as in the case of
Portuguese-speaking Brazil, do not conclude treaties with prevailing text
with their fellow LA countries. They use English almost exclusively for pre-
vailing texts in the case of treaties with third countries but resort to Span-
ish for unilingual treaties whenever possible. Fifteen out of the nineteen
unilingual treaties with third countries are in Spanish, all but one of them
14Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,Morocco, Oman, Palestine,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
15Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.
16Arab Economic Union Council, Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Pre-
vention of Tax Evasion between the States of the Arab Economic Union Council (Cairo:
Council of Arab Economic Unity, 1973); Arab Maghreb Union, Convention relative à
la non double imposition et l’application des règles de coopération d’échange dans le do-




with Spain.17 One of them is in Portuguese,18 two in English,19 and one in
French.20 The use of English as lingua franca is with roughly 60% compar-
ably low overall because of fewer and almost exclusively Spanish unilin-
gual treaties, combined with a comparably large share of treaties without
prevailing text.21
Table (9.21): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (LA)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
LA-LA 0.00% 0.00%
LA-NAL 10.53% 98.54%
Table (9.22): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (LA)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
LA-LA 0.00% 0.00%
LA-NAL 59.57% 55.41%
Regarding treaties between AF countries, the overall use of English as
lingua franca is with 78% relatively high, owing to a large share of English
unilingual treaties.This is attributable to many AF countries having English
as official language and being part of the CW. Also the ratified but not yet
17Sweden-Venezuela (1993).
18Brazil-Portugal (2000).
19Cuba-Lebanon (2001) and Chile-Japan (2016).
20France-St. Martin (2010).
21On a side note, the policy of the CARICOM countries (which are not included in the LA
group) differs.They have relatively few tax treaties in total, which are dominated by the
CARICOM official languages English, French, and Dutch, whereas the Intra–Regional
Double Taxation Agreement between some of the CARICOM members (Antigua and
Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago) is unilingual in English,
see Caribbean Community, Intra-Regional Double Taxation Agreement (Georgetown:
CARICOM Secretariat, 1994).
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in force East African Community22 income tax treaty of 2010 is unilingual
in English.23 The same was true for the 1997 version.24 Treaties between
AF and third countries feature high percentages for both unilingual treat-
ies and prevailing texts, but the overall use of English as lingua franca is
comparably low (48.82%) because of a large number of treaties without pre-
vailing text and a few countries tending to French. Also the West African
Economic and Monetary Union25 tax treaty is unilingual in French.26
Table (9.23): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (AF)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
AF-AF 96.97% 0.00%
AF-NAF 79.02% 81.25%
Table (9.24): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (AF)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
AF-AF 78.05% 100.00%
AF-NAF 48.82% 82.44%
Finally, both treaties between AS countries and between AS and third
countries show a high propensity to use English almost exclusively for uni-
lingual treaties and prevailing texts. The use of English as lingua franca is
22Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
23East African Community, Agreement between the Governments of the Republics of Kenya,
Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
(Arusha: East African Community, 2010).
24East African Community, Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Kenya,
the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (Arusha:
East African Community, 1997).
25Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.




below 90% only for treaties between AS and third countries because of a
small number of treaties without prevailing text. This policy is reflected in
the multilateral income tax and mutual assistance treaty of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation,27 which is unilingual in English.28
Table (9.25): English Unilingual Treaties and Prevailing Texts (AS)
Treaty eng %UL eng PL %PL w PT
AS-AS 94.12% 100.00%
AS-NAS 98.51% 99.49%
Table (9.26): English as Treaty Lingua Franca and Authentic Language (AS)
Treaty eng (UL+PL w PT) %total eng AL %PL w/o PT
AS-AS 91.23% 100.00%
AS-NAS 83.12% 86.27%
It remains difficult to pinpoint the exact motivations for a particular lan-
guage choicewithout an in-depth analysis of the entire background for each
case, which is not the purpose of this study. Several factors may influence
the outcome, for example, a country’s official language and linguistic policy,
the official language and linguistic policy of the treaty partner, the entire
historical and political background behind the current treaty relationship,
and the willingness to grant perceived linguistic advantages. Factors that af-
fect bargaining power such as relative economic size, asymmetric economic
interests, and the availability of human resources proficient in certain third
languages may also play a role. Even sentiments such as linguistic national-
ism translating into domestic socio-political forces may have a considerable
impact.
27Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
28South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC Limited Multilateral Agree-
ment on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Mat-
ters (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 2005).
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The relative weight of all these factors is hard to discern by simply ob-
serving the outcome from a birds-eye view; however, we may zoom in a
little on the observations most relevant in the current context by analysing
the data for certain groups and individual countries. For example, the data
shows that out of all treaties between countries having English as official
language, roughly two-thirds are unilingual and one-third is plurilingual.
Unsurprisingly, English is the language of all unilingual treaties and pre-
vailing texts. Yet, only roughly half of all plurilingual treaties feature a pre-
vailing text to begin with. Hence, some English-speaking countries have a
policy of not concluding treaties with prevailing text even when English is
available as a shared official language.
Roughly a quarter of treaties between countries having English as offi-
cial language and countries that do not is comprised of unilingual treaties,
over 95% of which are in English. Only about 40% of their plurilingual treat-
ies have prevailing texts, but almost all of them are in English. When we
compare that to treaties concluded by countries both having other official
languages, we see that the overall proportions of unilingual and plurilin-
gual treaties are roughly in the same ballpark, but only roughly half of the
unilingual treaties are in English, while roughly 80% of the plurilingual ones
have prevailing texts, almost 90% of which are in English.
Table (9.27): English as Treaty Lingua Franca in Relation to Official Language
Treaties EOL-EOL EOL-NEOL NEOL-NEOL
No. 262 1129 1967
UL %total 64.12% 23.91% 20.79%
eng %UL 100.00% 95.93% 54.28%
PL %total 35.88% 76.09% 79.21%
PL w PT %PL 48.94% 39.12% 79.59%
eng PT %PL w PT 100.00% 99.40% 87.58%
eng (UL+PT) %total 81.68% 52.52% 66.50%
From all this we may conclude that there exists a considerable number
of countries willing to agree to English as language for unilingual treaties
or prevailing texts even when English is the official language of the treaty
partner and not theirs, that is, when granting a linguistic advantage. Nev-
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ertheless, countries with official languages other than English have a much
higher propensity (roughly 2:1) to conclude treaties with English prevail-
ing text with each other than with countries having English as official lan-
guage. This may be attributable to two factors, that is, the policy preference
of some English-speaking countries against prevailing texts and the greater
willingness of countries to use English as lingua franca when no concession
of a linguistic advantage is involved. All in all, the propensity to use Eng-
lish as lingua franca in the non-English-speaking world (as in not having
English as official language) is almost exactly at two-thirds, whereas there
remains a gap of roughly 14% that mixed treaties (between countries that
have English as official language and countries that do not) lag behind in
using English as diplomatic language.
Another telling angle to look at the data is from the perspective of English
proficiency.29 Two-thirds of the thirty treaties between the native English-
speaking countries are unilingual in English. The remaining nine plurilin-
gual without prevailing text are treaties of Canada, which has a strict policy
of only concluding treaties with texts in both domestic official languages
English and French, none of which is to be designated as prevailing.
The treaties between native English-speaking countries and countries
with very good to very low English proficiency show relatively low fig-
ures regarding English unilingual treaties and treaties with English pre-
vailing text. Nevertheless, non-English-speaking countries display a limited
propensity (close to a quarter on average) to agree to English as diplomatic
language when concluding treaties with native English-speaking countries,
with the exception of countries with low and very low English proficiency,
which fall with roughly 16% short in this respect.
29Following the classification of the UK government for native English-speaking coun-
tries (Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Domin-
ica, Grenada, Guyana, Ireland, Jamaica, New Zealand, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United States of
America), together with the EF English Proficiency Index (http://www.ef.de/epi) for
countries the native tongue of which is not English. The EF EPI indexes only 70 coun-
tries, so (together with the 18 native English-speaking countries) the total sample size
is with 1,916 treaties much smaller than the global sample. In consequence, the respect-
ive statistics and conclusions presented in this section are somewhat less robust.
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Table (9.28): English as Treaty Lingua Franca for Native English-speaking Countries
Treaties n-n n-vg/g n-m n-l/vl
No. 30 155 69 108
UL %total 66.67% 16.77% 14.49% 8.33%
eng %UL 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
PL %total 33.33% 83.23% 85.51% 91.67%
PL w PT %PL 0.00% 8.53% 10.17% 8.08%
eng PT %PL w PT 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
eng (UL+PT) %total 66.67% 23.87% 23.19% 15.74%
For the treaty networks of all countries with good and very good English
proficiency, most figures concerning treaties between themselves, them and
countries with medium English proficiency, and them and countries with
low or very low English proficiency are roughly in the same ballpark; how-
ever, the first two groups have a much higher propensity to conclude uni-
lingual treaties than the third, whereas the latter two have a much higher
propensity to conclude plurilingual treaties with prevailing text. The over-
all propensity to use English as true diplomatic language and lingua franca
is relatively high for all three groups, while lowest for the first group and
highest for the group involving countries with medium English proficiency.
Table (9.29): English as Treaty Lingua Franca for Countries with Very Good and Good English Proficiency
Treaties vg-g vg/g-m vg/g-l/vl
No. 203 223 336
UL %total 25.62% 25.56% 13.10%
eng %UL 84.62% 96.49% 75.00%
PL %total 74.38% 74.44% 86.90%
PL w PT %PL 64.24% 78.31% 80.82%
eng PT %PL w PT 97.94% 95.38% 94.49%
eng (UL+PT) %total 68.47% 80.27% 76.19%
For the treaty networks of all countries with medium English proficiency,
most figures concerning treaties between themselves, them and countries
with very good or good English proficiency, and them and countries with
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low or very low English proficiency are again roughly in the same ball-
park; however, the first and third groups have a much lower propensity to
conclude unilingual treaties than the second one, while they have a higher
propensity to conclude plurilingual treaties with prevailing text.The overall
propensity to use English as true diplomatic language and lingua franca is
high. Treaties between countries with medium English proficiency display
the comparably highest propensity while treaties with low or very low Eng-
lish proficiency countries display the comparably lowest.
Table (9.30): English as Treaty Lingua Franca for Countries with Medium English Proficiency
Treaties m-m m-vg/g m-l/vl
No. 52 223 204
UL %total 15.38% 25.56% 11.76%
eng %UL 87.50% 96.49% 50.00%
PL %total 84.62% 74.44% 88.24%
PL w PT %PL 86.36% 78.31% 83.89%
eng PT %PL w PT 94.74% 95.38% 86.09%
eng (UL+PT) %total 82.69% 80.27% 69.61%
For the treaty networks of all countries with low or very low English
proficiency, the figures for treaties between themselves, them and coun-
tries with medium English proficiency, and them and countries with very
good or good English proficiency deviate the most. Although the first group
has a higher propensity to conclude unilingual treaties than the global av-
erage of roughly 25%, the propensities of the latter two to do so are signific-
antly lower. Only about 16% of the unilingual treaties concluded by the first
group are in English.This number increases to half for the second, and three-
quarters for the third group. Overall, the lower propensities to conclude
English unilingual treaties are mostly compensated by plurilingual treaties
with English prevailing text. Consequently, the overall propensity to use
English as lingua franca increases to levels close to the previous groupings,
with only the first group falling short at 52.82%.
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Table (9.31): English as Treaty Lingua Franca for Countries with Low and Very Low English Proficiency
Treaties l-vl l/vl-m l/vl-vg/g
No. 195 204 336
UL %total 28.72% 11.76% 13.10%
eng %UL 16.07% 50.00% 75.00%
PL %total 71.28% 88.24% 86.90%
PL w PT %PL 71.22% 83.89% 80.82%
eng PT %PL w PT 94.95% 86.09% 94.49%
eng (UL+PT) %total 52.82% 69.61% 76.19%
All in all, the propensity of non-English-speaking countries to use Eng-
lish as lingua franca is fairly high and does not diminish significantly with
the level of English proficiency when concluding treaties with each other,
apart from treaties between countries that have a low or very low English
proficiency, which fall short by almost 20% but still remain over 50%. This
may not be surprising because the country level of English proficiency may
not be overly representative of the level of English proficiency of the hu-
man resources involved in the negotiation, interpretation, and application
of tax treaties.
Strikingly, however, the correlation is not linear. The countries with me-
dium levels of English proficiency – not the ones with the highest levels –
display the most use of English as lingua franca. The countries with good
and very good English proficiency come in second by 10% short, while the
countries with low and very low English proficiency come in almost 20%
behind countries with good and very good English proficiency and almost
30% behind countries with medium English proficiency. Again, however,
this is not true across the board but only concerning the treaties of these
countries with each other.
For treaties between countries of low and very low English proficiency
with countries with very good, good, andmediumEnglish proficiency, these
numbers increase by almost 20–25%. Hence, the lower level of using English
as lingua franca is not necessarily attributable to a lack of readiness to do
so on their part, but rather caused by two factors: the slightly higher levels
of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text and the significantly lower
number of unilingual treaties in English together with a higher number
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of unilingual treaties in other languages, that is, rather attributable to a
lack of opportunity because their treaty partners prefer not to implement
prevailing texts, in addition to a larger opportunity to use languages other
than English for unilingual treaties because of shared third languages as
native or official languages.
In contrast, the 5–10% higher propensity of countries with good and very
good English proficiency to use English as lingua franca when concluding
treaties with countries of medium, low, or very low English proficiency
compared to treaties with countries of their own group is attributable al-
most entirely to a lower propensity to conclude treaties with prevailing text
because the percentages of unilingual English treaties for treaties between
themselves and with countries of medium English proficiency do barely de-
viate from the global average.Thus, this group contains more countries that
have a policy not to implement prevailing texts when concluding plurilin-
gual treaties.
The picture is entirely reversed when native English-speaking countries
are involved. Their treaties with all other countries show a low propensity
to use English as diplomatic language, which is represented both by less
English unilingual treaties and less treaties with prevailing text, that is, this
group contains mostly countries that have a strong policy not to implement
prevailing texts. In addition, the low figures may contain an element of re-
luctance on the part of other countries to grant linguistic advantages to
native English-speaking countries, which is highest for countries with low
and very low English proficiency.
9.5. Per Country Analysis
Analogous to the previous chapter, this sections performs a per country ana-
lysis of the use of English as lingua franca and (true) diplomatic language.
The sub-group of G1 countries that do not have English as official language
shows a high acceptance of English as lingua franca in general. Noteworthy,
several of them have a large number of English unilingual treaties, for ex-
ample, all the Nordic countries, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Japan, and the
Netherlands, together with a few others with slightly smaller but still size-
able amounts relative to the total number of their treaties. These countries
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have a stronger than average acceptance of English as true diplomatic lan-
guage.30 Despite having a policy to conclude unilingual treaties in English
as codified in its Model Convention, Belgium ranges in the midfield con-
cerning its overall score. This is attributable to a relatively large number of
treaties without prevailing text or with a French prevailing text.
France and Luxembourg virtually do not accept English as lingua franca
for tax treaties. In the case of France this may be rooted in the historical con-
text of French having played a dominant role as (true) diplomatic language
from the times of Louis XIV until the beginning of the 20th century, whereas
for Luxembourg the reasons may lie in the domestic linguistic context of
having three official languages: French, German, and Luxembourgish. Note-
worthy, Luxembourg has a handful of unilingual treaties in English.31 The
newer ones with the English-speaking Channel Islands and the Czech Re-
public (showing itself a strong propensity in favour of using English as true
diplomatic language and lingua franca) are fairly recent. It remains to be
seen whether they mark a change in Luxembourg’s policy for the future.
For the older ones, the motivation may have been rather to avoid the im-
passe of being faced with equally authentic texts in from a European per-
spective arcane languages, together with respective policy preferences of
the treaty partners.
Table (9.32): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G1 NEOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Indonesia 94.20% 69 25
Estonia 91.67% 60 11
Thailand 90.91% 66 25
Korea (Rep.) 87.78% 90 15
Japan 86.76% 68 30
Slovenia 86.67% 60 4
Croatia 85.71% 63 6
30Nevertheless, the Nordic Convention between the Scandinavian countries has Danish,
Faroese, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish texts, all being equally authoritat-
ive, see Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Income and Capital
Tax Treaty (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1996).
31Czech Republic (2013), Guernsey (2013), Isle of Man (2013), Japan (1992), Jersey (2013),
Korea (Rep.) (1984), Singapore (2013), Taiwan (2011), and Turkey (2003).
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Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Cyprus 84.38% 64 24
Czech Republic 83.52% 91 32
Turkey 83.13% 83 18
Finland 82.50% 80 35
Vietnam 81.94% 72 7
Hungary 80.49% 82 24
Sweden 79.35% 92 49
Denmark 79.01% 81 39
United Arab Emirates 78.75% 80 6
Norway 78.72% 94 46
Bulgaria 77.46% 71 8
Kuwait 77.14% 70 1
Netherlands 76.77% 99 29
Romania 76.67% 90 5
China 74.07% 108 0
Slovak Republic 73.91% 69 9
Egypt 71.21% 66 13
Belarus 69.57% 69 3
Ukraine 68.49% 73 0
Belgium 64.71% 102 37
Portugal 64.10% 78 1
Poland 63.64% 88 6
Russia 62.64% 91 0
Austria 62.37% 93 12
Qatar 62.16% 74 1
Italy 50.46% 109 4
Switzerland 49.58% 119 2
Spain 38.38% 99 0
Germany 37.04% 108 0
Morocco 35.82% 67 0
Luxembourg 21.18% 85 10
France 0.00% 139 0
In the case of Morocco, the low percentage is an outcome of the large
proportions of treaties with a French prevailing text and unilingual treaties
in Arabic. Nevertheless, Morocco still has a sizeable number of treaties with
English prevailing texts. Thus, generally speaking, Morocco seems to be
open to use English, French, or Arabic depending on the preferences of its
treaty partners.
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The situation is somewhat similar for Germany. Given the larger number
of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text, the overall propensity to use
English is only at roughly 37%. Nevertheless, Germany seems to be fairly
happy to accept English as lingua franca for tax treaties, while not being a
driving force in this respect.32 Noteworthy, Germany has four treaties with
a prevailing text in Russian;33 hence, given that the treaty partners in all
these cases are themselves fairly happy to use English for prevailing texts,
Germany seems to be open to accommodate its treaty partners in terms of
their native tongue or official language as a bargaining strategy.34
Spain also appears open to use English as lingua franca depending on
the treaty parter, while the relatively low score overall is attributable to
the larger amount of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text plus the
sizeable amount of Spanish unilingual treaties with LA countries.
All prevailing texts of Switzerland’s treaties are in English; however, out
of the one hundred and five plurilingual treaties in total, only roughly half
have a prevailing text to begin with.Therefore, the overall propensity to use
English as lingua franca for tax treaties remains with 49.58% comparably
low versus the global average because Switzerland’s unilingual treaties are
distributed over English, French, German, and Italian, the latter three being
official languages domestically. On thewhole, it seems that Switzerland, too,
is willing to use English as lingua franca for tax treaties, depending on the
preferences of its treaty partners.
The same goes for Italy, but with the peculiarity that Italy seems to have
retained a certain willingness to use French as lingua franca at least up to
the 1990s, embodied in 13 treaties with a French prevailing text and one
French unilingual treaty.35
32However, the final clause of the German Model published for the first time in 2013 im-
plements an English prevailing text (see next section), so it seems that German treaty
policy has shifted if it ever was different.
33Uzbekistan (1999), Azerbaijan (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005), and Georgia (2006). It has to
be noted in this context that, for historical reasons, Germany disposes of a sizeable
amount of human resources proficient in Russian.
34Germany also has two treaties with a French prevailing text, namely, Iran (1968) and
Algeria (2007).
35Greece (1964 – unilingual), Morocco (1972), Spain (1977), Hungary (1977), Tunisia (1979),
Argentina (1979), Sweden (1980), Portugal (1980), Slovak Republic (1981), Czech Repub-
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When we look at the numbers for all G1 countries with English as official
language, we see again that Canada has a strict policy not to use English
as lingua franca – a policy rooted in its domestic law.36 For the other coun-
tries in this sub-group, the use of English exhausts itself largely in unilin-
gual treaties with fellow English-speaking countries, with the exception of
India and Malaysia, which both display a strong policy to use English as
diplomatic language for tax treaties.
Table (9.33): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G1 EOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
India 97.00% 100 4
Malaysia 86.75% 83 7
Singapore 69.32% 88 37
Pakistan 68.75% 64 28
Malta 56.76% 74 24
South Africa 53.49% 86 36
Ireland 46.15% 78 25
United Kingdom 38.64% 132 43
United States 31.17% 77 23
Canada 0.00% 97 0
Overall, the sub-group of G2 countries not having English as official
language shows a high propensity to use English as lingua franca. Mex-
ico, Jordan, Brazil, Chile, Turkmenistan, and Lebanon make up the midfield
open to use English depending on the treaty parter. Only Tunisia and Al-
geria show little propensity to accept English. Noteworthy, only few coun-
tries have significant amounts of English unilingual treaties.
lic (1981), Bulgaria (1988), Netherlands (1990), Venezuela (1990), Mozambique (1998).
36See Gamble and Ku, ‘Choice of Language in Bilateral Treaties’, 249–53; Sasseville, ‘The
Canadian Experience’, 36.
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Table (9.34): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G2 NEOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Latvia 93.22% 59 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina 92.11% 38 13
Serbia and Montenegro 92.11% 38 8
Iran 92.00% 50 1
Macedonia (FYR) 88.46% 52 2
Albania 88.37% 43 9
Greece 87.93% 58 14
Israel 87.72% 57 9
Lithuania 85.19% 54 0
Bahrain 80.95% 42 0
Iceland 80.85% 47 14
Georgia 78.18% 55 2
Armenia 76.09% 46 0
Azerbaijan 75.00% 48 1
Kazakhstan 72.09% 43 2
Uzbekistan 71.70% 53 1
Saudi Arabia 71.05% 38 0
Mauritius 67.31% 52 27
Moldova 65.96% 47 0
Syria 65.63% 32 3
Oman 63.89% 36 0
Venezuela 58.82% 34 0
Tajikistan 58.06% 31 2
Mexico 55.17% 58 0
Jordan 54.55% 33 0
Brazil 51.52% 33 0
Chile 51.52% 33 1
Turkmenistan 47.50% 40 0
Lebanon 45.45% 33 5
Algeria 17.14% 35 0
Tunisia 16.36% 55 0
Use of English for G2 countries with English as official language largely
follows their preference for and against prevailing texts. While Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, and Hong Kong show a high propensity to use English as diplo-
matic language, the numbers for New Zealand, Philippines, Barbados, and
Australia are lower but still around 50-65% because of the high number of
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English unilingual treaties.
Table (9.35): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G2 EOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Bangladesh 93.75% 32 17
Sri Lanka 87.23% 47 0
Hong Kong 80.00% 35 16
New Zealand 65.31% 49 26
Philippines 62.79% 43 20
Barbados 50.00% 32 12
Australia 47.27% 55 24
For both G3 sub-groups, one has to be careful with conclusions because
of the small sample sizes. Concerning the sub-group of countries not hav-
ing English as official language, the majority shows a high propensity to use
English as lingua franca. Libya and Argentina may be categorised as belong-
ing to the indifferent group, whereas Ecuador and in particular Senegal are
the only countries showing reluctance to use English.
Table (9.36): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G3 NEOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Mongolia 89.29% 28 5
San Marino 85.71% 21 4
Serbia 80.77% 26 3
Panama 68.75% 16 0
Uruguay 65.00% 20 0
Kyrgyzstan 64.00% 25 0
Liechtenstein 57.89% 19 3
Libya 50.00% 16 0
Argentina 40.00% 20 0
Ecuador 18.75% 16 0
Senegal 0.00% 17 0
Regarding the G3 sub-group of countries with English as official lan-
guage, the generally high percentages seem to be based mostly in a larger
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number of English unilingual treaties with fellow English-speaking coun-
tries. Sudan and Zimbabwe seem to be in the indifferent category. Trinidad
and Tobago and Guernsey are the only countries showing reluctance to use
English as diplomatic language. Alternatively, the numbers may be attrib-
utable to their treaty partners not being prepared to concede a linguistic
advantage; however, the sample sizes may be too small for robust conclu-
sions.
Table (9.37): English as Treaty Lingua Franca G3 EOL
Country eng (UL+PT) %total treaties eng UL
Isle of Man 86.36% 22 17
Seychelles 86.21% 29 17
Nigeria 81.25% 16 10
Jersey 80.00% 25 18
Botswana 75.00% 16 11
Kenya 75.00% 16 10
Ethiopia 70.00% 20 8
Zambia 62.96% 27 16
Sudan 55.56% 18 5
Zimbabwe 52.63% 19 8
Trinidad and Tobago 37.50% 16 5
Guernsey 4.55% 22 0
If we look at all countries with twenty or more unilingual treaties not
having English as official language, we see that most of them have a high
acceptance of English as true diplomatic language. Only France and Tunisia
do not accept English at all. Lebanon and Egypt accept English, but most of
their unilingual treaties are in Arabic and French. Almost all the others dis-
play an implementation rate of English as true diplomatic language above
90% up to 100%. Only Norway falls slightly below 90%.
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Table (9.38): English as Treaty True Diplomatic Language for Countries with Twenty or More Unilingual Treaties


















For countries with ten or more but fewer than twenty unilingual treaties,
the picture is more varied. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Iceland, Tur-
key, Korea (Rep.), the Slovak Republic, and Greece range at the top with
more than 80% up to 100% English unilingual treaties. Algeria, Jordan, Mex-
ico, Morocco, and Spain have none at all. Syria, Yemen, and Switzerland
accept English at least to some extent, while Austria, Luxembourg, and the
UAE range the midfield.
Table (9.39): English as Treaty True Diplomatic Language for Countries with Ten or More but Fewer than Twenty
Unilingual Treaties
Country UL eng %UL




Korea (Rep.) 16 93.75%
Slovak Republic 10 90.00%
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Finally, most of the countries that do not have a single English unilingual
treaty or prevailing text in their treaty network have only one or two treat-
ies. Only France and Canada have larger treaty networks. Senegal, Ivory
Coast, and Gabon are the only three other countries with more than five
treaties. If we subtract France and Canada, the sum of all treaties of the re-
maining countries amounts to less than 3% of the global tax treaty network.






















Sao Tome and Principe 2
Togo 2
Anguilla 1
Antigua and Barbuda 1















St. Pierre and Miquelon 1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1
Timor-Leste 1
9.6. Model Convention Final Clauses
Model Conventions provide additional insight into the policies of (groups
of) countries. Although the work of the OECD is done mainly in English,37
the Model itself contains no final provision implementing a policy in this re-
spect: both the English and French versions of the Model and Commentary
are equally official. The same is true for the OECD Estate and Inheritance
Tax Model Convention.38 Hence, regarding tax treaties, the OECD makes
37Sasseville, ‘The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries’, 130.
38OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts’ (OECD Publishing,
June 1982).
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no policy suggestion with respect to linguistic form but leaves the matter
to the contracting states.39 The recent Exchange of Information Convention
Model, however, features the following final clause:
Signed in duplicate in (. .…) on (. .…).40
This seems to suggest a policy of unilingual form to the extent exchange
of information treaties are concerned. The placeholder does not necessarily
have to represent a single language but could be intended equally for any
number of languages to be inserted; however, the fact that the clause con-
tains no language concerning authenticity rather points to the conclusion
that it is indeed intended to implement a unilingual treaty – otherwise it
would represent an odd implementation of a historical form of final clause
not explicitly stipulating the authenticity of texts, which hardly exists any
more in actual treaties in force. Whether countries use this final clause of
the Model in practice would necessitate an investigation of all exchange of
information treaties, which has been excluded from the scope of this study.
Like the OECD Model, the UN Model contains no final clause suggesting
any policy concerning lingual form;41 however, in a recent publication con-
cerning the negotiation of tax treaties, a paragraph has been included that
may be read as a recommendation:
A treatymay be negotiated in the English language even if the two countries
are non-English-speaking countries. To avoid a problem with translation
errors, they may agree to have the treaty signed in the English language
only and have two unofficial translations. Alternatively, they may agree to
have three official languages where the English language shall prevail in
case of differences of interpretation.42
39The new multilateral instrument resulting from the BEPS project contains a final clause
declaring its English and French texts as equally authentic without declaring one as
prevailing, see OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Meas-
ures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016), Article
39. This policy and its consequences are discussed separately in the Annex.
40OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters,
Model Competent Authority Agreement (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2014).
41UN, UN Model.
42UN, Papers on Selected Topics in Negotiation of Tax Treaties for Developing Countries (New
York: United Nations, 2014), 130.
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The Andean43 Model contains a final clause implementing plurilingual
form without prevailing text:
In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries sign and stamp this
agreement. Signed in (. .…) on the (. .…) of (. .…) in (. .…) copies (. .…) in the
(. .…) language and (. .…) copies in the (. .…) language, the (. .…) and (. .…)
copies being equally authentic.44
The SADC45 Model Tax Convention features a final clause implementing
unilingual form:
DONE at (. .…) in duplicate, this (. .…) day of (. .…) 20(..).46
Although no specific language is specified in the Model, the observations
made above point to the conclusion that mainly English would be implied,
while French or Portuguese would be used alternatively when shared by
the contracting states as common official language. Given that the word-
ing contains no explicit formulation concerning authenticity, it is flexible
enough to cover plurilingual form without prevailing text just by the mere
fact that the signed texts could be in different languages; however, that
would amount to implementing a type of final clause hardly in use anymore.
Moreover, Article 5 of theMemorandum of Understanding on Co-operation
in Taxation and Related Matters of SADC regulates that ‘Member States
will develop a common policy for the negotiation of tax treaties between or
amongst themselves or with countries outside the Community.’47 One may
43The current members of the Andean Community are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are associate members.
44Andean Community, Standard Agreement to Avoid Double Taxation Between Member
Countries and States Outside the Subregion (Lima: Andean Community General Secret-
ariat, 1971), official English translation provided by the Andean Community General
Secretariat.
45Current members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
46Southern African Development Community, Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Tax-
ation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (Gaborone:
SADC Secretariat, 2013).
47Southern African Development Community, Memorandum of Understanding on Co-
Operation in Taxation and Related Matters (Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, 2002), para.
1.
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infer that unilingual form has been intended and implemented in the Model
as common policy.
The ASEAN48 Model features a final clause implementing plurilingual
formmodelled on TOW6, explicitly implementing English as prevailing text
language:
Done in duplicate at (. .…) this (. .…) day of (. .…) One thousand nine hundred
and ninety (. .…), each in (. .…) and the English language, both texts being
equally authoritative, except in the case of doubt when the English text shall
prevail.49
Although the curious TOW6 does not necessarily reflect the dominant
policy of the ASEAN countries concerning final clauses in their bilateral
tax treaties, the opposite is true for the explicit stipulation of English as
prevailing text language. This may be seen as evidence for TOW6 generally
being regarded as equivalent to TOW3 and TOW2.
A few countries have issued Model Tax Conventions of their own, the
most prominent being the US Model. All incarnations of the Model to date
(1981, 1996, 2006, and 2016) feature the same final clause implementing
plurilingual form without prevailing text:
Done at (. .…) in duplicate, in the English and (. .…) languages, the two texts
having equal authenticity, this (. .…) day of (. .…).
The same is true for the US Inheritance and Gift Tax and FATCA Models.50
Hence it is safe to say that the US has a strong policy in favour of conclud-
ing treaties without prevailing text. Noteworthy, however, it has one treaty
with an English prevailing text, namely, with India (1989). At the same time
it has twenty-three English unilingual treaties, some of which with coun-
tries not having English as official language: Egypt (1980), Cyprus (1984),
Netherlands Antilles (1986), Aruba (1986), Indonesia (1988), Sweden (1994),
48Members of the ASEAN signatory to the Model are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar (Birma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
49Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Intra-Asean Model Double Taxation Convention
(Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 1987).
50United States, Estates, Inheritances, Gifts, and Generation-Skipping Transfers Model Con-
vention, 1980; United States, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Com-
pliance and to Implement FATCA, 2012.
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Thailand (1996), Denmark (1999), and Belgium (2006). Some of those coun-
tries have close historical ties to English while others have a policy of using
English as true diplomatic language, for example, the Nordic countries and
Belgium.
The Netherlands, Germany, Russia, and Belgium also have their own
Model Tax Conventions. The Dutch and German Models feature TOW4 fi-
nal clauses explicitly implementing English as language of the prevailing
text:
GEDAAN in tweevoud te (. .…) de (. .…) in de Nederlandse, de (. .…) en de
Engelse taal, zijnde de drie teksten gelijkelijk authentiek. In geval de Neder-
landse en de (. .…) tekst verschillend kunnenworden uitgelegd, is de Engelse
tekst beslissend.51
Done at [place] on [date], in duplicate, in the German, [foreign language]
and [English] languages, each text being authentic. In case of divergent in-
terpretations of the German and [foreign language] texts, the English text
shall prevail.52
Thus, for both countries having an English prevailing text is official policy.
Whereas Germany is not a driving force in this respect to date, the case is
different for the Netherlands with almost 70% of its treaties being plurilin-
gual, roughly 72% of which implement prevailing texts, 94% of which in turn
are in English. Noteworthy about the German text are the square brackets
around ‘English’, indicating a placeholder as for ‘place’, ‘date’, and ‘foreign
language’. Consequently, the policy of Germany seems to be to implement
a prevailing text preferably in English, but other prevailing language pref-
erences of treaty partners may be accommodated.
The final clause of the Russian Model employs a TOW3 clause with Eng-
lish designated as language of the prevailing text. It translates to:53
Executed in the city of (. .…) on (. .…) in two originals, each one in the Rus-
sian, (. .…) and English languages, all texts having equal force. In case of any
discrepancies in interpretation the English text will be used.54
51De Regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Dutch Model.
52BMF, German Model (the German Federal Ministry of Finance has published an English
text alongside the German), square brackets in the original.
53Translation with the kind help of Ksenia Levushkina.
54Russia, Income and Capital Model Convention (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010).
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Finally, Belgium implements English as true diplomatic language in its
Model Convention final clause:
SIGNED in duplicate at (. .…), this (. .…), in the English language.55
9.7. Summary Observations
The preceding analysis has shown that, since the 1990s, the paradigm of lin-
guistic nationalism has been largely transcended and replaced by a new
paradigm of English as predominant lingua franca for tax treaties: two-
thirds of today’s global tax treaty network aremade up of treaties unilingual
in English or with an English prevailing text. Paradoxically, aside France,
mainly the major English-speaking countries have resisted this trend. Con-
cluding plurilingual treaties without English prevailing text is a political
anachronism that should be overcome to cut its economic cost and increase
consistency of treaty interpretation. The politics involved may require a
multilateral approach to close the residual gap. The best forum to tackle the
problem would be the OECD because mostly OECD members have failed
to catch up with the global developments while they are already engaged
there in a project to increase consistency of treaty interpretation in form of
the OECD Model Convention and Commentary.




This chapter aggregates the conclusions of the previous chapters and dis-
cusses them from a macro perspective. In addition, it assumes the perspect-
ive of a technical strategy paper and, on the basis of all findings, issues
policy recommendations how to best close the residual gap and eliminate
remaining additional interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual
form, together with its associated economic cost.
10.1.1. Theoretical Analysis
The fundamental propositions on which the VCLT principles concerning
the interpretation of plurilingual treaties are based, that is, p and q, can in
the absence of a prevailing text only be reconciled with each other if (1)
the texts are de facto identical, that is, q does not hold, or (2) divergences
between the texts can be reconciled by way of interpretation, that is, q is
proven to be immaterial.
The thought experiment based on the Natexis case has shown that r2
holds for tax treaties. Hence, all texts must be compared for purposes of in-
terpreting the treaty in good faith, as the presumption contained in Article
33(3) must be considered rebutted until proven otherwise; courts may not
rely in good faith on a single text of a tax treaty in the absence of a prevail-
ing text but are required to compare all texts to correctly apply the VLCT
rules.
The routine interpretation approach is a petitio principii and therefore
invalid. Its fundamental proposition implies its requirement c2 to be fulfilled,
whereas establishment of c2 abandons reliance on a single text by definition.
Consequently, the fundamental proposition of the routine interpretation
in its stronger form is disproven by means of a reductio ad absurdum. In
addition, it has been shown that assuming c2 to be fulfilled is not sound
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for tax treaties, but the set of cases for which the routine interpretation
approach may be considered applicable because c2 would be safe to assume
is an empty set, that is, the routine interpretation in its weaker form must
be considered unsound. When c2 cannot be safely assumed, c1 by itself fails
to be sufficient to justify reliance on a single text that is not designated
as prevailing. Consequently, the routine interpretation approach does not
apply to plurilingual tax treaties without prevailing text.
Tax treaties may not be special in this regard, but the conclusion may
be reformulated as a general principle: If the object and purpose of a treaty
covers conflicting interpretations, then clarity of a single text considered in
isolation does not satisfy the VCLT principles of interpretation and the set of
cases to which the routine interpretation approach may be applied in good
faith is an empty set. Yet, the thought experiment on which the proof of
this point is essentially based has been conducted only in the context of tax
treaties in line with the scope of this study. Therefore, this conclusion must
be restricted to tax treaties as a matter of scientific rigour. To the extent
no similar thought experiments are conducted or actual cases are observed
for other types of treaties to test its applicability, the principle remains a
hypothesis in their context.
Notwithstanding, it seems more likely than not that the principle applies
to all plurilingual treaties because differences in scope and procedure may
not necessarily affect the object and purpose, as we have seen in the Kiliç
case. A current example may be CETA in terms of the text ‘made public
exclusively for information purposes’, which ‘is not binding under interna-
tional law and will only become so after the entry into force of the Agree-
ment’.1 CETA has equally authoritative texts in the Bulgarian, Croatian,
Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek,
Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Ro-
manian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, and Swedish languages.2 The English
and German texts diverge with respect to the members of the CETA court:
1European Commission, ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between Canada, of the One Part, and the European Union, of the Other Part (Non-





the English text of Article 8.27(4) reads ‘The Members of the Tribunal shall
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appoint-
ment to judicial office, or be jurists of recognised competence’, whereas the
German text employs the wording ‘jurists of recognised excellent compet-
ence’,3 which implies a stricter selection process.4
Given all the additional language texts, there should be no problem to
come to a conclusive interpretation that reconciles the divergence; however,
if only the English and German texts existed, we would face a problem if
they were the final texts in force, because the more narrow set of jurists
of ‘recognised excellent competence’ and the wider set of jurists of mere
‘recognised competence’ are mutually exclusive for jurists that are of mere
recognised but not recognised excellent competence. This difference hardly
affects the object and purpose of free trade and having an international
tribunal instead of national ones presiding. If there are no further clues
in the text itself, neither Article 31 nor 33(4) should be of much help to
reconcile the divergence.
The German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung has asked the European
Commission as responsible organ about the reason for the divergence,5
and it appears the Commission has recycled formulations of the Treaty of
Lisbon that display the same divergence between the English and German
texts.6 Generally speaking, it seems sensible to economise and reuse well-
established formulations; however, one has to pay attention to the context,
which is not necessarily transplanted at the same time. The requirements
for the appointment of ECJ judges are much stricter, which is also obvious
from the text of Article 253 itself:
3Europäische Kommission, ‘Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über die Unterzeich-
nung im Namen der Europäischen Union des umfassenden Wirtschafts– und Handels-
abkommens zwischen Kanada einerseits und der Europäischen Union und ihren Mit-
gliedstaaten andererseits’ (Germany: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie,
2016), Article 8.27(4) (emphasis added).
4Trade agreement expert Manfred Spengler, as quoted in Silvia Liebrich, ‘Im Ceta-Vertrag
stecken kuriose Wortspiele’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 October 2016.
5Ibid.
6European Union, ‘Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Official Journal of the European
Union 51, no. C 115 (May 2008), Article 253.
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The Judges and Advocates-General of the Court of Justice shall be chosen
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in
their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised compet-
ence; they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of
the Member States for a term of six years, after consultation of the panel
provided for in Article 255.7
The initial part of the sentence makes clear that appointment to the ECJ
requires exceptional qualifications fit for ‘highest judicial offices’. The same
does not apply to the CETA formulation, which only requires ‘qualifica-
tions . . .for appointment to judicial office’. Also the procedure concerning
appointment is much stricter: whereas ECJ judges are appointed ‘by com-
mon accord of the governments of the Member States’, the CETA court
judges are appointed by the CETA Joint Committee.8 It seems reasonable
to conclude that in the case of the Treaty of Lisbon the formulation of ‘re-
cognised competence’ would default to the meaning implied by the German
text under a reconciliatory comparative interpretation of both, whereas the
opposite would be true for CETA.
As the case may be, for tax treaties the above defined general principle
may be violated in a wide variety of ways by the routine interpretation
approach, not only in terms of liable versus subject to tax, but also for all
issues of personal and material scope that may affect the reciprocal sharing
of taxing rights between the contracting states in ways not intended but un-
detected because the court fails to look into the other text(s) and realise the
false meaning projected by the seemingly clear text looked at, mistakenly
taking clarity of one text for clarity of the treaty meaning.
For other types of treaties, the problem is of somewhat less significance.
Treaty interpretation developed in the field of international law where two
states argued in front of an international court. One may assume that in
such context the court is naturally informed about any language differences
between the treaty texts. Tax treaty interpretation is different in that it typ-
ically involves an argument between one of the states which is party to the
treaty and one of the contracting states’ taxpayers. Consequently, the other
language version is not necessarily argued.
7Ibid., Article 253. The German text, again, reads ‘recognised excellent competence’.
8European Commission, ‘CETA’, Article 8.27(2) in combination with Article 26.1.
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Although it is a particular anatomic feature of the institutional architec-
ture of international tax law that national courts preside over the applica-
tion of tax treaties, those courts have to apply international law as if they
were a proxy for an international court, that is, to the extent the issues
at stake are governed by international law, their guiding line has to be a
consideration of the correct principles of interpretation to be applied by
an international tax court, assuming such existed.9 Fothergill states in this
respect per Lord Diplock:
By ratifying that convention, Her Majesty’s government has undertaken an
international obligation on behalf of the United Kingdom to interpret future
9See, by analogy, Penhallow et al. v Doane’s Administrators, 3 U.S. 54 (1795) (Dallas’s
Reports), 36: ‘A prize court is, in effect, a court of all the nations of the world, be-
cause all persons in every part of the world are concluded by its sentences, in cases
clearly coming within its jurisdiction’ (a prize court is a ‘municipal (national) court
in which the legality of captures of goods and vessels at sea and related questions are
determined’, Encyclopedia Britannica, ‘Prize Court’; see also Manley O. Hudson, The
Permanent Court of International Justice 1920–1942 (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1943), 71–79); Rose v Himeley, 8 U.S. 241 (1808), 277, concerning the ‘principle
that the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations, and is sup-
posed to be equally understood by all’; TWA v Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984),
262–263, Justice Stevens (dissenting): ‘The great object of an international agreement is
to define the common ground between sovereign nations. Given the gulfs of language,
culture, and values that separate nations, it is essential in international agreements for
the parties to make explicit their common ground on the most rudimentary of matters.
The frame of reference in interpreting treaties is naturally international, and not do-
mestic. Accordingly, the language of the law of nations is always to be consulted in
the interpretation of treaties. . . .Constructions of treaties yielding parochial variations
in their implementation are anathema to the raison d’etre of treaties, and hence to the
rules of construction applicable to them’; Buchanan (James) & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forward-
ing and Shipping (UK) Ltd, 152, per Lord Wilberforce, concerning interpretation of a
treaty ‘unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent,
but on broad principles of general acceptation’;Memec Plc v Inland Revenue Comission-
ers, [1996] STC 1336, 1349, per Robert Walker J., in terms of treaties to be construed in
an ‘international, not exclusively English’ way; R v Secretary for the Home Department,
Ex Parte Adan, [2001] AC 477, 515–517, per Lord Steyn: ‘In principle therefore there
can only be one true interpretation of a treaty. . . .In practice it is left to national courts,
faced with a material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve it. But in
doing so it must search, untrammelled by notions of its national legal culture, for the




treaties in this manner and, since under our constitution the function of
interpreting the written law is an exercise of judicial power and rests with
the courts of justice, that obligation assumed by the United Kingdom falls
to be performed by those courts.10
The common law judge may be trying to come to the same answer as an
international court, but if in doing so he obstinately adheres to the domestic
litigation traditions in terms of relying on one text alone when the parties
do not raise a divergence, he will not be able to come to that answer and, in
consequence, violate Articles 26 and 27 VCLT. Domestic procedural rules do
not have to be abandoned, but they have to be transcended to ensure proper
observance of obligations under international law, because with respect to
tax treaties it is not the law as argued by the parties to the dispute that is
at stake, but the terms of the deal struck between the contracting states.11
In practice, such may only be achieved in common law countries via an
extension of the duties of parties to put all texts before the judge.
The routine interpretation approach has frequently claimed heritage of
Waldock’s arguments. It is true that Waldock may be interpreted to have
argued its case; however, he may also be understood to have been primarily
concerned with how a comparison is to be conducted, that is, the point in
10Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 283. As Waibel notes, although the VCLT is not incor-
porated into UK domestic law, ‘there is widespread agreement about the customary
character of the VCLT interpretative principles’ and ‘They [English courts] refer to the
VCLT with some regularity, and when they do so seem to apply the VCLT as interna-
tional law’, Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation’, 20–21.
11Noteworthy, the principle of iura novit curia has been recognised and applied by interna-
tional courts such as the PCIJ, the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
ECHR, and the WTO adjudicating bodies, see Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in
WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 50 et seq.;
Federico Ortino, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1995–2003 (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2004), 167 et seq.; Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), 154 et seq.; Nicaragua v United States of America – Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 14 and 29; Fisheries Jurisdiction (United
Kingdom v Iceland), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice, 1974), 9,
para. 17;Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, 2002, para. 107. Thus, it may be regarded as a principle to be
applied in proceedings concerned with issues of international law.
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time when to best compare the texts, and not with denying the need for a
comparison in general.12
When not understood in the sense of excluding a comparison altogether,
the idea to first contemplate every text on its ownmerit in order to avoid ad-
ditional confusion may to some extent be sensible because the judge cannot
consider everything all at once but has to work his way forward through
the materials. Because of the remaining indeterminacy of a single text in-
terpreted in isolation, the question is then not whether but at what point
12If he were to be understood otherwise, his overall position would have to be qualified
as inconsistent. As pointed out by him in the ILC’s 874th meeting, the defects of the
initially drafted text may be the source of the problem rather than the solution, so any
notion that the initially drafted text should necessarily prevail must be rejected, see
ILC, Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966, I, Part II:210–11,
para. 33. This contradicts interpretation of his conceptual argument against adding a
comparison among the principal means of interpretation along the lines of the routine
interpretation approach, which presupposes an ultimate security of the individual texts
when interpreted in isolation. Here Waldock concedes that the contrary is true: there
is no ultimate security based on any individual text if the result is not confirmed by the
others, even when the text considered is the original one. Hence, his argument against
a comparison in order not to undermine the ‘security of the individual texts’ by trans-
planting ‘concepts of one language into the interpretation of a text in another language’,
ILC,Documents of the Second Part of the Seventeenth Session and of the Eighteenth Session
Including the Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, 100, para. 23, may be
understood only as implying a provisional procedural measure intended to safeguard
interpretation of each text according to its own idiomatic construction, while the out-
comes remain subject to verification under a consecutive comparison. Otherwise he
would have to be considered to contradict himself. As construed by the proponents of
the routine interpretation approach, his argument would not be very convincing in the
first place because he fails to provide sufficient reason why comparing terms during
the process of interpretation should result in distortion rather than clarification. Such
contention is merely speculative, while the opposite appears much more plausible. In
view of the need to preserve the unity of the treaty, the purposive constructions of
the texts ought to be reconciled regardless of their individual idiomatic constructions
unless such proves impossible, in which case the treaty must be considered defective.
This is the essence of Article 33(1), (3), and (4), and Waldock provides no good reason
why in order to achieve this goal a comparison of terms should prove more harmful
than helpful, see Kuner, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 958. Certainly,
his contention as understood by the proponents of the routine interpretation approach
would not find support among the prominent hermeneutic theorists of all eras, some
of whom forcefully rejected analogous ideas explicitly, see Chapter 3, s. 3.5.
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in time to conduct a comparison. The VCLT is tacit as to this point in terms
of explicit imperative language. According to Waldock as understood here,
the interpreter should first appreciate each text separately and then venture
to interpret them in light of each other. The approach to adopt may be sum-
marised as per Lord Wilberforce (by analogy but nevertheless pertinent):
So, in the present case the process of interpretation seems to involve (1) in-
terpretation of the English text, according to the principles on which inter-
national conventions are to be interpreted, (2) interpretation of the French
text according to the same principles but with additional linguistic problems,
(3) comparison of these meanings. Moreover, if the process of interpreta-
tion leaves the matter in doubt, the question may have to be faced whether
travaux preparatoires may be looked at in order to resolve the difficulty.13
It is submitted that (3) includes a consideration of the object and purpose
as sole decider under Article 33(4) as final authentic means to establish the
ordinary meaning on the basis of the text before supplementary means may
be used in their active role to determine the treaty meaning. Concerning
this, the ambiguous reference to Article 32 in Article 33(4) must be inter-
preted as referring only to the passive confirmatory role of Article 32 while
excluding the second part of its sentence. Otherwise, the fundamental hier-
archy implemented by the VCLT principles between authentic and supple-
mentary means, limiting use of the latter, would be upset. To the extent the
omission of letters (a) and (b) in the reference to Article 32 by Article 33(4)
may be seen as deliberate in view of the context and object and purpose of
Article 32 as merely permissive aid to be used in its active role only in lim-
ited situations, this coincides with a super-literal interpretation. The quasi-
literal interpretation, understanding the ambiguous reference to Article 32
as a reference to the entire article including letters (a) and (b), leads to an in-
consistent back and forth between authentic and supplementary means and
a crowding out of Article 33(4) in practice, rendering it an empty provision
never to apply, which violates the principle of effectiveness.
‘Ambiguous’, ‘obscure’, ‘absurd’, and ‘unreasonable’ in Article 32 must
be understood as intended to apply only to problems of the treaty meaning,
and not to problems between texts, to which ‘divergence’ and Article 33(4)
13Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 272. Noteworthy, recourse to supplementary means
is understood to come after a comparison of text, not before.
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are intended to apply, that is, Article 33(4) must be understood as a mere
extension of Article 31, augmenting it to close a gap in terms of plurilingual
form, whereas Article 32 must be understood to be supplementary to both.
To suggest otherwise and interpret ‘ambiguous’, ‘obscure’, ‘absurd’, and ‘un-
reasonable’ in a wider colloquial sense collapses the conceptual demarca-
tions between them and ‘divergence’, effectively rendering divergence an
empty concept. To the extent that problems between texts are classified as
an ambiguity to be treated by reference to supplementary means, Article
33(4) is bypassed, violating the intentions of the parties to the VCLT ex-
pressed by including it.
Such understanding is consistent with the dictum that in principle pluri-
lingual form of a treaty should not entail a different system of interpretation
than codified in the general rule, that is, Article 33 should only augment the
general rule of interpretation for plurilingual scenarios but not alter it. The
only alteration comes in the form of multiple texts, which are however in-
tended to have the same meaning, that is, they constitute the same treaty,
and this construction has to be made compatible in a sensible way with the
general rule of interpretation devised for interpreting one treaty, whether
embodied in a single text or equally expressed in multiple language texts.
An important corollary of the relationship between Article 33(4) and Art-
icle 32(a) and (b) as suggested is that contradictions between texts do not
render the treaty immediately defective once Article 33(4) fails, but Article
32(b) allows for a final resort after the last resort in that the interpreter
may have recourse to supplementary means to overcome the contradiction
before he must finally regard the treaty as defective if such is again not
possible. Such final resort after the last resort makes sense given that there
is a treaty, which implies that the parties actually intended to agree. Thus,
Article 33(4) is not a rule of ultimate last resort but only a rule of last resort
in terms of establishing the ordinary meaning with the help of all authentic
means before recourse to supplementary means may be had in their excep-
tional active role to establish the treaty meaning.
Even in such case, however, there can be no notion that the interpreter
must choose one text if he cannot find decisive arguments on the basis of
supplementary means fitting into the VCLT framework, but the evidence
used from supplementary means must still orientate itself on the criteria
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considered adequate by the VCLT, that is, either the intentions concerning
the meaning of the contradictory worded provisions in question are unequi-
vocally represented in form of a stated understanding on their interpreta-
tion, or their object and purpose can be deduced without doubt. Caution
needs to be applied because the preparatory materials of a treaty may be
far from clear in this respect but may be a collage of all positions taken
by the contracting parties during the negotiation phase, which may be mis-
leading. What matters is the final compromise that made it into the text.
If the adopted compromise is not obvious from the supplementary means
with some decisive force, the conclusion must be that the treaty meaning
cannot be determined under Article 32(a) or (b) as well.
In summary, Article 32(a) and (b) only extends the modi operandi of Art-
icles 31 and 33(4) by method of recourse to supplementary means but does
not allow for an expansion beyond their scope. Even if we suffer the pre-
dicament that the meaning arrived at according to an interpretation of the
treaty under Articles 31 and 33(4) remains ambiguous, obscure, absurd, or
unreasonable, which allows recourse to supplementary means in order to
determine themeaning underArticle 32(a) and (b), such determinationmust
be conducted within the framework of the principles provided by Articles
31 and 33(4), that is, Article 32 does not provide for a distinct method of in-
terpretation but only defines additional means to be used according to the
methods provided by Articles 31 and 33(4). Whereas the latter two contain
both legal rules and means, Article 32 only provides auxiliary means in case
the authentic means prove insufficient. For its application in substance, Art-
icle 32(a) and (b) requires recourse to the rules codified in Articles 31 and
33(4) as a legal basis. This understanding is contained in the ordinary mean-
ing of ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ as intended by the VCLT:
‘The word “supplementary” emphasizes that article 28 does not provide for
alternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to aid
an interpretation governed by the principles contained in article 27.’14
The routine interpretation approach transforms Waldock’s concern with
the point in time when to compare the texts effectively to never, only to
happen in case a problem arises, which does however not automatically
14ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19. Draft Art-
icles 27 and 28 became Articles 31 and 32 in the final text of the VCLT.
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happen with tax treaties under consideration of a single text in isolation,
that is, the problems defined by the routine interpretation approach as con-
ditions legitimately limiting its application, if present, are partly ignored
as a consequence of its application. Thus, its claim to validity is a result of
it being applied and not of all the conditions granting legitimacy to its ap-
plication being fulfilled, that is, in the context of tax treaties, the routine
interpretation approach is not a scientific but a reflexive theory.15 It seems
in this regard that it is based on an imbalanced weighing of Waldock’s ar-
guments. It concludes that it is safe to ignore q as long as nobody raises a
divergence; in consequence, it damages the principle of unity and impairs
proper application of the pacta sunt servanda principle enshrined in Article
26 VCLT.
Although the VCLT rules may not explicitly stipulate any obligation for
a comparison of texts in all cases, such obligation must be construed from
the context and object and purpose of the VCLT principles in the case of
tax treaties. The VCLT rules were drawn up with disputes between states
in mind, for which issues of divergent texts would automatically be raised
by the conflicting parties when existent. For tax treaties, the problems of
multiple texts are less likely to be automatically raised while they are not
less likely to exist, which necessarily leads to an undetected number of cases
in breach of Article 26 VCLT. To implicitly sanction each state to give pref-
erence to the text in its own language may be pragmatically opportune in
view of the number of international tax cases but effectively promotes diver-
gence rather than uniformity of interpretation and may lead to fragmented
jurisprudence.
Abandoning the routine interpretation approach escalates the practical
problems and resource demands implied by a comparison of texts. The nat-
ural reflex of the judge may be to look to the original text, that is, the text
of initial negotiation and drafting. Without explicit support by the treaty,
however, such preference is in violation of Article 10 VCLT establishing au-
thenticity of texts, Article 33, and the treaty final clause declaring all texts
as equally authoritative. The fact that treaties are concluded with multiple
language texts declared as authentic implies the common intention of the
15Conducting all tests that might refute a theory is an essential element of any scientific
approach, see Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, passim.
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parties not to consider the text in the language of negotiation and draft-
ing of higher relevance for interpretative purposes, regardless of what the
process of authentication in detail entails.
The VCLT is drafted in the way it is out of political considerations, pre-
cisely because countriesmay notwant to give precedence to a text in the lan-
guage of one of the treaty partners. The way the issue is posed by Rosenne,
‘whether the word “authentic” possesses any juridical content or whether
it is merely descriptive to serve a political purpose’,16 asks the wrong ques-
tion, and his arguments in favour of ‘linguistic concordance’ are of little
relevance to the matter. The term ‘authentic’ possesses a particular formal-
istic juridical content because of the political purpose it is intended to serve,
and the VCLT is drafted the way it is to implement that formalistic juridical
content.
There is nothing ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ about the original text to be pre-
ferred, such contention is merely speculative and without legal basis. If an
implicit pre-eminence of the original text were to be naturally assumed,
such should have been codified in the VCLT. What all the authors in sup-
port of granting decisive weight to the original text are basically saying is
that the VCLT principles should to a large extent be ignored because every-
body simply knows the text initially drawn up provides the proper meaning.
They do not interpret the VCLT rules but revise them.The ethically charged
language of their suggestions like ‘unfair’, ‘natural’, or ‘normal’ shows the
difficulty to base their view on the VCLT principles other than through a
loose reference to the principle of good faith.
It remains difficult to appreciate and delineate the scope of good faith in
its application as a legal principle, because its substance rests on the broader
and less tangible moral concepts of honesty, fairness, and reasonableness.
According to the ILC, the principle of interpretation in good faith is an es-
sential component of the rule pacta sunt servanda enshrined in Article 26
VCLT and also embodies the principle of effectiveness to the extent that
‘Properly limited and applied, the maxim [ut res magis valeat quam pereat]
does not call for an “extensive” or “liberal” interpretation in the sense of an
interpretation going beyond what is expressed or necessarily to be implied
16Rosenne, ‘The Meaning of “Authentic Text” in Modern Treaty Law’, 399.
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in the terms of the treaty.’17 Understood in this way, good faith rejects any
disposition in favour of the initially drafted text not decisively based on the
wording, context, and object and purpose of the treaty.
In order to overcome the problem of additional interpretational complex-
ity induced by plurilingual form, contracting parties may explicitly confer
special authority to one text for purposes of interpretation by designating it
as prevailing. Thereby, the practical and resource problems implied by com-
paring texts can be reduced because the VCLT framework of interpretation
allows for sole reliance on the prevailing text by the interpreter as long as in-
terpretation of the prevailing text under Article 31 establishes a clear mean-
ing.18 If such clear meaning cannot be established, recourse must first be
had to the other texts to clarify the meaning of the treaty via a comparative
application of Article 31 to all texts. If that remains unsuccessful, then Art-
icle 33(4) should be applied, that is, the object and purpose criterion should
be invoked as sole decider. If all these efforts based on authentic means re-
main unfruitful to establish the treaty meaning, the interpreter may have
recourse to supplementary means to determine it under Article 32(a) or (b).
If that fails as well, the treaty must be regarded as defective. Alternatively,
the interpreter may engage in a reconciliatory comparison of all texts from
the start; however, such may turn out to be a moot exercise in view of the
prevailing text having a clear meaning under Article 31. Hence, from a prag-
matic point of view, it is always preferable to begin with the prevailing text
and only resort to the others when it does not provide a clear meaning.
The view that sole reliance on the prevailing text is permitted only once
a comparison of texts in the face of an apparent divergence fails to recon-
cile their meaning, submitted by the advocates of the restrictive approach,
is not in line with the VCLT principles. In particular, it rests on a misinter-
pretation of the term ‘divergence’ (as used by Article 33) in the light of its
ordinary wording, context, and object and purpose. As a result, it is accom-
panied by a conglomerate of erroneous theories prescribing excessive use of
supplementary means or comparing only the texts in the two languages of
the contracting states while ignoring an existing prevailing text in a third
language until the others cannot be reconciled, which are all in violation
17ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:219, para. 6.
18Optionally, such may be confirmed but not contested by supplementary means.
321
10. Conclusions
of the principles codified in Articles 31–33 and 26 VCLT. Contrary to their
view, a divergence as referred to by Article 33(1) can be any divergence,
that is, a mere difference in expression as well as differences in meaning
that can or cannot be reconciled by a comparison of the texts under Article
31 and, optionally, Article 32 in its passive confirmatory role. This notion
fits with the fundamental axiom of the unity of the treaty in the sense that
any problem of difference between texts, even if only a different choice of
words or equivalent words with different connotations, must be addressed
by interpretative means to ensure equivalence in meaning.
As a corollary, Article 33 allows for sole reliance to the prevailing text but
does not prescribe it. In principle, recourse to the prevailing text becomes
mandatory only in case the interpreter would otherwise depart from its
meaning. This implies, however, that the prevailing text must be checked
always and can never be left out of the equation. Because the meaning of
the prevailing text prevails in all cases the other texts diverge from it, the
one true meaning of the treaty defaults to its meaning in any case, that is,
the existence of a prevailing text creates a situation of quasi-unilinguality.
This is confirmed by the VCLT Commentary, as it contains no conclusive
evidence that the meaning of ‘divergence’ should be delimited to material
differences in meaning, but employs terminology suggesting a continuum
from mere differences in expressions to material differences in meaning.
The conclusion should hardly come as a surprise, since the VCLT Com-
mentary is relatively explicit in implying it in paragraph 4 on page 224, in
which the drafters of the VCLT express their indecisiveness with respect
to prescribing a definite rule when the interpreter has to resort to the pre-
vailing text, apart from prohibiting cases of departure from its meaning.
Therefore, the wording supplied by the VCLT, if not expressly delimited by
the contracting parties in their actual treaties, must be considered flexible
enough to allow for sole reliance on the prevailing text as a tool to decrease
the complexity of interpreting plurilingual treaties, because either there is
a divergence prescribing reliance on it, or there is no divergence, allowing
reliance on it. At the same time, the VCLT wording does not compel sole
reliance on the prevailing text, but the court may compare all texts instead




Regarding the applicability of the permissive approach to tax treaties with
prevailing text in practice, an analysis of the global tax treaty network es-
tablishes the following:
1. With respect to one-quarter (25.22%), there is no problem of plurilin-
gual interpretation because of unilingual form.
2. Almost two-thirds (64.60%) of the remaining three-quarters feature a
prevailing text, amounting to almost half (48.30%) of the global tax
treaty network.
3. Apart from a small handful of exceptions, the wordings of all actual
tax treaty final clauses implementing a prevailing text allow for sole
reliance on it.
4. Sole reliance on prevailing texts is unavailable for roughly one-third
(35.13%) of all plurilingual tax treaties not providing for one, amount-
ing to roughly one-quarter (26.27%) of the global tax treaty network.
In addition, it remains unavailable for a small handful of treaties that
provide for either TOW7, TOW9, or two prevailing texts.
5. English dominates as widely accepted lingua franca for tax treaties:
About three-quarters (76.62%) of all unilingual treaties as well as the
overwhelming majority (94.57%) of all prevailing texts are in English.
In total, almost two-thirds (65.01%) of the global tax treaty network
use English either as language for unilingual treaties or prevailing
texts, whereas for French that share is confined to 3.31%. English is
used in numerous cases as true diplomatic language for unilingual
treaties between countries that do not have English as official lan-
guage. In contrast, French is confined to a marginal role with only
7.56% of all unilingual treaties and 2.90% of all prevailing texts. Apart
from a few exceptions, French is hardly used as (true) diplomatic lan-
guage.
6. English permeates the global tax treaty network as authentic lan-
guage up to 83.92%, whereas French remains marginal with only a
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7.68% share. An equally marginal 8.40% of all tax treaties use neither
English nor French as authentic language.
7. France and Canada are the only countries with major treaty networks
that have not concluded a single treaty unilingual in English or with
an English prevailing text. Apart from them, the total number of all
treaties of countries to which the same applies accounts for less than
3% of the global tax treaty network. Moreover, they are distributed
over countries with only one or two treaties in total plus a few French-
speaking countries with small treaty networks.
In summary, we may conclude that, since the 1990s, prevailing texts have
emerged as the standard device to address the difficulties of plurilingual
interpretation whenever the linguistic and political potential for unilingual
form has been exhausted. In total, almost three-quarters of today’s global
tax treaty network do not pose a problem by being either unilingual or
providing for a prevailing text in combination with a final clause allowing
for sole reliance on it. Additional interpretational complexity induced by
plurilingual form remains a residual problem of only one-quarter of all tax
treaties in force today that is plurilingual but lacks prevailing texts.
A bit of caution must be applied when concluding a general trend from
the magnitude of the numbers because treaties without prevailing text in
force today may be replaced again by treaties without prevailing text in
the future, depending on the policies of the particular countries in question.
Notwithstanding, the numbers concerning terminated treaties show that
the fraction of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text has reduced over
time in favour of prevailing texts.
With respect to the overall composition of the global tax treaty network
concerning unilingual and plurilingual form, the trend for newer treaties
to predominantly feature a prevailing text has been supported by a trend
for older treaties without prevailing text to be terminated and replaced
by newer versions with prevailing text, while the proportion of unilingual
treaties has remained stable.
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Table (10.1): Lingual Form of All Treaties
Treaties UL %total PL w/o PT %total PL w PT %total
global 25.16% 30.44% 44.22%
w/o term 25.22% 26.27% 48.30%
Finally, it must not be omitted that tax treaties look back at quite a suc-
cess story. Only about 13% of all treaties concluded since 1960 have been
terminated to date, and less than 2% of all treaties concluded since 1960
have been terminated and not replaced by later treaties on the same subject
between the same countries.
Although the global tax treaty network grew steadily from the 1960s
throughout the 1980s, its major wave of expansion took off as late as the
1990s. Three-quarters of all tax treaties in force today have been concluded
since 1990, and over 95% of all tax treaties concluded by OECD members
in force today had some version of the OECD Model available to draw on.
This may provide yet another argument for sole reliance on the prevailing
text because the official versions of the OECD Model and Commentary are
in English and French (while the actual work is done in English with the
French version being a translation), and almost all texts designated as pre-
vailing by treaties in the global tax treaty network are in English.
The slow-down in growth since the 1990s may indicate a certain satura-
tion starting to set in. In principle, the total potential for bilateral tax treat-
ies is only limited by the number of countries. To date almost two hundred
countries have concluded tax treaties with each other. Nevertheless, the
average number of treaties concluded per country is only 33.77, while the
standard deviation of 33.98 is fairly wide in comparison. In combination
with the slow-down in growth between the 1990s and 2000s, this may in-
dicate that in the context of the current global economy and its distribution
of capital, goods, and services, the global tax treaty networkmay be starting
to mature regarding its extension versus the economic needs of the coun-
tries involved.
This development may only be at the beginning: from 2010 to August
2016 growth has still been going strong, with the number of treaties con-
cluded already exceeding the total per decade numbers for the 1970s and
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1980s, and half of the per decade numbers for the 1990s and 2000s, which
suggests that by the end of the decade a number roughly equal to the 1990s
and 2000s will again be reached unless a major slow-down in growth will
set in beforehand. Of course, the economic circumstances and policies of
countries may change over time, so those countries that today only have a
few treaties may expand their treaty networks heavily in the future.
Whether the pattern of expansion since the 1990s has been driving or it-
self been driven by the growing structural interdependence and integration
of the world economy that took off after the Reagan and Thatcher years is
a topic for another study, but in itself the synchronicity is striking.
10.2. Policy Recommendations
10.2.1. Mission Statement
Issuing policy recommendations in a thesis raises the question of perspect-
ive. I have discussed the subject of this study mainly as a technical issue
from a technical point of view; matters of policy have been considered only
to the extent I perceived them to impact on the technical issues. Policy
makers have to adopt a broader perspective than technical experts, consider
more variables, and weigh courses of action applying a broader measure. In
line with the previous chapters, the following sections are written from
a technical perspective. When employing normative language in terms of
what should and should not be done, I assume the perspective of a consult-
ant providing recommendations on a specific issue in order to engineer a
system within a narrow framework of specifications that include political
aspects only to the extent they affect implementation of the technical re-
commendations. Overall, a simple policy goal of improving the system in
respect of the issues identified in the preceding analysis is assumed.
10.2.2. General Considerations
Plurilingual treaties without a prevailing text are mainly manifested as bi-
lingual treaties, about 81% of which have no prevailing text. Already for
treaties having a third authentic language the percentage implementing a
prevailing text surges to over 90%. Hence, it may be concluded that the
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primary motivation behind adding an additional text on top of the texts in
the official languages of the contracting states has been to provide for a
prevailing text.
If we look at the treaties with more than two texts of which none prevails,
we can see that the overwhelming majority of them (about 80%) are treaties
of Belgium, Canada, and Luxembourg, that is, mostly treaties of countries
that domestically have more than one official legal language in place, in
combination with a policy to not implement prevailing texts (at least as far
as Canada and Luxembourg are concerned). The addition of texts in these
cases may be attributable rather to a policy of extending the domestic use
of multiple official legal languages to international instruments.
Additional texts reduce the residual problem of unresolved additional in-
terpretational complexity induced by plurilingual form even if they are not
designated as prevailing, because the more language texts there are, the
more context is available for interpretation, which will help to resolve the
problem (as in New Skies, had the court looked). Hence, application of Art-
icle 33(4) using the object and purpose criterion as sole decider in case of
divergence and absence of a prevailing text will mainly be an issue for bilin-
gual treaties because of two equally authentic texts saying different things.
Notwithstanding, almost 70% of bilingual tax treaties without prevailing
text have an English authentic text, and English is otherwise widely used
as lingua franca. Therefore, in respect of resource demands, the global costs
involved in a comparison of texts may be considered reduced, at least with
respect to the countries having the other languages as official language.
In order to properly evaluate the residual policy choice against prevail-
ing texts, we have to view it against the background of English as emer-
ging lingua franca in the world of tax treaties. The numbers show that tax
treaties have already largely transcended the period of linguistic nation-
alism, which has characterised treaty making after the second world war.
Remaining plurilingual treaties without prevailing text are not evenly dis-
tributed over the global tax treaty network but concentrated in the treaty
networks of a few countries with strong policies in disfavour of prevail-
ing texts such as Canada, France, the UK, and the US; however, as these
handful of countries are among the most influential in the global economy,
the global political system, and intergovernmental organisations that shape
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the international tax law regime like the OECD, UN, and G20, their policy
choice remains a strong force at the core of the global tax treaty network.
Nevertheless, the use of either English unilingual treaties or English pre-
vailing texts is already the preferred policy of the vast majority of coun-
tries to the effect of covering roughly two-thirds of all tax treaties. More
than three-quarters of all unilingual treaties and almost 95% of all prevail-
ing texts are in English, but there still remains a gap of roughly 14% that
mixed bilingual treaties (between countries that have English as official lan-
guage and countries that do not) lag behind in using English as diplomatic
language compared to the non-English speaking world. This gap is attrib-
utable to the strong policy preferences of the same handful of countries
referred to above, which have a large impact because of their political influ-
ence, economic weight, and importance in the world of tax treaties. Their
effect is amplified by some other English-speaking countries such as Ireland,
South Africa, and Australia, combined with larger shares of treaties without
prevailing text in the treaty networks of a few more countries that them-
selves however are not policy drivers in this respect such as Germany and
Switzerland. The only strong driver not being English-speaking is France.
Luxembourg may be added but displays a somewhat less strict policy.
In summary, the fact that use of English as lingua franca is not even more
wide-spread in the world of tax treaties than it already is today is except
for France (and Luxembourg) largely attributable to the policy choices of
a few native English-speaking countries that do not exhaust the potential,
whereas the rest of the world largely accepts and uses English as lingua
franca in form of English prevailing texts. Several countries (such as the
Nordic ones) have even gone a step further by using English as a true diplo-
matic language for unilingual treaties. This almost schizophrenic seeming
result is all the more striking since the same English-speaking countries
must be considered the biggest losers of this situation in terms of resource
efficiency. With recourse to a prevailing English text being unavailable,
theywill have to compare texts in (from their perspective) arcane languages,
whereas their treaty partners will only need to compare the other text in




What might be the reasons for the paradoxic persistence of this gap?
One argument traditionally put forward is that countries may be reluctant
to concede linguistic advantages, as Arginelli concludes from his observa-
tions on the Maisto sample.19 There are documented cases of this sentiment
in practice: when acceding to the Treaty of Rome, Denmark would only
concede to restricting the number of languages to English and French if
in turn the English-speaking members would exclusively use French and
vice-versa.20 The numbers concerning English as official language confirm
a certain potential for this problem to show resilience, as roughly 87% of all
bilingual treaties without prevailing text having English as one authentic
language are between a country having English as official language and one
that does not (the rest is largely attributable to Canada not implementing
prevailing texts even if English is available as shared native tongue).
Moreover, the major English-speaking countries themselves may have
little incentive to change.21 With the routine interpretation approach in
place as dominant doctrine, they are not necessarily the biggest losers as
diagnosed by me but may be regarded as the biggest beneficiaries because
they can tacitly favour their own language text in bilingual situations, and
when more languages are involved, the English text will almost without ex-
ception have prevailing status. As Lord Diplock has put it, ‘Machiavellism is
not extinct at international conferences.’22 On the other hand, it is only un-
derstandable if they simply want to avoid accusations of imperialism. Tax
treaties are ultimately based on economic reciprocity and thus subject to
sensitive trade-offs between individual and mutual benefits. It might not
exactly be opportune to suggest one’s own language as prevailing in such
bargaining situation even though it may be the obvious choice for various
good reasons – a double bind.23 Overall, however, the numbers concerning
19See Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 133; Gaja, ‘The Perspective
of International Law’, 92.
20See Leigh Oakes, ‘Multilingualism in Europe: An Effective French Identity Strategy?’,
Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 23, no. 5 (2002): 375.
21As pointed out previously, the UK shows signs of a shift in policy, depending probably
on the readiness of the treaty partner. It would be interesting to know which side has
put the topic on the table in the negotiations.
22Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd., 283.
23Defined by the Oxford Dictionary as ‘A situation in which a person is confronted with
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the groups of countries investigated seem to suggest that this is much less a
problem in the relationship between economically powerful and economic-
ally less powerful countries, but rather one between economically powerful
countries themselves.
Finally, domestic constitutional law may interfere with the policy to des-
ignate one text as prevailing, as in the case of Canada. As for France being
the onlymajor country outside the English-speakingworld that has resisted
the global trend, the reasons may be rooted in history with French having
once played a dominant role as lingua franca and even true diplomatic lan-
guage for a prolonged period, as well as national political doctrine.24
How can these issues be addressed? From a purely theoretical perspect-
ive, the ‘linguistic advantage’ argument makes little sense. According to the
principle of unity there is only one treaty with one set of terms, irrespective
of the language in which they are expressed. Hence, it remains elusive what
the conjured up linguistic advantage or disadvantage should exactly consist
in. Reserving a kind of linguistic sovereignty in the sense of reserving the
right to arrive at different results depending on one’s own language text
goes against the very idea of the unity of the treaty and must be discarded
as a motivation not in good faith to begin with.
The numbers concerning general English proficiency on the other hand
show that it has little impact on a country’s propensity to conclude treaties
with an English prevailing text, that is, lack of general English proficiency
is for the most part not viewed as a disadvantage by countries that would
impede the conclusion of treaties with English prevailing texts.
Any argument in favour of texts in equally authentic languages without
English prevailing text in order to facilitate interpretation and application
of tax treaties by taxpayers, national authorities, and courts ‘who might not
be familiar with other languages, not even French or English, but are gen-
erally very familiar with the technical language of domestic tax law’25 is
equally unconvincing. Tax treaties are necessarily formulated in terms of
two irreconcilable demands or a choice between two undesirable courses of action.’
24See Henrik Uterwedde, ‘Frankreich – Grundlagen der Grandeur’, in Außenpolitik in der
Wirtschafts– und Finanzkrise (Walter de Gruyter, 2012); Günter Haensch, ‘Frankreich:
Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft’, in Außenpolitik in der Wirtschafts– und Finanzkrise
(Walter de Gruyter, 2012).
25Arginelli, The Interpretation of Multilingual Tax Treaties, 134.
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general abstractions connecting the tax systems of two countries. Consid-
erations of domestic law technical language are an important component
in their interpretation under Article 3(2); however, interpretation primarily
according to domestic law technical language is not the guiding principle
and may lead down a dangerous path to treaty misapplication (as discussed
in the context of the New Skies case and Vogel’s fictional scenario).
Moreover, English is without doubt the language of global trade and busi-
ness permeating also all other social dimensions such as diplomacy and sci-
ence as global lingua franca.26 As The Economist has pointed out already at
the beginning of this century:
It [English] is everywhere. Some 380 million people speak it as their first
language and perhaps two-thirds as many again as their second. A billion
are learning it, about a third of the world’s population are in some sense
exposed to it and by 2050, it is predicted, half the world will be more or less
proficient in it. It is the language of globalization – of international business,
politics and diplomacy.27
For taxpayers who need to evoke the protection of tax treaties for their
cross-border transactions, it is more than likely that they already conduct
their cross-border business in English or have no problem in doing so. If
they should really lack the proficiency, their legal advisers, who should be
accustomed to dealing with tax treaties and clients with cross-border activ-
ities, will not. On the other hand, taxpayers should obviously welcome the
extra legal certainty that comes with a prevailing text, especially since oth-
erwise they, too, need to compare texts in all other languages for their pur-
poses.
As far as authorities and courts are concerned, the numbers in terms
of treaties concluded unilingual in English or with English prevailing text
show that general English proficiency of a country has little effect, which
26See, e.g., David Crystal, English as a Global Language, 2nd ed. (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Anne Johnson, ‘The Rise of English: The Language
of Globalization in China and the European Union’, Macalester International 22 (2009):
131–68; Tsedal Neeley, ‘Global Business Speaks English’, Harvard Buisness Review 90,
no. 5 (May 2012).




implies that the required English proficiency of the human resources in-
volved in the negotiation, interpretation, and application of treaties must
be assumed as a given. It is not necessarily the countries with lower Eng-
lish proficiency that show a low tendency to conclude treaties with English
prevailing texts, but the native English-speaking countries plus France and
Luxembourg and a few others with a generally high level of English profi-
ciency. The policy against prevailing texts in English seems even less reas-
onable in the context of where it is most widespread, namely, the OECD,
G20, and EU, where English is the de facto working language on a multilat-
eral level.28
In essence, aside a self-defeating policy not to provide for a prevailing
text, the arguments in favour of plurilingual form without prevailing text
seem to boil down to nothing more than a costly concession to national sen-
timent.29 In the absence of an artificial universal language like Esperanto,
which despite some support by the UN never gained critical mass,30 English
prevailing texts in addition to texts in the official languages of the contract-
ing states are the next best thing to balance these sentiments with political
and economic interests, because of the de facto global reach of English.31
All national sentiment aside,32 the gap of plurilingual treaties without
28According to Sasseville, ‘The practical reality is that, nowadays, the OECD work on tax
treaties is primarily carried on in English and the French version is usually a transla-
tion’, Sasseville, ‘The OECD Model Convention and Commentaries’, 130; according to
Dor, ‘Ninety nine per cent of European institutions cite English as their working lan-
guage’, Daniel Dor, ‘From Englishization to Imposed Multilingualism: Globalization,
the Internet, and the Political Economy of the Linguistic Code’, Public Culture 16, no. 1
(2004): 103.
29Costly not only in terms of the resource costs involved but also because of the inherent
indeterminacy of tax treaties as a result of which reliance on a single text may lead to
treaty misapplication bilaterally and fragmented jurisprudence domestically.
30See John King Gamble, Lauren Kolb, and Casey Graml, ‘Choice of Official Text in Mul-
tilateral Treaties: The Interplay of Law, Politics, Language, Pragmatism and (Multi)-
Nationalism’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law 12, no. 2 (May 2014): 31–32.
31This is not to say that English is necessarily also the most suitable language given its
intrinsic properties. Especially in the past there has been much argument in favour of
French because of certain of its characteristics, see ibid., 36 et seq. Although this may
be a valid discussion from a linguistic point of view, such is moot for purposes of this
study in view of the realities.
32This is not intended to denounce national sentiment per se, and especially not as love for
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English prevailing text constitutes a costly impediment to economic activit-
ies in a global economy the de facto operating language of which is English,
and an anachronism in times of ‘harmonization’ being identified as a policy
goal on many levels.33
In view of all this, it is submitted that the policy to conclude plurilingual
treaties without prevailing text should be reconsidered and abandoned to
close the residual gap. One may point particularly to the Asian (but also
CIS, AW, and LA) countries as setting a good example in this respect. Their
economic success over the past decades may be attributable to a multitude
of different factors, however, considering the observed data, pragmatism
certainly appears to be one of them.
Of course, it would be naive to think national sentiment would simply
wane when confronted with its dead-weight loss. In bilateral scenarios all
sorts of additional historical and political factors may weigh in, so success
may vary. In order to take the sting out of the issue, the topic should be
discussed at the multilateral level. The best forum to achieve real progress
in this respect would be the OECD, as most of the countries clinging to
the policy choice of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text are OECD
members, while they are at the same time engaged there in a project to
achieve conformity of interpretation via the OECDModel and Commentary,
carried on primarily in English.
and devotion to one’s own native tongue.The present author is far from free of it, loving
his native tongue German for its capability to organically create and relate concepts;
however, tax treaties are not works of philosophy, poetry, or literature, essential for
defining cultural identity, but international legal tools to facilitate cross-border trade,
business, and investment. Hence, it seems sensible to give the devil his due, at least
from a purely pragmatic perspective. Of course, there are drawbacks of such choice
in general to moan about, see Minae Mizumura, The Fall of Language in the Age of
English, trans. Mari Yoshihara and Juliet Winters Carpenter, Tra (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015), passim, however, the question remains whether tax treaties are
really the proper area to make a stand.
33Although the gap of easily available potential not exhausted only amounts to 14%, it
represents a much larger share of global economic activity with respect to flows of
capital, goods, and services. This is obvious from the countries involved and the sizes
of their economies. As this study is not focussed on economics, I refrain frommatching
the data in order to put an exact number to this assertion. For purposes of the discussion




Unilingual treaties (TOW5) are the optimal solution for avoiding additional
complexity of interpretation induced by plurilingual form, but the option
may not be available for many countries because of domestic legal reasons
requiring the existence of an authentic text in the country’s official lan-
guage. The proportion of unilingual treaties has remained stable over the
decades, which suggests that the relative potential for them is exhausted –
at least with respect to non-English unilingual treaties. For treaties with an
English prevailing text, there might exist a certain potential for transform-
ation into unilingual treaties, but this is hard to quantify from a bird’s-eye
view. In any case, quasi-unilingual form through prevailing texts is suitable
to successfully reducemost of the extra complexity of plurilingual interpret-
ation and its economic cost in practice, so a wide-spread move to TOW5
apart from countries that do so on their own initiative needs no push-start.
The practice of bilingual treaties with TOW1 clauses, however, should
be discontinued. Such treaties have a major disadvantage versus all other
forms.Theymay in principle be defective if all means provided by the VCLT
exhaust without success. Such cases may be limited in practice, but they do
occur. Moreover, the effort required from courts to properly interpret cases
of prima facie divergence is generally more burdensome for such treaties
even if a solution in line with the VCLT principles can eventually be found
and discarding the treaty as defective on the point under dispute is aver-
ted. Treaties with a prevailing text may never be defective because of their
quasi-unilinguality. The VCLT principles leave no gap but assume that the
meaning of a single text can always be found. For cases in which the pre-
vailing text remains unclear if interpreted in isolation, the possibility that a
comparison of all texts should not bring resolution seems remote and con-
fined to serious drafting errors in all texts that have remained undetected
and cannot even be resolved via the travaux preparatoires.
Even trilingual treaties without prevailing texts perform better in this
respect because of the additional context provided by the third text, which
should help to resolve the issue in most cases. Bilingual treaties with TOW1
final clauses are the real problem because of two equally authentic texts
stating different things, which may have the judge at a loss, clutching at
straws.The resultingwasteful interpretation effort entailed in evaluating all
334
10.2. Policy Recommendations
supplementary means may in the worst case lead to just any meaning not
in line with the VCLT principles and the true intentions of the contracting
parties. If the routine interpretation approach is applied by the judge and
the difference between the texts is not paid attention to in the first place,
correct treaty application becomes a question of chance.
Concerning the actual drafting of treaty final clauses, the UN Handbook
is instructive in stressing the importance of precision:
In general, the final clauses of a treaty relate to procedural aspects rather
than to substantive aspects of the treaty. However, well-drafted final clauses
allow for the easy operation of the treaty and facilitate implementation by
the parties and the depositary. They can have a significant impact on sub-
stance as well. Accordingly, precision in drafting the final clauses becomes
important.34
In this regard, countries have several commonly used formulations at their
disposal when implementing prevailing texts. Although TOW2, TOW3,
TOW4, TOW6, and TOW8 all allow for sole reliance on the prevailing text
and therefore may be chosen indiscriminately, TOW3 has solidified its
position as main standard. TOW4 is a complicated wording that requires
a contextual interpretation to be applied correctly. It may mislead courts
and lead to varying practice. Given the number of alternatives available,
TOW4 is redundant and should be depreciated in favour of a more precise
wording. Countries using it at the moment should move to either TOW3
or any other more straightforward alternative, or implement TOW9 if the
intention is indeed to discourage sole reliance on the prevailing text. This
is especially relevant for the Netherlands and Germany, which both have
TOW4 implemented as policy standard in their Model Conventions.
Although TOW9 in its original form installs a prevailing text, such takes
precedence over the object and purpose as sole decider only if a divergence
persists after a comparative interpretation of the texts in the languages of
the contracting states. In its more modern form, an additional text is given
status as a reference to be taken into consideration, providing additional
context to help resolve problematic situations. The original form, having a
non-authentic text suddenly prevail, appears somewhat in friction with the
34UN, Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties: Handbook, E.04.V.3 (United Nations, 2003), 1.
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general construction of the VCLT. Implementation in a sound way requires
careful consideration to manage the interplay between Article 10 and Art-
icle 33(1), (2), and (4) VCLT. Therefore, it should be discarded as an option.
The more modern form, however, appears usable if one really wants to rule
out sole reliance on the prevailing text. In reality, it is likely that a treaty is
negotiated in English and later translated into the individual languages of
the contracting states; hence, such English text could be used as additional
context given decisive weight via the formulation of the final clause. This
would explicitly implement the ‘original text rationale’, which otherwise
cannot be applied in view of the VCLT principles.
TOW7 heals material divergences with the help of the treaty MAP clause
instead of leaving it to the national courts, that is, TOW7 is an alternative
for countries that want to have a mechanism in place in case a material di-
vergence between the treaty texts surfaces, but do not want to rely on the
courts of the other country deciding such case. Whether TOW7 is suitable
from a pragmatic perspective remains to be seen. Although theoretically
appealing because of its emphasis on the reciprocal character of treaties, it
trades speed of decision for having a direct reciprocal means available to re-
solve cases of material divergence. Mutual agreement procedures take time,
which is never a good thing for the taxpayer engaged in economic activities
requiring financial liquidity and certainty. Prevailing texts are preferable in
this respect. After all, countries should knowwhat they agree on at the time
they strike the deal and make the effort to arrive at a text that correctly ex-
presses their common intention. In the worst case, more common use of
TOW7 may serve to justify a practice of sloppy drafting and translation.
Considering the options, what can be done about the 734 bilingual treat-
ies without prevailing text currently in place amounting to 21.86% of the
global tax treaty network? It depends on their individual make-up. The
best solution would be to declare one text as prevailing. Almost always
this should default to the English text, as English will already be used as lin-
gua franca in other treaty relationships by the country not having English
as official language. In most cases it will be the text of initial negotiation
and drafting that, based on a Model Convention with Commentary, imple-




If there is no English text, however, the proposal to declare one text as
prevailing is not conclusive. Even when there is one, there may be reser-
vations on the side of the country not having English as official language
because of a reluctance to grant linguistic advantages. Although the argu-
ment per se is flawed because the terms of the treaty are the terms of the
treaty irrespective of the language in which they are transcribed, and any
wilful deviation from that principle must be regarded as bad faith, such does
not prevent it from having political force. What can be done in such case
is to propose the more modern form of TOW9. Given an existing English
text, the explicit status as additional reference decisive in cases of doubt
seems within reach of acceptance if that English text has been the text of
initial negotiation and drafting. If such proposal fails, one may consider
TOW7 as a last resort. Even Canada and France might find it useful to have
a mechanism in place for tricky cases, and TOW7 does not interfere with
constitutional requirements or the preference for not having an English pre-
vailing text. TOW7 may also be the choice when no English text of initial
negotiation and drafting is available.
The bilateral way to roll this out would be via requests for memoranda of
understanding. That way the openness of the treaty partner can be tested
and idle potential eliminated. Such approach allows for different roll-out
speeds, and individual countries can take action concerning their treaties
on a case-by-case basis without waiting for a global solution. Following the
same rationale, there is also a limited potential for France to suggest French
instead of English. Yet, the bilateral approach may remain underachieving
because of individual political issues in bilateral relationships. Therefore,
the issue is better served if simultaneously discussed at a multilateral level
to pave the way. Once a global consensus is reached, implementation at the
bilateral level will be easier and future policy choices by individual coun-
tries will be more consistent.
Based on all the aforesaid, the most suitable way to handle the issue ef-
ficiently would be for the OECD to implement recommendations for final
clauses in the OECD Model or at least the Commentary. The two primary
options recommended as main standard should be a TOW5 clause for coun-
tries wanting to agree on a unilingual treaty, and a TOW3 clause for pluri-
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lingual treaties.35 The formulation should follow the example of the German
Model in putting English in square brackets as unilingual language and lan-
guage for the prevailing text recommending it as default, but two countries
with another shared language may of course replace it accordingly while
still following the recommendation for type of wording.
The main supplementary recommendation should be a modern type
TOW9 clause for countries that do not want to declare one text as pre-
vailing, serving as a lowest common denominator. As a final restricted
recommendation, TOW7 should be added for countries that cannot even
agree on TOW9, cases for which no lingua franca text is available, or
when constitutional law forbids all other options. Nevertheless, use of
TOW7 should be discouraged beyond cases in which it is the only option
available for material reasons. In order to prevent excessive proliferation
of MAP cases, the Commentary should include a restrictive interpretation
of the meaning of ‘divergence’ as material divergence concerning its use
in TOW7 clauses.
Finally, for any remainder of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text,
Waldock’s argument concerning the practical difficulties and extra burden
of a comparison of texts in respect of resource gaps between countries re-
mains a fair point. Depending on the countries and languages involved, the
sourcing of expert witnesses may be difficult and expensive, while use of
mere language experts may not be sufficient in respect of interpreting tax
treaties, which involve a lot of technical language and domestic law con-
cepts.36 As Hilf has pointed out, some treaty terms require scientific mono-
35In order to address the reality of already existing treaties, TOW2, TOW6, and TOW8
may be listed as alternatives in the Commentary, together with a paragraph concern-
ing the correct interpretation of TOW4 as equivalent; however, use of TOW4 should
be discouraged by the Commentary for said reasons, and countries should clarify its
meaning for their existing treaty relationships to create legal certainty, either by ac-
cepting the suggested Commentary formulation concerning its interpretation without
reservation or issuing a reservation in combination with bilateral memoranda of un-
derstanding in case their intentions deviate for individual treaty relationships.
36With regard to foreign law expertise, the US Supreme Court has noted that ‘Because the
only authentic text of the Warsaw Convention is in French, the French text must guide
our analysis. . . .We must consider the “French legal meaning” of “lesion corporelle” for
guidance as to the shared expectations of the parties to the Convention because the
Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists’, Eastern Airlines, Inc., Peti-
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graphs rather than dictionaries to elucidate their proper meaning.37 In the
words of Lord Wilberforce:
In a case, such as I think the present is, when one is dealing with a nuanced
expression, a dictionary will not assist and reference to an expert might also
be unhelpful, for the expert would have to direct his evidence to a two-text
situation rather than simply to the meaning of words in his own language,
so that he would be in the same difficulty as the court.38
Concerning this, I would like to submit a modified version of a proposal
initially put forward by van Raad, namely, the creation of an advisory body
of independent tax treaty experts, however, not as an additional institu-
tional pillar but as a discretionary scientific service provided by theOECD.39
The service should be accessible for taxpayers and tax authorities from the
beginning of its creation, while its composition should reflect all relevant
languages in tax treaty scenarios. Barring taxpayers and authorities from
access to the service, even if only initially, would defeat its purpose in com-
mon law countries as long as their courts would consider themselves not
in the position to acquire evidence from the advisory body on their own
initiative. Although it is not unusual for civil law courts to have recourse
to expertise of academic institutions, for example, concerning questions of
foreign law in private international law cases, instalment of the service may
help to improve the evidence situation in civil law countries in which courts
may habitually tend to rely on their own language skills and dictionaries
despite having the option to investigate any sources they see fit, that is, the
mere existence of the service would suggest its use in the eyes of courts. Van
tioner v Rose Marie Floyd, et vir., et al., paras. 6 and 11.
37See Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Verträge, 23.
38Buchanan (James) & Co. Ltd. v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd., 153. Fantozzi
notes in this respect that ‘one could say that the interpreter of a DTC deals with fluid
concepts and therefore translation needs, necessarily, to be coupled with classification’,
Augusto Fantozzi, ‘Conclusions’, inMultilingual Texts and Interpretation of Tax Treaties
and EC Tax Law, ed. Guglielmo Maisto (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2005), 129–34, 338.
39See van Raad, ‘International Coordination of Tax Treaty Interpretation and Application’,
219–20, 225–30. For obvious reasons, the language issue discussed in this study sug-
gests itself to be added to the list of issues ‘why a particular tax treaty provision may
be interpreted and/or applied differently by the two countries involved’, outlined by
van Raad at 220–225.
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Raad discusses all relevant operational, compositional, and institutional is-
sues in detail, accompanied by relevant proposals. I agree on all accounts
without any additions of myself apart from the broader access and compos-
ition in terms of language, so I simply refer the reader to the original source
concerning these matters.40
With these observations I conclude my study.
— Richard Xenophon Resch
40See ibid., 225–30.
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11.1. Research Topic
The previous analysis revealed that the paradigm of linguistic nationalism,
which had shaped treaty making since the second world war, has been
largely transcended and replaced by a new paradigm of English as dominant
lingua franca for tax treaties. Since the conclusion of my study, the OECD
has issued the BEPS multilateral instrument,1 which modifies a large num-
ber of treaties. As of 22 March 2018, seventy-eight countries have signed
the MLI and six more have expressed their intent to do so.2 The MLI turns
out to be a bilingual treaty with equally authentic English and French texts:
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have
signed this Convention. Done at Paris, the 24th day of November 2016, in
English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy
which shall be deposited in the archives of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development.3
On the face of it, the policy implemented by the MLI appears as a comprom-
ise solution in view of the linguistic heterogeneity of the global tax treaty
network; however, the question arises whether the MLI really implements
the optimal policy available given the linguistic and political realities and, if
not, what can be done to improve it. This Annex will evaluate the MLI final
clause on the basis of the research presented in the previous chapters. In the
course of this, possible ways to remedy its deficiencies will be discussed.
1Henceforth referred to as MLI.
2http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf.
3OECD,Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, Article 39. The French text is equivalent and reads ‘Fait
à Paris, le 24ème jour de novembre 2016, en anglais et français, les deux textes faisant
également foi, en un exemplaire unique qui sera déposé aux archives de l’Organisation de
coopération et de développement économiques.’ OECD, Convention multilatérale pour la
mise en œuvre des mesures relatives aux conventions fiscales pour prévenir le BEPS (Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2016), Article 39.
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11.2. The Optimal Policy
In view of all the aforesaid, it is clear that a unilingual MLI in English or
one with an English prevailing text would constitute the optimal policy:
additional interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual form would
be reduced, and countries that currently have treaties without prevailing
text would be encouraged to designate existing English texts as prevailing.4
The question is whether such policy would be feasible and, if not, what
would be the best alternative given the circumstances.
Before publication of the MLI, Austry et al. discussed the particular lan-
guage issues involved in detail,5 considering several alternatives on the
basis of two different envisaged routes to implement the MLI substantive
provisions: by way of directly inserting them into individual treaties or by
keeping them separate in their own multilateral treaty to be considered
alongside the bilateral ones when applying them.6 The OECD has opted for
the latter path, which avoids the pitfalls of a ‘multitude of official language
versions of the amendments made by the MLI, with the corresponding risks
of differences in meaning.’7
Austry et al. still identify a problem of such approach, namely, that it ‘res-
ults in somemodifications being made to a tax treaty in a language different
from the rest of the treaty’.8 Obviously, this problem is not only relevant
for unilingual treaties but also for plurilingual ones having neither English
nor French texts or having texts in other languages while their English or
French text is not designated as prevailing. A plurilingual MLI having a
prevailing text does not resolve this:
There is also the middle way of using the original language (if not English
or French) versions for the modifications made by the MLI, but insisting on
the English or French version of those amendments prevailing in the event
of a conflict. While a prevailing version of part of a tax treaty is probably
unique, it would be important to ensure consistency of interpretation and
4See Austry et al., ‘The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument Amending Tax Treaties’,
s. 3.
5See ibid., ss. 3–4.
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might be accepted in preference to the two extremes. . . .The middle way of
requiring an English or French prevailing text of the modifications made
by the MLI might be attractive, however unusual it would be to have a pre-
vailing version of part of a tax treaty, as the price to ensure consistency of
interpretation.9
The question arises, however, whether such would really constitute a
problem as (seemingly) implied by Austry et al. and other authors.10 The
maybe perplexing because counter-intuitive answer to this question is no:
language ought to be considered an immaterial factor of treaties, which is
the very essence of the principle of unity. That treaties have (multiple) texts
consistently in one language (each) is merely a sensible convention in view
of the linguistic and political anatomy of the world. For all that matters
from a purely legal perspective, treaty texts could be written provision for
provision in different languages. Such would not change the fact that ‘in
law there is only one treaty’.11
This is only counter-intuitive because of the way we relate to language
as persons and use it to express (legal) content, which makes it difficult for
us to separate language as in any particular language to be considered an
immaterial factor in terms of treaty content from language in the abstract as
a tool to convey meaning.12 In principle, however, there is no problem with
a unilingual multilateral agreement or a plurilingual one with a prevailing
9Ibid., s. 3.
10See Schuch andWest, ‘Authentic Languages and Official Translations of the Multilateral
Instrument and Covered Tax Agreements’, 67–68, 81.
11ILC,DraftArticles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:225, para. 6. In this respect
I assume the reader to agree with me that the OECD Commentary is relevant for the
interpretation of all texts of treaties modelled in content on the OECD Model, not only
for texts incidentally in English or French. The contrary would imply that the OECD
Commentary could be relevant only for the English or French text of a plurilingual tax
treaty and not in an equal way for the other authentic ones in third languages, which
is precluded by the principle of unity, i.e., a self-contradicting proposition.
12This consideration is not only relevant in the context of plurilingual treaties but also
concerning unilingual ones, which should be obvious already from the fact that coun-
tries conclude unilingual treaties not only in their native tongues but also in the native
tongue of only one contracting state or in third languages. It is also implicit in the
prescribed textual approach to interpretation. Most treaty terms are conceptual ab-
stractions subject to a contextual interpretation. Since connotations of words together
with syntax function as building blocks of language, this re-introduces language as a
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text resulting in partial modifications of existing bilateral treaties.13 Newly
introduced prevailing parts of a treaty originally in different languages are
no different from agreeing (retroactively) on a prevailing text of the whole
treaty; the difference is merely a matter of degree. That this appears as a
novelty is attributable to the fact that in the past no good reason existed for
such practice because of the given linguistic and political circumstances.
The MLI now brings with it a good reason, namely, ‘to ensure consistency
of interpretation’ of a multilateral agreement devised to augment a large
number of bilateral tax treaties in various languages currently in place.14
What about the French treaties and all the others having neither English
nor French (prevailing) texts? They might be fewer in numbers, but that
does not mean we can simply ignore them when devising a multilateral
agreement modifying them.15 As already pointed out, in what particular
(prevailing) language they are amended does not matter because language
ought to be considered an immaterial factor based on the principle of unity.
Notwithstanding, the parties to those treaties might not want to use English
for good reasons, or else they would have done so in the first place.
Although the point is valid in principle, it remains exaggerated as sub-
potentially material factor in a derivative way because of the way we use it, which to
some extent we cannot escape unless we resort to a completely formal language like
Mathematics or computer code, defined by convention to help us abstract and sharpen
language’s blurred lines. In consequence, treaties can only be clear after (not before) in-
terpretation, and concerning plurilingual treaties the idiosyncrasies of all authentic lan-
guages combined result in the problem of divergences that necessitates a comparison
of all texts if they are equally authentic and none is designated as prevailing, because
of the otherwise residual indeterminacy.
13A similar position is taken by Lang, according to whom the issue of different authentic
languages being authoritative for different parts of a treaty provision modified by the
MLI should not be exaggerated in importance: ‘For the language question is, of course,
only relevant to the text of a provision; however, the text is only the starting point of
interpretation, not its end. In addition to the wording, the context, object and purpose,
and legal development are to be used to determine the content of a provision. Concern-
ing this it makes no difference which language is considered authentic’, Michael Lang,
‘Die Auslegung des multilateralen Instruments’, Steuer- und Wirtschaft International,
no. 1 (2017): 22–23.
14See Austry et al., ‘The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument Amending Tax Treaties’,
s. 3.
15See ibid., s. 3.
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mitted by Austry et al., because of being considered from the wrong per-
spective: it is not really the number of treaties in languages other than Eng-
lish we need to consider but the actual policies of individual countries in
this respect. The perspective from which we need to evaluate the issue is
whether there are countries that have a strict policy not to agree to English
unilingual treaties or prevailing texts and, if so, why.The crucial question is
whether there are any hard legal reasons for such policy, as otherwise noth-
ing speaks against an English unilingual multilateral agreement or a pluri-
lingual one with an English prevailing text, apart from lacking capacities in
terms of English speaking human resources. In short, when contemplating
a policy for a multilateral agreement, we should adopt a truly multilateral
perspective and not an essentially bilateral one that merely considers the
properties of individual treaties in an aggregated yet unsystematic fashion.
The first observation to make in this context is that 83.92% of all treat-
ies in the global tax treaty network have an English text, only 7.68% have
a French one, and only 8.40% have neither. Thus, the previously counted
two-thirds of all treaties either unilingual in English or with an English pre-
vailing text under-represent the actual potential for agreement to an Eng-
lish unilingual MLI or prevailing text: there exist a lot of treaties without
prevailing text that feature an English text attributable to English being the
official language of one treaty partner while the other might in principle
be available to agree to English unilingual treaties or prevailing texts and
has done so in other treaty relationships. The gap concerning the particular
treaty relationship constellation between countries having English as offi-
cial language and those that do not is merely attributable to both the reluct-
ance of English-speaking countries to implement prevailing texts and the
reluctance of non-English-speaking countries to grant potential linguistic
advantages. As I have argued at length before, the former is a costly and
ultimately self-defeating policy while the latter does not rest on sound ar-
gument.
Now, the mere numbers concerning treaties with either French but no
English texts or only texts in neither English nor French alone tell us noth-
ing about whether the particular countries party to those treaties reject
English as language for unilingual treaties or prevailing texts. If we look at
all countries without a single English unilingual treaty or prevailing text
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and subtract France and Canada for the moment, we see that the remainder
amounts to less than 3% of the global tax treaty network and is made up
mostly of countries with one to five treaties in total, except for Senegal,
Ivory Coast, and Gabon, which have slightly larger but nonetheless small
treaty networks below the global average. If we take a closer look at all these
jurisdictions, we can immediately eliminate Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Liberia, Montserrat, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines from the list because they all have English
as official language domestically and their ‘own’ text of plurilingual treaties
is the English one, so it is unreasonable to assume they would anything but
welcome an MLI unilingual in English or with an English prevailing text.
Besides France, bilingual Canada, and all countries having French unilin-
gual treaties or treaties with a French prevailing text, this leaves us only
with Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Timor-
Leste, that is, five countries with seven treaties in total, belonging to the
Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking world. As of now, they are not signator-
ies to the MLI and have not expressed their interest to become so. In any
case, rather than to accommodate them with additional Portuguese and
Spanish texts of a multilateral agreement that would increase interpreta-
tional complexity and economic cost of treaty application on a global scale,
the obvious solution would be to pool a fraction of the costs saved in order
to fund capacity building programs in terms of English language skills for
human resources of those countries in case such capacity would really con-
stitute a problem for them, which might also have other positive spill-over
effects in terms of economic development.
In summary, the only substantial argument against a unilingual MLI in
English or a plurilingual one with an English prevailing text rests with a
handful of French-speaking countries.16 If we again disregard France and
Canada for the moment, the small treaty networks of the remaining coun-
tries do not allow for the conclusion that all of them would be categorically
16Arabic, Spanish, and Russian, the other three only marginally represented but still relev-
ant languages in terms of unilingual treaties or prevailing texts, do not pose the same
problem because all AW, LA, and CIS countries have treaties with either English or
French prevailing texts in their respective treaty networks, and to a large extent dis-
play a preference for English as lingua franca.
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opposed to agreeing at least to an English prevailing text. In any case, given
the small number of treaties involved, it would rather make sense to add
these countries to the group receiving capacity building measures than to
accommodate them with a separate French text that increases interpreta-
tional complexity for everybody.
Hence, it comes down to Canada and France, and here the problem be-
comes difficult to resolve because of their economic importance, political
weight, large and important treaty networks in terms of flows of capital,
goods, and services covered, possibly strong cultural preferences, and (at
least in the case of Canada) strict domestic law requirements.17 Although
it seems not reasonable that global policy should be taken hostage by the
cultural preferences and domestic law idiosyncrasies of a few countries
to the detriment of everybody else, one cannot demand of countries to
renounce their constitutional principles or sacrifice their cultural prefer-
ences if they are not inclined to do so by themselves. Thus, unfortunately,
although preferable on many accounts, introducing an English unilingual
MLI or a plurilingual one with an English prevailing text seems to remain
a bridge too far in terms of its political feasibility.
11.3. The OECD Solution
As outlined at the beginning, the MLI is a bilingual treaty with equally au-
thentic English and French texts, none of which is designated as prevailing.
This implements a political anachronism on a global scale, ignoring the real-
ity that the vast majority of tax treaties (92.32%) does not feature French
texts and the world at large prefers and implements English as treaty lin-
gua franca. In fact, it outright counteracts the globally predominant policy
17Judging from the observed data, the problem posed by domestic constitutional law seems
to be limited to Canada and, possibly, a few others for which the data remains inde-
terminate in this respect. Most countries seem to have no problem in accepting pre-
vailing texts in another language if at least an authentic text in their official language
is available, while some even accept unilingual treaties in a third language. For many
countries the issue does not arise because English as the language of choice for the MLI
is already their official one. Canada’s case is peculiar because of the strict requirement
of treaty bilinguality under domestic law. Other bilingual countries such as Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Switzerland do not follow the example.
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of countries to implement English prevailing texts (and unilingual treaties)
and condemns all who have done so to suddenly compare an additional
French text, even if their treaties do not feature one.18
TheMLI qualifies as a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT.
Therefore, its own final clause applies with respect to the modifications it
introduces, that is, even if the modified treaty originally designates its Eng-
lish text as prevailing, the court has to compare the French text of the MLI
concerning the introduced modifications.19 Consequently, instead of redu-
cing complexity and global economic costs of tax treaty interpretation and
application versus the current state of affairs, the solution chosen by the
OECD for the MLI inflates them. In the words of Austry et al.:
If the OECD were to produce the MLI and its Explanatory Statements in
English and French versions that are equally authoritative, which might be
the natural way to proceed, this would have a disadvantage because it would
introduce a French official version of a modification to a tax treaty that was
only in English, which would have to be considered in case there was a
divergence of meaning (and similarly for a tax treaty only in French).20
Unfortunately, although the OECD realised that ‘Drafting a multilateral
instrument in a number of languages would increase its cost, the risk of
conflict between versions in different languages and practical challenges
in its administration’,21 it chose the worst option available in this respect,
namely, TOW1, which increases the interpretative burden in case of diver-
18This conclusion is largely independent of whether or not one agrees with me that in
respect of treaties with all equally authoritative texts, courts may not rely on a single
text in isolation. As pointed out earlier, the routine interpretation approach does not
provide a solution in principle because (by its own standards) it has to be abandoned
as soon as an ambiguity or divergence arises. It is not to be expected that with the MLI
substantially modifying a large number of tax treaties currently in place, the number
of contested cases will be small in practice.
19See Schuch andWest, ‘Authentic Languages and Official Translations of the Multilateral
Instrument and Covered Tax Agreements’, 83.
20Austry et al., ‘The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument Amending Tax Treaties’, s.
3.
21OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, Action 15 –
2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), 22.
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gences to the comparably largest extent.22 In principle, it may even lead to
the treaty being defective because of two texts stating the opposite and no
further text being available as additional context to decide the matter; how-
ever, via its Article 32(1), the MLI emulates a TOW7 final clause because
a divergence between the English and French texts of the MLI certainly
qualifies as a ‘question arising as to the interpretation or implementation
of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement as they are modified by this Con-
vention’.23 Hence, treaty MAPs alleviate the problem; however, as argued
earlier, TOW7 is suitable only as a method of last resort if none of the other
options is available for material reasons. In comparison to what had already
been achieved at large in terms of legal certainty through (English) prevail-
ing texts and unilingual treaties, TOW1+7 as a new global standard consti-
tutes a regression.
How can this problem be solved while adequately addressing the out-
lined political impediments? Austry et al. provide the silver bullet, namely,
allowing countries to subscribe to either the English or French text of the
MLI as prevailing:
Apossible way of avoiding the problem caused by introducing an equally au-
thoritative French version into a tax treaty in English only (and vice versa),
with the MLI and its Explanatory Statements being in both English and
French, might be for it to provide that states could adopt themodifications to
existing tax treaties and the Explanatory Statements either in English only,
or French only, or both (which Canada would adopt for constitutional reas-
ons) in which case both versions would have equal authority. Regardless of
22Like many authors on the subject (e.g., Schuch and West, ‘Authentic Languages and Of-
ficial Translations of the Multilateral Instrument and Covered Tax Agreements’, 69, 80,
86; Shelton, ‘Reconcilable Differences?The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties’, 20),
the OECD fails to appreciate that the correlation between additional interpretational
complexity and the number of equally authoritative language texts is not linear. While
lowest for unilingual treaties, it is highest for two texts and decreases with the num-
ber of languages added because of the additional context. In consequence, although the
drafting and administration costs may be slightly lower for two language texts than for
three or more, the costs incurred by the international community as a whole with re-
spect to the interpretation and application of tax treaties in practice are incomparably
higher for two texts versus any other number and, of course, most versus a unilingual
MLI or one with a prevailing text.
23See Schuch andWest, ‘Authentic Languages and Official Translations of the Multilateral
Instrument and Covered Tax Agreements’, 83.
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which version a state adopted, the English version would apply to modify a
treaty solely in English or with a prevailing English text (and similarly with
French). If the tax treaty being modified is between two states that have
adopted the English version, that version of the modifications and Explanat-
ory Statements would apply. If the tax treaty being modified is between two
states that have adopted different versions, both versions would apply and
be equally authoritative (this would automatically apply in Canada). How-
ever, states could, when signing the MLI, agree to use a different one of
those languages in relation to a particular tax treaty, so that two countries
both adopting the English version could modify a treaty in two Romance
languages in French.24
Such approach, which is supported by the present author, would remove all
French-speaking countries from the problem-country list. At the same time,
it would allow Canada to continue walking its self-chosen path without
everybody else being forced to incur the damaging costs of extra interpreta-
tional complexity induced by plurilingual form. Effectively, the issue would
be condensed to the five countries with currently seven treaties listed above
belonging to the Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking world, which are not
yet part of the MLI but could be supported via targeted English language
capacity building programs once they decide to join and face problems in
this respect.
It almost seems as if the MLI final clause is intended to implement this
approach despite its wording. Concerning its application, the Explanatory
Statement to the MLI says the following:
The final clause of the Convention provides the authentic languages of the
Convention are English and French. Accordingly, where questions of inter-
pretation arise in relation to Covered Tax Agreements concluded in other
languages or in relation to translations of the Convention into other lan-
guages, it may be necessary to refer back to the English or French authentic
texts of the Convention.25
24Austry et al., ‘The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument Amending Tax Treaties’, s.
3.
25OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD Publishing,
2016), para. 317 (emphasis added). The French text of the Explanatory Statement is
equivalent, reading ou in place of the English ‘or’.
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The rather inconspicuous final ‘or’ seems to suggest an interpretation and
application of the clause along the lines of the solution proposed by Aus-
try et al. and supported here, that is, instead of implementing two equally
authentic texts, the MLI could be considered to implement two equally au-
thentic alternatives for countries to choose from as prevailing concerning
their bilateral treaties.26
Unfortunately, under the textual approach to interpretation prescribed by
the VCLT, the plain words of the MLI cannot be ignored and teleologically
re-interpreted because of an Explanatory Statement that is not even very
explicit; in view of the MLI final clause wording and the overall content
and composition of the VCLT with respect to Articles 10 and 31–33, the
Explanatory Statement formulation as it stands is too indistinct to provide
enough traction for an application along the lines suggested here; the final
clause wording itself should be different in order to explicitly implement
such application.
What can be done to save the day? Several routes remain open. Under
Article 33(1) MLI, ‘Any Party may propose an amendment to this Conven-
tion by submitting the proposed amendment to the Depositary.’ For the
proposal to be considered by a ‘Conference of the Parties’, it will be ne-
cessary for the corresponding request to be ‘supported by one-third of the
Parties within six calendar months of the communication by the Deposit-
ary of the request’.27 Given the global preference for English, this should
pose no problem. The French speaking countries may prefer the same solu-
tion, which would allow them to treat the French text as prevailing. At the
same time, the option of treating both texts as equally authoritative may
be preserved for countries that want to do so. Hence, general consent at
the conference leading to a respective amendment of the MLI final clause
seems within reach.
Alternatively, presupposing agreement of all parties, the wording of the
final clause could be qualified as a drafting error and corrected under Article
79 VCLT, explicitly implementing the approach hinted at by the Explanat-
26The VCLT would not stand in the way of such approach because Article 33(1) does not
constitute a peremptory norm but ultimately leaves the matter to the actual intentions
of the parties.
27Article 33(2) MLI in combination with 31(3) MLI.
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ory Statement. Such errors constitute defects of the text in its property to
correctly convey the intentions of the treaty partners; their correction does
not imply a change or amendment of the treaty in substance, but the correc-
ted text applies ab initio under Article 79(4) VCLT. Once more this would
have to be instigated by a party under Article 31(3) MLI or all parties under
Article 31(1) MLI.
Yet another possibility would be to expand the context concerning the
interpretation and application of the final clause by a subsequent agreement
of the parties under Article 31(3)(a) VCLT. In theory, this could be done by
any two parties concerning their ‘Covered Tax Agreement’ on the basis of
Article 32(1) MLI in combination with the treaty MAP.
Concerning the approach proposed here in general, issues of linguistic
concordance between the English and French texts of the MLI gain in im-
portance. Since both would remain equally authentic but applied asymmet-
rically as prevailing by different countries, special care has to be taken to
ensure equivalence in order to prevent a schism between the English and
French speaking worlds. This may require the OECD to adjust its now com-
mon practice of working predominantly in English, giving more attention
again to French via simultaneous drafting of all further agreements and
commentaries on the MLI.28 There are signs of such approach having been
adopted in respect of the MLI itself,29 which seem to confirm the OECD’s
earlier statement that ‘The multilateral instrument is being negotiated in
English and French’.30
28Discrepancies remaining regardless may be healed subsequently under Article 33(2) and
(3) MLI as soon as they are raised.
29See ibid., para. 80.
30OECD, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 15: Development of a Multilateral Instrument
to Implement the Tax Treaty related BEPS Measures, 31 May – June 30 (Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2016), 3, para. 9; see Schuch and West, ‘Authentic Languages and Official





A. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
A.1. Articles 31–33
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the or-
dinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall com-
prise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in con-
nection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpret-
ation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
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Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31,
or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article
31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Article 33
Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages,
the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty
provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular
text shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which
the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only
if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in
each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph
1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of
meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove,
the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the




Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Entry into force: 27 January 1980, in accordance with article 84(1).




Text: United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
Source: United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXIII, Law of Treaties.
Table (A.1): Parties to the VCLT
Participant Signature Accession(a), Succession(d), Ratification
Afghanistan 23 May 1969
Albania 27 Jun 2001 a
Algeria 8 Nov 1988 a
Andorra 5 Apr 2004 a
Argentina 23 May 1969 5 Dec 1972
Armenia 17 May 2005 a
Australia 13 Jun 1974 a
Austria 30 Apr 1979 a
Azerbaijan 11 Jan 2018 a
Barbados 23 May 1969 24 Jun 1971
Belarus 1 May 1986 a
Belgium 1 Sep 1992 a
Benin 2 Nov 2017 a
Bolivia 23 May 1969
Bosnia-Herz. 1 Sep 1993 d
Brazil 23 May 1969 25 Sep 2009
Bulgaria 21 Apr 1987 a
Burkina Faso 25 May 2006 a
Cambodia 23 May 1969
Cameroon 23 Oct 1991 a
Canada 14 Oct 1970 a
Central African Republic 10 Dec 1971 a
Chile 23 May 1969 9 Apr 1981
China 3 Sep 1997 a
Colombia 23 May 1969 10 Apr 1985
Congo 23 May 1969 12 Apr 1982
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Participant Signature Accession(a), Succession(d), Ratification
Costa Rica 23 May 1969 22 Nov 1996
Côte d’Ivoire 23 Jul 1969
Croatia 12 Oct 1992 d
Cuba 9 Sep 1998 a
Cyprus 28 Dec 1976 a
Czech Republic 22 Feb 1993 d
Dem. Rep. Congo 25 Jul 1977 a
Denmark 18 Apr 1970 1 Jun 1976
Dominican Republic 1 Apr 2010 a
Ecuador 23 May 1969 11 Feb 2005
Egypt 11 Feb 1982 a
El Salvador 16 Feb 1970
Estonia 21 Oct 1991 a
Ethiopia 30 Apr 1970
Finland 23 May 1969 19 Aug 1977
Gabon 5 Nov 2004 a
Georgia 8 Jun 1995 a
Germany 30 Apr 1970 21 Jul 1987
Ghana 23 May 1969
Greece 30 Oct 1974 a
Guatemala 23 May 1969 21 Jul 1997
Guinea 16 Sep 2005 a
Guyana 23 May 1969 15 Sep 2005
Haiti 25 Aug 1980 a
Holy See 30 Sep 1969 25 Feb 1977
Honduras 23 May 1969 20 Sep 1979
Hungary 19 Jun 1987 a
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 23 May 1969
Ireland 7 Aug 2006 a
Italy 22 Apr 1970 25 Jul 1974
Jamaica 23 May 1969 28 Jul 1970
Japan 2 Jul 1981 a
Kazakhstan 5 Jan 1994 a
Kenya 23 May 1969
Kiribati 15 Sep 2005 a
Kuwait 11 Nov 1975 a
Kyrgyzstan 11 May 1999 a
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 31 Mar 1998 a
Latvia 4 May 1993 a
Lesotho 3 Mar 1972 a
Liberia 23 May 1969 29 Aug 1985
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Participant Signature Accession(a), Succession(d), Ratification
Libya 22 Dec 2008 a
Liechtenstein 8 Feb 1990 a
Lithuania 15 Jan 1992 a
Luxembourg 4 Sep 1969 23 May 2003
Madagascar 23 May 1969
Malawi 23 Aug 1983 a
Malaysia 27 Jul 1994 a
Maldives 14 Sep 2005 a
Mali 31 Aug 1998 a
Malta 26 Sep 2012 a
Mauritius 18 Jan 1973 a
Mexico 23 May 1969 25 Sep 1974
Mongolia 16 May 1988 a
Montenegro 23 Oct 2006 d
Morocco 23 May 1969 26 Sep 1972
Mozambique 8 May 2001 a
Myanmar 16 Sep 1998 a
Nauru 5 May 1978 a
Nepal 23 May 1969
Netherlands 9 Apr 1985 a
New Zealand 29 Apr 1970 4 Aug 1971
Niger 27 Oct 1971 a
Nigeria 23 May 1969 31 Jul 1969
Oman 18 Oct 1990 a
Pakistan 29 Apr 1970
Panama 28 Jul 1980 a
Paraguay 3 Feb 1972 a
Peru 23 May 1969 14 Sep 2000
Philippines 23 May 1969 15 Nov 1972
Poland 2 Jul 1990 a
Portugal 6 Feb 2004 a
Republic of Korea 27 Nov 1969 27 Apr 1977
Republic of Moldova 26 Jan 1993 a
Russian Federation 29 Apr 1986 a
Rwanda 3 Jan 1980 a
Saudi Arabia 14 Apr 2003 a
Senegal 11 Apr 1986 a
Serbia 12 Mar 2001 d
Slovakia 28 May 1993 d
Slovenia 6 Jul 1992 d
Solomon Islands 9 Aug 1989 a
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Participant Signature Accession(a), Succession(d), Ratification
Spain 16 May 1972 a
St. Vincent / Grenadines 27 Apr 1999 a
State of Palestine 2 Apr 2014 a
Sudan 23 May 1969 18 Apr 1990
Suriname 31 Jan 1991 a
Sweden 23 Apr 1970 4 Feb 1975
Switzerland 7 May 1990 a
Syrian Arab Republic 2 Oct 1970 a
Tajikistan 6 May 1996 a
Macedonia 8 Jul 1999 d
Timor-Leste 8 Jan 2013 a
Togo 28 Dec 1979 a
Trinidad and Tobago 23 May 1969
Tunisia 23 Jun 1971 a
Turkmenistan 4 Jan 1996 a
Ukraine 14 May 1986 a
UK and Northern Ireland 20 Apr 1970 25 Jun 1971
United Republic of Tanzania 12 Apr 1976 a
United States of America 24 Apr 1970
Uruguay 23 May 1969 5 Mar 1982
Uzbekistan 12 Jul 1995 a
Viet Nam 10 Oct 2001 a
Zambia 23 May 1969
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The ILC cites two cases that, in its view, led to manifestly absurd or unreas-
onable results in respect of an interpretation under Article 31, mandating an
‘exception to the rule that the ordinary meaning must prevail’ in favour of
an alternative meaning established with the help of supplementary means.1
In my view, these two cases are not compelling as examples.
B.1. Netherlands Workers Delegate
In Netherlands Workers Delegate the court clearly established the ordinary
meaning of Article 389(3) of the Treaty of Versailles via a textual interpreta-
tion under Article 31,2 and there can be no suggestion that an ‘absurd or un-
reasonable character of the “ordinary” meaning is manifest’,3 which would
warrant departure from it in favour of an alternative meaning to be determ-
ined by recourse to supplementary means under Article 32(b). There is, of
course, an implied assumption that the interpretation brought forward by
the Netherlands government in support for its nomination of a single work-
ers’ delegate from the multitude of labour unions, namely, that the plural
form employed by the provision in question would refer to both one repres-
entative of the employers and one of the workers, is unreasonable; however,
this unreasonableness is established by the court’s interpretation of the or-
dinary wording of the provision in the light of its context and object and
purpose. That the interpretation arrived at by the Netherlands government
is unreasonable in view of the interpretation arrived at by the court is an-
other matter that does not establish a case of Article 32(b); the Netherlands
1See ILC, Documents of the Sixteenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to
the General Assembly, II:57, para. 16; ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with
Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
2Netherlands Workers Delegate to the ILO, PCIJ (Publications of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 1922).
3ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
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government as party to the dispute was simply wrong in its interpretation
of the ordinary wording of the provision given its context and object and
purpose. Summary quote:
The obligation is, that the persons nominated should have been chosen in
agreement with the organisations most representative of employers or work
people, as the case may be. There is no definition of the word ‘representat-
ive’ in the Treaty. The most representative organisations for this purpose
are, of course, those organisations which best represent the employers and
the workers respectively. What these organisations are, is a question to be
decided in the particular case, having regard to the circumstances in each
particular country at the time when the choice falls to be made. Numbers
are not the only test of the representative character of the organisations, but
they are an important factor; other things being equal, the most numerous
will be the most representative. . . .The view maintained by the Netherlands
Confederation is not sufficiently supported by the text of the Article, and it
is at all events obvious that the ideas inspiring the provisions of paragraph
3 clearly demonstrate that the only possible construction that can be given
to the word ‘organisations’ is that the plural refers as well to employers’ as
to workers’ organisations. . . .The only object of the intervention of indus-
trial organisations, in connection with the selection of delegates and tech-
nical advisers, is to ensure, as far as possible, that the Governments should
nominate persons whose opinions are in harmony with the opinions of em-
ployers and workers respectively. If, therefore, in a particular country there
exist several industrial organisations representing the working classes, the
Government must take all of them into consideration when it is proceeding
to the nomination of the workers’ delegate and his technical advisers. Only
by acting in this way can the Government succeed in choosing persons who,
having regard to the particular circumstances, will be able to represent at
the Conference the views of the working classes concerned. . . .The follow-
ing example will show how widely the view maintained by the Netherlands
Confederation of Trades Unions differs from the spirit of Article 389 of the
Treaty of Versailles. In a given country there are six organisations of work-
ers, one with 110,000 members, and five others each with a membership
of 100,000. According to the view of the objectors to the nomination made
in the present case, the candidate proposed by the five last organisations
jointly would have to be discarded in favour of the candidate of the first. One
hundred and ten thousand workers would dictate to five hundred thousand.
. . .The Court confines itself to observing that no suggestion to the effect that
only one organisation should be represented is anywhere to be found in the
Treaty, which, on the contrary, expressly refers, in the first paragraph of
Article 389, to there presentation of the workers of each particular country.
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. . .Even admitting that such an interpretation is reconcilable with the letter
of paragraph 3 of Article 389, it is clearly inadmissible. In order to realise this,
it will suffice to point out that the construction in question would make it
possible for one single organisation, in opposition to the wishes of the great
majority of workers, to prevent the reaching of an agreement.4
B.2. South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa)
The second case cited by the ILC seems to be closer to the mark.5 Article 7 of
the Mandate of 17 December 1920 for South West Africa regarding Article
80(1) of the United Nations Charter read ‘the Mandatory agrees that, if any
dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Mem-
ber of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application
of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute shall be submitted to the Per-
manent Court of International Justice’. As the League of Nations ceased to
exist on 19 April 1946, the objection was raised that there could no longer
be ‘another Member of the League of Nations’. Accordingly, ‘no State had
“locus standi ” or was qualified to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in any
dispute with the Respondent as Mandatory.’6 The court dismissed this ob-
jection with reference to the agreement of the league members to continue
their mandates despite the dissolution of the league.
It may be disputed again whether this is really a case ‘where the absurd
or unreasonable character of the “ordinary” meaning is manifest’.7 Clearly,
under a literal interpretation, the term ‘Member of the League of Nations’
had lost its reference in a technical sense of the word,8 however, not ne-
cessarily its meaning under a textual interpretation. The case seems to be
rather one of Article 31(3)(a) than Article 32(b): the court established the or-
dinary meaning of the term referring to its context and object and purpose
with the help of a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
4Netherlands Workers Delegate to the ILO.
5South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa), ICJ (Annual Reports of the International
Court of Justice, 1962).
6Ibid.
7ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:223, para. 19.
8‘Reference is a relation that obtains between certain sorts of representational tokens
(e.g. names, mental states, pictures) and objects’, Reimer and Michaelson, ‘Reference’.
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interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’ that must
be read into the treaty,9 and this ordinary meaning boiled down to ‘former
member of the League of Nations continuing its mandate’. Summary quote:
The third reason for concluding that Article 7 with particular reference to
the term ‘another Member of the League of Nations’ continues to be applic-
able is that obviously an agreement was reached among all the Members
of the League at the Assembly session in April 1946 to continue the differ-
ent Mandates as far as it was practically feasible or operable with reference
to the obligations of the Mandatory Powers and therefore to maintain the
rights of the Members of the League, notwithstanding the dissolution of the
League itself. This agreement is evidenced not only by the contents of the
dissolution resolution of 18 April 1946 but also by the discussions relating
to the question of Mandates in the First Committee of the Assembly and the
whole set of surrounding circumstances which preceded, and prevailed at,
the session. Moreover, the Court sees no valid ground for departing from
the conclusion reached in the Advisory Opinion of 1950 to the effect that
the dissolution of the League of Nations has not rendered inoperable Article
7 of the Mandate. Those States who were Members of the League at the time
of its dissolution continue to have the right to invoke the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court, as they had the right to do before the dissolution of the
League. That right continues to exist for as long as the Respondent holds
on to the right to administer the territory under the Mandate. . . .Manifestly,
this continuance of obligations under the Mandate could not begin to oper-
ate until the day after the dissolution of the League of Nations and hence the
literal objections derived from the words ‘another Member of the League of
Nations’ are not meaningful, since the resolution of 18 April 1946 was adop-
ted precisely with a view to averting them and continuing the Mandate as a
treaty between the Mandatory and the Members of the League of Nations.10
9UN, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3)(a); see ILC, Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, II:221, para. 14.
10South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa).
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C. Pre–Model OECD Member Treaties
C.1. 1963 Model (Income and Capital)
From the time before the adoption of the OECD Model on 30 July 1963, the
IBFD records thirty-eight income tax treaties of OECD members as still in
force,1 thirteen between OECD members and twenty-five between OECD
members and non-members:
Table (C.1): OECD Member Income Tax Treaties pre–OECD Model
Treaty Conclusion





















Isle of Man-United Kingdom 1955
1Tax Treaties Database, 2016.
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Sierra Leone-United Kingdom 1947
Solomon Islands-United Kingdom 1950
St. Kitts and Nevis-United Kingdom 1947
Switzerland-Zambia 1961
Tuvalu-United Kingdom 1950
C.2. 1982 Model (Estates, Inheritances, and Gifts)
From the time before the OECD Model on inheritance taxes,2 the IBFD re-
cords sixty-four inheritance and gift tax treaties as still in force,3 forty-one
between OECD members and twenty-three between OECD members and
non-members:









2OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning the Avoidance of Double Taxation
with Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances and on Gifts’.
3Tax Treaties Database, 2016.
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C. Pre–Model OECD Member Treaties
Fifteen of them are coupled with income tax treaties:


















D. Treaty and TOW Distributions
D.1. Treaties per Group
























D. Treaty and TOW Distributions
Table (D.2): Global Tax Treaty Network per Group with One or Both Group Members per Treaty
Treaty No. %total
OECD any 2279 67.87%
OECDKP any 374 11.14%
G20 any 1395 41.54%
CW any 1253 37.31%
EU any 1849 55.06%
CIS any 584 17.39%
AW any 641 19.09%
LA any 254 7.56%
AF any 379 11.29%
AS any 685 20.40%
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The following table displays the TOW use of countries with twenty or more
plurilingual treaties with prevailing text. TOW9 is omitted since only three
treaties in the global tax treaty network implement it. TOW8 is omitted
because it is only relevant in the case of Malaysia (35.38% of all its treaties
with prevailing text). The special case of TOW7 is only used by Spain in six
instances and France-UAE (1989).
Table (D.3): TOW Distribution for Countries with Twenty or more Plurilingual Treaties
Country PL w PT TOW2 TOW3 TOW4 TOW6
India 93 38.71% 50.54% 4.30% 5.38%
China (People’s Rep.) 80 6.25% 80.00% 6.25% 6.25%
Romania 67 8.96% 83.58% 4.48% 2.99%
Malaysia 65 3.08% 56.92% 4.62% 0.00%
Italy 64 4.69% 43.75% 4.69% 45.31%
Korea (Rep.) 64 7.81% 84.38% 4.69% 1.56%
Russia 62 27.42% 38.71% 33.87% 0.00%
Ukraine 59 20.34% 64.41% 11.86% 3.39%
Switzerland 57 7.02% 28.07% 56.14% 8.77%
United Arab Emirates 57 29.82% 56.14% 10.53% 3.51%
Poland 55 9.09% 76.36% 9.09% 3.64%
Portugal 54 7.41% 79.63% 3.70% 7.41%
Kuwait 53 75.47% 18.87% 5.66% 0.00%
Belarus 52 15.38% 76.92% 5.77% 1.92%
Turkey 52 53.85% 30.77% 11.54% 1.92%
Vietnam 52 9.62% 78.85% 5.77% 3.85%
Netherlands 50 6.00% 14.00% 80.00% 0.00%
Croatia 49 8.16% 63.27% 28.57% 0.00%
Austria 48 18.75% 70.83% 8.33% 2.08%
Bulgaria 48 6.25% 81.25% 10.42% 0.00%
Slovenia 48 62.50% 29.17% 6.25% 2.08%
Georgia 47 25.53% 61.70% 8.51% 4.26%
Latvia 47 12.77% 82.98% 4.26% 0.00%
Germany 46 0.00% 6.52% 82.61% 8.70%
Iran 46 13.04% 76.09% 8.70% 0.00%
Lithuania 46 4.35% 89.13% 6.52% 0.00%
Czech Republic 45 48.89% 24.44% 24.44% 2.22%
Hungary 45 11.11% 68.89% 13.33% 2.22%
Qatar 45 71.11% 26.67% 2.22% 0.00%
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Country PL w PT TOW2 TOW3 TOW4 TOW6
Estonia 44 15.91% 81.82% 2.27% 0.00%
Macedonia (FYR) 44 18.18% 65.91% 13.64% 2.27%
Uzbekistan 44 20.45% 68.18% 9.09% 2.27%
Slovak Republic 43 9.30% 74.42% 13.95% 0.00%
Israel 41 19.51% 53.66% 14.63% 12.20%
Morocco 41 4.88% 82.93% 7.32% 2.44%
Sri Lanka 41 7.32% 82.93% 4.88% 2.44%
Indonesia 40 12.50% 57.50% 25.00% 2.50%
Azerbaijan 39 23.08% 69.23% 7.69% 0.00%
Greece 39 15.38% 43.59% 7.69% 30.77%
Spain 39 46.15% 35.90% 7.69% 7.69%
Armenia 37 16.22% 75.68% 8.11% 0.00%
Kazakhstan 35 37.14% 57.14% 2.86% 2.86%
Moldova 35 31.43% 60.00% 5.71% 2.86%
Thailand 35 17.14% 28.57% 20.00% 31.43%
Bahrain 34 35.29% 50.00% 2.94% 8.82%
Belgium 34 52.94% 47.06% 0.00% 0.00%
Egypt 34 11.76% 61.76% 14.71% 11.76%
Finland 32 3.13% 96.88% 0.00% 0.00%
Mexico 32 37.50% 56.25% 6.25% 0.00%
Cyprus 30 16.67% 53.33% 23.33% 6.67%
Albania 29 44.83% 34.48% 13.79% 3.45%
Japan 29 0.00% 86.21% 10.34% 0.00%
Norway 28 17.86% 57.14% 21.43% 3.57%
Saudi Arabia 27 11.11% 88.89% 0.00% 0.00%
Serbia and Montenegro 27 7.41% 81.48% 11.11% 0.00%
Turkmenistan 26 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Denmark 25 28.00% 52.00% 4.00% 16.00%
Sweden 25 32.00% 52.00% 0.00% 16.00%
Iceland 24 12.50% 75.00% 4.17% 12.50%
Singapore 24 37.50% 62.50% 0.00% 0.00%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 23 13.04% 69.57% 13.04% 0.00%
Oman 23 8.70% 47.83% 43.48% 0.00%
Tajikistan 22 40.91% 54.55% 4.55% 0.00%
Venezuela 21 38.10% 33.33% 28.57% 0.00%
Kyrgyzstan 20 30.00% 55.00% 10.00% 0.00%
Mongolia 20 30.00% 55.00% 10.00% 0.00%
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E. Sample
The sample consists of all tax treaties concluded between 1 January 1960
and 15 August 2016 in so far as they have been recorded in the IBFD tax
treaties database, independent of their status, that is, not only treaties in
force but also terminated treaties and treaties not yet in force but still to
be ratified are included. Treaties reported as merely initialed, under nego-
tiation, or abandoned are excluded. The same goes for mere exchanges of
notes, memoranda of understanding, dominion double taxation relief rules,
and agreements concerning the provisional abolition of double taxation
prior to a treaty. All types of tax treaties are included, that is, mainly in-
come and capital and inheritance and gift tax treaties, whether separate
or in combination, or only covering specific types of income. Not included
are exchange of information treaties, transport agreements, social secur-
ity treaties, economic relations treaties, FATCA agreements, friendship and
fiscal co-operation agreements, friendship and commerce treaties, and mu-
tual assistance agreements unless they are not stand-alone but coupledwith
a tax treaty in one single instrument. In addition, 146 treaties fulfilling the
above conditions have been excluded because either their texts could not
be retrieved or their final clause type of wording could not be established
beyond doubt. They are listed below as excluded treaties. The sample com-
































Bangladesh-United Arab Emirates 2011
Belarus-Ecuador 2016
Belarus-Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.) 2006
Belize-United Arab Emirates 2015
Benin-Kuwait 2009
Benin-United Arab Emirates 2013









Brunei-United Arab Emirates 2013
Cape Verde-Guinea-Bissau 2015
China (People’s Rep.)-Paraguay 1994
China (People’s Rep.)-Romania 2016
China (People’s Rep.)-Taiwan 2015
Colombia-Panama 2016















































Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)-Macedonia (FYR) 1997
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)-Malaysia 1998









































Nigeria-United Arab Emirates 2016
Palestine-Sudan 2013
















Uganda-United Arab Emirates 2015
United Arab Emirates-Uruguay 2014
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Table (E.2): Treaties In Force or Yet to Come Into Force
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Albania–Austria 2007 eng;alb;ger eng 3
Albania–Belgium 2002 eng eng 5
Albania–Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 eng;alb;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Albania–Bulgaria 1998 eng;alb;bul eng 3
Albania–China (People’s Rep.) 2004 eng;alb;chi eng 3
Albania–Croatia 1994 eng eng 5
Albania–Czech Republic 1995 eng eng 5
Albania–Egypt 2005 eng;alb;ara eng 3
Albania–Estonia 2010 eng;est;alb eng 3
Albania–France 2002 fre;alb 1
Albania–Germany 2010 eng;ger;alb eng 4
Albania–Greece 1995 eng eng 5
Albania–Hungary 1992 eng eng 5
Albania–Iceland 2014 eng eng 5
Albania–India 2013 eng;hin;alb eng 2
Albania–Ireland 2009 eng;alb 1
Albania–Italy 1994 eng;alb;ita eng 6
Albania–Korea (Rep.) 2006 eng;alb;kor eng 2
Albania–Kosovo 2004 eng;alb eng 2
Albania–Kosovo 2014 eng;alb eng 2
Albania–Kuwait 2010 eng;ara;alb eng 2
Albania–Latvia 2008 eng;alb;lat eng 2
Albania–Luxembourg 2009 fre;alb 1
Albania–Macedonia (FYR) 1998 eng;alb;mac eng 3
Albania–Malaysia 1994 eng;alb;may eng 8
Albania–Malta 2000 eng;alb eng 2
Albania–Moldova 2002 eng;alb;mol eng 2
Albania–Morocco 2015 eng;ara;alb eng 3
Albania–Netherlands 2004 eng;alb;dut eng 4
Albania–Norway 1998 eng eng 5
Albania–Poland 1993 eng;alb;pol eng 3
Albania–Qatar 2011 eng;ara;alb eng 2
Albania–Romania 1994 eng;alb;rum eng 2
Albania–Russia 1995 eng;alb;rus eng 2
Albania–Serbia and Montenegro 2004 eng;alb;ser eng 3
Albania–Singapore 2010 eng;alb eng 2
Albania–Slovenia 2008 eng;alb;slv eng 2
Albania–Spain 2010 eng;spa;alb map 7
Albania–Sweden 1998 eng eng 5
Albania–Switzerland 1999 eng;alb;ger eng 4
Albania–Turkey 1994 eng eng 5
Albania–United Arab Emirates 2014 eng;ara;alb eng 4
Albania–United Kingdom 2013 eng;alb 1
Algeria–Austria 2003 fre;ara;ger fre 3
Algeria–Bahrain 2000 ara ara 5
Algeria–Belgium 1991 fre;ara;dut 1
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Algeria–Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 eng;bos;ser;cro;ara eng 3
Algeria–Bulgaria 1998 eng;ara;bul eng 3
Algeria–Canada 1999 eng;fre;ara 1
Algeria–China (People’s Rep.) 2006 eng;ara;chi eng 3
Algeria–Egypt 2001 ara ara 5
Algeria–France 1999 fre;ara 1
Algeria–Germany 2007 fre;ara;ger fre 4
Algeria–Indonesia 1995 ara;ind 1
Algeria–Iran 2008 eng;ara;per eng 3
Algeria–Italy 1991 fre;ara;ita 1
Algeria–Jordan 1997 ara ara 5
Algeria–Korea (Rep.) 2001 eng;ara;kor eng 3
Algeria–Kuwait 2006 ara ara 5
Algeria–Lebanon 2002 ara ara 5
Algeria–Libya 1988 ara ara 5
Algeria–Morocco 1990 ara ara 5
Algeria–Oman 2000 ara ara 5
Algeria–Poland 2000 fre;ara;pol 1
Algeria–Portugal 2003 fre;ara;por fre 3
Algeria–Qatar 2008 fre fre 5
Algeria–Romania 1994 fre;ara;rum 1
Algeria–Russia 2006 fre;ara;rus fre 2
Algeria–South Africa 1998 eng;ara 1
Algeria–Spain 2002 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Algeria–Switzerland 2006 fre;ara 1
Algeria–Syria 1997 ara ara 5
Algeria–Tunisia 1985 ara ara 5
Algeria–Turkey 1994 fre;ara;tur fre 3
Algeria–Ukraine 2002 fre;ara;ukr 1
Algeria–United Arab Emirates 2001 ara ara 5
Algeria–United Kingdom 2015 eng;ara 1
Algeria–Yemen 2002 ara ara 5
Andorra–France 2013 fre;cat 1
Andorra–Liechtenstein 2015 eng;ger;cat eng 3
Andorra–Spain 2015 spa;cat 1
Anguilla–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Antigua and Barbuda–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Argentina–Australia 1999 eng;spa;rus 1
Argentina–Belgium 1996 eng;fre;spa;dut eng 2
Argentina–Bolivia 1976 spa spa 5
Argentina–Brazil 1980 por;spa 1
Argentina–Canada 1993 eng;fre;spa 1
Argentina–Chile 2015 spa spa 5
Argentina–Denmark 1995 eng;spa;den eng 2
Argentina–Finland 1994 eng;spa;fin eng 3
Argentina–France 1979 fre;spa 1
Argentina–Germany 1978 spa;ger 1
Argentina–Italy 1979 fre;spa;ita fre 3
Argentina–Mexico 2015 spa spa 5
Argentina–Netherlands 1996 eng;spa;dut eng 4
Argentina–Norway 1997 eng;spa;nor eng 3
Argentina–Russia 2001 eng;spa;rus eng 2
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Argentina–Spain 2013 spa spa 5
Argentina–Sweden 1995 eng;spa;swe eng 3
Argentina–Switzerland 2014 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Argentina–United Kingdom 1996 eng;spa 1
Argentina–United States 1981 eng;spa 1
Armenia–Austria 2002 eng;arm;ger eng 3
Armenia–Belgium 2001 eng;fre;arm;dut eng 3
Armenia–Bulgaria 1995 eng;arm;bul eng 3
Armenia–Canada 2004 eng;fre;arm 1
Armenia–China (People’s Rep.) 1996 eng;arm;chi eng 3
Armenia–Croatia 2009 eng;arm;cro eng 3
Armenia–Cyprus 2011 eng;arm;gre eng 4
Armenia–Czech Republic 2008 eng;arm;cze eng 2
Armenia–Denmark 1986 rus;dan 1
Armenia–Egypt 2005 eng;arm;ara eng 3
Armenia–Estonia 2001 eng;arm;est eng 3
Armenia–Finland 2006 eng;arm;fin eng 3
Armenia–France 1997 fre;arm 1
Armenia–Germany 1981 ger;rus 1
Armenia–Greece 1999 eng;arm;gre eng 3
Armenia–Hungary 2009 eng;arm;hun eng 3
Armenia–India 2003 eng;arm;hin eng 3
Armenia–Indonesia 2005 eng;arm;ind eng 3
Armenia–Iran 1995 eng;arm;per eng 3
Armenia–Ireland 2011 eng;arm 1
Armenia–Italy 2002 eng;arm;ita eng 3
Armenia–Japan 1986 eng;rus;jap eng 3
Armenia–Kuwait 2009 eng;arm;ara eng 2
Armenia–Latvia 2000 eng;arm;lat eng 3
Armenia–Lebanon 1998 eng;arm;ara eng 3
Armenia–Lithuania 2000 eng;arm;lit eng 3
Armenia–Luxembourg 2009 eng;fre;arm 1
Armenia–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Armenia–Netherlands 2001 eng;arm;dut eng 4
Armenia–Poland 1999 eng;arm;pol eng 3
Armenia–Qatar 2002 eng;arm;ara eng 2
Armenia–Romania 1996 eng;arm;rum eng 3
Armenia–Russia 1996 rus;arm 1
Armenia–Serbia 2014 eng;ser;arm eng 3
Armenia–Slovak Republic 2015 eng;arm;slo eng 3
Armenia–Slovenia 2010 eng;arm;slo eng 2
Armenia–Spain 2010 eng;arm;spa eng 2
Armenia–Sweden 2016 eng;swe;arm eng 3
Armenia–Switzerland 2006 eng;arm;ger eng 4
Armenia–Syria 2005 eng;arm;ara eng 3
Armenia–Tajikistan 2005 rus;tgk;arm rus 3
Armenia–Thailand 2001 eng;arm;tha eng 3
Armenia–Turkmenistan 1997 arm;tkm;rus rus 3
Armenia–United Arab Emirates 2002 eng;arm;ara eng 2
Armenia–United Kingdom 2011 eng;arm 1
Armenia–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Aruba–Australia 2009 eng eng 5
381
E. Sample
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Aruba–United States 1986 eng eng 5
Australia–Austria 1986 eng;ger 1
Australia–Belgium 1977 eng;fre;dut 1
Australia–British Virgin Islands 2008 eng eng 5
Australia–Canada 1980 eng;fre 1
Australia–Chile 2010 eng;spa 1
Australia–China (People’s Rep.) 1988 eng;chi 1
Australia–Cook Islands 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Czech Republic 1995 eng;cze 1
Australia–Denmark 1981 eng eng 5
Australia–Fiji 1990 eng eng 5
Australia–Finland 2006 eng;fin 1
Australia–France 2006 eng;fre 1
Australia–Germany 1972 eng;ger 1
Australia–Germany 2015 eng;ger 1
Australia–Guernsey 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Hungary 1990 eng;hun 1
Australia–India 1991 eng;hin eng 6
Australia–Indonesia 1992 eng eng 5
Australia–Ireland 1983 eng eng 5
Australia–Isle of Man 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Italy 1982 eng;ita 1
Australia–Japan 2008 eng;jap 1
Australia–Jersey 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Kiribati 1991 eng eng 5
Australia–Korea (Rep.) 1982 eng;kor 1
Australia–Malaysia 1980 eng;may 1
Australia–Malta 1984 eng eng 5
Australia–Marshall Islands 2010 eng eng 5
Australia–Mauritius 2010 eng eng 5
Australia–Mexico 2002 eng;spa 1
Australia–Netherlands 1976 eng;dut 1
Australia–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Norway 2006 eng eng 5
Australia–Papua New Guinea 1989 eng eng 5
Australia–Philippines 1979 eng eng 5
Australia–Poland 1991 eng;pol 1
Australia–Romania 2000 eng;rum 1
Australia–Russia 2000 eng;rus 1
Australia–Samoa 2009 eng eng 5
Australia–Singapore 1969 eng eng 5
Australia–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;slv 1
Australia–South Africa 1999 eng eng 5
Australia–Spain 1992 eng;spa 1
Australia–Sri Lanka 1989 eng;sin 1
Australia–Sweden 1981 eng eng 5
Australia–Switzerland 1980 eng;ger 1
Australia–Switzerland 2013 eng;ger 1
Australia–Taiwan 1996 eng;chi eng 3
Australia–Thailand 1989 eng;tha 1
Australia–Turkey 2010 eng;tur 1
Australia–United Kingdom 2003 eng eng 5
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Australia–United States 1982 eng eng 5
Australia–Vietnam 1992 eng;vts 1
Austria–Azerbaijan 2000 eng;ger;aze eng 2
Austria–Bahrain 2009 eng;ger;ara eng 3
Austria–Barbados 2006 eng;ger 1
Austria–Belarus 2001 eng;ger;bel eng 3
Austria–Belgium 1971 fre;ger;dut 1
Austria–Belize 2002 eng;ger 1
Austria–Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 eng;ger;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Austria–Brazil 1975 ger;por 1
Austria–Bulgaria 2010 eng;ger;bul eng 3
Austria–Canada 1976 eng;fre;ger 1
Austria–Chile 2012 eng;ger;spa eng 3
Austria–China (People’s Rep.) 1991 eng;ger;chi eng 3
Austria–Croatia 2000 eng;ger;cro eng 3
Austria–Cuba 2003 eng;ger;spa eng 3
Austria–Cyprus 1990 eng;ger;gre eng 6
Austria–Czech Republic 1996 eng eng 5
Austria–Czech Republic 2006 eng eng 5
Austria–Denmark 2007 ger;dan 1
Austria–Egypt 1962 eng eng 5
Austria–Estonia 2001 eng;ger;est eng 3
Austria–Faroe Islands 1967 ger;dan 1
Austria–Finland 2000 ger;fin 1
Austria–France 1993 fre;ger 1
Austria–France 1993 fre;ger 1
Austria–Georgia 2005 eng;ger;geo eng 4
Austria–Germany 2000 ger ger 5
Austria–Greece 2007 eng eng 5
Austria–Hong Kong 2010 eng eng 5
Austria–Hungary 1975 ger;hun 1
Austria–India 1999 eng;ger;hin eng 2
Austria–Indonesia 1986 eng eng 5
Austria–Iran 2002 eng;ger;per eng 2
Austria–Ireland 1966 eng;ger 1
Austria–Israel 1970 eng eng 5
Austria–Italy 1981 ger;ita 1
Austria–Japan 1961 eng eng 5
Austria–Kazakhstan 2004 eng;ger;rus;kaz eng 2
Austria–Korea (Rep.) 1985 eng eng 5
Austria–Kuwait 2002 eng;ger;ara eng 2
Austria–Kyrgyzstan 2001 eng;ger;rus;kyr eng 3
Austria–Latvia 2005 eng;ger;lat eng 3
Austria–Liechtenstein 1969 ger ger 5
Austria–Liechtenstein 2013 ger ger 5
Austria–Lithuania 2005 eng;ger;lit eng 3
Austria–Luxembourg 1962 ger ger 5
Austria–Macedonia (FYR) 2007 eng;ger;mac eng 3
Austria–Malaysia 1989 eng;ger;may eng 3
Austria–Malta 1978 eng;ger 1
Austria–Mexico 2004 eng;ger;spa eng 3
Austria–Moldova 2004 eng;ger;mol eng 3
383
E. Sample
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Austria–Mongolia 2003 eng;ger;mol eng 3
Austria–Montenegro 2014 eng;ger;mtg eng 3
Austria–Morocco 2002 fre;ger;ara fre 3
Austria–Nepal 2000 eng eng 5
Austria–Netherlands 1970 ger;dut 1
Austria–Netherlands 2001 ger;dut 1
Austria–New Zealand 2006 eng;ger eng 3
Austria–Norway 1995 eng;ger;nor eng 4
Austria–Pakistan 2005 eng eng 5
Austria–Philippines 1981 eng;ger 1
Austria–Poland 2004 eng;ger;pol eng 3
Austria–Qatar 2010 eng;ger;ara eng 2
Austria–Romania 2005 eng;ger;rum eng 3
Austria–Russia 2000 eng;ger;rus eng 4
Austria–San Marino 2004 eng;ger;ita eng 3
Austria–Saudi Arabia 2006 eng;ger;ara eng 3
Austria–Serbia 2010 eng;ger;ser eng 3
Austria–Singapore 2001 eng;ger 1
Austria–Slovak Republic 1978 ger;cze 1
Austria–Slovenia 1997 eng;ger;slv eng 2
Austria–South Africa 1996 eng;ger 1
Austria–Spain 1966 ger;spa 1
Austria–Sweden 1962 ger;swe 1
Austria–Switzerland 1974 ger ger 5
Austria–Taiwan 2014 eng;ger;chi eng 3
Austria–Tajikistan 2011 eng;ger;tgk eng 3
Austria–Thailand 1985 eng eng 5
Austria–Tunisia 1977 fre fre 5
Austria–Turkey 2008 eng;ger;tur eng 3
Austria–Turkmenistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Turkmenistan 2015 eng;ger;rus;tkm eng 2
Austria–Ukraine 1997 eng;ger;ukr eng 3
Austria–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;ger;ara eng 2
Austria–United Kingdom 1969 eng;ger 1
Austria–United States 1982 eng;ger 1
Austria–United States 1996 eng;ger 1
Austria–Uzbekistan 2000 eng;ger;uzb eng 3
Austria–Venezuela 2006 eng;ger;spa eng 4
Austria–Vietnam 2008 eng;ger;vts eng 3
Azerbaijan–Belgium 2004 eng;fre;aze;dut eng 2
Azerbaijan–Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 eng;aze;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Azerbaijan–Bulgaria 2007 eng;aze;bul eng 3
Azerbaijan–Canada 2004 eng;fre;aze 1
Azerbaijan–China (People’s Rep.) 2005 eng;aze;chi eng 3
Azerbaijan–Croatia 2012 eng;aze;cro eng 3
Azerbaijan–Cyprus 1982 eng;rus 1
Azerbaijan–Czech Republic 2005 eng;aze;cze eng 4
Azerbaijan–Estonia 2007 eng;aze;est eng 3
Azerbaijan–Finland 2005 eng;aze;fin eng 3
Azerbaijan–France 2001 fre;aze 1
Azerbaijan–Georgia 1997 rus;aze;geo rus 3
Azerbaijan–Germany 2004 ger;aze;rus rus 4
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Azerbaijan–Greece 2009 eng;aze;gre eng 3
Azerbaijan–Hungary 2008 eng;aze;hun eng 3
Azerbaijan–India 1988 eng;rus;hin eng 2
Azerbaijan–Iran 2009 eng;aze;per eng 3
Azerbaijan–Italy 2004 eng;aze;ita eng 3
Azerbaijan–Jordan 2008 eng;aze;ara eng 3
Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan 1996 rus;aze;kaz rus 3
Azerbaijan–Korea (Rep.) 2008 eng;aze;kor eng 3
Azerbaijan–Latvia 2005 eng;aze;lat eng 3
Azerbaijan–Lithuania 2004 eng;aze;lit eng 3
Azerbaijan–Luxembourg 2006 fre;aze 1
Azerbaijan–Macedonia (FYR) 2013 eng;mac;aze eng 3
Azerbaijan–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Azerbaijan–Malta 2016 eng;aze 1
Azerbaijan–Montenegro 2013 eng;aze;mtg eng 3
Azerbaijan–Netherlands 2008 eng;aze;dut eng 4
Azerbaijan–Norway 1996 eng;aze;nor eng 3
Azerbaijan–Pakistan 1996 eng;aze eng 2
Azerbaijan–Qatar 2007 eng;aze;ara eng 2
Azerbaijan–Romania 2002 eng;aze;rum eng 2
Azerbaijan–Russia 1997 rus;aze 1
Azerbaijan–San Marino 2015 eng;ita;aze eng 3
Azerbaijan–Saudi Arabia 2014 eng;aze;ara eng 3
Azerbaijan–Serbia 2010 eng;aze;ser eng 3
Azerbaijan–Slovenia 2011 eng;aze;slv eng 2
Azerbaijan–Spain 2014 eng;spa;aze eng 2
Azerbaijan–Sweden 2016 eng;aze;swe eng 3
Azerbaijan–Switzerland 2006 eng;ger;aze eng 3
Azerbaijan–Turkey 1994 aze;tur 1
Azerbaijan–Ukraine 1999 rus;aze;ukr rus 3
Azerbaijan–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;aze;ara eng 2
Azerbaijan–United Kingdom 1994 eng eng 5
Azerbaijan–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Azerbaijan–Vietnam 2014 eng;aze;vts eng 3
Bahrain–Bangladesh 2015 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Barbados 2012 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Belarus 2002 eng;ara;rus eng 6
Bahrain–Belgium 2007 eng;ara;fre;dut eng 2
Bahrain–Bermuda 2010 eng;ara eng 2
Bahrain–Brunei 2008 eng;ara;may eng 2
Bahrain–Bulgaria 2009 eng;ara;bul eng 3
Bahrain–China (People’s Rep.) 2002 eng;ara;chi eng 3
Bahrain–Cyprus 2015 eng;ara;gre eng 3
Bahrain–Czech Republic 2011 eng;ara;cze eng 2
Bahrain–Egypt 1997 ara ara 5
Bahrain–Estonia 2012 eng;ara;est eng 2
Bahrain–France 1993 fre;ara 1
Bahrain–Georgia 2011 eng;ara;geo eng 2
Bahrain–Hungary 2014 eng;ara;hun eng 3
Bahrain–Iran 2002 eng;ara;per eng 3
Bahrain–Ireland 2009 eng;ara eng 2
Bahrain–Isle of Man 2011 eng;ara eng 2
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Bahrain–Jordan 2000 ara ara 5
Bahrain–Korea (Rep.) 2012 eng;ara;kor eng 3
Bahrain–Lebanon 2003 ara ara 5
Bahrain–Luxembourg 2009 eng;ara;fre 1
Bahrain–Malaysia 1999 eng;ara;may eng 8
Bahrain–Malta 2010 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Mexico 2010 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Bahrain–Morocco 2000 ara ara 5
Bahrain–Netherlands 2008 eng;ara;dut eng 4
Bahrain–Pakistan 2005 eng;ara eng 6
Bahrain–Philippines 2001 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Portugal 2015 eng;por;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Seychelles 2010 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Singapore 2004 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Sri Lanka 2011 eng;ara;sin eng 3
Bahrain–Syria 2000 ara ara 5
Bahrain–Tajikistan 2014 eng;ara;tgk eng 2
Bahrain–Thailand 2001 eng;ara;tha eng 6
Bahrain–Turkey 2005 eng;ara;tur eng 2
Bahrain–Turkmenistan 2011 eng;ara;tkm eng 2
Bahrain–United Kingdom 2010 eng;ara eng 3
Bahrain–Uzbekistan 2009 eng;ara;uzb eng 3
Bangladesh–Belarus 2013 eng;rus;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Belgium 1990 eng;fre;dut;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Canada 1982 eng;fre;ben 1
Bangladesh–China (People’s Rep.) 1996 eng;chi;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Denmark 1996 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–France 1987 eng;fre;ben 1
Bangladesh–Germany 1990 eng;ger;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–India 1991 eng;hin;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Indonesia 2003 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Italy 1990 eng;ita;ben eng 6
Bangladesh–Japan 1991 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Korea (Rep.) 1983 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Malaysia 1983 eng;may;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Mauritius 2009 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Netherlands 1993 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Norway 2004 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Pakistan 1981 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Philippines 1997 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Poland 1997 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Romania 1987 eng;rum;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Saudi Arabia 2011 eng;ara;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Singapore 1980 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Sri Lanka 1986 eng;ben;sin eng 3
Bangladesh–Sweden 1982 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Switzerland 2007 eng;ger;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–Thailand 1997 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–Turkey 1999 eng;tur;ben eng 3
Bangladesh–United Kingdom 1979 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–United States 1980 eng eng 5
Bangladesh–United States 2004 eng eng 5
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Bangladesh–Vietnam 2004 eng eng 5
Barbados–Botswana 2005 eng eng 5
Barbados–Canada 1980 eng;fre 1
Barbados–China (People’s Rep.) 2000 eng;chi 1
Barbados–Cuba 1999 eng;spa 1
Barbados–Czech Republic 2011 eng;cze 1
Barbados–Finland 1989 eng;fin 1
Barbados–Ghana 2008 eng eng 5
Barbados–Iceland 2011 eng;ice 1
Barbados–Italy 2015 eng;ita 1
Barbados–Luxembourg 2009 eng;fre 1
Barbados–Malta 2001 eng eng 5
Barbados–Mauritius 2004 eng eng 5
Barbados–Mexico 2008 eng;spa eng 2
Barbados–Netherlands 2006 eng eng 5
Barbados–Norway 1990 eng;nor 1
Barbados–Panama 2010 eng;spa eng 2
Barbados–Portugal 2010 eng;por 1
Barbados–Qatar 2012 eng;ara 1
Barbados–Rwanda 2014 eng eng 5
Barbados–San Marino 2012 eng eng 5
Barbados–Seychelles 2007 eng eng 5
Barbados–Singapore 2013 eng eng 5
Barbados–Slovak Republic 2015 eng;slo 1
Barbados–Spain 2010 eng;spa 1
Barbados–Sweden 1991 eng eng 5
Barbados–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Barbados–United Arab Emirates 2014 eng;ara eng 2
Barbados–United Kingdom 2012 eng eng 5
Barbados–United States 1984 eng eng 5
Barbados–Venezuela 1998 eng;spa 1
Belarus–Belgium 1995 eng eng 5
Belarus–Bulgaria 1996 eng;bel;bul eng 3
Belarus–Canada 1985 eng;rus;fre 1
Belarus–China (People’s Rep.) 1995 eng;bel;chi eng 3
Belarus–Croatia 2003 eng;bel;cro eng 3
Belarus–Cyprus 1998 eng;rus;gre eng 3
Belarus–Czech Republic 1996 eng;bel;cze eng 3
Belarus–Denmark 1986 rus;dan 1
Belarus–Egypt 1998 eng;rus;ara eng 3
Belarus–Estonia 1997 eng;bel;est eng 3
Belarus–Finland 2007 eng;rus;fin eng 3
Belarus–France 1985 fre;rus 1
Belarus–Georgia 2015 eng;rus;geo eng 2
Belarus–Germany 2005 ger;bel 1
Belarus–Hungary 2002 eng;bel;hun eng 3
Belarus–India 1997 eng;bel;hin eng 2
Belarus–Indonesia 2013 eng;ind;bel eng 3
Belarus–Iran 1995 eng;bel;per eng 3
Belarus–Ireland 2009 eng;rus 1
Belarus–Israel 2000 eng;bel;heb eng 3
Belarus–Italy 2005 eng;bel;ita eng 4
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Belarus–Japan 1986 eng;rus;jap eng 3
Belarus–Kazakhstan 1997 rus;kaz;bel rus 3
Belarus–Korea (Rep.) 2002 eng;bel;kor eng 3
Belarus–Kuwait 2001 eng;rus;ara eng 3
Belarus–Kyrgyzstan 1997 rus;bel;kyr rus 3
Belarus–Laos 2013 eng;rus;lao eng 3
Belarus–Latvia 1995 eng;bel;lat eng 3
Belarus–Lebanon 2001 eng;bel;ara eng 3
Belarus–Libya 2008 eng;rus;ara eng 2
Belarus–Lithuania 1995 eng;bel;lit eng 3
Belarus–Macedonia (FYR) 2005 eng;rus;mac eng 3
Belarus–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Belarus–Moldova 1994 rus;bel;mol rus 3
Belarus–Mongolia 2001 eng;bel;mon eng 3
Belarus–Netherlands 1996 eng;bel;dut eng 4
Belarus–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Belarus–Oman 2007 eng;ara;rus eng 4
Belarus–Pakistan 2004 eng;bel 1
Belarus–Poland 1992 pol;bel 1
Belarus–Qatar 2007 eng;rus;ara eng 3
Belarus–Romania 1997 eng;bel;rum eng 3
Belarus–Russia 1995 rus;bel 1
Belarus–Saudi Arabia 2009 eng;rus;ara eng 3
Belarus–Serbia and Montenegro 1998 eng;bel;ser eng 3
Belarus–Singapore 2013 eng;rus eng 2
Belarus–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;bel;slo eng 3
Belarus–Slovenia 2010 eng;rus;slv eng 2
Belarus–South Africa 2002 eng;bel 1
Belarus–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Belarus–Sri Lanka 2013 eng;rus;sin eng 3
Belarus–Sweden 1994 eng;bel;swe eng 3
Belarus–Switzerland 1999 eng;bel;ger eng 3
Belarus–Syria 1998 eng eng 5
Belarus–Tajikistan 1999 rus;bel;tgk rus 3
Belarus–Thailand 2005 eng;rus;tha eng 3
Belarus–Turkey 1996 eng;bel;tur eng 2
Belarus–Turkmenistan 2002 rus;bel;tkm rus 3
Belarus–Ukraine 1993 rus;ukr;bel rus 2
Belarus–United Arab Emirates 2000 eng;bel;ara eng 3
Belarus–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Belarus–United Kingdom 1995 eng;bel 1
Belarus–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Belarus–Uzbekistan 1994 rus;uzb;bel rus 2
Belarus–Venezuela 2007 eng;rus;spa eng 3
Belarus–Vietnam 1997 eng eng 5
Belgium–Bosnia and Herzegovina 1980 eng eng 5
Belgium–Brazil 1972 fre;dut;por 1
Belgium–Bulgaria 1988 fre;dut;bul 1
Belgium–Canada 2002 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–Chile 2007 eng;fre;dut;spa eng 2
Belgium–China (People’s Rep.) 2009 eng;fre;chi;dut eng 3
Belgium–Congo (Dem. Rep.) 2007 fre;dut fre 3
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Belgium–Croatia 2001 eng;fre;dut;cro eng 2
Belgium–Cyprus 1996 eng eng 5
Belgium–Czech Republic 1996 eng eng 5
Belgium–Denmark 1969 fre;dut;dan 1
Belgium–Ecuador 1996 fre;dut;spa 1
Belgium–Egypt 1991 eng;fre;dut;ara eng 3
Belgium–Estonia 1999 eng;fre;dut;est eng 3
Belgium–Finland 1976 eng eng 5
Belgium–France 1964 fre fre 5
Belgium–Gabon 1993 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Georgia 2000 eng eng 5
Belgium–Germany 1967 fre;dut;ger 1
Belgium–Ghana 2005 eng eng 5
Belgium–Greece 2004 fre;dut;gre fre 3
Belgium–Hong Kong 2003 eng eng 5
Belgium–Hungary 1982 fre;dut;hun fre 3
Belgium–Iceland 2000 eng eng 5
Belgium–India 1993 eng;fre;dut;hin eng 3
Belgium–Indonesia 1997 eng eng 5
Belgium–Ireland 1970 eng;fre;dut;iri 1
Belgium–Isle of Man 2009 eng eng 5
Belgium–Israel 1972 eng eng 5
Belgium–Italy 1983 fre;dut;ita 1
Belgium–Ivory Coast 1977 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Japan 1968 eng eng 5
Belgium–Kazakhstan 1998 eng;fre;dut;rus;kaz eng 2
Belgium–Korea (Rep.) 1977 eng eng 5
Belgium–Kuwait 1990 eng;fre;dut;ara eng 2
Belgium–Kyrgyzstan 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Latvia 1999 eng;fre;dut;lat eng 3
Belgium–Lithuania 1998 eng;fre;dut;lit eng 3
Belgium–Luxembourg 1970 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Macau 2006 eng;fre;dut;chi;por eng 2
Belgium–Macedonia (FYR) 2010 eng;fre;dut;mac eng 2
Belgium–Malaysia 1973 eng eng 5
Belgium–Malta 1974 eng eng 5
Belgium–Mauritius 1995 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–Mexico 1992 fre;dut;spa 1
Belgium–Moldova 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Moldova 2008 eng;fre;dut;mol eng 2
Belgium–Mongolia 1995 eng eng 5
Belgium–Morocco 2006 fre;ara;dut fre 3
Belgium–Netherlands 2001 fre;dut 1
Belgium–New Zealand 1981 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–Nigeria 1989 eng eng 5
Belgium–Norway 1988 eng eng 5
Belgium–Norway 2014 eng eng 5
Belgium–Oman 2008 eng;fre;dut;ara eng 2
Belgium–Pakistan 1980 eng eng 5
Belgium–Philippines 1976 eng eng 5
Belgium–Poland 2001 fre;dut;pol 1
Belgium–Portugal 1969 fre;dut;por 1
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Belgium–Qatar 2007 eng;fre;dut;ara eng 2
Belgium–Romania 1996 fre;dut;rum fre 2
Belgium–Russia 1995 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Russia 2015 eng;fre;rus;dut eng 2
Belgium–Rwanda 2007 eng eng 5
Belgium–San Marino 2005 eng eng 5
Belgium–Senegal 1987 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Serbia and Montenegro 1980 eng eng 5
Belgium–Seychelles 2006 eng eng 5
Belgium–Singapore 2006 eng eng 5
Belgium–Slovak Republic 1997 eng;fre;dut;slo eng 3
Belgium–Slovenia 1998 eng;fre;dut;slv eng 2
Belgium–South Africa 1995 eng eng 5
Belgium–Spain 1995 fre;dut;spa 1
Belgium–Sri Lanka 1983 eng;fre;dut;sin eng 3
Belgium–Sweden 1991 fre;dut;swe 1
Belgium–Switzerland 1978 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Taiwan 2004 eng eng 5
Belgium–Tajikistan 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Tajikistan 2009 eng;fre;dut;tgk eng 2
Belgium–Thailand 1978 eng eng 5
Belgium–Tunisia 2004 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Belgium–Turkey 1987 eng eng 5
Belgium–Turkmenistan 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Uganda 2007 eng eng 5
Belgium–Ukraine 1996 eng;fre;dut;ukr eng 2
Belgium–United Arab Emirates 1996 eng eng 5
Belgium–United Kingdom 1987 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–United States 2006 eng eng 5
Belgium–Uruguay 2013 eng;fre;spa;dut eng 2
Belgium–Uzbekistan 1996 eng eng 5
Belgium–Venezuela 1993 eng;fre;dut;spa eng 3
Belgium–Vietnam 1996 eng eng 5
Belize–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Benin–France 1975 fre fre 5
Benin–Norway 1979 fre fre 5
Bermuda–Denmark 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–Finland 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–Iceland 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–Japan 2010 eng;jap 1
Bermuda–Netherlands 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–Norway 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–Qatar 2012 eng;ara 1
Bermuda–Sweden 2009 eng eng 5
Bermuda–United States 1986 eng eng 5
Bhutan–India 2013 eng;hin;dzo eng 3
Bolivia–Colombia 2004 spa spa 5
Bolivia–France 1994 fre;spa 1
Bolivia–Germany 1992 spa;ger 1
Bolivia–Spain 1997 spa spa 5
Bolivia–Sweden 1994 eng;spa;swe eng 3
Bolivia–United Kingdom 1994 eng;spa 1
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Bosnia and Herzegovina–China (People’s Rep.) 1988 eng;scr;chi eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Croatia 2004 bos;ser;cro cro 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Cyprus 1985 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Czech Republic 2007 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Denmark 1981 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Finland 1986 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–France 1974 fre;scr 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Germany 1987 eng;scr;ger eng 4
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Greece 2007 eng;bos;ser;cro;gre eng 8
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Hungary 1985 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Ireland 2009 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Italy 1982 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Jordan 2007 eng;ara;cro;ser;bos eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Kuwait 2008 eng;ara;bos;ser;cro eng 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Macedonia (FYR) 2013 eng;mac;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Malaysia 2007 eng;may;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Moldova 2003 eng;mol;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Netherlands 1982 eng;scr;dut eng 4
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Norway 1983 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Pakistan 2004 eng;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Poland 1985 eng;scr;pol eng 4
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Poland 2014 eng;pol;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Qatar 2010 eng;ara;bos;ser;cro eng 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Romania 1986 eng;scr;rum eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Serbia and Montenegro 2004 eng;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Slovak Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Slovenia 2006 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Spain 2008 eng;spa;bos;ser;cro eng 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Sri Lanka 1985 eng;scr;sin eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Sweden 1980 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Turkey 2005 eng eng 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;ara;bos;ser;cro eng 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina–United Kingdom 1981 eng;scr 1
Botswana–China (People’s Rep.) 2012 eng;chi 1
Botswana–France 1999 eng;fre 1
Botswana–India 2006 eng;hin eng 3
Botswana–Ireland 2014 eng eng 5
Botswana–Mauritius 1995 eng eng 5
Botswana–Mozambique 2009 eng;por 1
Botswana–Namibia 2004 eng eng 5
Botswana–Russia 2003 eng;rus 1
Botswana–Seychelles 2004 eng eng 5
Botswana–South Africa 2003 eng eng 5
Botswana–Swaziland 2010 eng eng 5
Botswana–Sweden 1992 eng eng 5
Botswana–United Kingdom 2005 eng eng 5
Botswana–Zambia 2013 eng eng 5
Botswana–Zimbabwe 2004 eng eng 5
Brazil–Canada 1984 eng;fre;por 1
Brazil–Chile 2001 por;spa 1
Brazil–China (People’s Rep.) 1991 eng;por;chi eng 3
Brazil–Czech Republic 1986 eng;por;cze eng 3
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Brazil–Denmark 1974 eng;por;dan eng 6
Brazil–Ecuador 1983 spa;por 1
Brazil–Finland 1996 eng;por;fin eng 3
Brazil–France 1971 fre;por 1
Brazil–Hungary 1986 eng;por;hun eng 4
Brazil–India 1988 eng;hin;por eng 3
Brazil–Israel 2002 eng;por;heb eng 3
Brazil–Italy 1978 eng;por;ita eng 6
Brazil–Japan 1967 eng;por;jap eng 3
Brazil–Korea (Rep.) 1989 eng;por;kor eng 4
Brazil–Luxembourg 1978 eng;por 1
Brazil–Mexico 2003 por;spa 1
Brazil–Netherlands 1990 eng;por;dut eng 3
Brazil–Norway 1980 eng;por;nor eng 3
Brazil–Peru 2006 spa;por 1
Brazil–Philippines 1983 eng;por 1
Brazil–Portugal 2000 por por 5
Brazil–Russia 2004 eng;por;rus eng 3
Brazil–Slovak Republic 1986 eng;por;cze eng 3
Brazil–South Africa 2003 eng;por 1
Brazil–Spain 1974 spa;por 1
Brazil–Sweden 1975 eng;por;swe eng 3
Brazil–Trinidad and Tobago 2008 eng;por;tur 1
Brazil–Turkey 2010 eng;por;tur eng 4
Brazil–Ukraine 2002 eng;por;ukr eng 4
Brazil–Venezuela 2005 spa;por 1
British Virgin Islands–Denmark 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–Finland 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–Iceland 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–Norway 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–Sweden 2009 eng eng 5
British Virgin Islands–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
British Virgin Islands–United Kingdom 2008 eng eng 5
Brunei–China (People’s Rep.) 2004 eng;may;chi eng 3
Brunei–Hong Kong 2010 eng eng 5
Brunei–Indonesia 2000 eng eng 5
Brunei–Japan 2009 eng eng 5
Brunei–Kuwait 2009 eng;ara;may eng 2
Brunei–Laos 2006 eng eng 5
Brunei–Luxembourg 2015 eng;fre;may eng 2
Brunei–Malaysia 2009 eng eng 5
Brunei–Oman 2008 eng;ara;may eng 4
Brunei–Pakistan 2009 eng eng 5
Brunei–Singapore 2005 eng;may eng 3
Brunei–Vietnam 2007 eng;may;vts eng 3
Bulgaria–Canada 1999 eng;fre 1
Bulgaria–China (People’s Rep.) 1989 eng;bul;chi eng 3
Bulgaria–Croatia 1997 eng;bul;cro eng 4
Bulgaria–Cyprus 2000 eng;bul;gre eng 3
Bulgaria–Czech Republic 1998 eng;bul;cze eng 2
Bulgaria–Denmark 1988 eng eng 5
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Bulgaria–Egypt 2003 eng;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–Estonia 2008 eng;bul;est eng 3
Bulgaria–Finland 1985 eng;bul;fin eng 3
Bulgaria–France 1987 fre;bul 1
Bulgaria–Georgia 1998 eng;bul;geo eng 3
Bulgaria–Germany 2010 eng;bul;ger eng 4
Bulgaria–Greece 1991 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Hungary 1994 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–India 1994 eng;bul;hin eng 4
Bulgaria–Indonesia 1991 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Iran 2004 eng;bul;per eng 3
Bulgaria–Ireland 2000 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–Israel 2000 eng;bul;heb eng 3
Bulgaria–Italy 1988 fre;ita;bul fre 8
Bulgaria–Japan 1991 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Jordan 2006 eng;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–Kazakhstan 1997 eng;bul;kaz;rus eng 3
Bulgaria–Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.) 1999 eng;bul;kor eng 3
Bulgaria–Korea (Rep.) 1994 eng;kor;bul eng 3
Bulgaria–Kuwait 2002 eng;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–Latvia 2003 eng;bul;lat eng 3
Bulgaria–Lebanon 1999 eng;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–Lithuania 2006 eng;bul;lit eng 3
Bulgaria–Luxembourg 1992 fre;bul 1
Bulgaria–Macedonia (FYR) 1999 bul;mac 1
Bulgaria–Malta 1986 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–Moldova 1998 eng;bul;mol eng 3
Bulgaria–Mongolia 2000 eng;bul;mon eng 3
Bulgaria–Morocco 1996 eng;fre;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–Netherlands 1990 eng;bul;dut eng 4
Bulgaria–Norway 1988 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Norway 2014 eng;bul;nor eng 3
Bulgaria–Poland 1994 eng;bul;pol eng 3
Bulgaria–Portugal 1995 eng;bul;por eng 3
Bulgaria–Qatar 2010 eng;bul;ara eng 2
Bulgaria–Romania 1994 eng;bul;rum eng 3
Bulgaria–Romania 2015 eng;bul;rum eng 3
Bulgaria–Russia 1993 rus;bul 1
Bulgaria–Serbia and Montenegro 1998 eng;bul;ser eng 3
Bulgaria–Singapore 1996 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;bul;slo eng 3
Bulgaria–Slovenia 2003 eng;bul;slv eng 3
Bulgaria–South Africa 2004 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–Spain 1990 spa;bul 1
Bulgaria–Sweden 1988 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Switzerland 2012 eng;ger;bul eng 4
Bulgaria–Syria 2001 eng;bul;ara eng 2
Bulgaria–Thailand 2000 eng;bul;tha eng 3
Bulgaria–Turkey 1994 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Ukraine 1995 eng;bul;ukr eng 3
Bulgaria–United Arab Emirates 2007 eng;bul;ara eng 3
Bulgaria–United Kingdom 1987 eng;bul 1
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Bulgaria–United Kingdom 2015 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–United States 2007 eng;bul 1
Bulgaria–Uzbekistan 2003 eng;bul;uzb eng 3
Bulgaria–Vietnam 1996 eng;bul;vts eng 3
Bulgaria–Zimbabwe 1988 eng;bul 1
Burkina Faso–France 1965 fre fre 5
Burkina Faso–Morocco 2012 fre;ara 1
Burkina Faso–Tunisia 2003 fre;ara fre 3
Cambodia–Singapore 2016 eng eng 5
Cameroon–Canada 1982 eng;fre 1
Cameroon–France 1976 fre fre 5
Cameroon–Morocco 2012 eng;fre;ara fre 3
Cameroon–South Africa 2015 eng;fre 1
Cameroon–Tunisia 1999 fre;ara fre 2
Canada–Chile 1998 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–China (People’s Rep.) 1986 eng;fre;chi 1
Canada–Colombia 2008 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Croatia 1997 eng;fre;cro 1
Canada–Cyprus 1984 eng;fre 1
Canada–Czech Republic 2001 eng;fre;cze 1
Canada–Denmark 1997 eng;fre;dan 1
Canada–Dominican Republic 1976 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Ecuador 2001 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Egypt 1983 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Estonia 1995 eng;fre;est 1
Canada–Finland 2006 eng;fre;fin;swe 1
Canada–France 1975 eng;fre 1
Canada–Gabon 2002 eng;fre 1
Canada–Germany 2001 eng;fre;ger 1
Canada–Greece 2009 eng;fre;gre 1
Canada–Guyana 1985 eng;fre 1
Canada–Hong Kong 2012 eng;fre;chi 1
Canada–Hungary 1992 eng;fre;hun 1
Canada–Iceland 1997 eng;fre;ice 1
Canada–India 1996 eng;fre;hin 1
Canada–Indonesia 1979 eng;fre;ind 1
Canada–Ireland 2003 eng;fre 1
Canada–Israel 1975 eng;fre;heb 1
Canada–Italy 2002 eng;fre;ita 1
Canada–Jamaica 1978 eng;fre 1
Canada–Japan 1986 eng;fre;jap 1
Canada–Jordan 1999 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Kazakhstan 1996 eng;fre;rus;kaz 1
Canada–Kenya 1983 eng;fre 1
Canada–Korea (Rep.) 2006 eng;fre;kor 1
Canada–Kuwait 2002 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Kyrgyzstan 1998 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Latvia 1995 eng;fre;lat 1
Canada–Lebanon 1998 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Lithuania 1996 eng;fre;lit 1
Canada–Luxembourg 1999 eng;fre 1
Canada–Malaysia 1976 eng;fre;may 1
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Canada–Malta 1986 eng;fre 1
Canada–Mexico 2006 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Moldova 2002 eng;fre;mol 1
Canada–Mongolia 2002 eng;fre;mon 1
Canada–Morocco 1975 eng;fre 1
Canada–Namibia 2010 eng;fre 1
Canada–Netherlands 1986 eng;fre;dut 1
Canada–New Zealand 1980 eng;fre 1
Canada–New Zealand 2012 eng;fre 1
Canada–Nigeria 1992 eng;fre 1
Canada–Norway 2002 eng;fre;nor 1
Canada–Oman 2004 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Pakistan 1976 eng;fre 1
Canada–Papua New Guinea 1987 eng;fre 1
Canada–Peru 2001 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Philippines 1976 eng;fre 1
Canada–Poland 2012 eng;fre;pol 1
Canada–Portugal 1999 eng;fre;por 1
Canada–Romania 2004 eng;fre;rum 1
Canada–Russia 1995 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Senegal 2001 eng;fre 1
Canada–Serbia 2012 eng;fre;ser 1
Canada–Singapore 1976 eng;fre 1
Canada–Slovak Republic 2001 eng;fre;slo 1
Canada–Slovenia 2000 eng;fre;slv 1
Canada–South Africa 1995 eng;fre 1
Canada–Spain 1976 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Sri Lanka 1982 eng;fre;sin 1
Canada–Sweden 1996 eng;fre;swe 1
Canada–Switzerland 1997 eng;fre 1
Canada–Taiwan 2016 eng;fre 1
Canada–Tanzania 1995 eng;fre 1
Canada–Thailand 1984 eng;fre;tha 1
Canada–Trinidad and Tobago 1995 eng;fre 1
Canada–Tunisia 1982 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–Turkey 2009 eng;fre;tur 1
Canada–Turkmenistan 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Ukraine 1996 eng;fre;ukr 1
Canada–United Arab Emirates 2002 eng;fre;ara 1
Canada–United Kingdom 1978 eng;fre 1
Canada–United States 1980 eng;fre 1
Canada–Uzbekistan 1999 eng;fre;uzb 1
Canada–Venezuela 2001 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Vietnam 1997 eng;fre;vts 1
Canada–Zambia 1984 eng;fre 1
Canada–Zimbabwe 1992 eng;fre 1
Cape Verde–Macau 2010 por;chi 1
Cape Verde–Portugal 1999 por por 5
Cayman Islands–Denmark 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–Faroe Islands 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–Finland 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–Greenland 2009 eng eng 5
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Cayman Islands–Iceland 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–Norway 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–Sweden 2009 eng eng 5
Cayman Islands–United Kingdom 2009 eng eng 5
Central African Republic–France 1969 fre fre 5
Chad–Libya 2009 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Chad–Tunisia 2012 fre;ara 1
Chile–China (People’s Rep.) 2015 eng;spa;chi eng 3
Chile–Croatia 2003 eng;spa;cro eng 3
Chile–Czech Republic 2015 eng;spa;cze eng 2
Chile–Denmark 2002 eng;spa;dan eng 4
Chile–Ecuador 1999 spa spa 5
Chile–France 2004 fre;spa 1
Chile–Ireland 2005 eng;spa 1
Chile–Italy 2015 eng;spa;ita eng 3
Chile–Japan 2016 eng eng 5
Chile–Korea (Rep.) 2002 eng;spa;kor eng 3
Chile–Malaysia 2004 eng;spa;may eng 4
Chile–Mexico 1998 spa spa 5
Chile–New Zealand 2003 eng;spa 1
Chile–Norway 2001 eng;spa;nor eng 4
Chile–Paraguay 2005 spa spa 5
Chile–Peru 2001 spa spa 5
Chile–Poland 2000 eng;spa;pol eng 3
Chile–Portugal 2005 eng;spa;por eng 3
Chile–Russia 2004 eng;spa;rus eng 4
Chile–South Africa 2012 eng;spa 1
Chile–Spain 2003 spa spa 5
Chile–Sweden 2004 eng;spa;swe eng 2
Chile–Switzerland 2008 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Chile–Thailand 2006 eng;spa;tha eng 4
Chile–United Kingdom 2003 eng;spa 1
Chile–United States 2010 eng;spa 1
Chile–Uruguay 2016 spa spa 5
China (People’s Rep.)–Croatia 1995 eng;chi;cro eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Cuba 2001 eng;chi;spa eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Cyprus 1990 eng;chi;gre eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Czech Republic 2009 eng;chi;cze eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Denmark 2012 eng;chi;den eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Ecuador 2013 eng;chi;spa eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Egypt 1997 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Estonia 1998 eng;chi;est eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Ethiopia 2009 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Finland 2010 eng;chi;fin eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–France 1984 fre;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–France 2013 fre;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Georgia 2005 eng;chi;geo eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Germany 1985 chi;ger 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Germany 2014 eng;chi;ger eng 4
China (People’s Rep.)–Greece 2002 eng;chi;gre eng 4
China (People’s Rep.)–Hong Kong 2006 chi chi 5
396
E.2. Global Tax Treaty Network
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
China (People’s Rep.)–Hungary 1992 eng;chi;hun eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Iceland 1996 eng;chi;ice eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–India 1994 eng;chi;hin eng 2
China (People’s Rep.)–Indonesia 2001 eng;chi;ind eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Iran 2002 eng;chi;per eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Ireland 2000 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Israel 1995 eng;chi;heb eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Italy 1986 eng;chi;ita eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Jamaica 1996 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Japan 1983 eng;chi;jap eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Kazakhstan 2001 eng;chi;kaz eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Korea (Rep.) 1994 eng;chi;kor eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Kuwait 1989 eng;chi;ara eng 2
China (People’s Rep.)–Kyrgyzstan 2002 eng;chi;kyr;rus eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Laos 1999 eng;chi;lao eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Latvia 1996 eng;chi;lat eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Lithuania 1996 eng;chi;lit eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Luxembourg 1994 eng;chi;fre 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Macau 2003 chi chi 5
China (People’s Rep.)–Macedonia (FYR) 1997 eng;chi;mac eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Malaysia 1985 eng;chi;may eng 8
China (People’s Rep.)–Malta 2010 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Mauritius 1994 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Mexico 2005 eng;chi;spa eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Moldova 2000 eng;chi;mol eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Mongolia 1991 eng;chi;mon eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Morocco 2002 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Nepal 2001 eng;chi;nep eng 2
China (People’s Rep.)–Netherlands 1987 eng;chi;dut eng 4
China (People’s Rep.)–Netherlands 2013 eng;chi;dut eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–New Zealand 1986 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Nigeria 2002 eng;chi eng 2
China (People’s Rep.)–Norway 1986 eng;chi;nor eng 4
China (People’s Rep.)–Oman 2002 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Pakistan 1989 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Papua New Guinea 1994 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Philippines 1999 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Poland 1988 eng;chi;pol eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Portugal 1998 eng;chi;por eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Qatar 2001 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Romania 1991 eng;chi;rum eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Russia 1994 eng;chi;rus eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Russia 2014 eng;rus;chi eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Saudi Arabia 2006 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Serbia and Montenegro 1997 eng;chi;ser eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Seychelles 1999 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Singapore 2007 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Slovak Republic 1987 eng;chi;cze eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Slovenia 1995 eng;chi;slv eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–South Africa 2000 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Spain 1990 eng;chi;spa eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Sri Lanka 2003 eng;chi;sin eng 3
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China (People’s Rep.)–Sudan 1997 eng;chi;mac eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Sweden 1986 eng;chi;swe eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Switzerland 1990 eng;chi;fre eng 4
China (People’s Rep.)–Switzerland 2013 eng;chi;ger eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Syria 2010 eng;chi;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Tajikistan 2008 eng;chi;tgk eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Thailand 1986 eng;chi;tha eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Trinidad and Tobago 2003 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Tunisia 2002 eng;chi;fre;ara eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Turkey 1995 eng;chi;tkm eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Turkmenistan 2009 eng;chi;tkm;rus eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Uganda 2012 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Ukraine 1995 eng;chi;ukr eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–United Arab Emirates 1993 eng;chi;ara eng 2
China (People’s Rep.)–United Kingdom 2011 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–United States 1984 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Uzbekistan 1996 eng;chi;uzb eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Venezuela 2001 eng;chi;spa eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Vietnam 1995 eng;chi;vts eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Zambia 2010 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Zimbabwe 2015 eng;chi 1
Colombia–Czech Republic 2012 eng;spa;cze eng 2
Colombia–France 2015 fre;spa 1
Colombia–India 2011 eng;spa;hin eng 3
Colombia–Korea (Rep.) 2010 eng;spa;kor eng 3
Colombia–Mexico 2009 spa spa 5
Colombia–Portugal 2010 eng;spa;por eng 3
Colombia–Spain 2005 spa spa 5
Colombia–Switzerland 2007 fre;spa 1
Congo (Dem. Rep.)–South Africa 2005 eng;fre 1
Congo (Dem. Rep.)–Zimbabwe 2002 eng;fre 1
Congo (Rep.)–France 1987 fre fre 5
Congo (Rep.)–Italy 2003 fre;ita 1
Congo (Rep.)–Mauritius 2010 fre fre 5
Congo (Rep.)–Tunisia 2005 fre;ara 1
Cook Islands–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
Costa Rica–Germany 1993 spa;ger 1
Costa Rica–Germany 2014 eng;spa;ger eng 4
Costa Rica–Romania 1991 spa;rum 1
Costa Rica–Spain 2004 spa spa 5
Croatia–Czech Republic 1999 eng;cro;cze eng 4
Croatia–Denmark 2007 eng;cro;dan eng 3
Croatia–Egypt 2005 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Estonia 2002 eng;cro;est eng 3
Croatia–Finland 1986 eng eng 5
Croatia–France 2003 fre;cro 1
Croatia–Georgia 2013 eng;cro;geo eng 3
Croatia–Germany 2006 ger;cro 1
Croatia–Greece 1996 eng;cro;gre eng 4
Croatia–Hungary 1996 eng;cro;hun eng 4
Croatia–Iceland 2010 eng;cro;ice eng 3
Croatia–India 2014 eng;cro;hin eng 3
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Croatia–Indonesia 2002 eng;cro;ind eng 4
Croatia–Iran 2003 eng;cro;per eng 3
Croatia–Ireland 2002 eng;cro eng 3
Croatia–Israel 2006 eng;cro;heb eng 4
Croatia–Italy 1999 eng;cro;ita eng 3
Croatia–Jordan 2005 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Korea (Rep.) 2002 eng;cro;kor eng 3
Croatia–Kuwait 2001 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Latvia 2000 eng;cro;lat eng 3
Croatia–Lithuania 2000 eng;cro;lit eng 3
Croatia–Luxembourg 2014 eng;fre;cro eng 3
Croatia–Macedonia (FYR) 1994 eng;cro;mac eng 3
Croatia–Malaysia 2002 eng;cro;may eng 4
Croatia–Malta 1998 eng;cro 1
Croatia–Mauritius 2002 eng;cro 1
Croatia–Moldova 2005 eng;cro;mol eng 3
Croatia–Morocco 2008 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Netherlands 2000 eng;cro;dut eng 4
Croatia–Norway 1983 eng eng 5
Croatia–Oman 2009 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Poland 1994 eng;cro;rus eng 4
Croatia–Portugal 2013 eng;cro;por eng 3
Croatia–Qatar 2008 eng;cro;ara eng 2
Croatia–Romania 1996 eng;cro;rum eng 4
Croatia–Russia 1995 eng;cro;rus eng 4
Croatia–San Marino 2004 eng;cro;ita eng 3
Croatia–Serbia and Montenegro 2001 eng eng 5
Croatia–Slovak Republic 1996 eng;cro;slo eng 4
Croatia–Slovenia 2005 eng;cro;slv eng 2
Croatia–South Africa 1996 eng;cro 1
Croatia–Spain 2005 eng;cro;spa eng 2
Croatia–Sri Lanka 1985 eng;scr;sin eng 3
Croatia–Sweden 1980 eng eng 5
Croatia–Switzerland 1999 eng;cro;ger eng 4
Croatia–Syria 2008 eng;cro;ara eng 3
Croatia–Turkey 1997 eng eng 5
Croatia–Turkmenistan 2014 eng;rus;cro;tkm eng 3
Croatia–Ukraine 1996 eng;cro;ukr eng 4
Croatia–United Kingdom 1981 eng;scr 1
Croatia–United Kingdom 2015 eng;cro 1
Cuba–Italy 2000 spa;ita 1
Cuba–Lebanon 2001 eng eng 5
Cuba–Portugal 2000 spa;pro 1
Cuba–Qatar 2006 eng;spa;ara eng 2
Cuba–Russia 2000 spa;rus 1
Cuba–Spain 1999 spa spa 5
Cuba–Ukraine 2003 eng;spa;ukr eng 3
Cuba–Venezuela 2003 spa spa 5
Cuba–Vietnam 2002 eng;spa;vts eng 3
Curacao–Malta 2015 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Czech Republic 2009 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Denmark 2010 eng eng 5
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Cyprus–Egypt 1993 eng;ara eng 3
Cyprus–Estonia 2012 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Ethiopia 2015 eng;gre eng 3
Cyprus–Finland 2012 eng eng 5
Cyprus–France 1981 eng;fre 1
Cyprus–Georgia 2015 eng;gre;geo eng 3
Cyprus–Germany 2011 eng;gre;ger eng 4
Cyprus–Greece 1968 gre gre 5
Cyprus–Guernsey 2014 eng;gre 1
Cyprus–Hungary 1981 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Iceland 2014 eng;gre;ice eng 4
Cyprus–India 1994 eng;hin eng 2
Cyprus–Iran 2015 eng;gre;per eng 3
Cyprus–Ireland 1968 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Italy 1974 eng;gre;ita eng 3
Cyprus–Jersey 2016 eng;gre eng 3
Cyprus–Kuwait 1984 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Kuwait 2010 eng;gre;ara eng 2
Cyprus–Kyrgyzstan 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Latvia 2016 eng;gre;lat eng 3
Cyprus–Lebanon 2003 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Lithuania 2013 eng;gre;lit eng 3
Cyprus–Macedonia (FYR) 1985 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Malta 1993 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Mauritius 2000 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Moldova 2008 eng;gre;mol eng 3
Cyprus–Norway 2014 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Poland 1992 eng;gre;pol eng 3
Cyprus–Portugal 2012 eng;gre;por eng 3
Cyprus–Qatar 2008 eng;gre;ara eng 2
Cyprus–Romania 1981 eng;gre;rum eng 3
Cyprus–Russia 1998 eng;gre;rus eng 4
Cyprus–San Marino 2007 eng;gre;ita eng 2
Cyprus–Serbia and Montenegro 1985 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Seychelles 2006 eng;gre eng 3
Cyprus–Singapore 2000 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Slovak Republic 1980 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Slovenia 1985 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Slovenia 2010 eng;gre;slv eng 2
Cyprus–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Spain 2013 eng;gre;spa map 7
Cyprus–Sweden 1988 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Switzerland 2014 eng;fre;gre eng 4
Cyprus–Syria 1992 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Tajikistan 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Thailand 1998 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Turkmenistan 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Ukraine 2012 eng;gre;ukr eng 4
Cyprus–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;gre;ara eng 4
Cyprus–United Kingdom 1974 eng eng 5
Cyprus–United States 1984 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Uzbekistan 1982 eng;rus 1
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Czech Republic–Denmark 2011 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Egypt 1995 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Estonia 1994 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Ethiopia 2007 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Finland 1994 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–France 2003 fre;cze 1
Czech Republic–Georgia 2006 eng;cze;geo eng 4
Czech Republic–Germany 1980 cze;ger 1
Czech Republic–Greece 1986 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Hong Kong 2011 eng;cze;chi eng 2
Czech Republic–Hungary 1993 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Iceland 2000 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–India 1998 eng;cze;hin eng 2
Czech Republic–Indonesia 1994 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Iran 2015 eng;cze;per eng 4
Czech Republic–Ireland 1995 eng;cze 1
Czech Republic–Israel 1993 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Italy 1981 fre;cze;ita fre 6
Czech Republic–Japan 1977 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Jordan 2006 eng;cze;ara eng 2
Czech Republic–Kazakhstan 1998 eng;cze;kaz;rus eng 2
Czech Republic–Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.) 2005 eng;cze;kor eng 2
Czech Republic–Korea (Rep.) 1992 eng;cze;kor eng 3
Czech Republic–Kosovo 2013 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Kuwait 2001 eng;cze;ara eng 2
Czech Republic–Latvia 1994 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Lebanon 1997 eng;cze;ara eng 2
Czech Republic–Liechtenstein 2014 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Lithuania 1994 eng;cze;lit eng 3
Czech Republic–Luxembourg 1991 fre;cze 1
Czech Republic–Luxembourg 2013 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Macedonia (FYR) 2001 eng;cze;mac eng 4
Czech Republic–Malaysia 1996 eng;cze;may eng 3
Czech Republic–Malta 1996 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Mexico 2002 eng;cze;spa eng 2
Czech Republic–Moldova 1999 eng;cze;mol eng 2
Czech Republic–Mongolia 1997 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Morocco 2001 eng;cze;ara eng 2
Czech Republic–Netherlands 1974 eng;cze;dut eng 4
Czech Republic–New Zealand 2007 eng;cze 1
Czech Republic–Nigeria 1989 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Norway 2004 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Pakistan 2014 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Panama 2012 eng;cze;spa eng 2
Czech Republic–Philippines 2000 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Poland 2011 eng;cze;pol eng 2
Czech Republic–Portugal 1994 eng;cze;por eng 3
Czech Republic–Romania 1993 eng;cze;rum eng 3
Czech Republic–Russia 1995 eng;cze;rus eng 4
Czech Republic–Saudi Arabia 2012 eng;cze;ara eng 2
Czech Republic–Serbia and Montenegro 2004 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Singapore 1997 eng eng 5
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Czech Republic–Slovak Republic 2002 cze;slo 1
Czech Republic–Slovenia 1997 eng;cze;slv eng 4
Czech Republic–South Africa 1996 eng;cze 1
Czech Republic–Spain 1980 cze;spa 1
Czech Republic–Sri Lanka 1978 eng;cze;sin eng 3
Czech Republic–Sweden 1979 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Switzerland 1995 eng;cze;ger eng 4
Czech Republic–Syria 2008 eng;cze;ara eng 4
Czech Republic–Tajikistan 2006 eng;cze;tgk;rus eng 2
Czech Republic–Thailand 1994 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Tunisia 1990 fre fre 5
Czech Republic–Turkey 1999 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Turkmenistan 2016 eng;cze;tkm eng 2
Czech Republic–Ukraine 1997 eng;cze;ukr eng 2
Czech Republic–United Arab Emirates 1996 eng;cze;ara eng 3
Czech Republic–United Kingdom 1990 eng;cze 1
Czech Republic–United States 1993 eng;cze 1
Czech Republic–Uzbekistan 2000 eng;cze;uzb eng 2
Czech Republic–Venezuela 1996 eng;cze;spa eng 4
Czech Republic–Vietnam 1997 eng;cze;vts eng 3
Denmark–Egypt 1989 eng;dan;ara eng 3
Denmark–Estonia 1993 eng eng 5
Denmark–Georgia 2007 eng eng 5
Denmark–Germany 1995 dan;ger 1
Denmark–Ghana 2014 eng eng 5
Denmark–Greece 1989 eng eng 5
Denmark–Greenland 1979 dan;gro 1
Denmark–Guernsey 2008 eng eng 5
Denmark–Hungary 2011 eng;dan;hun eng 3
Denmark–India 1989 eng;dan;hin eng 2
Denmark–Indonesia 1985 eng eng 5
Denmark–Ireland 1993 eng eng 5
Denmark–Isle of Man 2007 eng eng 5
Denmark–Israel 2009 eng;dan;heb eng 2
Denmark–Italy 1966 eng;dan;ita eng 6
Denmark–Italy 1999 eng;dan;ita eng 6
Denmark–Jamaica 1990 eng eng 5
Denmark–Japan 1968 eng eng 5
Denmark–Jersey 2008 eng eng 5
Denmark–Kenya 1972 eng eng 5
Denmark–Korea (Rep.) 1977 eng eng 5
Denmark–Kuwait 2010 eng;dan;ara eng 2
Denmark–Kyrgyzstan 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Latvia 1993 eng eng 5
Denmark–Lithuania 1993 eng;dan;lit eng 3
Denmark–Luxembourg 1980 fre;dan 1
Denmark–Macedonia (FYR) 2000 eng;dan;mac eng 3
Denmark–Malaysia 1970 eng eng 5
Denmark–Malta 1998 eng eng 5
Denmark–Mexico 1997 eng;dan;spa eng 3
Denmark–Morocco 1984 fre;dan;ara 1
Denmark–Netherlands 1996 eng eng 5
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Denmark–New Zealand 1980 eng eng 5
Denmark–Pakistan 1987 eng eng 5
Denmark–Philippines 1995 eng eng 5
Denmark–Poland 2001 eng;dan;pol eng 3
Denmark–Portugal 2000 eng;dan;por eng 2
Denmark–Romania 1976 eng;dan;rum eng 3
Denmark–Russia 1996 eng;dan;rus eng 3
Denmark–Serbia 2009 eng eng 5
Denmark–Singapore 2000 eng eng 5
Denmark–Slovak Republic 1982 eng eng 5
Denmark–Slovenia 2001 eng;dan;slv eng 2
Denmark–South Africa 1995 eng eng 5
Denmark–Sri Lanka 1981 eng;dan;sin eng 3
Denmark–Switzerland 1973 dan;ger 1
Denmark–Switzerland 1973 dan;ger 1
Denmark–Taiwan 2005 eng eng 5
Denmark–Tanzania 1976 eng eng 5
Denmark–Thailand 1998 eng eng 5
Denmark–Trinidad and Tobago 1969 eng eng 5
Denmark–Tunisia 1981 fre fre 5
Denmark–Turkey 1991 eng;dan;tur eng 2
Denmark–Turkmenistan 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Uganda 2000 eng eng 5
Denmark–Ukraine 1996 eng;dan;ukr eng 3
Denmark–United Kingdom 1980 eng;dan 1
Denmark–United States 1983 eng;dan 1
Denmark–United States 1999 eng eng 5
Denmark–Venezuela 1998 eng;dan;spa eng 3
Denmark–Vietnam 1995 eng;dan;vts eng 3
Denmark–Zambia 1973 eng;dan 1
Dominica–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Dominican Republic–Spain 2011 spa spa 5
Ecuador–France 1989 fre;spa 1
Ecuador–Germany 1982 spa;ger 1
Ecuador–Italy 1984 spa;ita 1
Ecuador–Korea (Rep.) 2012 eng;spa;kor eng 3
Ecuador–Mexico 1992 spa spa 5
Ecuador–Qatar 2014 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Ecuador–Romania 1992 spa;rum 1
Ecuador–Singapore 2013 eng;spa 1
Ecuador–Spain 1991 spa spa 5
Ecuador–Switzerland 1994 fre;spa 1
Ecuador–Uruguay 2011 spa spa 5
Egypt–Ethiopia 2011 eng;ara eng 3
Egypt–Finland 1965 eng eng 5
Egypt–France 1980 fre;ara 1
Egypt–Georgia 2010 eng;ara;geo eng 3
Egypt–Germany 1987 eng;ara;ger eng 4
Egypt–Greece 2004 eng;ara;gre eng 6
Egypt–Hungary 1991 eng;ara;hun eng 4
Egypt–India 1969 eng eng 5
Egypt–Indonesia 1998 eng;ara;ind eng 3
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Egypt–Iraq 1968 ara ara 5
Egypt–Ireland 2012 eng;ara eng 3
Egypt–Italy 1979 eng eng 5
Egypt–Japan 1968 eng eng 5
Egypt–Jordan 1996 ara ara 5
Egypt–Korea (Rep.) 1992 eng;ara;kor eng 3
Egypt–Kuwait 2004 ara ara 5
Egypt–Lebanon 1996 ara ara 5
Egypt–Libya 1990 ara ara 5
Egypt–Macedonia (FYR) 1999 eng;ara;mac eng 3
Egypt–Malaysia 1997 eng;ara;may eng 3
Egypt–Malta 1999 eng;ara eng 3
Egypt–Mauritius 2012 eng;ara eng 2
Egypt–Morocco 1989 ara ara 5
Egypt–Netherlands 1999 eng;ara;dut eng 4
Egypt–Norway 1964 eng eng 5
Egypt–Oman 2000 ara ara 5
Egypt–Pakistan 1995 eng;ara 1
Egypt–Palestinian Autonomous Areas 1998 ara ara 5
Egypt–Poland 1996 eng eng 5
Egypt–Romania 1979 eng;ara;rum eng 6
Egypt–Russia 1997 eng;ara;rus eng 2
Egypt–Saudi Arabia 2016 ara ara 5
Egypt–Serbia and Montenegro 2005 eng;ara;ser eng 3
Egypt–Singapore 1996 eng eng 5
Egypt–Slovak Republic 2004 eng;ara;slo eng 3
Egypt–Slovenia 2009 eng;ara;slv eng 2
Egypt–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Egypt–Spain 2005 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Egypt–Sudan 1970 ara ara 5
Egypt–Sudan 2001 ara ara 5
Egypt–Sweden 1994 eng;ara;swe eng 6
Egypt–Switzerland 1987 eng;ara;fre eng 6
Egypt–Syria 1991 ara ara 5
Egypt–Thailand 2006 eng;ara;tha eng 4
Egypt–Turkey 1993 eng eng 5
Egypt–Ukraine 1997 eng;ara;ukr eng 4
Egypt–United Arab Emirates 1994 ara ara 5
Egypt–United Kingdom 1977 eng eng 5
Egypt–United States 1980 eng eng 5
Egypt–Uzbekistan 1999 eng;ara;uzb eng 3
Egypt–Vietnam 2006 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Egypt–Yemen 1997 ara ara 5
El Salvador–Spain 2008 spa spa 5
Estonia–Finland 1993 eng eng 5
Estonia–France 1997 fre;est 1
Estonia–Georgia 2006 eng;est;geo eng 3
Estonia–Germany 1996 eng;est;ger eng 4
Estonia–Greece 2006 eng;est;gre eng 3
Estonia–Hungary 2002 eng;est;hun eng 3
Estonia–Iceland 1994 eng eng 5
Estonia–India 2011 eng;est;hin eng 3
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Estonia–Ireland 1997 eng;est eng 3
Estonia–Isle of Man 2009 eng;est eng 2
Estonia–Israel 2009 eng;est;heb eng 2
Estonia–Italy 1997 eng;est;ita eng 3
Estonia–Jersey 2010 eng;est eng 2
Estonia–Kazakhstan 1999 eng;est;kaz;rus eng 3
Estonia–Korea (Rep.) 2009 eng;est;kor eng 3
Estonia–Latvia 2002 eng;est;lat eng 3
Estonia–Lithuania 2004 eng;est;lit eng 3
Estonia–Luxembourg 2006 eng;fre;est 1
Estonia–Luxembourg 2014 eng eng 5
Estonia–Macedonia (FYR) 2008 eng;est;mac eng 3
Estonia–Malta 2001 eng;est eng 3
Estonia–Mexico 2012 eng;est;spa eng 2
Estonia–Moldova 1998 eng;est;mol eng 3
Estonia–Morocco 2013 eng;est;ara eng 3
Estonia–Netherlands 1997 eng eng 5
Estonia–Norway 1993 eng eng 5
Estonia–Poland 1994 eng;est;pol eng 3
Estonia–Portugal 2003 eng;est;por eng 3
Estonia–Romania 2003 eng;est;rum eng 3
Estonia–Russia 2002 eng;est;rus eng 3
Estonia–Serbia 2009 eng eng 5
Estonia–Singapore 2006 eng;est eng 3
Estonia–Slovak Republic 2003 eng;est;slo eng 3
Estonia–Slovenia 2005 eng;est;slv eng 3
Estonia–Spain 2003 eng;est;spa eng 2
Estonia–Sweden 1993 eng eng 5
Estonia–Switzerland 2002 eng;est;ger eng 3
Estonia–Thailand 2012 eng eng 5
Estonia–Turkey 2003 eng;est;tur eng 3
Estonia–Turkmenistan 2011 eng;est;tkm eng 2
Estonia–Ukraine 1996 eng;est;ukr eng 3
Estonia–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;est;ara eng 3
Estonia–United Kingdom 1994 eng;est 1
Estonia–United States 1998 eng;est 1
Estonia–Uzbekistan 2012 eng;est;uzb eng 3
Estonia–Vietnam 2015 eng;est;vts eng 3
Ethiopia–France 2006 eng;fre 1
Ethiopia–India 2011 eng;hin eng 3
Ethiopia–Ireland 2014 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–Israel 2004 eng;heb eng 3
Ethiopia–Italy 1997 eng;ita 1
Ethiopia–Kuwait 1996 eng;ara 1
Ethiopia–Netherlands 2012 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–Poland 2015 eng;pol 1
Ethiopia–Romania 2003 eng;rum eng 3
Ethiopia–Russia 1999 eng;rus 1
Ethiopia–Seychelles 2012 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–South Africa 2004 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–Sudan 2006 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–Tunisia 2003 eng;ara eng 3
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Ethiopia–Turkey 2005 eng eng 5
Ethiopia–United Kingdom 2011 eng eng 5
Falkland Islands–United Kingdom 1997 eng eng 5
Faroe Islands–Greenland 2000 fao;gro;dan 1
Faroe Islands–Guernsey 2008 eng eng 5
Faroe Islands–India 1989 eng;dan;hin eng 2
Faroe Islands–Isle of Man 2007 eng eng 5
Faroe Islands–Jersey 2008 eng eng 5
Faroe Islands–Switzerland 1978 dan;ger 1
Faroe Islands–Switzerland 1978 dan;ger 1
Faroe Islands–United Kingdom 2007 eng;fao 1
Fiji–India 2014 eng;hin eng 3
Fiji–Japan 1970 eng;jap 1
Fiji–Korea (Rep.) 1994 eng;kor eng 3
Fiji–Malaysia 1995 eng;may eng 8
Fiji–New Zealand 1976 eng eng 5
Fiji–Papua New Guinea 1998 eng eng 5
Fiji–Qatar 2013 eng;ara 1
Fiji–Singapore 2005 eng eng 5
Fiji–United Arab Emirates 2012 eng;ara eng 2
Fiji–United Kingdom 1975 eng eng 5
Finland–France 1970 fre;fin 1
Finland–Georgia 2007 eng;fin;geo eng 3
Finland–Germany 1979 fin;ger 1
Finland–Germany 2016 ger;fin 1
Finland–Greece 1980 eng eng 5
Finland–Greece 1995 eng eng 5
Finland–Guernsey 2008 eng eng 5
Finland–Hungary 1978 eng eng 5
Finland–India 2010 eng;fin;swe;hin eng 3
Finland–Indonesia 1987 eng eng 5
Finland–Ireland 1992 eng;fin 1
Finland–Isle of Man 2007 eng eng 5
Finland–Israel 1997 eng eng 5
Finland–Italy 1981 eng;fin;ita eng 3
Finland–Japan 1972 eng eng 5
Finland–Jersey 2008 eng eng 5
Finland–Kazakhstan 2009 eng;fin;swe;kaz;rus eng 3
Finland–Korea (Rep.) 1979 eng eng 5
Finland–Kosovo 1986 eng eng 5
Finland–Kyrgyzstan 2003 eng;fin;kyr;rus eng 3
Finland–Latvia 1993 eng eng 5
Finland–Lithuania 1993 eng;fin;ukr eng 3
Finland–Luxembourg 1982 fre;fin 1
Finland–Macedonia (FYR) 2001 eng;fin;mac eng 3
Finland–Malaysia 1984 eng;fin;may eng 3
Finland–Malta 2000 eng eng 5
Finland–Mexico 1997 eng;fin;spa eng 3
Finland–Moldova 2008 eng;fin;mol eng 3
Finland–Montenegro 1986 eng eng 5
Finland–Morocco 2006 fre;fin;swe;are fre 3
Finland–Netherlands 1995 eng eng 5
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Finland–New Zealand 1982 eng eng 5
Finland–Pakistan 1994 eng eng 5
Finland–Philippines 1978 eng eng 5
Finland–Poland 2009 eng;fin;pol eng 3
Finland–Portugal 1970 eng eng 5
Finland–Romania 1998 eng;fin;rum eng 3
Finland–Russia 1996 eng;fin;rus eng 3
Finland–Serbia 1986 eng eng 5
Finland–Singapore 2002 eng eng 5
Finland–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;fin;slo eng 3
Finland–Slovenia 2003 eng;fin;slv eng 3
Finland–South Africa 1995 eng eng 5
Finland–Spain 1967 fin;spa 1
Finland–Spain 2015 spa;fin 1
Finland–Sri Lanka 1982 eng;fin;sin eng 3
Finland–Switzerland 1991 eng;fin;ger eng 3
Finland–Tajikistan 2012 eng;fin;tgk eng 3
Finland–Tanzania 1976 eng eng 5
Finland–Thailand 1985 eng eng 5
Finland–Turkey 2009 eng;fin;tur eng 3
Finland–Ukraine 1994 eng;fin;ukr eng 3
Finland–United Arab Emirates 1996 eng;fin;ara eng 3
Finland–United Kingdom 1969 eng;fin 1
Finland–United States 1989 eng;fin 1
Finland–Uruguay 2011 eng;fin;spa eng 2
Finland–Uzbekistan 1998 eng;fin;uzb eng 3
Finland–Vietnam 2001 eng;fin;vts eng 3
Finland–Zambia 1978 eng eng 5
France–Gabon 1995 fre fre 5
France–Georgia 2007 fre;geo 1
France–Germany 2006 fre;ger 1
France–Ghana 1993 eng;fre 1
France–Greece 1963 fre fre 5
France–Guinea 1999 fre fre 5
France–Hong Kong 2010 eng;fre 1
France–Hungary 1980 fre;hun 1
France–Iceland 1990 fre;ice 1
France–India 1992 eng;fre;hin 1
France–Indonesia 1979 fre;ind 1
France–Iran 1973 fre;per 1
France–Ireland 1968 eng;fre 1
France–Israel 1995 eng;heb 1
France–Italy 1989 fre;ita 1
France–Italy 1990 fre;ita 1
France–Ivory Coast 1966 fre fre 5
France–Jamaica 1995 eng;fre 1
France–Japan 1995 fre;jap 1
France–Jordan 1984 fre;ara 1
France–Kazakhstan 1998 fre;rus;kaz 1
France–Kenya 2007 eng;fre 1
France–Korea (Rep.) 1979 fre;kor 1
France–Kosovo 1974 fre;scr 1
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France–Kuwait 1982 fre;ara 1
France–Kyrgyzstan 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Latvia 1997 fre;lat 1
France–Lebanon 1962 fre fre 5
France–Libya 2005 fre;ara 1
France–Lithuania 1997 fre;lit 1
France–Macedonia (FYR) 1999 fre;mac 1
France–Madagascar 1983 fre fre 5
France–Malawi 1963 eng;fre 1
France–Malaysia 1975 fre;may 1
France–Mali 1972 fre fre 5
France–Malta 1977 eng;fre 1
France–Mauritania 1967 fre fre 5
France–Mauritius 1980 eng;fre 1
France–Mayotte 1970 fre fre 5
France–Mexico 1991 fre;spa 1
France–Moldova 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Moldova 2006 fre;mol 1
France–Monaco 1963 fre fre 5
France–Mongolia 1996 fre;mon 1
France–Morocco 1970 fre fre 5
France–Namibia 1996 eng;fre 1
France–Netherlands 1973 fre;dut 1
France–New Caledonia 1983 fre fre 5
France–New Zealand 1979 eng;fre 1
France–Niger 1965 fre fre 5
France–Nigeria 1990 eng;fre 1
France–Norway 1980 fre fre 5
France–Oman 1989 fre;ara 1
France–Pakistan 1994 eng;fre 1
France–Panama 2011 fre;spa 1
France–Philippines 1976 eng;fre 1
France–Poland 1975 fre;pol 1
France–Portugal 1971 fre;por 1
France–Portugal 1994 fre fre 5
France–Qatar 1990 fre;ara 1
France–Quebec 1987 fre fre 5
France–Romania 1974 fre;rum 1
France–Russia 1996 fre;rus 1
France–Saudi Arabia 1982 fre;ara 1
France–Senegal 1974 fre fre 5
France–Serbia and Montenegro 1974 fre;scr 1
France–Singapore 1974 eng;fre 1
France–Singapore 2015 eng;fre 1
France–Slovak Republic 1973 fre;cze 1
France–Slovenia 2004 fre;slv 1
France–South Africa 1993 eng;fre 1
France–Spain 1961 fre;spa 1
France–Spain 1963 fre;spa 1
France–Spain 1995 fre;spa 1
France–Sri Lanka 1981 fre;sin 1
France–St. Martin 2010 fre fre 5
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France–St. Pierre and Miquelon 1988 fre fre 5
France–Sweden 1990 fre fre 5
France–Sweden 1994 fre fre 5
France–Switzerland 1966 fre fre 5
France–Switzerland 1979 fre fre 5
France–Switzerland 1983 fre fre 5
France–Switzerland 2013 fre fre 5
France–Syria 1998 fre;ara 1
France–Taiwan 2010 eng;fre;chi 1
France–Tajikistan 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Thailand 1974 fre;tha 1
France–Togo 1971 fre fre 5
France–Trinidad and Tobago 1987 eng;fre 1
France–Tunisia 1973 fre fre 5
France–Turkey 1987 fre;tur 1
France–Turkmenistan 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Ukraine 1997 fre;ukr 1
France–United Arab Emirates 1989 fre;ara map 7
France–United Kingdom 1963 eng;fre 1
France–United Kingdom 2008 eng;fre 1
France–United States 1978 eng;fre 1
France–United States 1994 eng;fre 1
France–Uzbekistan 1996 fre fre 5
France–Venezuela 1992 fre;spa 1
France–Vietnam 1993 fre;vts 1
France–Zambia 1963 eng;fre 1
France–Zimbabwe 1993 eng;fre 1
Gabon–Italy 1999 fre;ita 1
Gabon–Korea (Rep.) 2010 eng;fre;kor 1
Gabon–Lebanon 2001 fre fre 5
Gabon–Morocco 1999 fre;ara fre 3
Gabon–South Africa 2005 eng;fre 1
Gabon–Tunisia 1986 fre fre 5
Gambia–Norway 1994 eng eng 5
Gambia–Qatar 2014 eng;ara 1
Gambia–Sweden 1993 eng eng 5
Gambia–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Gambia–Taiwan 1998 eng;chi eng 2
Gambia–United Kingdom 1980 eng eng 5
Georgia–Germany 2006 rus;geo;ger rus 4
Georgia–Greece 1999 eng;geo;gre eng 6
Georgia–Hungary 2012 eng;geo;hun eng 3
Georgia–Iceland 2015 eng;geo;ice eng 3
Georgia–India 2011 eng;geo;hin eng 3
Georgia–Iran 1996 eng;geo;per eng 3
Georgia–Ireland 2008 eng;geo 1
Georgia–Israel 2010 eng;geo;heb eng 2
Georgia–Italy 2000 eng;geo;ita eng 6
Georgia–Japan 1986 eng;rus;jap eng 3
Georgia–Korea (Rep.) 2016 eng;kor;geo eng 3
Georgia–Kuwait 2009 eng;geo;ara eng 2
Georgia–Latvia 2004 eng;geo;lat eng 3
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Georgia–Liechtenstein 2015 eng;ger;geo eng 3
Georgia–Lithuania 2003 eng;geo;lit eng 3
Georgia–Luxembourg 2007 eng;geo;fre 1
Georgia–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Georgia–Malta 2009 eng;geo eng 2
Georgia–Netherlands 2002 eng;geo;dut eng 4
Georgia–Norway 2011 eng;geo;nor eng 3
Georgia–Poland 1999 rus;geo;pol rus 3
Georgia–Portugal 2012 eng;geo;por eng 3
Georgia–Qatar 2010 eng;geo;ara eng 2
Georgia–Romania 1997 eng;geo;rum eng 3
Georgia–San Marino 2012 eng;geo;ita eng 3
Georgia–Serbia 2012 eng;geo;ser eng 3
Georgia–Singapore 2009 eng;geo eng 2
Georgia–Slovak Republic 2011 eng;geo;slo eng 3
Georgia–Slovenia 2012 eng;geo;slv eng 2
Georgia–Spain 2010 eng;geo;spa eng 2
Georgia–Sweden 2013 eng;geo;swe eng 2
Georgia–Switzerland 1986 rus;ger 1
Georgia–Switzerland 2010 eng;geo;ger eng 3
Georgia–Turkey 2007 eng;geo;tur eng 2
Georgia–Turkmenistan 1997 geo;tkm;rus rus 3
Georgia–Ukraine 1997 rus;geo;ukr rus 3
Georgia–United Arab Emirates 2010 eng;geo;ara eng 2
Georgia–United Kingdom 2004 eng;geo 1
Georgia–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Georgia–Uzbekistan 1996 rus;geo;uzb rus 3
Germany–Ghana 2004 eng;ger 1
Germany–Greece 1966 eng;ger;gre eng 6
Germany–Hungary 2011 eng;ger;hun eng 4
Germany–Iceland 1971 ger;ice 1
Germany–India 1995 eng;ger;hin eng 4
Germany–Indonesia 1990 eng;ger;ind eng 4
Germany–Iran 1968 fre;ger;per fre 4
Germany–Ireland 2011 eng;ger 1
Germany–Israel 1962 eng;ger;heb eng 6
Germany–Israel 2014 eng;ger;heb eng 4
Germany–Italy 1989 ger;ita 1
Germany–Ivory Coast 1979 fre;ger 1
Germany–Jamaica 1974 eng;ger 1
Germany–Japan 1966 eng;ger;jap eng 9
Germany–Japan 2015 eng;ger;jap eng 4
Germany–Jersey 2008 eng;ger 1
Germany–Jersey 2015 eng;ger 1
Germany–Kazakhstan 1997 eng;ger;rus;kaz eng 4
Germany–Kenya 1977 eng;ger 1
Germany–Korea (Rep.) 2000 eng;ger;kor eng 4
Germany–Kuwait 1999 eng;ger;ara eng 4
Germany–Kyrgyzstan 2005 rus;ger;kyr rus 4
Germany–Latvia 1997 eng;ger;lat eng 4
Germany–Liberia 1970 eng;ger 1
Germany–Liechtenstein 2011 ger ger 5
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Germany–Lithuania 1997 eng;ger;lit eng 4
Germany–Luxembourg 2012 ger ger 5
Germany–Macedonia (FYR) 2006 eng;ger;mac eng 4
Germany–Malaysia 2010 eng;ger;may eng 4
Germany–Malta 2001 eng;ger 1
Germany–Mauritius 2011 eng;ger 1
Germany–Mexico 2008 eng;ger;spa eng 4
Germany–Moldova 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Mongolia 1994 eng;ger;mon eng 4
Germany–Morocco 1972 fre;ger 1
Germany–Namibia 1993 eng;ger 1
Germany–Netherlands 2012 ger;dut 1
Germany–New Zealand 1978 eng;ger 1
Germany–Norway 1991 ger;nor 1
Germany–Oman 2012 eng;ger;ara eng 4
Germany–Pakistan 1994 eng;ger 1
Germany–Papua New Guinea 1995 eng;ger 1
Germany–Philippines 1983 eng;ger 1
Germany–Philippines 2013 eng;ger 1
Germany–Poland 2003 ger;pol 1
Germany–Portugal 1980 eng;ger;por eng 4
Germany–Romania 2001 eng;ger;rum eng 4
Germany–Russia 1996 ger;rus 1
Germany–Serbia and Montenegro 1987 eng;ger;scr eng 4
Germany–Singapore 2004 eng;ger 1
Germany–Slovak Republic 1980 ger;cze 1
Germany–Slovenia 2006 eng;ger;slv eng 4
Germany–South Africa 1973 eng;ger;afr eng 6
Germany–South Africa 2008 eng;ger 1
Germany–Spain 2011 ger;spa map 7
Germany–Sri Lanka 1979 eng;ger;sin eng 3
Germany–Sweden 1992 ger;swe 1
Germany–Switzerland 1971 ger ger 5
Germany–Switzerland 1978 ger ger 5
Germany–Syria 2010 eng;ger;ara eng 4
Germany–Taiwan 2011 eng;ger;chi eng 4
Germany–Tajikistan 2003 ger;rus 1
Germany–Thailand 1967 eng;ger;tha eng 6
Germany–Trinidad and Tobago 1973 eng;ger 1
Germany–Tunisia 1975 fre;ger 1
Germany–Turkey 2011 eng;ger;tur eng 4
Germany–Turkmenistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Ukraine 1995 eng;ger;ukr eng 3
Germany–United Arab Emirates 2010 eng;ger;ara eng 4
Germany–United Kingdom 2010 eng;ger 1
Germany–United States 1980 eng;ger 1
Germany–United States 1989 eng;ger 1
Germany–Uruguay 2010 ger;spa 1
Germany–Uzbekistan 1999 rus;ger;uzb rus 4
Germany–Venezuela 1995 ger;spa 1
Germany–Vietnam 1995 eng;ger;vts eng 4
Germany–Zambia 1973 eng;ger 1
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Germany–Zimbabwe 1988 eng;ger 1
Ghana–Italy 2004 eng;ita 1
Ghana–Netherlands 2008 eng eng 5
Ghana–Serbia and Montenegro 2000 eng;ser eng 3
Ghana–Seychelles 2014 eng eng 5
Ghana–South Africa 2004 eng eng 5
Ghana–Switzerland 2008 eng;fre 1
Ghana–United Kingdom 1977 eng eng 5
Ghana–United Kingdom 1993 eng eng 5
Greece–Hungary 1983 eng eng 5
Greece–Iceland 2006 eng;gre;ice eng 3
Greece–India 1965 eng eng 5
Greece–Ireland 2003 eng;gre eng 6
Greece–Israel 1995 eng;gre;heb eng 3
Greece–Italy 1964 fre fre 5
Greece–Italy 1987 eng eng 5
Greece–Korea (Rep.) 1995 eng;gre;kor eng 3
Greece–Kuwait 2003 eng;gre;ara eng 2
Greece–Latvia 2002 eng;gre;lat eng 3
Greece–Lithuania 2002 eng;gre;lit eng 3
Greece–Luxembourg 1991 eng;fre;gre 1
Greece–Malta 2006 eng;gre eng 6
Greece–Mexico 2004 eng;gre;spa eng 3
Greece–Moldova 2004 eng;gre;mol eng 6
Greece–Montenegro 1997 eng;gre;ser eng 3
Greece–Morocco 2007 eng;fre;gre;ara eng 3
Greece–Netherlands 1981 eng;gre;dut eng 4
Greece–Norway 1988 eng eng 5
Greece–Poland 1987 eng;gre;pol eng 3
Greece–Portugal 1999 eng;gre;por eng 6
Greece–Qatar 2008 eng;gre;ara eng 2
Greece–Romania 1991 eng;gre;rum eng 6
Greece–Russia 2000 eng;gre;rus eng 3
Greece–San Marino 2013 eng;gre;ita eng 2
Greece–Saudi Arabia 2008 eng;gre;ara eng 3
Greece–Serbia 1997 eng;gre;ser eng 3
Greece–Slovak Republic 1986 eng eng 5
Greece–Slovenia 2001 eng;gre;slv eng 2
Greece–South Africa 1998 eng;gre eng 6
Greece–Spain 2000 eng;gre;spa eng 3
Greece–Sweden 1961 eng eng 5
Greece–Switzerland 1983 eng;fre;ger eng 6
Greece–Tunisia 1992 fre;gre;ara fre 2
Greece–Turkey 2003 eng;gre;tur eng 2
Greece–Ukraine 2000 eng;gre;ukr eng 6
Greece–United Arab Emirates 2010 eng eng 5
Greece–Uzbekistan 1997 eng;gre;uzb eng 6
Greenland–Guernsey 2008 eng eng 5
Greenland–Iceland 2002 eng eng 5
Greenland–Isle of Man 2007 eng eng 5
Greenland–Jersey 2008 eng eng 5
Greenland–Norway 2005 nor;gro 1
412
E.2. Global Tax Treaty Network
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Grenada–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Grenada–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Guatemala–Mexico 2015 spa spa 5
Guernsey–Hong Kong 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Iceland 2008 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Ireland 2009 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Isle of Man 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Jersey 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Liechtenstein 2014 eng;ger eng 3
Guernsey–Luxembourg 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Malta 2012 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Mauritius 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Monaco 2014 eng;fre 1
Guernsey–Norway 2008 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Poland 2013 eng;pol 1
Guernsey–Qatar 2013 eng;ara 1
Guernsey–Seychelles 2014 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Singapore 2013 eng eng 5
Guernsey–Sweden 2008 eng eng 5
Guinea–Morocco 2014 fre;ara fre 3
Guinea–Serbia and Montenegro 1996 fre;ser 1
Guinea–Tunisia 1993 fre fre 5
Guinea-Bissau–Morocco 2015 fre;ara;por fre 3
Guinea-Bissau–Portugal 2008 por por 5
Guyana–United Kingdom 1992 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Hungary 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Indonesia 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Ireland 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Italy 2013 eng;ita 1
Hong Kong–Japan 2010 eng;chi;jap eng 3
Hong Kong–Jersey 2012 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Korea (Rep.) 2014 eng;chi;kor eng 3
Hong Kong–Kuwait 2010 eng;chi;ara eng 2
Hong Kong–Latvia 2016 eng;chi;lat eng 3
Hong Kong–Liechtenstein 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Luxembourg 2007 eng;fre 1
Hong Kong–Malaysia 2012 eng;chi;may eng 3
Hong Kong–Malta 2011 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Mexico 2012 eng;chi;spa eng 2
Hong Kong–Netherlands 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–New Zealand 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Portugal 2011 eng;chi;por eng 2
Hong Kong–Qatar 2013 eng;chi;spa eng 2
Hong Kong–Romania 2015 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Russia 2016 eng;rus;chi eng 3
Hong Kong–South Africa 2014 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Spain 2011 eng;spa 1
Hong Kong–Switzerland 2011 eng;chi;ger eng 3
Hong Kong–Thailand 2005 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–United Arab Emirates 2014 eng;ara eng 2
Hong Kong–United Kingdom 2010 eng eng 5
Hong Kong–Vietnam 2008 eng;vts 1
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Hungary–Iceland 2005 eng;hun;ice eng 3
Hungary–India 2003 eng;hun;hin eng 2
Hungary–Indonesia 1989 eng eng 5
Hungary–Iran 2015 eng;hun;per eng 3
Hungary–Ireland 1995 eng;hun 1
Hungary–Israel 1991 eng eng 5
Hungary–Italy 1977 fre;hun;ita fre 6
Hungary–Japan 1980 eng eng 5
Hungary–Korea (Rep.) 1989 eng;hun;kor eng 3
Hungary–Kosovo 2013 eng;hun;alb eng 3
Hungary–Kosovo (FYR) 1985 eng eng 5
Hungary–Kuwait 1994 eng;hun;ara eng 2
Hungary–Latvia 2004 eng;hun;lat eng 3
Hungary–Liechtenstein 2015 eng eng 5
Hungary–Lithuania 2004 eng;hun;lit eng 3
Hungary–Luxembourg 1990 eng;fre;hun 1
Hungary–Luxembourg 2015 eng;fre;hun eng 3
Hungary–Macedonia (FYR) 2001 eng;hun;mac eng 2
Hungary–Malaysia 1989 eng;hun;may eng 8
Hungary–Malta 1991 eng eng 5
Hungary–Mexico 2011 eng;hun;spa eng 3
Hungary–Moldova 1995 eng;hun;mol eng 3
Hungary–Mongolia 1994 eng;hun;mon eng 3
Hungary–Morocco 1991 fre;hun;ara fre 3
Hungary–Netherlands 1986 eng eng 5
Hungary–Norway 1980 eng eng 5
Hungary–Pakistan 1992 eng eng 5
Hungary–Philippines 1997 eng eng 5
Hungary–Poland 1992 eng;hun;pol eng 3
Hungary–Portugal 1995 eng;hun;por eng 3
Hungary–Qatar 2012 eng;hun;ara eng 2
Hungary–Romania 1993 eng eng 5
Hungary–Russia 1994 eng;hun;rus eng 3
Hungary–San Marino 2009 eng;hun;ita eng 3
Hungary–Saudi Arabia 2014 eng;hun;ara eng 3
Hungary–Serbia and Montenegro 2001 eng eng 5
Hungary–Singapore 1997 eng eng 5
Hungary–Slovak Republic 1994 eng;hun;slo eng 4
Hungary–Slovenia 2004 eng;hun;slv eng 2
Hungary–South Africa 1994 eng;hun 1
Hungary–Spain 1984 eng;hun;spa 1
Hungary–Sweden 1981 eng eng 5
Hungary–Switzerland 1981 hun;ger 1
Hungary–Switzerland 2013 eng;hun;ger eng 4
Hungary–Taiwan 2010 eng;hun;chi eng 3
Hungary–Thailand 1989 eng eng 5
Hungary–Tunisia 1992 fre fre 5
Hungary–Turkey 1993 eng eng 5
Hungary–Turkmenistan 2016 eng;hun;tkm eng 3
Hungary–Ukraine 1995 eng;hun;ukr eng 3
Hungary–United Arab Emirates 2013 eng;hun;ara eng 3
Hungary–United Kingdom 2011 eng;hun 1
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Hungary–United States 1979 eng;hun 1
Hungary–United States 2010 eng;hun 1
Hungary–Uruguay 1988 eng;hun;spa eng 9
Hungary–Uzbekistan 2008 eng;hun;uzb eng 3
Hungary–Vietnam 1994 eng;hun;vts eng 3
Iceland–India 2007 eng;ice;hin eng 3
Iceland–Ireland 2003 eng;ice 1
Iceland–Isle of Man 2007 eng eng 5
Iceland–Italy 2002 eng;ice;ita eng 3
Iceland–Jersey 2008 eng eng 5
Iceland–Korea (Rep.) 2008 eng;ice;kor eng 3
Iceland–Latvia 1994 eng eng 5
Iceland–Liechtenstein 2016 eng;ger;ice eng 2
Iceland–Lithuania 1998 eng;ice;lit eng 3
Iceland–Luxembourg 1999 eng;fre;ice 1
Iceland–Malta 2004 eng eng 5
Iceland–Mexico 2008 eng;ice;spa eng 2
Iceland–Netherlands 1997 eng eng 5
Iceland–Poland 1998 eng;ice;pol eng 3
Iceland–Portugal 1999 eng;ice;por eng 3
Iceland–Romania 2007 eng;ice;rum eng 3
Iceland–Russia 1999 eng;ice;rus eng 3
Iceland–Russia 1999 eng;rus;ice eng 3
Iceland–Slovak Republic 2002 eng;ice;slo eng 3
Iceland–Slovenia 2011 eng;slv;ice eng 2
Iceland–Spain 2002 eng;ice;spa eng 3
Iceland–Switzerland 1988 eng;ice;ger eng 6
Iceland–Switzerland 2014 eng;ger;ice eng 6
Iceland–Ukraine 2006 eng;ice;ukr eng 3
Iceland–United Kingdom 1991 eng;ice 1
Iceland–United Kingdom 2013 eng;ice 1
Iceland–United States 2007 eng;ice 1
Iceland–Vietnam 2002 eng;ice;vts eng 3
India–Indonesia 1987 eng;hin;ind eng 3
India–Indonesia 2012 eng;hin;ind eng 3
India–Ireland 2000 eng;hin eng 2
India–Israel 1996 eng;hin;heb eng 3
India–Italy 1993 eng;hin;ita eng 6
India–Japan 1989 eng;hin;jap eng 3
India–Jordan 1999 eng;hin;ara eng 2
India–Kazakhstan 1996 eng;hin;kaz;rus eng 2
India–Kenya 1985 eng;hin eng 8
India–Korea (Rep.) 1985 eng;hin;kor eng 2
India–Korea (Rep.) 2015 eng;hin;kor eng 3
India–Kuwait 2006 eng;hin;ara eng 3
India–Kyrgyzstan 1999 eng;hin;kyr;rus eng 2
India–Latvia 2013 eng;hin;lat eng 3
India–Libya 1981 eng;hin;ara eng 6
India–Lithuania 2011 eng;hin;lit eng 3
India–Luxembourg 2008 eng;fre;hin 1
India–Macedonia (FYR) 2013 eng;mac;hin eng 3
India–Malaysia 2012 eng;hin;may eng 3
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India–Malta 1994 eng;hin eng 2
India–Malta 2013 eng;hin eng 3
India–Mauritius 1982 eng;hin eng 2
India–Mexico 2007 eng;hin;spa eng 3
India–Moldova 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Mongolia 1994 eng;hin;mon eng 2
India–Morocco 1998 eng;fre;hin;ara eng 3
India–Mozambique 2010 eng;hin;por eng 3
India–Myanmar 2008 eng;hin;bur eng 3
India–Namibia 1997 eng;hin eng 3
India–Nepal 2011 eng;hin;nep eng 3
India–Netherlands 1988 eng;hin;dut eng 4
India–New Zealand 1986 eng;hin eng 2
India–Norway 2011 eng;hin;nor eng 3
India–Oman 1997 eng;hin;ara eng 3
India–Philippines 1990 eng;hin eng 3
India–Poland 1989 eng;hin;pol eng 4
India–Portugal 1998 eng;hin;por eng 6
India–Qatar 1999 eng;hin;ara eng 2
India–Romania 2013 eng;hin;rum eng 3
India–Russia 1997 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Saudi Arabia 2006 eng;hin;ara eng 3
India–Serbia and Montenegro 2006 eng;hin;ser eng 3
India–Singapore 1994 eng;hin eng 2
India–Slovak Republic 1986 eng eng 5
India–Slovenia 2003 eng;hin;slv eng 2
India–South Africa 1996 eng;hin eng 3
India–Spain 1993 eng;hin;spa eng 2
India–Sri Lanka 2013 eng;hin;sin eng 3
India–Sudan 2003 eng;hin;ara eng 3
India–Sweden 1997 eng;hin;swe eng 2
India–Switzerland 1994 eng;hin;ger eng 6
India–Syria 2008 eng;hin;ara eng 3
India–Taiwan 2011 eng;hin;chi eng 3
India–Tajikistan 2008 eng;hin;tgk eng 3
India–Tanzania 2011 eng;hin eng 3
India–Thailand 1985 eng;hin;tha eng 2
India–Thailand 2015 eng;hin;tha eng 3
India–Trinidad and Tobago 1999 eng;hin eng 2
India–Turkey 1995 eng;hin;tur eng 2
India–Turkmenistan 1997 eng;hin;tkm eng 2
India–Uganda 2004 eng;hin eng 2
India–Ukraine 1999 eng;hin;ukr eng 2
India–United Arab Emirates 1992 eng;hin;ara eng 2
India–United Kingdom 1993 eng;hin eng 2
India–United States 1989 eng;hin eng 2
India–Uruguay 2011 eng;hin;spa eng 3
India–Uzbekistan 1993 eng;hin;uzb eng 2
India–Vietnam 1994 eng;hin;vts eng 3
India–Zambia 1981 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Iran 2004 eng;ind;per eng 3
Indonesia–Italy 1990 eng;ind;ita eng 6
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Indonesia–Japan 1982 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Jordan 1996 eng;ind;ara eng 3
Indonesia–Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.) 2002 eng;ind;kor eng 3
Indonesia–Korea (Rep.) 1988 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Kuwait 1997 eng;ind;ara eng 2
Indonesia–Luxembourg 1993 eng;fre;ind 1
Indonesia–Malaysia 1991 eng;ind;may eng 8
Indonesia–Mexico 2002 eng;ind;spa eng 4
Indonesia–Mongolia 1996 eng;ind;mon eng 3
Indonesia–Morocco 2008 eng;ind;ara eng 3
Indonesia–Myanmar 2003 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Netherlands 2002 eng;ind;dut eng 4
Indonesia–New Zealand 1987 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Norway 1988 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Pakistan 1990 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Philippines 1993 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Poland 1992 eng;ind;pol eng 3
Indonesia–Portugal 2003 eng;ind;por eng 3
Indonesia–Qatar 2006 eng;ind;ara eng 2
Indonesia–Romania 1996 eng;ind;rum eng 3
Indonesia–Russia 1999 eng;ind;rus eng 2
Indonesia–Serbia 2011 eng;ind;ser eng 3
Indonesia–Seychelles 1999 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Singapore 1990 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Slovak Republic 2000 eng;ind;slo eng 4
Indonesia–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Spain 1995 eng;ind;spa eng 3
Indonesia–Sri Lanka 1993 eng;ind;sin eng 3
Indonesia–Sudan 1998 eng;ind;ara eng 4
Indonesia–Suriname 2003 eng;ind;dut eng 4
Indonesia–Sweden 1989 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Switzerland 1988 eng;fre;ind eng 4
Indonesia–Syria 1997 eng;ind;ara eng 4
Indonesia–Taiwan 1995 eng;ind;chi eng 3
Indonesia–Tajikistan 2003 eng;ind;tgk eng 3
Indonesia–Thailand 2001 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Tunisia 1992 eng;ind;ara;fre eng 3
Indonesia–Turkey 1997 eng;ind;tur eng 2
Indonesia–Ukraine 1996 eng;ind;ukr eng 4
Indonesia–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng;ind;ara eng 3
Indonesia–United Kingdom 1993 eng eng 5
Indonesia–United States 1988 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Uzbekistan 1996 eng;ind;uzb eng 3
Indonesia–Venezuela 1997 eng;ind;spa eng 2
Indonesia–Vietnam 1997 eng;ind;vts eng 3
Iran–Iraq 2011 eng;ara;per eng 3
Iran–Jordan 2003 eng;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Kazakhstan 1996 eng;per;kaz;rus eng 2
Iran–Kenya 2012 eng eng 5
Iran–Korea (Rep.) 2006 eng;per;kor eng 3
Iran–Kuwait 2008 eng;per;ara eng 2
Iran–Kyrgyzstan 2002 eng;per;kyr;rus eng 3
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Iran–Lebanon 1998 eng;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Macedonia (FYR) 2000 eng;per;mac eng 3
Iran–Malaysia 1992 eng;per;may eng 8
Iran–Morocco 2008 eng;fre;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Oman 2004 eng;per;ara eng 4
Iran–Pakistan 1999 eng;per 1
Iran–Poland 1998 eng;per;pol eng 3
Iran–Qatar 2000 eng;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Romania 2001 eng;per;rum eng 3
Iran–Russia 1998 eng;per;rus eng 4
Iran–Serbia and Montenegro 2004 eng;per;ser eng 3
Iran–Slovak Republic 2016 eng;slo;per eng 3
Iran–Slovenia 2011 eng;per;slv eng 2
Iran–South Africa 1997 eng;per 1
Iran–Spain 2003 eng;per;spa eng 3
Iran–Sri Lanka 2000 eng;per;sin eng 3
Iran–Sudan 2004 eng;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Switzerland 2002 eng;per;ger eng 3
Iran–Syria 1996 eng;per;ara eng 3
Iran–Tajikistan 1998 eng;per;tgk eng 3
Iran–Tunisia 2001 eng;fre;per;ara eng;fre 3
Iran–Turkey 2002 eng;per;tur eng 3
Iran–Turkmenistan 1995 eng;per;tkm eng 2
Iran–Ukraine 1996 eng;per;ukr eng 3
Iran–Uzbekistan 2002 eng;per;uzb eng 3
Iran–Venezuela 2005 eng;per;spa eng 2
Iran–Vietnam 2014 eng;per;vts eng 3
Iraq–Sudan 2002 ara ara 5
Iraq–Tunisia 2001 ara ara 5
Iraq–Yemen 2001 ara ara 5
Ireland–Isle of Man 2008 eng eng 5
Ireland–Israel 1995 eng;heb 1
Ireland–Italy 1971 eng;ita 1
Ireland–Japan 1974 eng eng 5
Ireland–Jersey 2009 eng eng 5
Ireland–Korea (Rep.) 1990 eng eng 5
Ireland–Kuwait 2010 eng;ara 1
Ireland–Latvia 1997 eng;lat eng 2
Ireland–Lithuania 1997 eng;lit 1
Ireland–Luxembourg 1972 eng;fre 1
Ireland–Macedonia (FYR) 2008 eng;mac 1
Ireland–Malaysia 1998 eng;may eng 8
Ireland–Malta 2008 eng eng 5
Ireland–Mexico 1998 eng;spa 1
Ireland–Moldova 2009 eng;mol 1
Ireland–Montenegro 2010 eng;mon 1
Ireland–Morocco 2010 eng;ara 1
Ireland–Netherlands 1969 eng;dut 1
Ireland–New Zealand 1986 eng eng 5
Ireland–Norway 2000 eng;nor 1
Ireland–Pakistan 1973 eng eng 5
Ireland–Pakistan 2015 eng eng 5
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Ireland–Panama 2011 eng;spa eng 2
Ireland–Poland 1995 eng;pol 1
Ireland–Portugal 1993 eng;por 1
Ireland–Qatar 2012 eng;ara 1
Ireland–Romania 1999 eng;rum eng 3
Ireland–Russia 1994 eng;rus 1
Ireland–Saudi Arabia 2011 eng;ara 1
Ireland–Serbia 2009 eng;ser 1
Ireland–Singapore 2010 eng eng 5
Ireland–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;slo 1
Ireland–Slovenia 2002 eng;slv 1
Ireland–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Ireland–Spain 1994 eng;spa 1
Ireland–Sweden 1986 eng eng 5
Ireland–Switzerland 1966 eng;fre 1
Ireland–Thailand 2013 eng eng 5
Ireland–Turkey 2008 eng;tur 1
Ireland–Ukraine 2013 eng;ukr 1
Ireland–United Arab Emirates 2010 eng;ara 1
Ireland–United Kingdom 1976 eng eng 5
Ireland–United Kingdom 1977 eng eng 5
Ireland–United States 1997 eng eng 5
Ireland–Uzbekistan 2012 eng;uzb eng 3
Ireland–Vietnam 2008 eng;vts 1
Ireland–Zambia 1971 eng eng 5
Ireland–Zambia 2015 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Jersey 2013 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Luxembourg 2013 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Malta 2009 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Norway 2007 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Poland 2011 eng;pol 1
Isle of Man–Qatar 2012 eng;ara 1
Isle of Man–Seychelles 2013 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Singapore 2012 eng eng 5
Isle of Man–Slovenia 2011 eng;slv 1
Isle of Man–Sweden 2007 eng eng 5
Israel–Italy 1968 eng;heb;ita eng 6
Israel–Italy 1995 eng;heb;ita eng 6
Israel–Jamaica 1984 eng;heb 1
Israel–Japan 1993 eng eng 5
Israel–Korea (Rep.) 1997 eng;heb;kor eng 3
Israel–Latvia 2006 eng;heb;lat eng 3
Israel–Lithuania 2006 eng;heb;lit eng 3
Israel–Luxembourg 2004 eng;fre;heb 1
Israel–Macedonia (FYR) 2016 eng;heb;mac eng 2
Israel–Malta 2011 eng;heb eng 2
Israel–Mexico 1999 eng;heb;spa eng 3
Israel–Moldova 2006 eng;heb;mol eng 3
Israel–Netherlands 1973 eng;heb;dut eng 4
Israel–Netherlands 1974 eng;heb;dut eng 4
Israel–Norway 1966 eng eng 5
419
E. Sample
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Israel–Panama 2012 eng;heb;spa eng 2
Israel–Philippines 1992 eng;heb eng 3
Israel–Poland 1991 eng;heb;pol eng 3
Israel–Portugal 2006 eng;heb;por eng 3
Israel–Romania 1997 eng;heb;rum eng 3
Israel–Russia 1994 eng;heb;rus eng 2
Israel–Singapore 2005 eng;heb eng 3
Israel–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;heb;slo eng 3
Israel–Slovenia 2007 eng;heb;slv eng 2
Israel–South Africa 1978 eng;heb;afr eng 6
Israel–Spain 1999 eng;heb;spa eng 3
Israel–Sweden 1962 eng eng 5
Israel–Switzerland 2003 eng;heb;ger eng 4
Israel–Taiwan 2009 eng eng 5
Israel–Thailand 1996 eng;heb;tha eng 6
Israel–Turkey 1996 eng;heb;tur eng 3
Israel–Ukraine 2003 eng;heb;ukr eng 4
Israel–United Kingdom 1962 eng;heb 1
Israel–United States 1975 eng;heb 1
Israel–Uzbekistan 1998 eng;heb;uzb eng 3
Israel–Vietnam 2009 eng;heb;vts eng 3
Italy–Ivory Coast 1982 fre;ita 1
Italy–Japan 1969 eng;ita;jap eng 3
Italy–Jordan 2004 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Kazakhstan 1994 eng;ita;kaz;rus eng 6
Italy–Kenya 1979 eng;ita 1
Italy–Korea (Rep.) 1989 eng;ita;kor eng 3
Italy–Kuwait 1987 eng;ita;ara eng 2
Italy–Latvia 1997 eng;ita;lat eng 3
Italy–Lebanon 2000 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Libya 2009 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Lithuania 1996 eng;ita;lit eng 3
Italy–Luxembourg 1981 fre;ita 1
Italy–Macedonia (FYR) 1996 eng;ita;mac eng 6
Italy–Malaysia 1984 eng;ita;may eng 3
Italy–Malta 1981 eng;ita 1
Italy–Mauritius 1990 eng;ita 1
Italy–Mexico 1991 ita;spa 1
Italy–Moldova 2002 eng;ita;mol eng 3
Italy–Mongolia 2003 eng;ita;mon eng 3
Italy–Morocco 1972 fre;ita;ara fre 6
Italy–Mozambique 1998 fre;ita;por fre 3
Italy–Netherlands 1990 fre;ita;dut fre 4
Italy–New Zealand 1979 eng;ita 1
Italy–Norway 1985 eng;ita;nor eng 6
Italy–Oman 1998 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Pakistan 1984 eng;ita eng 3
Italy–Panama 2010 eng;ita;spa eng 2
Italy–Philippines 1980 eng;ita 1
Italy–Poland 1985 eng;ita;pol eng 6
Italy–Portugal 1980 fre;ita;por fre 6
Italy–Qatar 2002 eng;ita;ara eng 3
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Italy–Romania 1977 ita;rum 1
Italy–Romania 2015 eng;ita;rum eng 3
Italy–Russia 1996 eng;ita;rus eng 4
Italy–San Marino 2002 ita ita 5
Italy–Saudi Arabia 2007 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Senegal 1998 fre;ita 1
Italy–Serbia and Montenegro 1982 eng eng 5
Italy–Singapore 1977 eng;ita 1
Italy–Slovak Republic 1981 fre;ita;cze fre 6
Italy–Slovenia 2001 eng;ita;slv eng 6
Italy–South Africa 1995 eng;ita 1
Italy–Spain 1977 fre;ita;spa fre 6
Italy–Sri Lanka 1984 eng;ita;sin eng 3
Italy–Sweden 1980 fre;ita;swe fre 6
Italy–Switzerland 1976 ita ita 5
Italy–Syria 2000 eng;ita;ara eng 3
Italy–Taiwan 2015 ita;chi 1
Italy–Tanzania 1973 eng;ita 1
Italy–Thailand 1977 eng;ita;tha eng 6
Italy–Trinidad and Tobago 1971 eng;ita 1
Italy–Tunisia 1979 fre;ita fre 6
Italy–Turkey 1990 eng;ita;tur eng 6
Italy–Turkmenistan 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Uganda 2000 eng;ita 1
Italy–Ukraine 1997 eng;ita;ukr eng 6
Italy–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng;ita;ara eng 6
Italy–United Kingdom 1966 eng;ita 1
Italy–United Kingdom 1988 eng;ita 1
Italy–United States 1999 eng;ita 1
Italy–Uzbekistan 2000 eng;ita;uzb eng 2
Italy–Venezuela 1990 fre;ita;spa fre 3
Italy–Vietnam 1996 eng;ita;vts eng 6
Italy–Zambia 1972 eng;ita 1
Ivory Coast–Morocco 2006 fre;ara fre 3
Ivory Coast–Norway 1978 fre fre 5
Ivory Coast–Portugal 2015 fre;por 1
Ivory Coast–Switzerland 1987 fre fre 5
Ivory Coast–Tunisia 1999 fre;ara fre 3
Ivory Coast–United Kingdom 1985 eng;fre 1
Jamaica–Norway 1991 eng;nor 1
Jamaica–Spain 2008 eng;spa 1
Jamaica–Sweden 1985 eng eng 5
Jamaica–Switzerland 1994 eng;fre 1
Jamaica–United Kingdom 1973 eng eng 5
Jamaica–United States 1980 eng eng 5
Japan–Kazakhstan 2008 eng eng 5
Japan–Korea (Rep.) 1998 eng eng 5
Japan–Kuwait 2010 eng;jap;ara eng 3
Japan–Kyrgyzstan 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Luxembourg 1992 eng eng 5
Japan–Malaysia 1999 eng eng 5
Japan–Mexico 1996 eng;jap;spa eng 3
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Japan–Moldova 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Netherlands 2010 eng eng 5
Japan–New Zealand 2012 eng;jap 1
Japan–Norway 1992 eng eng 5
Japan–Oman 2014 eng;jap;ara eng 3
Japan–Pakistan 2008 eng eng 5
Japan–Philippines 1980 eng eng 5
Japan–Poland 1980 eng;jap;pol eng 3
Japan–Portugal 2011 eng;jap;por eng 3
Japan–Qatar 2015 eng;ara;jap eng 3
Japan–Romania 1976 eng eng 5
Japan–Russia 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Saudi Arabia 2010 eng;jap;ara eng 3
Japan–Singapore 1994 eng eng 5
Japan–Slovak Republic 1977 eng eng 5
Japan–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Japan–Spain 1974 eng;jap;spa eng 4
Japan–Sri Lanka 1967 eng;jap;sin eng 3
Japan–Sweden 1983 eng eng 5
Japan–Switzerland 1971 eng;jap;ger eng 4
Japan–Taiwan 2015 eng eng 5
Japan–Tajikistan 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Thailand 1990 eng eng 5
Japan–Turkey 1993 eng eng 5
Japan–Turkmenistan 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Ukraine 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–United Arab Emirates 2013 eng;jap;ara eng 3
Japan–United Kingdom 2006 eng;jap 1
Japan–United States 2003 eng;jap 1
Japan–Uzbekistan 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Vietnam 1995 eng;jap;vts eng 3
Japan–Zambia 1970 eng;jap 1
Jersey–Luxembourg 2013 eng eng 5
Jersey–Malta 2010 eng eng 5
Jersey–New Zealand 2009 eng eng 5
Jersey–Norway 2008 eng eng 5
Jersey–Poland 2011 eng;pol 1
Jersey–Qatar 2012 eng;ara 1
Jersey–Rwanda 2015 eng eng 5
Jersey–Seychelles 2015 eng eng 5
Jersey–Singapore 2012 eng eng 5
Jersey–Sweden 2008 eng eng 5
Jersey–United Arab Emirates 2016 eng;ara 1
Jordan–Korea (Rep.) 2004 eng;ara;kor eng 3
Jordan–Lebanon 2002 ara ara 5
Jordan–Malaysia 1994 eng;ara;may eng 3
Jordan–Malta 2009 eng;ara 1
Jordan–Morocco 2005 ara ara 5
Jordan–Netherlands 2006 eng;dut;ara eng 4
Jordan–Pakistan 2006 eng;ara eng 6
Jordan–Palestinian Autonomous Areas 2011 ara ara 5
Jordan–Poland 1997 eng;ara;pol eng 3
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Jordan–Qatar 2004 ara ara 5
Jordan–Romania 1983 eng;ara;rum eng 3
Jordan–Syria 2001 ara ara 5
Jordan–Tunisia 1988 ara ara 5
Jordan–Turkey 1985 eng;ara;tur eng 4
Jordan–Ukraine 2005 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Jordan–United Arab Emirates 2016 ara ara 5
Jordan–United Kingdom 2001 eng;ara 1
Jordan–Uzbekistan 2010 eng;ara;uzb eng 3
Jordan–Yemen 1998 ara ara 5
Kazakhstan–Korea (Rep.) 1997 eng;kaz;kor eng 3
Kazakhstan–Latvia 2001 eng;kaz;lat;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Lithuania 1997 eng;kaz;lit;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Luxembourg 2008 eng;fre;kaz;rus 1
Kazakhstan–Macedonia (FYR) 2012 eng;kaz;mac;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Malaysia 2006 eng;kaz;may;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Mongolia 1998 eng;kaz;mon;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Netherlands 1996 eng;kaz;dut;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Norway 2001 eng;kaz;nor;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Pakistan 1995 eng;kaz;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Qatar 2014 eng eng 5
Kazakhstan–Romania 1998 eng;kaz;rum;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Russia 1996 rus;kaz rus 3
Kazakhstan–Serbia 2015 eng;rus;kaz;ser eng 2
Kazakhstan–Singapore 2006 eng;kaz;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Slovak Republic 2007 eng;kaz;slo;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–Spain 2009 eng;kaz;spa;rus 1
Kazakhstan–Sweden 1997 eng;kaz;swe;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Switzerland 1999 eng;kaz;ger;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Turkey 1995 eng;kaz;tur;rus eng 2
Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan 1997 rus;kaz;tkm rus 3
Kazakhstan–Ukraine 1996 rus;kaz;ukr rus 3
Kazakhstan–United Arab Emirates 2008 eng;kaz;ara;rus eng 3
Kazakhstan–United Kingdom 1994 eng;kaz;rus 1
Kazakhstan–United States 1993 eng;rus;kaz 1
Kazakhstan–Uzbekistan 1996 rus;kaz;uzb rus 3
Kazakhstan–Vietnam 2011 eng;vts;rus;kaz eng 3
Kenya–Mauritius 2012 eng eng 5
Kenya–Netherlands 2015 eng eng 5
Kenya–Norway 1972 eng eng 5
Kenya–South Africa 2010 eng eng 5
Kenya–Sweden 1973 eng eng 5
Kenya–Thailand 2006 eng eng 5
Kenya–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;ara eng 3
Kenya–United Kingdom 1973 eng eng 5
Kenya–Zambia 1968 eng eng 5
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)–Korea (Rep.) 2000 kor kor 5
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)–Romania 1998 eng;kor;rum eng 3
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)–Russia 1997 eng;kor;rus eng 4
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)–Serbia and Montenegro 2000 eng;kor;ser eng 3
Korea (Dem. People’s Rep.)–Syria 2000 eng;kor;ara eng 2
Korea (Rep.)–Kuwait 1998 eng;kor;ara eng 3
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Korea (Rep.)–Kyrgyzstan 2012 eng;kor;rus;kyr eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Laos 2004 eng;kor;lao eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Latvia 2008 eng;kor;lat eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Lithuania 2006 eng;kor;lit eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Luxembourg 1984 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Malaysia 1982 eng;kor;may eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Malta 1997 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–Mexico 1994 eng;kor;spa eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Mongolia 1992 eng;kor;mon eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Morocco 1999 eng;kor;ara eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Myanmar 2002 eng;kor;bur eng 8
Korea (Rep.)–Nepal 2001 eng;kor;nep eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Netherlands 1978 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–New Zealand 1981 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Norway 1982 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Oman 2005 eng;kor;ara eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Pakistan 1987 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Panama 2010 eng;kor;spa eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Papua New Guinea 1996 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–Peru 2012 eng;kor;spa eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Philippines 1984 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–Poland 1991 eng;kor;pol eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Portugal 1996 eng;kor;por eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Qatar 2007 eng;kor;ara eng 2
Korea (Rep.)–Romania 1993 eng;kor;rum eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Russia 1992 eng;kor;rus eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Saudi Arabia 2007 eng;kor;ara eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Serbia 2016 eng;kor;ser eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Singapore 1979 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Slovak Republic 2001 eng;kor;slo eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Slovenia 2005 eng;kor;slv eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–South Africa 1995 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–Spain 1994 eng;kor;spa eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Sri Lanka 1984 eng;kor;sin eng 6
Korea (Rep.)–Sweden 1981 eng eng 5
Korea (Rep.)–Switzerland 1980 eng;kor;ger eng 4
Korea (Rep.)–Thailand 2006 eng;kor;tha eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Tunisia 1988 eng;kor;ara;fre eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Turkey 1983 eng;kor;tur eng 2
Korea (Rep.)–Ukraine 1999 eng;kor;ukr eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;kor;ara eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–United Kingdom 1996 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–United States 1976 eng;kor 1
Korea (Rep.)–Uruguay 2011 eng;kor;spa eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Uzbekistan 1998 eng;kor;uzb eng 3
Korea (Rep.)–Venezuela 2006 eng;kor;spa eng 2
Korea (Rep.)–Vietnam 1994 eng;kor;vts eng 3
Kosovo–Macedonia (FYR) 2011 eng;alb;mac eng 3
Kosovo–Netherlands 1982 eng;scr;dut eng 4
Kosovo–Slovenia 2013 eng;alb;slv eng 2
Kosovo–Turkey 2012 eng;alb;tur eng 3
Kosovo–United Kingdom 2015 eng;alb 1
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Kuwait–Kyrgyzstan 2015 eng;rus;ara;kyr eng 2
Kuwait–Latvia 2009 eng;ara;lat eng 3
Kuwait–Lebanon 2001 ara ara 5
Kuwait–Luxembourg 2007 eng;fre;ara 1
Kuwait–Macedonia (FYR) 2012 eng;ara;mac eng 2
Kuwait–Malaysia 2003 eng;ara;may eng 2
Kuwait–Malta 2002 eng;ara;mal eng 3
Kuwait–Mauritius 1997 eng;ara eng 2
Kuwait–Mexico 2009 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Kuwait–Moldova 2010 eng;ara;mol eng 3
Kuwait–Mongolia 1998 eng;ara;mon eng 2
Kuwait–Morocco 2002 ara ara 5
Kuwait–Netherlands 2001 eng;ara;dut eng 4
Kuwait–Pakistan 1998 eng;ara eng 2
Kuwait–Philippines 2009 eng;ara eng 2
Kuwait–Poland 1996 eng;ara;pol eng 2
Kuwait–Portugal 2010 eng;ara;por eng 3
Kuwait–Romania 1992 eng;ara;rum eng 2
Kuwait–Russia 1999 eng;ara;rus eng 4
Kuwait–Serbia and Montenegro 2002 eng;ara;ser eng 2
Kuwait–Seychelles 2008 eng;ara eng 2
Kuwait–Singapore 2002 eng;ara 1
Kuwait–Slovak Republic 2012 eng;ara;slo eng 2
Kuwait–Slovenia 2010 eng;ara;slv eng 2
Kuwait–South Africa 2004 eng;ara 1
Kuwait–Spain 2008 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Kuwait–Sri Lanka 2002 eng;ara;sin eng 2
Kuwait–Sudan 2001 ara ara 5
Kuwait–Switzerland 1999 eng;ara;ger eng 2
Kuwait–Thailand 2003 eng;ara;tha eng 2
Kuwait–Tunisia 2000 ara ara 5
Kuwait–Turkey 1997 eng;ara;tur eng 2
Kuwait–Ukraine 2003 eng;ara;ukr eng 2
Kuwait–United Kingdom 1999 eng;ara 1
Kuwait–Uzbekistan 2004 eng;ara;uzb eng 2
Kuwait–Venezuela 2004 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Kuwait–Vietnam 2009 eng;ara;vts eng 2
Kuwait–Yemen 2001 ara ara 5
Kuwait–Zimbabwe 2006 eng;ara 1
Kyrgyzstan–Latvia 2006 eng;lat;kyr;rus eng 3
Kyrgyzstan–Lithuania 2008 eng;rus;lit eng 3
Kyrgyzstan–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Kyrgyzstan–Malaysia 2000 eng;kyr;rus;may eng 8
Kyrgyzstan–Mongolia 1999 eng;kyr;rus;mon eng 2
Kyrgyzstan–Pakistan 2005 eng;kyr;rus eng 2
Kyrgyzstan–Russia 1999 rus;kyr rus 3
Kyrgyzstan–Switzerland 2001 eng;kyr;rus;ger eng 4
Kyrgyzstan–Turkey 1999 eng;kyr;rus;tur eng 2
Kyrgyzstan–Ukraine 1997 rus;kyr;ukr rus 2
Laos–Luxembourg 2012 eng;fre;lao 1
Laos–Malaysia 2010 eng;lao;may eng 3
Laos–Russia 1999 eng;lao;rus eng 4
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Laos–Singapore 2014 eng;lao eng 3
Laos–Thailand 1997 eng;lao;tha eng 6
Laos–Vietnam 1996 eng;lao;vts eng 4
Latvia–Lithuania 1993 eng;lat;lit eng 2
Latvia–Luxembourg 2004 eng;fre;lat 1
Latvia–Macedonia (FYR) 2006 eng;lat;mac eng 3
Latvia–Malta 2000 eng;lat eng 3
Latvia–Mexico 2012 eng;lat;spa eng 3
Latvia–Moldova 1998 eng;lat;mol eng 3
Latvia–Morocco 2008 eng;lat;fre;ara eng 4
Latvia–Netherlands 1994 eng eng 5
Latvia–Norway 1993 eng eng 5
Latvia–Poland 1993 eng eng 5
Latvia–Portugal 2001 eng;lat;por eng 3
Latvia–Qatar 2015 eng;ara;lat eng 2
Latvia–Romania 2002 eng;lat;rum eng 3
Latvia–Russia 2010 eng;lat;rus eng 3
Latvia–Serbia and Montenegro 2005 eng;lat;ser eng 3
Latvia–Singapore 1999 eng;lat eng 3
Latvia–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;lat;slo eng 3
Latvia–Slovenia 2002 eng;lat;slv eng 3
Latvia–Spain 2003 eng;lat;spa eng 2
Latvia–Sweden 1993 eng eng 5
Latvia–Switzerland 2002 eng;lat;ger eng 3
Latvia–Tajikistan 2009 eng;lat;tgk;rus eng 2
Latvia–Turkey 1999 eng;lat;tur eng 3
Latvia–Turkmenistan 2012 eng;lat;rus;tkm eng 3
Latvia–Ukraine 1995 eng;lat;ukr eng 3
Latvia–United Arab Emirates 2012 eng;lat;ara eng 3
Latvia–United Kingdom 1996 eng;lat eng 3
Latvia–United States 1998 eng;lat 1
Latvia–Uzbekistan 1998 eng;lat;uzb eng 3
Lebanon–Malaysia 2003 eng eng 5
Lebanon–Malta 1999 eng;ara 1
Lebanon–Morocco 2001 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Oman 2001 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Pakistan 2005 eng eng 5
Lebanon–Poland 1999 eng;ara;pol eng 3
Lebanon–Qatar 2005 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Romania 1995 eng;ara;rum eng 3
Lebanon–Russia 1997 eng;ara;rus eng 4
Lebanon–Senegal 2002 fre fre 5
Lebanon–Sudan 2004 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Syria 1997 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Tunisia 1998 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Turkey 2004 eng eng 5
Lebanon–Ukraine 2002 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Lebanon–United Arab Emirates 1998 ara ara 5
Lebanon–Yemen 2002 ara ara 5
Lesotho–Mauritius 1997 eng eng 5
Lesotho–South Africa 1995 eng eng 5
Lesotho–South Africa 2014 eng eng 5
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Lesotho–United Kingdom 1997 eng eng 5
Libya–Malta 2008 eng;ara 1
Libya–Pakistan 1975 eng;ara 1
Libya–Serbia 2009 eng;ara;ser eng 2
Libya–Singapore 2009 eng;ara eng 2
Libya–Slovak Republic 2009 eng;ara;slo eng 3
Libya–Sudan 1990 ara ara 5
Libya–Ukraine 2008 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Libya–United Arab Emirates 2013 ara ara 5
Libya–United Kingdom 2008 eng;ara 1
Liechtenstein–Luxembourg 2009 ger ger 5
Liechtenstein–Malta 2013 eng;ger eng 2
Liechtenstein–San Marino 2009 eng;ger;ita eng 2
Liechtenstein–Singapore 2013 eng;ger eng 3
Liechtenstein–Switzerland 1995 ger ger 5
Liechtenstein–Switzerland 2015 ger ger 5
Liechtenstein–United Arab Emirates 2015 eng;ara;ger eng 3
Liechtenstein–United Kingdom 2012 eng;ger 1
Liechtenstein–Uruguay 2010 eng;spa 1
Lithuania–Luxembourg 2004 eng;fre;lit 1
Lithuania–Macedonia (FYR) 2007 eng;lit;mac eng 3
Lithuania–Malta 2001 eng;lit 1
Lithuania–Mexico 2012 eng;lit;spa eng 3
Lithuania–Moldova 1998 eng;lit;mol eng 3
Lithuania–Morocco 2013 eng;lit;ara eng 3
Lithuania–Netherlands 1999 eng;lit;dut eng 4
Lithuania–Norway 1993 eng;lit;nor eng 3
Lithuania–Poland 1994 eng;lit;por eng 3
Lithuania–Portugal 2002 eng;por eng 3
Lithuania–Romania 2001 eng;lit;rum eng 3
Lithuania–Russia 1999 eng;lit;rus eng 4
Lithuania–Serbia 2007 eng;lit;ser eng 3
Lithuania–Singapore 2003 eng;lit 1
Lithuania–Slovak Republic 2001 eng;lit;slo eng 3
Lithuania–Slovenia 2000 eng;lit;slv eng 3
Lithuania–Spain 2003 eng;lit;spa eng 2
Lithuania–Sweden 1993 eng;lit;swe eng 3
Lithuania–Switzerland 2002 eng;lit;ger eng 3
Lithuania–Turkey 1998 eng;lit;tur eng 3
Lithuania–Turkmenistan 2013 eng;lit;tkm eng 3
Lithuania–Ukraine 1996 eng;lit;ukr eng 3
Lithuania–United Arab Emirates 2013 eng;ara;lit eng 3
Lithuania–United Kingdom 2001 eng;lit 1
Lithuania–United States 1998 eng;lit 1
Lithuania–Uzbekistan 2002 eng;lit;uzb eng 3
Luxembourg–Macedonia (FYR) 2012 eng;fre;mac 1
Luxembourg–Malaysia 2002 eng;fre;may 1
Luxembourg–Malta 1994 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Mauritius 1995 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Mexico 2001 eng;fre;spa 1
Luxembourg–Moldova 2007 eng;fre;mol 1
Luxembourg–Monaco 2009 fre fre 5
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Luxembourg–Morocco 1980 fre;ara 1
Luxembourg–Netherlands 1968 fre;dut 1
Luxembourg–Norway 1983 fre;nor 1
Luxembourg–Panama 2010 eng;fre;spa 1
Luxembourg–Poland 1995 fre;pol 1
Luxembourg–Portugal 1999 fre;por 1
Luxembourg–Qatar 2009 eng;fre;ara 1
Luxembourg–Romania 1993 fre;rum 1
Luxembourg–Russia 1993 fre;rus 1
Luxembourg–San Marino 2006 eng;fre;ita 1
Luxembourg–Saudi Arabia 2013 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Luxembourg–Senegal 2016 fre fre 5
Luxembourg–Serbia 2015 eng;fre;ser eng 3
Luxembourg–Seychelles 2012 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Singapore 1993 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Singapore 2013 eng eng 5
Luxembourg–Slovak Republic 1991 fre;cze 1
Luxembourg–Slovenia 2001 eng;fre;slv 1
Luxembourg–South Africa 1998 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Spain 1986 fre;spa 1
Luxembourg–Sri Lanka 2013 eng;fre;sin eng 3
Luxembourg–Sweden 1996 fre fre 5
Luxembourg–Switzerland 1993 fre fre 5
Luxembourg–Taiwan 2011 eng eng 5
Luxembourg–Tajikistan 2011 eng;fre;tgk eng 2
Luxembourg–Thailand 1996 eng;fre;tha 1
Luxembourg–Trinidad and Tobago 2001 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Tunisia 1996 eng;ara 1
Luxembourg–Turkey 2003 eng eng 5
Luxembourg–Ukraine 1997 eng;fre;ukr 1
Luxembourg–United Arab Emirates 2005 eng;fre;ara 1
Luxembourg–United Kingdom 1967 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–United States 1996 eng;fre 1
Luxembourg–Uruguay 2015 eng;fre;spa eng 3
Luxembourg–Uzbekistan 1997 eng;fre;uzb 1
Luxembourg–Vietnam 1996 eng;fre;vts 1
Macau–Mozambique 2007 chi;por 1
Macau–Portugal 1999 chi;por 1
Macedonia (FYR)–Moldova 2006 eng;mac;mol eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Morocco 2010 eng;mac;ara eng 2
Macedonia (FYR)–Netherlands 1998 eng;chi;dut eng 4
Macedonia (FYR)–Norway 1983 eng eng 5
Macedonia (FYR)–Norway 2011 eng;mac;nor eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Poland 1996 eng;mac;pol eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Qatar 2008 eng;mac;ara 1
Macedonia (FYR)–Romania 2000 eng;mac;rum eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Russia 1997 eng;mac;rus eng 4
Macedonia (FYR)–Saudi Arabia 2014 eng;ara;mac eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Serbia and Montenegro 1996 eng;mac;ser eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Slovak Republic 2009 eng;mac;slo eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Slovenia 1998 eng;mac;slv eng 2
Macedonia (FYR)–Spain 2005 eng;mac;spa eng 4
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Macedonia (FYR)–Sri Lanka 1985 eng;scr;sin eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Sweden 1998 eng;mac;swe eng 2
Macedonia (FYR)–Switzerland 2000 eng;mac;ger eng 4
Macedonia (FYR)–Taiwan 1999 eng;mac;chi eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Turkey 1995 eng;mac;tur eng 2
Macedonia (FYR)–Ukraine 1998 eng;mac;ukr eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–United Arab Emirates 2015 eng;ara;mac eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–United Kingdom 2006 eng;mac 1
Macedonia (FYR)–Vietnam 2014 eng;mac;vts eng 3
Malawi–Netherlands 2015 eng eng 5
Malawi–Norway 2009 eng eng 5
Malawi–South Africa 1971 eng;afr 1
Malawi–Switzerland 1961 eng;fre 1
Malaysia–Malta 1995 eng;may 1
Malaysia–Mauritius 1992 eng;may eng 8
Malaysia–Moldova 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malaysia–Mongolia 1995 eng;may;mon eng 8
Malaysia–Morocco 2001 eng;fre;may;ara eng 8
Malaysia–Myanmar 1998 eng;may;bur eng 8
Malaysia–Namibia 1998 eng;may eng 8
Malaysia–Netherlands 1988 eng;may;dut eng 3
Malaysia–New Zealand 1976 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Norway 1970 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Pakistan 1982 eng;may 1
Malaysia–Papua New Guinea 1993 eng;may eng 8
Malaysia–Philippines 1982 eng;may 1
Malaysia–Poland 1977 eng;may;pol 1
Malaysia–Poland 2013 eng;may;pol eng 3
Malaysia–Qatar 2008 eng;may;ara eng 3
Malaysia–Romania 1982 eng;may;rum eng 3
Malaysia–Russia 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malaysia–San Marino 2009 eng;may;ita eng 3
Malaysia–Saudi Arabia 2006 eng;may;ara eng 3
Malaysia–Senegal 2010 eng;fre;may 1
Malaysia–Serbia and Montenegro 1990 eng;may;scr eng 3
Malaysia–Seychelles 2003 eng;may eng 3
Malaysia–Singapore 2004 eng;may eng 3
Malaysia–South Africa 2005 eng;may eng 3
Malaysia–Spain 2006 eng;may;spa eng 8
Malaysia–Sri Lanka 1997 eng;may;sin eng 8
Malaysia–Sudan 1993 eng;may;ara eng 3
Malaysia–Sweden 2002 eng;may;swe eng 3
Malaysia–Switzerland 1974 may;ger 1
Malaysia–Syria 2007 eng;may;ara eng 8
Malaysia–Taiwan 1996 eng;may;chi eng 8
Malaysia–Thailand 1982 eng;may;tha 1
Malaysia–Turkey 1994 eng;may;tur eng 8
Malaysia–Turkmenistan 2008 eng;may;tkm;rus eng 2
Malaysia–Ukraine 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malaysia–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng;may;ara eng 3
Malaysia–United Kingdom 1996 eng;may eng 8
Malaysia–Uzbekistan 1997 eng;may;uzb eng 3
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Malaysia–Venezuela 2006 eng;may;spa eng 3
Malaysia–Vietnam 1995 eng;may;vts eng 8
Malaysia–Zimbabwe 1994 eng;may eng 8
Mali–Morocco 2014 fre;ara fre 3
Mali–Russia 1996 fre;rus 1
Mali–Tunisia 2000 fre;ara 1
Malta–Mauritius 2014 eng eng 5
Malta–Mexico 2012 eng;spa 1
Malta–Moldova 2014 eng;rum 1
Malta–Montenegro 2008 eng;mtg 1
Malta–Morocco 2001 eng;ara eng 3
Malta–Netherlands 1977 eng;dut 1
Malta–Norway 2012 eng eng 5
Malta–Pakistan 1975 eng eng 5
Malta–Poland 1994 eng;pol 1
Malta–Portugal 2001 eng;por 1
Malta–Qatar 2009 eng;ara 1
Malta–Romania 1995 eng;rum eng 3
Malta–Russia 2013 eng;rus 1
Malta–San Marino 2005 eng;ita 1
Malta–Saudi Arabia 2012 eng;ara 1
Malta–Serbia 2009 eng;ser 1
Malta–Singapore 2006 eng eng 5
Malta–Slovak Republic 1999 eng;slo 1
Malta–Slovenia 2002 eng;slv eng 2
Malta–South Africa 1997 eng eng 5
Malta–Spain 2005 eng;spa eng 3
Malta–Sweden 1995 eng eng 5
Malta–Switzerland 2011 eng;fre 1
Malta–Syria 1999 eng eng 5
Malta–Tunisia 2000 eng;fre;ara eng;fre 3
Malta–Turkey 2011 eng;tur 1
Malta–Ukraine 2013 eng;ukr 1
Malta–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;ara 1
Malta–United Kingdom 1994 eng eng 5
Malta–United States 2008 eng eng 5
Malta–Uruguay 2011 eng;spa eng 2
Marshall Islands–New Zealand 2010 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Monaco 2013 fre fre 5
Mauritius–Morocco 2015 eng;ara eng 3
Mauritius–Mozambique 1997 eng;por 1
Mauritius–Namibia 1995 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Nepal 1999 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Nigeria 2012 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Oman 1998 eng;ara 1
Mauritius–Pakistan 1994 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Qatar 2008 eng;ara 1
Mauritius–Russia 1995 eng;rus 1
Mauritius–Rwanda 2001 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Rwanda 2013 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Senegal 2002 fre fre 5
Mauritius–Seychelles 2005 eng eng 5
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Mauritius–Singapore 1995 eng eng 5
Mauritius–South Africa 1996 eng eng 5
Mauritius–South Africa 2013 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Sri Lanka 1996 eng;sin eng 3
Mauritius–Swaziland 1994 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Sweden 2011 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Thailand 1997 eng;tha eng 6
Mauritius–Tunisia 2008 fre;ara 1
Mauritius–Uganda 2003 eng eng 5
Mauritius–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;ara eng 2
Mauritius–United Kingdom 1981 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Zambia 2011 eng eng 5
Mauritius–Zimbabwe 1992 eng eng 5
Mexico–Netherlands 1993 spa;dut 1
Mexico–New Zealand 2006 eng;spa eng 2
Mexico–Norway 1995 spa;nor 1
Mexico–Panama 2010 spa spa 5
Mexico–Peru 2011 spa spa 5
Mexico–Poland 1998 eng;spa;pol eng 3
Mexico–Portugal 1999 eng;spa;por eng 3
Mexico–Qatar 2012 eng;spa;ara eng 2
Mexico–Romania 2000 spa;rum 1
Mexico–Russia 2004 eng;spa;rus eng 3
Mexico–Singapore 1994 eng;spa eng 3
Mexico–Slovak Republic 2006 eng;spa;slo eng 2
Mexico–South Africa 2009 eng;spa eng 3
Mexico–Spain 1992 spa spa 5
Mexico–Sweden 1992 eng;spa 1
Mexico–Switzerland 1993 fre;spa 1
Mexico–Turkey 2013 eng;spa;tur eng 2
Mexico–Ukraine 2012 eng;spa;ukr eng 3
Mexico–United Arab Emirates 2012 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Mexico–United Kingdom 1994 eng;spa 1
Mexico–United States 1992 eng;spa 1
Mexico–Uruguay 2009 spa spa 5
Mexico–Venezuela 1997 spa spa 5
Moldova–Netherlands 2000 eng;mol;dut eng 4
Moldova–Oman 2007 eng;ara;mol eng 4
Moldova–Portugal 2009 eng;mol;por eng 3
Moldova–Romania 1995 rum rum 5
Moldova–Russia 1996 rus;mol 1
Moldova–Serbia and Montenegro 2005 eng;ser;mol eng 3
Moldova–Slovak Republic 2003 eng;mol;slo eng 3
Moldova–Slovenia 2006 eng;mol;slv eng 2
Moldova–Spain 2007 eng;mol;spa eng 2
Moldova–Switzerland 1999 eng;mol;ger eng 2
Moldova–Turkey 1998 eng;mol;tur eng 2
Moldova–Turkmenistan 2013 rus;mol;tgk rus 2
Moldova–Ukraine 1995 rus;mol;ukr rus 2
Moldova–United Kingdom 2007 eng;mol 1
Moldova–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Moldova–Uzbekistan 1995 rus;mol;uzb rus 2
431
E. Sample
Treaty Conclusion AL UL/PT TOW
Monaco–Qatar 2009 eng;fre;ara eng 2
Monaco–Seychelles 2010 eng;fre 1
Monaco–St. Kitts and Nevis 2009 eng;fre 1
Mongolia–Poland 1997 eng;mon;pol eng 3
Mongolia–Russia 1995 eng;mon;rus eng 2
Mongolia–Singapore 2002 eng eng 5
Mongolia–Switzerland 1999 eng;mon;ger eng 4
Mongolia–Thailand 2006 eng eng 5
Mongolia–Turkey 1995 eng;mon;tur eng 2
Mongolia–Ukraine 2002 eng;mon;ukr eng 3
Mongolia–United Arab Emirates 2001 eng eng 5
Mongolia–United Kingdom 1996 eng;mon 1
Mongolia–Vietnam 1996 eng;mon;vts eng 3
Montenegro–United Arab Emirates 2012 eng;mtg;ara 1
Montserrat–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Morocco–Netherlands 1977 fre;ara;dut fre 4
Morocco–Norway 1972 fre fre 5
Morocco–Oman 2006 ara ara 5
Morocco–Pakistan 2006 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Morocco–Poland 1994 fre;ara;pol fre 3
Morocco–Portugal 1997 fre;ara;por fre 3
Morocco–Qatar 2006 ara ara 5
Morocco–Qatar 2013 ara ara 5
Morocco–Romania 2003 fre;ara;rum fre 3
Morocco–Russia 1997 fre;ara;rus fre 4
Morocco–Sao Tome and Principe 2016 fre;ara fre 3
Morocco–Saudi Arabia 2015 ara ara 5
Morocco–Senegal 2002 fre;ara 1
Morocco–Serbia 2013 eng;fre;ara;ser eng 3
Morocco–Singapore 2007 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Morocco–Slovenia 2016 eng;fre;ara;slv eng 3
Morocco–Spain 1978 fre fre 5
Morocco–Switzerland 1993 fre;ara 1
Morocco–Syria 2005 ara ara 5
Morocco–Turkey 2004 eng;ara;tur eng 3
Morocco–Ukraine 2007 eng;fre;ara;ukr eng 3
Morocco–United Arab Emirates 1999 ara ara 5
Morocco–United Kingdom 1981 eng;ara 1
Morocco–United States 1977 eng;fre;ara 1
Morocco–Vietnam 2008 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Morocco–Yemen 2006 ara ara 5
Mozambique–Portugal 1991 por por 5
Mozambique–South Africa 2007 eng;por 1
Mozambique–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;por;ara eng 3
Mozambique–Vietnam 2010 eng;por;vts eng 3
Myanmar–Singapore 1999 eng eng 5
Myanmar–Thailand 2002 eng;tha;bur eng 8
Myanmar–Vietnam 2000 eng eng 5
Namibia–Romania 1998 eng;rum 1
Namibia–Russia 1998 eng;rus 1
Namibia–South Africa 1998 eng eng 5
Namibia–Sweden 1993 eng eng 5
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Namibia–United Kingdom 1962 eng;afr 1
Nepal–Norway 1996 eng eng 5
Nepal–Pakistan 2001 eng eng 5
Nepal–Qatar 2007 eng;nep;ara eng 2
Nepal–Sri Lanka 1999 eng;nep;sin eng 3
Nepal–Thailand 1998 eng eng 5
Netherlands Antilles–Norway 1989 eng eng 5
Netherlands Antilles–United States 1986 eng eng 5
Netherlands–New Zealand 1980 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–Nigeria 1991 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Norway 1990 eng;dut;nor eng 4
Netherlands–Oman 2009 eng;dut;ara eng 4
Netherlands–Pakistan 1982 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–Panama 2010 eng;dut;spa eng 3
Netherlands–Philippines 1989 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Poland 2002 eng;dut;pol eng 4
Netherlands–Portugal 1999 eng;dut;por eng 4
Netherlands–Qatar 2008 eng;dut;ara eng 2
Netherlands–Romania 1998 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Russia 1996 eng;dur;rus eng 4
Netherlands–Saudi Arabia 2008 eng;dut;ara eng 3
Netherlands–Serbia and Montenegro 1982 eng;dut;scr eng 4
Netherlands–Singapore 1971 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–Slovak Republic 1974 eng;dut;cze eng 4
Netherlands–Slovenia 2004 eng;dut;slv eng 2
Netherlands–South Africa 2005 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Spain 1971 eng;dut;spa eng 2
Netherlands–Sri Lanka 1982 eng;dut;sin eng 4
Netherlands–Suriname 1975 dut dut 5
Netherlands–Sweden 1991 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Switzerland 2010 eng;fre;dut eng 4
Netherlands–Taiwan 2001 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Tajikistan 1986 eng;dut;rus 1
Netherlands–Thailand 1975 eng;dut;tha eng 4
Netherlands–Tunisia 1995 fre;dut;ara fre 3
Netherlands–Turkey 1986 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Uganda 2004 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Ukraine 1995 eng;dut;ukr eng 4
Netherlands–United Arab Emirates 2007 eng;dut;ara eng 4
Netherlands–United Kingdom 1979 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–United Kingdom 2008 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–United Kingdom 2013 eng eng 5
Netherlands–United States 1969 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–United States 1992 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–Uzbekistan 2001 eng;dut;uzb eng 4
Netherlands–Venezuela 1991 eng;dut;spa eng 4
Netherlands–Vietnam 1995 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Zambia 1977 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Zambia 2015 eng eng 5
Netherlands–Zimbabwe 1989 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Norway 1982 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Papua New Guinea 2012 eng eng 5
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New Zealand–Philippines 1980 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Poland 2005 eng;pol 1
New Zealand–Russia 2000 eng;rus 1
New Zealand–Samoa 2010 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Samoa 2015 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Singapore 2009 eng eng 5
New Zealand–South Africa 2002 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Spain 2005 eng;spa eng 2
New Zealand–St. Kitts and Nevis 2009 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Sweden 1979 eng;swe 1
New Zealand–Switzerland 1980 eng;ger 1
New Zealand–Taiwan 1996 eng;chi eng 3
New Zealand–Thailand 1998 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Turkey 2010 eng;tur 1
New Zealand–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;ara eng 6
New Zealand–United Kingdom 1983 eng eng 5
New Zealand–United States 1982 eng eng 5
New Zealand–Vietnam 2013 eng;vts 1
Nigeria–Pakistan 1989 eng eng 5
Nigeria–Philippines 1997 eng eng 5
Nigeria–Qatar 2016 eng;ara 1
Nigeria–Romania 1992 eng;rum eng 3
Nigeria–Slovak Republic 1989 eng eng 5
Nigeria–South Africa 2000 eng eng 5
Nigeria–Spain 2009 eng;spa eng 3
Nigeria–Sweden 2004 eng eng 5
Nigeria–United Kingdom 1987 eng eng 5
Norway–Pakistan 1986 eng eng 5
Norway–Philippines 1987 eng;nor 1
Norway–Poland 2009 eng;nor;pol eng 3
Norway–Portugal 2011 eng;por;nor eng 3
Norway–Qatar 2009 eng;nor;ara eng 2
Norway–Romania 1980 eng;nor;rum eng 3
Norway–Romania 2015 eng;nor;rum eng 3
Norway–Russia 1996 eng;nor;rus eng 2
Norway–Senegal 1994 fre fre 5
Norway–Serbia 2015 eng;nor;ser eng 3
Norway–Serbia and Montenegro 1983 eng eng 5
Norway–Singapore 1997 eng eng 5
Norway–Slovak Republic 1979 eng eng 5
Norway–Slovenia 2008 eng;nor;slv eng 2
Norway–South Africa 1996 eng eng 5
Norway–Spain 1999 eng;nor;spa eng 4
Norway–Sri Lanka 1986 eng;nor;sin eng 3
Norway–Switzerland 1987 eng eng 5
Norway–Tanzania 1976 eng eng 5
Norway–Thailand 2003 eng eng 5
Norway–Trinidad and Tobago 1969 eng eng 5
Norway–Tunisia 1978 fre fre 5
Norway–Turkey 2010 eng;nor;tur eng 2
Norway–Turkmenistan 1980 nor;rus 1
Norway–Uganda 1999 eng eng 5
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Norway–Ukraine 1996 eng;nor;ukr eng 3
Norway–United Kingdom 2013 eng;nor 1
Norway–United States 1971 eng;nor 1
Norway–Venezuela 1997 eng;nor;spa eng 4
Norway–Vietnam 1995 eng;nor;vts eng 3
Norway–Zambia 1971 eng eng 5
Norway–Zambia 2015 eng;nor 1
Norway–Zimbabwe 1989 eng eng 5
Oman–Pakistan 1999 eng;ara eng 3
Oman–Portugal 2015 eng;por;ara eng 3
Oman–Russia 2001 eng;ara;rus eng 4
Oman–Seychelles 2003 eng;ara eng 3
Oman–Singapore 2003 eng;ara 1
Oman–South Africa 2002 eng;ara eng 2
Oman–Spain 2014 eng;ara;spa map 7
Oman–Sudan 2003 ara ara 5
Oman–Switzerland 2015 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Oman–Thailand 2003 eng;ara;tha eng 4
Oman–Tunisia 1997 ara ara 5
Oman–Turkey 2006 eng;ara;tur eng 4
Oman–United Kingdom 1998 eng;ara 1
Oman–Uzbekistan 2009 eng;ara;uzb eng 4
Oman–Vietnam 2008 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Oman–Yemen 2002 ara ara 5
Pakistan–Philippines 1979 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Poland 1974 eng;pol 1
Pakistan–Portugal 2000 eng;por eng 6
Pakistan–Qatar 1999 eng;ara 1
Pakistan–Romania 1999 eng;rum 1
Pakistan–Saudi Arabia 2006 eng;ara 1
Pakistan–Serbia 2010 eng;ser 1
Pakistan–Singapore 1993 eng eng 5
Pakistan–South Africa 1998 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Spain 2010 eng;spa map 7
Pakistan–Sri Lanka 1981 eng;sin eng 3
Pakistan–Sweden 1985 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Switzerland 2005 eng;ger 1
Pakistan–Syria 2001 eng;ara eng 3
Pakistan–Tajikistan 2004 eng;rus;tgk eng 3
Pakistan–Thailand 1980 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Tunisia 1996 eng;fre;ara eng;fre 3
Pakistan–Turkey 1985 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Turkmenistan 1994 eng;tkm;rus eng 2
Pakistan–Ukraine 2008 eng;ukr 1
Pakistan–United Arab Emirates 1993 eng eng 5
Pakistan–United Kingdom 1986 eng eng 5
Pakistan–Uzbekistan 1995 eng;uzb 1
Pakistan–Vietnam 2004 eng;vts 1
Pakistan–Yemen 2004 eng eng 5
Palestinian Autonomous Areas–Serbia 2012 eng;ser;ara eng 3
Palestinian Autonomous Areas–Sri Lanka 2012 eng;sin eng 3
Palestinian Autonomous Areas–Venezuela 2014 eng;spa 1
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Palestinian Autonomous Areas–Vietnam 2013 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Panama–Portugal 2010 eng;spa;por eng 3
Panama–Qatar 2010 eng;spa;ara eng 2
Panama–Singapore 2010 eng;spa eng 2
Panama–Spain 2010 spa spa 5
Panama–United Arab Emirates 2012 eng;spa;ara eng 2
Panama–United Kingdom 2013 eng;spa 1
Papua New Guinea–Singapore 1991 eng eng 5
Papua New Guinea–United Kingdom 1991 eng eng 5
Paraguay–Taiwan 1994 eng;spa;chi eng 2
Peru–Portugal 2012 eng;spa;por eng 3
Peru–Spain 2006 spa spa 5
Peru–Switzerland 2012 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Philippines–Poland 1992 eng eng 5
Philippines–Qatar 2008 eng;ara 1
Philippines–Romania 1994 eng;rum 1
Philippines–Russia 1995 eng;rus eng 2
Philippines–Singapore 1977 eng eng 5
Philippines–Spain 1989 eng;spa 1
Philippines–Sweden 1998 eng eng 5
Philippines–Switzerland 1998 eng;ger eng 3
Philippines–Thailand 1982 eng eng 5
Philippines–Thailand 2013 eng eng 5
Philippines–Turkey 2009 eng;tur 1
Philippines–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;ara eng 3
Philippines–United Kingdom 1976 eng eng 5
Philippines–United States 1976 eng eng 5
Philippines–Vietnam 2001 eng;vts 1
Poland–Portugal 1995 eng;pol;por eng 3
Poland–Qatar 2008 eng;pol;ara eng 2
Poland–Romania 1994 eng;pol;rum eng 3
Poland–Russia 1992 pol;rus 1
Poland–Saudi Arabia 2011 eng;pol;ara eng 3
Poland–Serbia and Montenegro 1997 eng;pol;ser eng 3
Poland–Singapore 1993 eng eng 5
Poland–Singapore 2012 eng;pol 1
Poland–Slovak Republic 1994 eng;pol;slo eng 3
Poland–Slovenia 1996 eng eng 5
Poland–South Africa 1993 eng;pol 1
Poland–Spain 1979 pol;spa 1
Poland–Sri Lanka 1980 eng;pol;sin eng 3
Poland–Sri Lanka 2015 eng;pol;sin eng 3
Poland–Sweden 2004 eng;pol;swe eng 3
Poland–Switzerland 1991 eng;pol;ger eng 4
Poland–Syria 2001 eng;pol;ara eng 3
Poland–Tajikistan 2003 rus;pol;tgk rus 3
Poland–Thailand 1978 eng;pol;tha eng 6
Poland–Tunisia 1993 fre;pol;ara fre 2
Poland–Turkey 1993 eng;pol;tur eng 2
Poland–Ukraine 1993 pol;ukr 1
Poland–United Arab Emirates 1993 eng;pol;ara eng 3
Poland–United Kingdom 2006 eng;pol 1
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Poland–United States 1974 eng;pol 1
Poland–United States 2013 eng;pol 1
Poland–Uruguay 1991 pol;spa eng 9
Poland–Uzbekistan 1995 rus;pol;uzb rus 3
Poland–Vietnam 1994 eng;pol;vts eng 3
Poland–Zambia 1995 eng;pol 1
Poland–Zimbabwe 1993 eng;pol 1
Portugal–Qatar 2011 eng;por;ara eng 3
Portugal–Romania 1997 eng;por;rum eng 3
Portugal–Russia 2000 eng;por;rus eng 3
Portugal–San Marino 2010 eng;por;ita eng 3
Portugal–Sao Tome and Principe 2015 por por 5
Portugal–Saudi Arabia 2015 eng;ara;por eng 3
Portugal–Senegal 2014 fre;por 1
Portugal–Senegal 2014 fre;por 1
Portugal–Singapore 1999 eng;por eng 3
Portugal–Slovak Republic 2001 eng;por;slo eng 3
Portugal–Slovenia 2003 eng;por;slv eng 3
Portugal–South Africa 2006 eng;por 1
Portugal–Spain 1993 por;spa 1
Portugal–Sweden 2002 eng;por;swe eng 2
Portugal–Switzerland 1974 fre;por 1
Portugal–Timor-Leste 2011 eng;por por 3
Portugal–Tunisia 1999 fre;por;ara fre 8
Portugal–Turkey 2005 eng;por;tur eng 3
Portugal–Ukraine 2000 eng;por;ukr eng 3
Portugal–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;por;ara eng 3
Portugal–United Kingdom 1968 eng;por 1
Portugal–United States 1994 eng;por 1
Portugal–Uruguay 2009 eng;por;spa eng 2
Portugal–Uzbekistan 2001 eng;por;uzb eng 3
Portugal–Venezuela 1996 eng;por;spa eng 3
Portugal–Vietnam 2015 eng;por;vts eng 3
Qatar–Romania 1999 eng;ara;rum eng 3
Qatar–Russia 1998 eng;ara;rus eng 4
Qatar–San Marino 2013 eng;ara;ita eng 2
Qatar–Senegal 1998 fre;ara 1
Qatar–Serbia 2009 eng;ara;ser eng 3
Qatar–Seychelles 2006 eng;ara eng 3
Qatar–Singapore 2006 eng;ara eng 2
Qatar–Slovenia 2010 eng;ara;slv eng 2
Qatar–South Africa 2015 eng;ara 1
Qatar–Spain 2015 eng;ara;spa map 7
Qatar–Sri Lanka 2004 eng;ara;sin eng 2
Qatar–Sudan 1998 ara ara 5
Qatar–Switzerland 2009 eng;fre;ara eng 3
Qatar–Syria 2003 ara ara 5
Qatar–Tunisia 1997 fre fre 5
Qatar–Turkey 2001 eng;ara;tur eng 2
Qatar–United Kingdom 2009 eng;ara 1
Qatar–Venezuela 2006 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Qatar–Vietnam 2009 eng;ara;vts eng 3
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Romania–Russia 1993 eng;rum;rus eng 3
Romania–San Marino 2007 eng;rum;ita eng 2
Romania–Saudi Arabia 2011 eng;rum;ara eng 3
Romania–Serbia and Montenegro 1996 eng;rum;ser eng 3
Romania–Singapore 2002 eng;rum 1
Romania–Slovak Republic 1994 eng;rum;slo eng 3
Romania–Slovenia 2002 eng;rum;slv eng 3
Romania–South Africa 1993 eng;rum;afr eng 3
Romania–Spain 1979 spa;rum 1
Romania–Sri Lanka 1984 eng;rum;sin eng 3
Romania–Sudan 2007 eng eng 5
Romania–Sweden 1976 eng;rum;swe eng 3
Romania–Switzerland 1993 fre;rum 1
Romania–Thailand 1996 eng;rum;tha eng 4
Romania–Tunisia 1987 fre;rum fre 3
Romania–Turkey 1986 eng;rum;tur eng 3
Romania–Turkmenistan 2008 eng;rum;tkm eng 3
Romania–Ukraine 1996 eng;rum;ukr eng 3
Romania–United Arab Emirates 1993 eng;rum;ara eng 3
Romania–United Arab Emirates 2015 eng;ara;rum eng 3
Romania–United Kingdom 1975 eng;rum 1
Romania–United States 1973 eng;rum 1
Romania–Uruguay 2012 eng;spa;rum eng 3
Romania–Uzbekistan 1996 eng;rum;uzb eng 3
Romania–Vietnam 1995 eng;rum;vts eng 3
Romania–Zambia 1983 eng;rum eng 3
Russia–Saudi Arabia 2007 eng;rus;ara eng 3
Russia–Serbia and Montenegro 1995 eng;rus;ser eng 2
Russia–Singapore 2002 eng;rus 1
Russia–Slovak Republic 1994 rus;slo 1
Russia–Slovenia 1995 eng;rus;slv eng 2
Russia–South Africa 1995 eng;rus 1
Russia–Spain 1998 eng;rus;spa eng 3
Russia–Sri Lanka 1999 eng;rus;sin eng 2
Russia–Sweden 1993 eng;rus;swe eng 3
Russia–Switzerland 1995 eng;rus;ger eng 4
Russia–Syria 2000 eng;rus;ara eng 4
Russia–Tajikistan 1997 rus;tgk rus 3
Russia–Thailand 1999 eng;rus;tha eng 2
Russia–Turkey 1997 eng;rus;tur eng 2
Russia–Turkmenistan 1998 rus;tkm 1
Russia–Ukraine 1995 rus;ukr 1
Russia–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;rus;ara eng 4
Russia–United Kingdom 1994 eng;rus 1
Russia–United States 1992 eng;rus 1
Russia–Uzbekistan 1994 rus;uzb 1
Russia–Venezuela 2003 eng;rus;spa eng 4
Russia–Vietnam 1993 eng;rus;vts eng 2
Rwanda–Singapore 2014 eng eng 5
Rwanda–South Africa 2002 eng eng 5
San Marino–Seychelles 2012 eng eng 5
San Marino–Singapore 2013 eng eng 5
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San Marino–Vietnam 2013 eng;vts;ita eng 3
Saudi Arabia–Singapore 2010 eng;ara 1
Saudi Arabia–South Africa 2007 eng;ara 1
Saudi Arabia–Spain 2007 eng;ara;spa eng 2
Saudi Arabia–Sweden 2015 eng;ara;swe eng 3
Saudi Arabia–Syria 2009 ara ara 5
Saudi Arabia–Tunisia 2010 ara ara 5
Saudi Arabia–Turkey 2007 eng;ara;tur eng 3
Saudi Arabia–Ukraine 2011 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Saudi Arabia–United Kingdom 2007 eng;ara 1
Saudi Arabia–Uzbekistan 2008 eng;ara;uzb eng 3
Saudi Arabia–Venezuela 2015 eng;spa;ara eng 2
Saudi Arabia–Vietnam 2010 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Senegal–Spain 2006 fre;spa 1
Senegal–Taiwan 2000 eng;fre;chi 1
Senegal–Tunisia 1984 fre fre 5
Senegal–United Kingdom 2015 eng;fre 1
Serbia and Montenegro–Slovak Republic 2001 eng;ser;slo eng 3
Serbia and Montenegro–Slovenia 2003 eng;ser;slv eng 3
Serbia and Montenegro–Sri Lanka 1985 eng;scr;sin eng 3
Serbia and Montenegro–Sweden 1980 eng eng 5
Serbia and Montenegro–Switzerland 2005 eng;fre;ser eng 4
Serbia and Montenegro–Turkey 2005 eng;ser;tur eng 3
Serbia and Montenegro–Ukraine 2001 eng;ser;ukr eng 3
Serbia and Montenegro–United Kingdom 1981 eng;scr 1
Serbia and Montenegro–Zimbabwe 1996 eng;ser eng 3
Serbia–Spain 2009 eng;ser;spa eng 3
Serbia–Tunisia 2012 fre;ser;ara 1
Serbia–United Arab Emirates 2013 eng;ser;ara eng 3
Serbia–Vietnam 2013 eng;ser;vts eng 3
Seychelles–Singapore 2014 eng eng 5
Seychelles–South Africa 1998 eng eng 5
Seychelles–Sri Lanka 2011 eng;sin eng 3
Seychelles–Swaziland 2012 eng eng 5
Seychelles–Thailand 2001 eng eng 5
Seychelles–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;ara eng 3
Seychelles–Vietnam 2005 eng;vts 1
Seychelles–Zambia 2010 eng eng 5
Seychelles–Zimbabwe 2002 eng eng 5
Sierra Leone–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Singapore–Slovak Republic 2005 eng;slo 1
Singapore–Slovenia 2010 eng;slv 1
Singapore–South Africa 1996 eng eng 5
Singapore–Spain 2011 eng;spa 1
Singapore–Sri Lanka 1979 eng;sin 1
Singapore–Sri Lanka 2014 eng;sin eng 3
Singapore–Sweden 1968 eng eng 5
Singapore–Switzerland 2011 eng;ger 1
Singapore–Taiwan 1981 eng;chi 1
Singapore–Thailand 1975 eng eng 5
Singapore–Thailand 2015 eng;tha eng 3
Singapore–Turkey 1999 eng;tur 1
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Singapore–Ukraine 2007 eng;ukr 1
Singapore–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng;ara eng 2
Singapore–United Kingdom 1997 eng eng 5
Singapore–Uruguay 2015 eng;spa eng 3
Singapore–Uzbekistan 2008 eng;uzb eng 2
Singapore–Vietnam 1994 eng;vts 1
Slovak Republic–Malaysia 2015 eng;slo;may eng 3
Slovak Republic–Slovenia 2003 eng;slo;slv eng 3
Slovak Republic–South Africa 1998 eng;slo 1
Slovak Republic–Spain 1980 spa;cze 1
Slovak Republic–Sri Lanka 1978 eng;cze;sin eng 3
Slovak Republic–Sweden 1979 eng eng 5
Slovak Republic–Switzerland 1997 eng;slo;ger eng 4
Slovak Republic–Syria 2009 eng;slo;ara eng 4
Slovak Republic–Taiwan 2011 eng;slo;chi eng 3
Slovak Republic–Tunisia 1990 fre fre 5
Slovak Republic–Turkey 1997 eng;slo;tur eng 2
Slovak Republic–Turkmenistan 1996 eng;slo;tkm eng 2
Slovak Republic–Ukraine 1996 eng;slo;ukr eng 3
Slovak Republic–United Arab Emirates 2015 eng;ara;slo eng 3
Slovak Republic–United Kingdom 1990 eng;cze 1
Slovak Republic–United States 1993 eng;slo 1
Slovak Republic–Uzbekistan 2003 eng;slo;uzb eng 3
Slovak Republic–Vietnam 2008 eng;slo;vts eng 3
Slovenia–Spain 2001 eng;slv;spa eng 2
Slovenia–Sweden 1980 eng eng 5
Slovenia–Switzerland 1996 eng;slv;ger eng 4
Slovenia–Thailand 2003 eng;slv;tha eng 2
Slovenia–Turkey 2001 eng;slv;tur eng 2
Slovenia–Ukraine 2003 eng;slv;ukr eng 3
Slovenia–United Arab Emirates 2013 eng;slv;ara eng 2
Slovenia–United Kingdom 2007 eng;slv 1
Slovenia–United States 1999 eng;slv 1
Slovenia–Uzbekistan 2013 eng;slv;uzb eng 3
South Africa–Spain 2006 eng;spa eng 3
South Africa–Sudan 2007 eng eng 5
South Africa–Swaziland 2004 eng eng 5
South Africa–Sweden 1961 eng;afr;swe 1
South Africa–Sweden 1995 eng eng 5
South Africa–Switzerland 2007 eng;fre 1
South Africa–Taiwan 1994 eng;chi 1
South Africa–Tanzania 2005 eng eng 5
South Africa–Thailand 1996 eng;tha eng 6
South Africa–Tunisia 1999 eng;ara 1
South Africa–Turkey 2005 eng;tur 1
South Africa–Uganda 1997 eng eng 5
South Africa–Ukraine 2003 eng;ukr 1
South Africa–United Arab Emirates 2015 eng;ara 1
South Africa–United Kingdom 1978 eng;afr 1
South Africa–United Kingdom 2002 eng eng 5
South Africa–United States 1997 eng eng 5
South Africa–Zimbabwe 1965 eng;afr 1
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South Africa–Zimbabwe 2015 eng eng 5
Spain–Sweden 1963 spa;swe 1
Spain–Sweden 1976 eng;spa;swe eng 6
Spain–Switzerland 1966 fre;spa 1
Spain–Tajikistan 1985 spa;rus 1
Spain–Thailand 1997 eng;spa;tha eng 6
Spain–Trinidad and Tobago 2009 eng;spa 1
Spain–Tunisia 1982 fre fre 5
Spain–Turkey 2002 eng;spa;tur eng 2
Spain–Turkmenistan 1985 spa;rus 1
Spain–Ukraine 1985 spa;rus 1
Spain–United Arab Emirates 2006 eng;spa;ara eng 3
Spain–United Kingdom 1975 eng;spa 1
Spain–United Kingdom 2013 eng;spa 1
Spain–United States 1990 eng;spa 1
Spain–Uruguay 2009 spa spa 5
Spain–Uzbekistan 2013 eng;spa;uzb 1
Spain–Venezuela 2003 spa spa 5
Spain–Vietnam 2005 eng;spa;vts eng 3
Sri Lanka–Sweden 1983 eng;sin;swe eng 3
Sri Lanka–Switzerland 1983 eng;sin;ger eng 4
Sri Lanka–Thailand 1988 eng;sin;tha eng 3
Sri Lanka–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;sin;ara eng 3
Sri Lanka–United Kingdom 1979 eng;sin 1
Sri Lanka–United States 1985 eng;sin 1
Sri Lanka–Vietnam 2005 eng;sin;vts eng 3
St. Kitts and Nevis–San Marino 2010 eng;ita eng 2
St. Kitts and Nevis–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
St. Lucia–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Sudan–Turkey 2001 eng eng 5
Sudan–United Kingdom 1975 eng eng 5
Swaziland–Taiwan 1998 eng;chi eng 3
Swaziland–United Kingdom 1968 eng eng 5
Sweden–Switzerland 1965 swe;ger 1
Sweden–Switzerland 1979 swe;ger 1
Sweden–Taiwan 2001 eng eng 5
Sweden–Tanzania 1976 eng eng 5
Sweden–Thailand 1988 eng eng 5
Sweden–Trinidad and Tobago 1984 eng eng 5
Sweden–Tunisia 1981 fre fre 5
Sweden–Turkey 1988 eng eng 5
Sweden–Turkmenistan 1981 rus;swe 1
Sweden–Ukraine 1995 eng;swe;ukr eng 2
Sweden–United Kingdom 1980 eng;swe 1
Sweden–United Kingdom 1983 eng;swe 1
Sweden–United Kingdom 2015 eng eng 5
Sweden–United States 1994 eng eng 5
Sweden–Venezuela 1993 spa spa 5
Sweden–Vietnam 1994 eng;swe;vts eng 2
Sweden–Zambia 1974 eng eng 5
Sweden–Zimbabwe 1989 eng eng 5
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Switzerland–Taiwan 2007 eng eng 5
Switzerland–Tajikistan 2010 eng;ger;tgk;rus eng 4
Switzerland–Thailand 1996 eng;ger;tha eng 4
Switzerland–Trinidad and Tobago 1973 eng;fre 1
Switzerland–Tunisia 1994 fre;ara 1
Switzerland–Turkey 2010 eng;fre;tur eng 2
Switzerland–Turkmenistan 2012 eng;ger;rus;tkm eng 3
Switzerland–Ukraine 2000 eng;ger;ukr eng 3
Switzerland–United Arab Emirates 2011 eng;fre;ara eng 4
Switzerland–United Kingdom 1977 eng;fre 1
Switzerland–United Kingdom 1993 eng;fre 1
Switzerland–United States 1996 eng;ger 1
Switzerland–Uruguay 2010 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Switzerland–Uzbekistan 2002 eng;ger;uzb eng 4
Switzerland–Venezuela 1996 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Switzerland–Vietnam 1996 eng;ger;vts eng 4
Switzerland–Zambia 1961 eng;fre 1
Syria–Tunisia 1998 ara ara 5
Syria–Turkey 2004 eng;ara;tur eng 4
Syria–Ukraine 2003 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Syria–United Arab Emirates 2000 ara ara 5
Taiwan–Thailand 1999 eng;chi;tha eng 2
Taiwan–United Kingdom 2002 eng;chi eng 3
Taiwan–Vietnam 1998 eng eng 5
Tajikistan–Thailand 2013 eng;rus;tgk;tha eng 2
Tajikistan–Turkey 1996 eng eng 5
Tajikistan–Turkmenistan 2007 rus;tgk;tgk rus 2
Tajikistan–Ukraine 2002 rus;ukr;tgk rus 2
Tajikistan–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng eng 5
Tajikistan–United Kingdom 2014 eng;tgk eng 2
Tajikistan–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Tanzania–Zambia 1968 eng eng 5
Thailand–Turkey 2002 eng;tha;tur eng 4
Thailand–Ukraine 2004 eng;tha;ukr eng 3
Thailand–United Arab Emirates 2000 eng;ara;tha eng 3
Thailand–United Kingdom 1981 eng;tha 1
Thailand–United States 1996 eng eng 5
Thailand–Uzbekistan 1999 eng;tha;uzb eng 3
Thailand–Vietnam 1992 eng;tha;vts eng 6
Togo–Tunisia 1987 fre fre 5
Trinidad and Tobago–United Kingdom 1982 eng eng 5
Trinidad and Tobago–United States 1970 eng eng 5
Trinidad and Tobago–Venezuela 1996 eng;spa 1
Tunisia–Turkey 1986 eng;fre 1
Tunisia–United Arab Emirates 1996 ara ara 5
Tunisia–United Kingdom 1982 eng;fre;ara 1
Tunisia–United States 1985 eng;fre 1
Tunisia–Vietnam 2010 eng;ara;vts eng 3
Tunisia–Yemen 1998 ara ara 5
Turkey–Turkmenistan 1995 eng;tur;tkm eng 2
Turkey–Ukraine 1996 eng;tur;ukr eng 2
Turkey–United Arab Emirates 1993 eng;tur;ara eng 2
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Turkey–United Kingdom 1986 eng;tur 1
Turkey–United States 1996 eng;tur 1
Turkey–Uzbekistan 1996 eng;tur;uzb eng 2
Turkey–Vietnam 2014 eng;tur;vts eng 2
Turkey–Yemen 2005 eng eng 5
Turkmenistan–Ukraine 1998 rus;ukr;tkm rus 2
Turkmenistan–United Arab Emirates 1998 eng;rus eng 3
Turkmenistan–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Turkmenistan–United Kingdom 2016 eng;tkm 1
Uganda–United Kingdom 1992 eng eng 5
Uganda–Zambia 1968 eng eng 5
Ukraine–United Arab Emirates 2003 eng;ara;ukr eng 3
Ukraine–United Kingdom 1993 eng;ukr 1
Ukraine–United States 1994 eng;ukr 1
Ukraine–Uzbekistan 1994 rus;ukr;uzb rus 2
Ukraine–Vietnam 1996 eng;ukr;vts eng 3
United Arab Emirates–United Kingdom 2016 eng;ara eng 2
United Arab Emirates–Uzbekistan 2007 eng;ara;uzb eng 3
United Arab Emirates–Venezuela 2010 eng;spa;ara eng 2
United Arab Emirates–Vietnam 2009 eng eng 5
United Arab Emirates–Yemen 2001 ara ara 5
United Kingdom–United States 1978 eng eng 5
United Kingdom–United States 2001 eng eng 5
United Kingdom–Uruguay 2016 eng;spa 1
United Kingdom–Uzbekistan 1993 eng;rus eng 3
United Kingdom–Venezuela 1996 eng;spa 1
United Kingdom–Vietnam 1994 eng;vts 1
United Kingdom–Zambia 1972 eng eng 5
United Kingdom–Zambia 2014 eng eng 5
United Kingdom–Zimbabwe 1982 eng eng 5
United States–Uzbekistan 1973 eng;rus 1
United States–Venezuela 1999 eng;spa 1
United States–Vietnam 2015 eng;vts 1
Uruguay–Vietnam 2013 eng;spa;vts eng 3
Uzbekistan–Vietnam 1996 eng;uzb;vts eng 3
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Algeria–France 1982 fre;ara 1
Anguilla–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Antigua and Barbuda–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Argentina–Austria 1979 spa;ger 1
Argentina–Chile 1976 spa spa 5
Argentina–Spain 1992 spa spa 5
Argentina–Sweden 1962 spa;swe 1
Argentina–Switzerland 1997 eng;fre;spa eng 4
Armenia–Austria 1981 ger;rus 1
Armenia–Belgium 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Armenia–Canada 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Armenia–Cyprus 1982 eng;rus 1
Armenia–Finland 1987 rus;fin 1
Armenia–France 1985 fre;rus 1
Armenia–India 1988 eng;rus;hin eng 2
Armenia–Italy 1985 ita;rus 1
Armenia–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Armenia–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Armenia–Spain 1985 spa;rus 1
Armenia–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Armenia–Switzerland 1986 ger;rus 1
Armenia–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Australia–Finland 1984 eng;fin 1
Australia–France 1976 eng;fre 1
Australia–Japan 1969 eng;jap 1
Australia–New Zealand 1960 eng eng 5
Australia–New Zealand 1972 eng eng 5
Australia–New Zealand 1995 eng eng 5
Australia–Norway 1982 eng eng 5
Australia–United Kingdom 1967 eng eng 5
Austria–Azerbaijan 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Belarus 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Bulgaria 1983 ger;bul 1
Austria–Czech Republic 1978 ger;cze 1
Austria–Denmark 1961 ger;dan 1
Austria–Finland 1963 ger;fin 1
Austria–Georgia 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Germany 2008 ger ger 5
Austria–Greece 1970 eng;ger;gre eng 6
Austria–India 1963 eng eng 5
Austria–Kazakhstan 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Kyrgyzstan 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Moldova 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Norway 1960 ger;nor 1
Austria–Pakistan 1970 eng eng 5
Austria–Poland 1974 ger;pol 1
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Austria–Portugal 1970 ger;por 1
Austria–Romania 1976 ger;rum 1
Austria–Russia 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Tajikistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Turkey 1970 ger;tur 1
Austria–Ukraine 1981 ger;rus 1
Austria–Uzbekistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Azerbaijan–Belgium 1987 fre;rus;dut 1
Azerbaijan–Canada 1985 eng;rus;fre 1
Azerbaijan–Denmark 1986 rus;dan 1
Azerbaijan–Finland 1987 rus;fin 1
Azerbaijan–France 1985 rus;fre 1
Azerbaijan–Germany 1981 rus;ger 1
Azerbaijan–Italy 1985 rus;ita 1
Azerbaijan–Japan 1986 eng;rus;jap eng 3
Azerbaijan–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Azerbaijan–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Azerbaijan–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Azerbaijan–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Azerbaijan–Switzerland 1986 ger;rus 1
Azerbaijan–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Barbados–United Kingdom 1970 eng eng 5
Belarus–Belgium 1987 eng;rus;dut 1
Belarus–Cyprus 1982 eng;rus 1
Belarus–Finland 1987 rus;fin 1
Belarus–Germany 1981 rus;ger 1
Belarus–India 1988 eng;rus;hin eng 3
Belarus–Italy 1985 rus;ita 1
Belarus–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Belarus–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Belarus–Switzerland 1986 rus;ger 1
Belgium–Canada 1975 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–China (People’s Rep.) 1985 fre;dut;chi 1
Belgium–Croatia 1980 eng eng 5
Belgium–Czech Republic 1975 fre fre 5
Belgium–Georgia 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Greece 1968 fre;dut;gre fre 2
Belgium–India 1974 eng;fre;dut;hin 1
Belgium–Indonesia 1973 eng eng 5
Belgium–Italy 1970 fre;dut;ita 1
Belgium–Kazakhstan 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Morocco 1972 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Netherlands 1970 fre;dut 1
Belgium–Norway 1967 fre;dut;nor 1
Belgium–Poland 1976 fre;dut;pol 1
Belgium–Romania 1976 fre;dut;rum fre 2
Belgium–Russia 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–Singapore 1972 eng eng 5
Belgium–Slovak Republic 1975 fre fre 5
Belgium–Slovenia 1980 eng eng 5
Belgium–Spain 1970 fre;dut;spa 1
Belgium–Sweden 1965 fre;dut;swe 1
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Belgium–Tunisia 1975 fre;dut;ara fre 2
Belgium–Ukraine 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belgium–United Kingdom 1967 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–United States 1970 eng;fre;dut 1
Belgium–Uzbekistan 1987 fre;dut;rus 1
Belize–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Bolivia–Colombia 1971 spa spa 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina–Czech Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Botswana–South Africa 1977 eng;afr 1
Botswana–United Kingdom 1977 eng eng 5
Brazil–Finland 1972 eng;por;fin eng 3
Brazil–Germany 1975 eng;por;ger eng 4
Brazil–Portugal 1971 por por 5
British Virgin Islands–Japan 1970 eng;jap 1
British Virgin Islands–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Bulgaria–Cyprus 1985 eng;bul;gre eng 3
Bulgaria–Denmark 1977 eng eng 5
Bulgaria–Germany 1987 ger;bul 1
Bulgaria–Switzerland 1991 fre;bul 1
Canada–Czech Republic 1990 eng;fre;cze 1
Canada–Finland 1990 eng;fre;fin 1
Canada–Georgia 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Germany 1981 eng;fre;ger 1
Canada–India 1985 eng;fre;hin 1
Canada–Ireland 1966 eng;fre;iri 1
Canada–Italy 1977 eng;fre;ita 1
Canada–Japan 1964 eng;jap 1
Canada–Kazakhstan 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Korea (Rep.) 1978 eng;fre;kor 1
Canada–Kyrgyzstan 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Luxembourg 1989 eng;fre 1
Canada–Mexico 1991 eng;fre;spa 1
Canada–Moldova 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Norway 1966 eng;fre;nor 1
Canada–Poland 1987 eng;fre;pol 1
Canada–Romania 1978 eng;fre;rum 1
Canada–Russia 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Slovak Republic 1990 eng;fre;cze 1
Canada–Sweden 1983 eng;fre;swe 1
Canada–Switzerland 1976 eng eng 5
Canada–Tajikistan 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–Trinidad and Tobago 1966 eng;fre 1
Canada–Ukraine 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
Canada–United Kingdom 1966 eng;fre 1
Canada–Uzbekistan 1985 eng;fre;rus 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Croatia 1988 eng;chi;scr eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Czech Republic 1987 eng;chi;cze eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Denmark 1986 eng;chi;dan eng 6
China (People’s Rep.)–Finland 1986 eng;chi;fin eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Hong Kong 1998 chi chi 5
China (People’s Rep.)–Macedonia (FYR) 1988 eng;chi;scr eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Malta 1993 eng;chi 1
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China (People’s Rep.)–Serbia and Montenegro 1988 eng;chi;scr eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–Singapore 1986 eng;chi 1
China (People’s Rep.)–Slovenia 1988 eng;chi;scr eng 3
China (People’s Rep.)–United Kingdom 1984 eng;chi 1
Comoro Islands–France 1970 fre fre 5
Congo (Rep.)–France 1967 fre fre 5
Croatia–Cyprus 1985 eng eng 5
Croatia–Czech Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Croatia–Denmark 1981 eng eng 5
Croatia–France 1974 fre;scr 1
Croatia–Germany 1987 eng;scr;ger eng 4
Croatia–Hungary 1985 eng eng 5
Croatia–Italy 1982 eng eng 5
Croatia–Netherlands 1982 eng;scr;dut eng 4
Croatia–Poland 1985 eng;scr;pol eng 4
Croatia–Romania 1986 eng;scr;rum eng 3
Croatia–Slovak Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Czech Republic 1980 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Denmark 1981 eng eng 5
Cyprus–Georgia 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Germany 1974 eng;gre;ger 1
Cyprus–Kazakhstan 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Moldova 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–Russia 1982 eng;rus 1
Cyprus–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Cyprus–Ukraine 1982 eng;rus 1
Czech Republic–Denmark 1982 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Finland 1975 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–France 1973 fre;cze 1
Czech Republic–India 1986 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Macedonia (FYR) 1981 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Norway 1979 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Poland 1993 eng;cze;pol eng 3
Czech Republic–Serbia and Montenegro 1981 eng eng 5
Czech Republic–Slovak Republic 1992 cze cze 5
Czech Republic–Slovenia 1981 eng eng 5
Denmark–Faroe Islands 1986 dan;fao 1
Denmark–Georgia 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Germany 1962 dan;ger 1
Denmark–Hungary 1978 eng eng 5
Denmark–Ireland 1964 eng eng 5
Denmark–Israel 1966 eng eng 5
Denmark–Italy 1980 eng;dan;ita eng 6
Denmark–Kazakhstan 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Macedonia (FYR) 1981 eng eng 5
Denmark–Malta 1975 eng;dan 1
Denmark–Moldova 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Netherlands Antilles 1960 eng eng 5
Denmark–Pakistan 1961 eng;dan 1
Denmark–Philippines 1966 eng eng 5
Denmark–Poland 1976 eng eng 5
Denmark–Portugal 1972 eng eng 5
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Denmark–Russia 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Serbia and Montenegro 1981 eng eng 5
Denmark–Singapore 1986 eng eng 5
Denmark–Slovenia 1981 eng eng 5
Denmark–Spain 1972 eng;dan;spa eng 6
Denmark–Tajikistan 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Thailand 1965 eng eng 5
Denmark–Ukraine 1986 dan;rus 1
Denmark–Uzbekistan 1986 dan;rus 1
Dominica–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Estonia–Latvia 1993 eng eng 5
Estonia–Lithuania 1993 eng;est;lit eng 2
Falkland Islands–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Falkland Islands–United Kingdom 1984 eng eng 5
Faroe Islands–United Kingdom 1960 eng eng 5
Fiji–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Finland–Georgia 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–India 1983 eng;fin;hin eng 3
Finland–Ireland 1969 eng eng 5
Finland–Israel 1965 eng eng 5
Finland–Kazakhstan 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Kyrgyzstan 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Macedonia (FYR) 1986 eng eng 5
Finland–Malta 1975 eng;fin 1
Finland–Moldova 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Morocco 1973 fre;fin;ara 1
Finland–Netherlands 1970 fin;dut 1
Finland–Poland 1977 eng eng 5
Finland–Romania 1977 eng;fin;rum eng 3
Finland–Russia 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Singapore 1981 eng eng 5
Finland–Slovak Republic 1975 eng eng 5
Finland–Slovenia 1986 eng eng 5
Finland–Tajikistan 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Turkey 1986 eng;fin;tur eng 2
Finland–Turkmenistan 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–Ukraine 1987 fin;rus 1
Finland–United States 1970 eng;fin 1
Finland–Uzbekistan 1987 fin;rus 1
France–Gabon 1966 fre fre 5
France–Georgia 1985 fre;rus 1
France–India 1969 fre;hin 1
France–Israel 1963 fre;heb 1
France–Japan 1964 fre;jap 1
France–Kazakhstan 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Macedonia (FYR) 1974 fre;scr 1
France–Pakistan 1966 eng;fre 1
France–Panama 1995 fre fre 5
France–Russia 1985 fre;rus 1
France–Slovenia 1974 fre;scr 1
France–Spain 1973 fre;spa 1
France–Ukraine 1985 fre;rus 1
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France–United Kingdom 1968 eng;fre 1
France–United States 1967 eng;fre 1
France–Uzbekistan 1985 fre;rus 1
Gambia–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Georgia–Germany 1981 rus;ger 1
Georgia–India 1988 eng;geo;hin eng 2
Georgia–Italy 1985 rus;ita 1
Georgia–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Georgia–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Georgia–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Georgia–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Georgia–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Germany–Hungary 1977 ger;hun 1
Germany–Indonesia 1977 eng;ger;ind eng 4
Germany–Ireland 1962 eng;ger;iri eng 6
Germany–Kazakhstan 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Korea (Rep.) 1976 eng;ger;kor eng 6
Germany–Kuwait 1987 eng;ger;ara eng 2
Germany–Kyrgyzstan 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Macedonia (FYR) 1987 eng;ger;scr eng 4
Germany–Malaysia 1977 eng;ger;may eng 3
Germany–Malta 1974 eng;ger 1
Germany–Mauritius 1978 eng;ger 1
Germany–Mexico 1993 ger;spa 1
Germany–Poland 1972 ger;pol 1
Germany–Romania 1973 ger;rum 1
Germany–Russia 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Singapore 1972 eng;ger 1
Germany–Slovenia 1987 eng;ger;scr eng 4
Germany–Spain 1966 ger;spa 1
Germany–Tajikistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–Turkey 1985 eng;ger;tur eng 4
Germany–Ukraine 1981 ger;rus 1
Germany–United Arab Emirates 1995 eng;ger;ara eng 4
Germany–United Kingdom 1964 eng;ger 1
Germany–Uruguay 1987 ger;spa 1
Germany–Uzbekistan 1981 ger;rus 1
Greece–Italy 1965 eng;gre;ita eng 6
Grenada–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Hungary–India 1986 eng eng 5
Hungary–Macedonia (FYR) 1985 eng eng 5
Hungary–Serbia and Montenegro 1985 eng eng 5
Hungary–Slovenia 1985 eng eng 5
Hungary–United Kingdom 1977 eng;hun 1
Iceland–United States 1975 eng;ice 1
India–Italy 1981 eng;hin;ita eng 6
India–Japan 1960 eng eng 5
India–Kazakhstan 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Malaysia 1976 eng;hin;may eng 3
India–Malaysia 2001 eng;hin;may eng 8
India–Nepal 1987 eng;hin;nep eng 3
India–Norway 1986 eng;hin;nor eng 2
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India–Romania 1987 eng;hin;rum eng 2
India–Russia 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Singapore 1981 eng eng 5
India–Sri Lanka 1982 eng;hin;sin eng 3
India–Sweden 1988 eng eng 5
India–Syria 1984 eng;hin;ara eng 2
India–Tajikistan 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Tanzania 1979 eng eng 5
India–Turkmenistan 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–Ukraine 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
India–United Kingdom 1981 eng;hin eng 2
India–Uzbekistan 1988 eng;hin;rus eng 2
Indonesia–Mauritius 1996 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Netherlands 1973 eng;ind;dut eng 4
Indonesia–Philippines 1981 eng eng 5
Indonesia–Thailand 1981 eng eng 5
Indonesia–United Kingdom 1974 eng eng 5
Ireland–Norway 1969 eng eng 5
Israel–Italy 1968 eng;heb;ita eng 6
Israel–Singapore 1971 eng eng 5
Italy–Kazakhstan 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Kyrgyzstan 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Macedonia (FYR) 1982 eng eng 5
Italy–Moldova 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Russia 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Slovenia 1982 eng eng 5
Italy–Tajikistan 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–Ukraine 1985 ita;rus 1
Italy–United Kingdom 1960 eng;ita 1
Italy–United States 1984 eng;ita 1
Italy–Uzbekistan 1985 ita;rus 1
Japan–Kazakhstan 1986 eng;jap;rus eng 3
Japan–Korea (Rep.) 1970 eng eng 5
Japan–Malaysia 1970 eng eng 5
Japan–Montserrat 1970 eng;jap 1
Japan–Netherlands 1970 eng;jap;dut eng 9
Japan–New Zealand 1963 eng;jap 1
Japan–Norway 1967 eng eng 5
Japan–Seychelles 1970 eng;jap 1
Japan–Singapore 1971 eng eng 5
Japan–Thailand 1963 eng eng 5
Japan–United Kingdom 1969 eng;jap 1
Japan–United States 1971 eng;jap 1
Kazakhstan–Malaysia 1987 eng;rus;may eng 3
Kazakhstan–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Kazakhstan–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Kazakhstan–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Kazakhstan–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Kazakhstan–Switzerland 1986 rus;ger 1
Kazakhstan–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Kazakhstan–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Kenya–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
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Kiribati–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Korea (Rep.)–Thailand 1974 eng;kor;tha eng 2
Korea (Rep.)–United Kingdom 1977 eng;kor 1
Kyrgyzstan–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Kyrgyzstan–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Kyrgyzstan–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Kyrgyzstan–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Kyrgyzstan–Switzerland 1986 ger;rus 1
Kyrgyzstan–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Kyrgyzstan–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Liberia–Sweden 1969 eng eng 5
Libya–Malta 1972 eng;ara 1
Luxembourg–Mongolia 1998 fre;mon 1
Luxembourg–Sweden 1983 fre fre 5
Luxembourg–United States 1962 eng;fre 1
Macedonia (FYR)–Netherlands 1982 eng;scr;dut eng 4
Macedonia (FYR)–Poland 1985 eng;scr;pol eng 4
Macedonia (FYR)–Romania 1986 eng;scr;rum eng 3
Macedonia (FYR)–Slovak Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Macedonia (FYR)–Sweden 1980 eng eng 5
Macedonia (FYR)–United Kingdom 1981 eng;scr 1
Malawi–Netherlands 1969 eng;dut 1
Malawi–Norway 1961 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Singapore 1968 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Sri Lanka 1972 eng;may;sin eng 3
Malaysia–Sweden 1970 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Tajikistan 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malaysia–Turkmenistan 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malaysia–United Kingdom 1973 eng eng 5
Malaysia–Uzbekistan 1987 eng;may;rus eng 3
Malta–Norway 1975 eng eng 5
Malta–Sweden 1975 eng eng 5
Malta–United Kingdom 1962 eng eng 5
Malta–United States 1980 eng eng 5
Mauritius–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Mauritius–Sweden 1992 eng eng 5
Moldova–Netherlands 1986 eng;rus;dut 1
Moldova–Norway 1980 rus;nor 1
Moldova–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Moldova–Switzerland 1986 rus;ger 1
Moldova–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Mongolia–Netherlands 2002 eng;mon;dut eng 4
Montserrat–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Morocco–Romania 1981 fre;ara;rum fre 3
Morocco–Sweden 1961 fre fre 5
Netherlands–Norway 1966 dut;nor 1
Netherlands–Poland 1979 eng;dut;pol eng 4
Netherlands–Romania 1979 fre;dut;pol fre 4
Netherlands–Russia 1986 eng;dut;rus 1
Netherlands–Slovenia 1982 eng;dut;scr eng 4
Netherlands–South Africa 1971 eng;dut;afr 1
Netherlands–Sweden 1968 dut;swe 1
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Netherlands–Turkmenistan 1986 eng;dut;rus 1
Netherlands–Ukraine 1986 eng;dut;rus 1
Netherlands–United Kingdom 1967 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–United Kingdom 1980 eng;dut 1
Netherlands–Uzbekistan 1986 eng;dut;rus 1
New Zealand–Singapore 1973 eng eng 5
New Zealand–United Kingdom 1966 eng eng 5
Norway–Poland 1977 eng eng 5
Norway–Portugal 1970 eng eng 5
Norway–Russia 1980 nor;rus 1
Norway–Singapore 1966 eng eng 5
Norway–Singapore 1984 eng eng 5
Norway–Slovenia 1983 eng eng 5
Norway–Spain 1963 eng;spa 1
Norway–Sri Lanka 1964 eng eng 5
Norway–Tajikistan 1980 nor;rus 1
Norway–Thailand 1964 eng eng 5
Norway–Turkey 1971 eng eng 5
Norway–Ukraine 1980 nor;rus 1
Norway–United Kingdom 1969 eng;nor 1
Norway–United Kingdom 1985 eng;nor 1
Norway–United Kingdom 2000 eng;nor 1
Norway–Uzbekistan 1980 nor;rus 1
Pakistan–Romania 1978 eng;rum 1
Pakistan–United Kingdom 1961 eng eng 5
Peru–Sweden 1966 spa;swe 1
Philippines–Sweden 1966 eng eng 5
Philippines–Sweden 1987 eng eng 5
Poland–Serbia and Montenegro 1985 eng;pol;scr eng 4
Poland–Slovenia 1985 eng;pol;scr eng 4
Poland–Sweden 1975 eng eng 5
Poland–United Kingdom 1976 eng;pol 1
Portugal–Spain 1968 por;spa 1
Romania–Serbia and Montenegro 1986 eng;rum;scr eng 3
Romania–Slovenia 1986 eng;rum;scr eng 3
Russia–Spain 1985 rus;spa 1
Russia–Sweden 1981 rus;swe 1
Russia–Switzerland 1986 rus;ger 1
Russia–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Russia–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
Serbia and Montenegro–Slovak Republic 1981 eng eng 5
Seychelles–South Africa 1960 eng;afr 1
Seychelles–Switzerland 1963 eng;fre 1
Singapore–Switzerland 1975 eng;ger 1
Singapore–United Kingdom 1966 eng eng 5
Slovak Republic–Slovenia 1981 eng eng 5
Slovenia–Sri Lanka 1985 eng;scr;sin eng 3
Slovenia–United Kingdom 1981 eng;scr 1
South Africa–Swaziland 1972 eng;afr 1
South Africa–Switzerland 1967 eng;ger;afr 1
South Africa–Trinidad and Tobago 1960 eng;afr 1
South Africa–United Kingdom 1968 eng;afr 1
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Spain–Uzbekistan 1985 spa;rus 1
St. Kitts and Nevis–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
St. Lucia–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
St. Vincent and the Grenadines–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Swaziland–Sweden 1972 eng;swe 1
Sweden–Tajikistan 1981 rus;swe 1
Sweden–Thailand 1961 eng eng 5
Sweden–Tuvalu 1972 eng;swe 1
Sweden–Ukraine 1981 rus;swe 1
Sweden–United Kingdom 1960 eng;swe 1
Sweden–United States 1983 eng;swe 1
Sweden–Uzbekistan 1981 rus;swe 1
Switzerland–Tajikistan 1986 ger;rus 1
Switzerland–Tanzania 1963 eng;fre 1
Switzerland–Turkmenistan 1986 ger;rus 1
Switzerland–Ukraine 1986 ger;rus 1
Switzerland–Uzbekistan 1986 ger;rus 1
Switzerland–Yemen 1963 eng;fre 1
Switzerland–Zimbabwe 1961 eng;fre 1
Tajikistan–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Ukraine–United Kingdom 1985 eng;rus 1
Ukraine–United States 1973 eng;rus 1
United Kingdom–United States 1975 eng eng 5
United Kingdom–Uzbekistan 1985 eng;rus 1
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The purpose of this study is twofold:
1. To increase awareness about the pitfalls of the current orthodoxy and, in con-
sequence, to help reduce misapplication of plurilingual tax treaties through
its abandonment.
2. To submit a feasible alternative (sole reliance on prevailing texts) that re-
duces the global resource costs of tax treaty interpretation and increases
its overall consistency via elimination of unintended deviations caused by
language idiosyncrasies.
To support this goal, this study seeks to provide conclusive arguments and useful
data to policy makers, treaty negotiators, judges, and other scholars.
The current orthodoxy concerning the interpretation of plurilingual tax treaties
comprises the following views:
• Courts may rely on a single text for cases of ‘routine interpretation’, that is,
when the text interpreted is ‘clear’ and no divergence has ‘arisen’.
• When there is a divergence, courts may rely on the ‘original text’ by virtue
of it being the text of initial negotiation and drafting.
• When there is a divergence and one text is designated as prevailing, courts
may rely on the latter only after it has been established that the divergence
is ‘material’.
These views are commonly accompanied by a conglomerate of theories prescrib-
ing excessive use of supplementary means or comparing only the texts in the two
languages of the contracting states while ignoring an existing prevailing text in a
third language until the others cannot be reconciled.
This study shows that these views are erroneous and in violation of the principles
codified in the VCLT. Conversely, it shows that when no text is designated as pre-
vailing, a valid combination of the VCLT principles requires courts to compare
all authentic texts; however, given certain conditions, courts may rely solely on
a text designated as prevailing whether or not the existence of a divergence has
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been established. Hence, the otherwise obligatory comparison may be avoided by
designating one text as prevailing.
In line with its twofold purpose to refute the erroneous prevailing view and replace
it with a feasible alternative that is in line with the VCLT principles, the research
questions pursued by this study are both of a theoretical and practical nature:
1. Are judges legally required to compare all authentic language texts in the
absence of a prevailing one?
2. If so, how is the comparison performed correctly?
3. To what extent can we eliminate the need for such comparison with the help
of prevailing texts without risking treaty misapplication?
4. To what extent can we rely solely on prevailing texts in actual practice?
5. What can/should be done to further extend practical applicability of sole
reliance on prevailing texts?
In contrast to other scholars that have dealt with the topic, I employ axiomatic-
deductive reasoning based on logic, in line with Articles 31–33 VCLT codifying
‘principles of logic and good sense’. The fundamental axiom on which I build my
theory is the principle of unity of the treaty. In addition, I use the methodology of
interpretation provided by the VCLT to help derive the premisses and deduct the
conclusions put forward. In the same vein, the arguments put forward by the most
adamant supporters of the current orthodoxy are evaluated in respect of their valid-
ity and soundness against the background of the VCLT principles. This evaluation
is gauged by considering insights derived from the discipline of general hermen-
eutics. Finally, I conduct an empirical analysis of the global tax treaty network to
quantify the applicability of my theoretical findings and formulate policy recom-
mendations concerning how to best eliminate additional interpretational complex-
ity induced by plurilingual form, together with its economic cost.
The study is divided into four parts:
• The introductory part comprises chapters one and two, which introduce and
scope the project, explain the meaning of key terminology, and outline the
methodology applied.
• The theoretical part comprises chapters three to seven. Chapters three
and four deal with interpretation in case of all equally authoritative texts,
whereas chapters five and six are concerned with the case of one text being
designated as prevailing. Chapter seven reverses the perspective from
international to domestic law.
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• The empirical part comprises chapters eight and nine, which share a com-
mon framework but have different functions: chapter eight is concerned
with practical applicability of sole reliance on prevailing texts for actual tax
treaties, whereas chapter nine investigates use of English as lingua franca
throughout the global tax treaty network.
• The concluding part comprises chapters ten and eleven. The first provides
overall conclusions and policy recommendations, while the latter deals ex-
clusively with the OECD BEPS multilateral instrument.
The results of this study are as follows:
• Articles 31–33 in combination with Articles 26–27 VCLT put courts under
an obligation to compare all texts of a plurilingual tax treaty in the absence
of a prevailing text. This obligation is independent of domestic procedural
law. The currently prevailing view maintaining the opposite rests on an er-
roneous interpretation of Articles 31–33.
• Articles 31–33 do not sanction giving preference to the original text merely
in virtue of it being the text of negotiation and drafting.
• To avoid misinterpretation of plurilingual treaties without prevailing text,
recourse should be had first to Article 33(4) after Article 31 fails to reconcile
the texts in away that can be confirmed by a consideration of supplementary
means. If the object and purpose as sole decider fails to resolve a divergence
between the texts, recourse to supplementary means may be had to help
establish a commonmeaning; however, suchmust be based on the principles
enshrined in Articles 31 and 33. In case that is also not possible, the treaty
must be considered defective.
• Confusing treaty concepts with domestic law ones is a mistake easy to
make, as tax treaties will for a variety of reasons often feature terminology
identical to domestic law. Therefore, renvoi clauses increase the necessity
to compare texts.
• Particularly in common law countries, domestic procedural law in combin-
ation with the current orthodoxy curbs proper application of tax treaties
by establishing specific procedural prerequisites for the consideration of all
texts in form of a requirement for the parties to a dispute to plead them.This
may lead to a violation of VCLT principles. Therefore, domestic courts must
in effect approach tax treaty interpretation as if they were an international
court outside the domestic legal tradition but subject to the international
consensus rules codified by the VCLT; domestic measures may be necessary
to counteract domestic procedural law and custom standing in the way of
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enacting one’s treaty obligations.
• The VCLT permits automatic recourse to the prevailing text, and sole reli-
ance on it is justified as long as its interpretation under Article 31 neither
leaves its meaning ambiguous or obscure nor leads to a result that is mani-
festly absurd or unreasonable. The contrary view currently supported by
many scholars rests on an erroneous interpretation of Article 33. Hence, the
problem of additional interpretational complexity induced by plurilingual
form may be resolved by implementing prevailing texts.
• Treaties lacking a prevailing text only amount to a residual quarter of the
global tax treaty network, while almost all final clauses of treaties with a
prevailing text permit sole reliance on it.The residual quarter of plurilingual
treaties without prevailing text are not evenly distributed but concentrated
in the treaty networks of a handful of countries.
• The paradigm of linguistic nationalism has been largely transcended and re-
placed by a new paradigm of English as predominant lingua franca for tax
treaties: two-thirds of today’s global tax treaty network are made up of treat-
ies unilingual in English or with an English prevailing text. Paradoxically,
aside France, mainly themajor English-speaking countries have resisted this
trend.
• Concluding plurilingual treaties without English prevailing text is a political
anachronism that should be overcome to cut its economic cost and increase
consistency of treaty interpretation.The politics involvedmay require amul-
tilateral approach to close the residual gap.The best forum to tackle the prob-
lem would be the OECD because mostly its members have failed to catch up
with the global trend while they are already engaged there in a project to
increase consistency of treaty interpretation in form of the OECD Model
Convention and Commentary.
• The policy implemented by the BEPS MLI to implement equally authoritat-
ive French and English texts as new global standard counteracts the global
preference in favour of English as lingua franca and constitutes a regres-
sion in comparison to what had already been achieved at large in terms
of legal certainty through (English) prevailing texts and unilingual treaties.
It reintroduces considerable additional interpretational complexity and in-
creases the global cost of treaty interpretation; therefore, it should be adjus-
ted. Given political and legal obstacles, the only feasible remedy may be to
implement a new form of final clause that allows countries to choose either
the English or French text of the MLI as prevailing alternative. Several ways
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are available to effectively implement this policy now after conclusion of
the MLI.
Most issues dealt with in this study apply to treaty interpretation in general; how-
ever, the fundamental argument of this study is developed with a particular focus
on tax treaties because of the following three peculiarities that increase the harm-
ful effects of the current orthodoxy in practice:
(1) Disputes concerning the interpretation of tax treaties are usually taxpayer-
state disputes under the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of one contract-
ing state.
(2) The object and purpose of tax treaties may cover multiple results and may
not necessarily be affected by issues of procedure or personal and material
scope.
(3) Tax treaties implement renvoi to domestic law, which must be applied in a
way compatible with the principles enshrined in the VCLT and the reality
of multiple authentic texts.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)‡
De interpretatie van meertalige belastingverdragen:
theorie, praktijk en beleid
Het doel van deze studie is tweeledig:
1. Het vergroten van het bewustzijn dat er in de heersende leer over meert-
alige belastingverdragen valkuilen bestaan, zulks ter vermindering van de
onjuiste toepassing van deze verdragen.
2. Het aanbieden van een haalbaar alternatief (enkele afhankelijkheid van
prevalerende teksten) waardoor de wereldwijde resourcekosten van de
interpretatie van belastingverdragen worden verminderd en de algehele
consistentie van de interpretatie worden vergroot door eliminatie van
de niet-bedoelde afwijkingen, die veroorzaakt worden door taalkundige
bijzonderheden.
Ter ondersteuning van deze doelstelling beoogt deze studie beleidsmakers, verdrag-
sonderhandelaars, rechters en andere geleerden te voorzien van overtuigende ar-
gumenten en bruikbare gegevens.
De heersende opvatting betreffende de interpretatie van meertalige belastingver-
dragen omvat de volgende gezichtspunten:
• Rechters mogen zich verlaten op een enkele tekst als het gaat om
een ‘routineuze interpretatie’, hetgeen zich voordoet wanneer de te
interpreteren tekst ‘duidelijk’ is en er geen afwijkingen zijn.
• Wanneer er een afwijking is, mogen rechters zich verlaten op de ‘oor-
spronkelijke tekst’, aangezien het de tekst is die de grondslag vormde voor
de onderhandelingen en het ontwerpen van het verdrag.
• Wanneer er een afwijking is en een tekst als prevalerend is aangewezen,
mogen rechters zich alleen verlaten op de prevalerende tekst, nadat is vast-
gesteld dat de afwijking ‘wezenlijke betekenis’ heeft.
‡Translation with the kind help of Wim Wijnen.
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Deze opvattingen gaan gewoonlijk vergezeld van een conglomeraat van theorieën,
die een excessief gebruik van aanvullende middelen van interpretatie beschrijven
of slechts de teksten in de twee talen van de verdragslanden vergelijken, waarbij
een bestaande prevalerende tekst in een derde taal pas aan de orde komt, als de tek-
sten van de verdragslanden niet met elkaar in overeenstemming kunnen worden
gebracht.
Deze studie toont aan dat deze opvattingen onjuist zijn en de beginselen schenden,
die zijn gecodificeerd in het Verdrag van Wenen. Omgekeerd, toont het aan dat,
wanneer er geen beslissende tekst is aangewezen, een valide combinatie van de be-
ginselen van het Verdrag van Wenen rechters opdraagt alle authentieke teksten
met elkaar te vergelijken; er zijn evenwel voorwaarden op grond waarvan het
rechters is toegestaan zich te verlaten op een als prevalerend aangewezen tekst
ongeacht of het bestaan van een afwijking is vastgesteld. De anders verplichte
vergelijking kan daardoor worden vermeden door een tekst aan te wijzen, die pre-
valerend is.
Overeenkomstig de tweeledige doelstelling van deze studie – het weerleggen van
de onjuiste heersende leer en de vervanging ervan door een passend alternatief,
dat in overeenstemming is met de beginselen van het Verdrag van Wenen – zijn
de vragen, waarvan in dit onderzoek wordt uitgegaan, zowel van theoretische als
praktische aard:
1. Zijn rechters wettelijk verplicht alle authentieke verdagsteksten te
vergelijken bij ontstentenis van een beslissende tekst?
2. Indien dat het geval is, hoe kan de vergelijking correct worden uitgevoerd?
3. In hoeverre kunnen we met behulp van prevalerende teksten de behoefte
aan zo’n vergelijking uitsluiten zonder het risico te lopen, dat het verdrag
verkeerd wordt toegepast?
4. In hoeverre kunnen we ons in de huidige praktijk enkel verlaten op preval-
erende teksten?
5. Wat kan of zou moeten worden gedaan om bij de toepassing in de praktijk
de afhankelijkheid van prevalerende teksten verder uit te breiden?
Anders dan andere auteurs, die zich met dit onderwerp hebben bezig gehouden,
volg ik een axiomatisch-deductieve redenering op basis van logica, die in lijn is met
de Artikelen 31–33 van het Verdrag van Wenen, waarin ‘de beginselen van logica
en gezond verstand’ zijn gecodificeerd. Het fundamentele axioma waarop ik mijn
theorie heb gebaseerd is het beginsel van de eenheid van het verdrag. Daarnaast
gebruik ik de interpretatiemethodologie van het Verdrag van Wenen om daarmee
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de premissen af te leiden en de conclusies te trekken. Op dezelfde manier wordt
bezien in hoeverre de argumenten, die door de meest verstokte supporters van de
huidige leer naar voren worden gebracht, geldig en deugdelijk zijn in het licht van
de beginselen van het Verdrag van Wenen. Deze evaluatie wordt gemeten aan de
hand van inzichten, die zijn afgeleid van de discipline van algemene hermeneut-
iek. Tenslotte onderwerp ik het wereldwijde netwerk van belastverdragen aan een
empirische analyse om de toepasselijkheid van mijn theoretische bevindingen te
kwantificeren en de beleidsmatige aanbevelingen te formuleren met betrekking
tot de vraag, hoe de bijkomende interpretatieve complexiteit veroorzaakt door de
meertalige vorm van de verdragen kan worden geëlimineerd en de daarmee samen-
hangende kosten kunnen worden vermeden.
De studie is verdeeld in vier delen:
• Het inleidende gedeelte omvat de hoofdstukken een en twee, waarin het
project wordt geïntroduceerd en afgebakend, de betekenis van de belangrijk-
ste terminologie wordt uitgelegd en de toegepaste methodologie wordt ges-
chetst.
• Het theoretische gedeelte omvat de hoofdstukken drie tot zeven. Hoofd-
stukken drie en vier behandelen interpretatie in situaties, waarin alle tek-
sten gelijkelijk gezaghebbend zijn, terwijl hoofdstukken vijf en zes dat doen
in situaties waarin een tekst als prevalerend is aangewezen. In hoofdstuk
zeven wordt het perspectief omgekeerd van internationaal naar nationaal
recht.
• Het empirische gedeelte omvat de hoofdstukken acht en negen. Deze
delen een gemeenschappelijk kader, maar hebben verschillende functies:
hoofdstuk acht gaat over de praktische toepasbaarheid van de enkele
afhankelijkheid van prevalerende teksten voor de bestaande belastingver-
dragen, terwijl hoofdstuk negen de implementatie onderzoekt van Engels
als lingua franca in het wereldwijde netwerk van belastingverdragen.
• Het afsluitende gedeelte omvat hoofdstukken tien en elf. Hoofdstuk tien
geeft algemene conclusies en beleidsmatige aanbevelingen, terwijl hoofd-
stuk elf uitsluitend het BEPS multilaterale instrument behandelt.
De resultaten van deze studie komen op het volgende neer:
• Artikelen 31–33 in samenhang met Artikelen 26–27 van het Verdrag van
Wenen leggen rechters de verplichting op alle teksten van meertalige belast-
ingverdragen te vergelijken bij ontstentenis van een beslissende tekst. Deze
verplichting staat los van het nationale procesrecht. De heersende leer, die
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de tegenovergestelde opvatting is toegedaan, berust op een verkeerde inter-
pretatie van de Artikelen 31–33.
• Artikelen 31–33 geven geen aanleiding de oorspronkelijke tekst te laten pre-
valeren uitsluitend vanwege het feit dat het de tekst is, waarin het verdrag
is onderhandeld en ontworpen.
• Om misinterpretatie van meertalige verdragen zonder een prevalerende
tekst te voorkomen dient eerst gekeken te worden naar Artikel 33(4), indien
blijkt dat Artikel 31 niet in staat is de teksten met elkaar te verzoenen op
een manier, die door aanvullende middelen in overweging te nemen kan
worden bevestigd. Indien doel en strekking als enige criterium er niet in
slaagt een afwijking tussen de teksten op te lossen, kan een beroep worden
gedaan op aanvullende middelen om een gemeenschappelijke betekenis te
helpen vaststellen; dit dient evenwel te zijn gebaseerd op de beginselen,
die zijn verankerd in de Artikelen 31 en 33. Indien dat ook niet mogelijk is,
dient het verdrag als gebrekkig te worden aangemerkt.
• Het is gemakkelijk om verdrags- met nationale concepten te verwarren,
aangezien belastingverdragen vaak om uiteenlopende redenen dezelfde ter-
minologie hanteren als het nationale recht. Renvoi bepalingen vergroten
daarom de noodzaak om teksten te vergelijken.
• Vooral in common law-landen beperkt het nationale procesrecht in com-
binatie met de heersende leer de juiste toepassing van belastingverdragen
door de specifieke procedurele regel, dat de partijen bij een geschil de be-
handeling van alle teksten ten processe dienen te bepleiten. Dit kan leiden
tot een schending van de beginselen van het Verdrag van Wenen. Daarom
dienen nationale rechters interpretatie van belastingverdragen eigenlijk te
benaderen alsof zij een internationaal hof zijn, dat buiten de nationale jur-
idische traditie staat maar onderworpen is aan de internationale consensus
zoals gecodificeerd door het Verdrag van Wenen; Nationale maatregelen
kunnen nodig zijn om nationaal proces- en gewoonterecht opzij te zetten
dat een passende uitvoering van verdragsverlichtingen door de rechter in
de weg staat.
• Het Verdrag van Wenen staat automatisch beroep op de prevalerende tekst
toe, en de enkele afhankelijkheid hiervan is gerechtvaardigd zolang de in-
terpretatie ervan onder Artikel 31 de betekenis noch dubbelzinnig of duister
laat noch tot een resultaat leidt, dat duidelijk ongerijmd of onredelijk is. De
tegenovergestelde opvatting, die op dit moment door veel wetenschappers
wordt gesteund, berust op een onjuiste interpretatie van Artikel 33. Vandaar
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dat het probleem, dat interpretatie extra complex wordt bij een meertalige
vorm, kan worden opgelost door het implementeren van prevalerende tek-
sten.
• Het aantal verdragen waarin een prevalerende tekst ontbreekt beloopt niet
meer dan een kwart van het wereldwijde netwerk van belastingverdragen,
terwijl vrijwel alle slotformules van verdragen met een prevalerende tekst
toestaan daarop enkel te vertrouwen. Het resterende kwart van de meerta-
lige verdragen zonder prevalerende tekst zijn niet gelijkmatig verdeeld over
de verdragen, maar geconcentreerd in de verdragsnetwerken van een hand-
vol landen.
• Het paradigma van taalkundig nationalisme is grotendeels overtroffen
en vervangen door een nieuw paradigma dat engels aanmerkt als de
overheersende lingua franca voor belastingverdragen: twee-derde van het
huidige werelwijde netwerk van belastingverdragen bestaat uit verdragen
die eentalig in het engels zijn gesloten dan wel met een engelse preval-
erende tekst. Paradoxaal genoeg hebben, naast Frankrijk, vooral de grote
engelstalige landen zich tegen deze trend verzet.
• Het sluiten van meertalige verdagen zonder een engelse prevalerende tekst
is een beleidsmatig anachronisme dat overwonnen moet worden om de eco-
nomische kosten van verdragsinterpretatie te drukken en de consistentie
ervan te vergroten. Om de resterende kloof te dichten kan dit beleidsmatig
een multilaterale aanpak vereisen. Het beste forum om dit probleem aan te
pakken is de OECD, aangezien het meestal de OECD leden zijn, die er niet
in zijn geslaagd gelijke tred te houden met de mondiale ontwikkelingen, al-
hoewel zij met het OECDModel verdrag en het Commentaar al bezig waren
met een project om de consistentie van de verdragsinterpretatie te vergro-
ten.
• Het door BEPS MLI geïmplementeerde beleid gelijkwaardig gezaghebbende
franse en engelse teksten als nieuwe mondiale standaard in te voeren staat
haaks op de wereldwijde voorkeur voor engels als de lingua franca en is
een stap terug in vergelijking tot wat reeds op grote schaal is bereikt op het
gebied van de rechtszekerheid door engelstalige prevalerende teksten en
eentalig engelse verdragen. Het herintroduceert de aanzienlijke additionele
complexiteit van de verdragsinterpretatie en verhoogt wereldwijd de kosten
ervan; daarom moet dit worden gecorrigeerd. Gezien de beleidsmatige en
juridische obstakels kan de enige uitvoerbare remedie zijn een nieuwe slot-
formule te implementeren, die landen toestaat te kiezen tussen de engelse
491
of franse tekst van de MLI als prevalerend alternatief. Er zijn verschillende
manieren om dit beleid nu, na het sluiten van de MLI, effectief te imple-
menteren.
De meeste onderwerpen, die in deze studie worden behandeld, betreffen ver-
dragsinterpretatie in het algemeen; het fundamentele argument van deze studie is
evenwel ontwikkeld met een bijzondere focus op belastingverdragen vanwege de
volgende drie bijzondere aspecten, die de schadelijke effecten van de heersende
leer in de praktijk vergroten:
(1) Geschillen betreffende de interpretatie van belastingverdragen zijn gewoon-
lijk belastingplichtige-overheid geschillen onder de jurisdictie van de na-
tionale rechter van een van de verdragsstaten.
(2) Doel en strekking van belastingverdragen kunnen meerdere resultaten om-
vatten en hoeven niet noodzakelijkerwijs teworden beïnvloed door kwesties
van procedurele aard of van de persoonlijke en materiële reikwijdte.
(3) Belastingverdragen voorzien in renvoi naar nationaal recht, hetgeen moet
worden toegepast op een manier, die verenigbaar is met de beginselen, die
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